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2.2d. Externalism and Mental Causation (Externalism and Mental Causation on PhilPapers)

See also:
Adams, Frederick R. (1993). Fodor's modal argument. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.   (Google)
Abstract: What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of this causal powers argument. I argue that Fodor's argument (in old or new dress) is a non sequitur. It neither establishes the existence of narrow content nor the need for a content other than broad content to explain intentional behavior
Barrett, J. (1997). Individualism and the cross-contexts test. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):242-60.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Jerry Fodor has defended the claim that psychological theories should appeal to narrow rather than wide intentional properties. One of his arguments relies upon the cross contexts test, a test that purports to determine whether two events have the same causally relevant properties. Critics have charged that this test is too weak, since it counts certain genuinely explanatory relational properties in science as being causally irrelevant. Further, it has been claimed, the test is insensitive to the fact that special scientific laws allow for exceptions which do not undermine those laws. This paper refines the cross contexts test to meet these objections while still allowing it to play its role in Fodor
Braun, David M. (1991). Content, causation, and cognitive science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (December):375-89.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (1989). Individuation and causation in psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 707 (4):303-22.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1995). Intentional properties and causation. In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates About Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1993). Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 76 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1995). Reply: Intentional properties and causation. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Butler, Keith (1996). Content, causal powers, and context. Philosophy of Science 63 (1):105-14.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Christensen, D. (1992). Causal powers and conceptual connections. Analysis 52 (3):163-8.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Dardis, Anthony B. (2002). Individualism and the new logical connections argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):83-102.   (Google)
de Muijnck, Wim (2002). Causation by relational properties. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):123-137.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In discussions on mental causation and externalism, it is often assumed that extrinsic, or relational, properties cannot have causal efficacy. In this paper I argue that this assumption is based on a category mistake, in that causal efficacy (dependence among events or states of affairs) is confused with causal influence (persistence of and interaction among objects). I then argue that relational properties are indeed causally efficacious, which I explain with the help of Dretske's notion of a 'structuring cause'
Figdor, Carrie (2009). Semantic externalism and the mechanics of thought. Minds and Machines 19 (1):1-24.   (Google)
Abstract: I review a widely accepted argument to the conclusion that the contents of our beliefs, desires and other mental states cannot be causally efficacious in a classical computational model of the mind. I reply that this argument rests essentially on an assumption about the nature of neural structure that we have no good scientific reason to accept. I conclude that computationalism is compatible with wide semantic causal efficacy, and suggest how the computational model might be modified to accommodate this possibility
Fodor, Jerry A. (1991). A modal argument for narrow content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 43 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (1994). The supervenience of mental content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Guichard, Lex (1995). The causal efficacy of propositional attitudes. In