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2.2b. Social Externalism (Social Externalism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Antony, Michael V. (1993). Social relations and the individuation of thought. Mind 102 (406):247-61.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1988). Burge's new thought experiment: Back to the drawing room. Journal of Philosophy 85 (February):88-97.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). Social externalism and first-person authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”
Benejam, A. (2003). Thought experiments and semantic competence. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Bridges, Jason (2006). Davidson's transcendental externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):290-315.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson
Brown, Jessica (2000). Against temporal externalism. Analysis 60 (2):178-188.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). Defending Burge's thought experiment. Erkenntnis 55 (3):387-391.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Davidson and forms of anti-individualism: Reply to Hahn. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Descartes, bare concepts, and anti-individualism: Reply to Normore. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1979). Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:73-122.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1986). Intellectual norms and foundations of mind. Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.   (Cited by 68 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Psychology and the environment: Reply to Chomsky. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Replies from Tyler Burge. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Burge, Taylor (2003). Thought experiments: Reply to Donnellan. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). The indexical strategy: Reply to Owens. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Collins, John M. (2006). Temporal externalism, natural kind terms, and scientifically ignorant communities. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):55-68.   (Google | More links)
Loewer, Barry (2009). Why is there anything except physics? Synthese 170 (2):217-233.   (Google)
Abstract: In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor’s question it is immensely implausible
Davis, Andrew (2005). Social externalism and the ontology of competence. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):297-308.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Social externalism implies that many competences are not personal assets separable from social and cultural environments but complex states of affairs involving individuals and persisting features of social reality. The paper explores the consequences for competence identity over time and across contexts, and hence for the predictive role usually accorded to competences
Elugardo, Reinaldo (1993). Burge on content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):367-84.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Forbes, Graeme R. (1987). A dichotomy sustained. Philosophical Studies 51 (March):187-211.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Frapolli, Maria J. & Romero, E. (eds.) (2003). Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Frances, Bryan (1999). On the explanatory deficiencies of linguistic content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining their actions. I argue that the considerations motivating this view are best handled with just the ordinary ‘that’-clause contents.
Millikan, Ruth G. (1999). Historical kinds and the "special sciences". Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.   (Cited by 49 | Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (1991). Mental content and the division of epistemic labour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (September):302-18.   (Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (2003). Social externalism and linguistic communication. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. CSLI.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the expressive theory of communication, the primary function of language is to enable speakers to convey the content of their thoughts to hearers. According to Tyler Burge's social externalism, the content of a person's thought is relative to the way words are used in his or her surrounding linguistic community. This paper argues that Burge's social externalism refutes the expressive theory of communication.
Georgalis, Nicholas (2003). Burge's thought experiment: Still in need of defense. Erkenntnis 58 (2):267-273.   (Google | More links)
Georgalis, N. (1999). Rethinking Burge's thought experiment. Synthese 118 (2):145-64.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Green, Mitchell S. (2000). The status of supposition. Noûs 34 (3):376–399.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
Grimaltos, Tobies (2003). Terms and content. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Hahn, Martin & Ramberg, B. (eds.) (2003). Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hahn, Martin (2003). When swampmen get arthritis: "Externalism" in Burge and Davidson. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Haugeland, John (2004). Social cartesianism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Jackman, Henry (2000). Deference and self-knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
Jackman, Henry (1998). Individualism and interpretation. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):31-38.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: 'Interpretational' accounts of meaning are frequently treated as incompatible with accounts stressing language's 'social' character. However, this paper argues that one can reconcile interpretational and social accounts by distinguishing "methodological" from "ascriptional" individualism. While methodological individualism requires only that the meaning of one's terms ultimately be grounded in facts about oneself, ascriptional individualism requires that the meaning of one's terms be independent of how others use theirs. Interpretational accounts are committed only to methodological individualism, while arguments for languages social character are best understood as attacks on ascriptional individualism. As a result, one can recognize language's social character and still be an interpretationalist
Jackman, Henry (1996). Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There has frequently been taken to be a tension, if not an incompatibility, between "externalist" theories of content (which allow the make-up of one's physical environment and the linguistic usage of one's community to contribute to the contents of one's thoughts and utterances) and the "methodologically individualist" intuition that whatever contributes to the content of one's thoughts and utterances must ultimately be grounded in facts about one's own attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation I argue that one can underwrite such externalist theories within a methodologically individualistic framework by understanding semantic norms in terms of the need to reach, for each of one's terms, a type of "equilibrium." Each speaker's commitment to making her _own_ beliefs and applications consistent allows one to incorporate these 'external' factors into the contents of their thoughts and utterances in a way that remains methodologically individualistic. Methodologically individualistic accounts are typically taken to be unable to incorporate 'external' factors such as the world's physical make-up or communal usage because of arguments suggesting that the individual's own beliefs and usage underdetermine or even misidentify what, according to externalist accounts, they mean by their terms. These arguments, however, only seem plausible if one presupposes a comparatively impoverished conception of the individual's beliefs. The beliefs a speaker associates with a given term extend far beyond the handful of sentences they would produce if asked to list such beliefs. In particular, speakers have an implicit, but rich, understanding of their language, their world, and the relation between them. Speakers typically understand languages as shared temporally extended practices about which they can be, both individually and collectively, mistaken. Once this conception of language is taken into account, the ascriptions which purportedly forced 'non-individualistic' conceptions of content upon us (particularly ascriptions which seemed to tie what we meant to social use rather than our own beliefs) turn out to be ultimately grounded in the individual's own beliefs. Indeed, our self-conception does much more than merely underwrite 'non-individualistic' ascriptions..
Jackman, Henry (2005). Temporal externalism and our ordinary linguistic practices. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):365-380.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately re?ect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
Jackman, Henry (2006). Temporal externalism, constitutive norms, and theories of vagueness. In Tomas Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Our concept of truth is governed by two principles. The
Jackman, Henry (2005). Temporal externalism, deference, and our ordinary linguistic practice. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):365-380.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
Jackman, Henry (1999). We live forwards but understand backwards: Linguistic practices and future behavior. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):157-177.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ascriptions of content are sensitive not only to our physical and social environment, but also to unforeseeable developments in the subsequent usage of our terms. This paper argues that the problems that may seem to come from endorsing such 'temporally sensitive' ascriptions either already follow from accepting the socially and historically sensitive ascriptions Burge and Kripke appeal to, or disappear when the view is developed in detail. If one accepts that one's society's past and current usage contributes to what one's terms mean, there is little reason not to let its future usage to do so as well
Lewis, Harry A. (1985). Content and community. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:177-196.   (Google)
Liu, Jeeloo (2002). Physical externalism and social externalism: Are they really compatible? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:381-404.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Putnam and Burge have been viewed as launching a joint attack on individualism, the view that the content of one's psychological state is determined by what is in the head . Putnam argues that meanings are not in the head while Burge argues that beliefs are not in the head either, and both have come up with convincing arguments against individualism. It is generally conceived that Putnam's view is a version of physical externalism, which argues that factors in the physical environment play a role in determining the meanings of natural kind terms. Burge, on the other hand, is regarded as following up Putnam's argument to bring in factors in the social environment for the determination of belief. Burge's view has been commonly referred to as 'social externalism.' The general consensus in the field is that physical externalism and social externalism are compatible views. Furthermore, both Putnam and Burge seem to endorse each other’s position for the most part. In this paper, however, I shall argue against this general view to show that the two theories are deep down incompatible
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism and memory: A problem? Acta Analytica 10 (14):69-76.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory. Analysis 55 (3):157-59.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (ms). The myth of social content.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Social externalism is the view that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are logically determined at least in part by her linguistic community's standards for the use of her words. If social externalism is correct, its importance can hardly be overemphasized. The traditional Cartesian view of psychological states as essentially first personal and non-relational in character, which has shaped much theorizing about the nature of psychological explanation, would be shown to be deeply flawed
Onof, Christian & Marsh, Leslie (2008). Introduction to the special issue “perspectives on social cognition”. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: No longer is sociality the preserve of the social sciences, or ‘‘culture’’ the preserve of the humanities or anthropology. By the same token, cognition is no longer the sole preserve of the cognitive sciences. Social cognition (SC) or, sociocognition if you like, is thus a kaleidoscope of research projects that has seen exponential growth over the past 30 or so years.
Marqueze, J. (2003). On orthodox and heterodox externalisms. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
McKinsey, Michael (1993). Curing folk psychology of arthritis. Philosophical Studies 70 (3):323-36.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial thought experiment nor a second type of example that Burge describes supports either of these conclusions. Second, I will identify the proper conclusion to draw from Burge's discussion and show that this conclusion does not really pose a serious problem for individualism about the mental. And finally, I will argue that Burge's discussion does not in fact provide a conclusive reason for believing its proper conclusion
Millikan, Ruth G. (2003). In defense of public language. In Louise M. Antony & H. Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Normore, Calvin G. (2003). Burge, Descartes, and us. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Nordby, Halvor (2005). Davidson on social externalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):88-94.   (Google | More links)
Nordby, Halvor (2004). Incorrect understanding and concept possession. Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):55-70.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Tyler Burge has argued that an incorrect understanding of a word can be sufficient for possessing the concept the word literally expresses. His well-known 'arthritis' case involves a patient who understands 'arthritis' incorrectly, but who nevertheless, according to Burge, possesses the concept arthritis. Critics of Burge have objected that there is an alternative concept that best matches the patient's understanding and that this, therefore, is the patient's concept. The paper first argues that Burge's response to this objection is unconvincing. A better response is then developed. It is argued that there is no alternative concept that matches the incorrect understanding, since the patient thinks he has a partial understanding. This, together with points about ordinary psychological explanation and modes of presentations of concepts, establish that it is impossible to undermine Burge's social externalism by appealing to the idea that an alternative concept matches the incorrect understanding
Pagin, Peter (2006). Intersubjective externalism. In T. Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholar Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in T. Marvan (ed) What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholar Press, Newcastle upon Tyne, 39-54, 2006
Pitt, David (ms). The Burgean intuitions.   (Google)
Putnam, Hilary (1987). Meaning, other people, and the world. In Representation and Reality. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sawyer, Sarah (2003). Conceptual errors and social externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):265-273.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Verheggen, Claudine (2006). How social must language be? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2):203-219.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2004). Externalism and incomplete understanding. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):287-294.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2001). Social externalism and conceptual errors. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):217-31.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist can opt for a
Woodfield, Andrew (1998). Social externalism and conceptual diversity. In John M. Preston (ed.), Thought and Language. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Woodfield, Andrew (1982). Thought and the social community. Inquiry 25 (December):435-50.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Yalowitz, Steven (1999). Davidson's social externalism. Philosophia 27 (1-2):99-136.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)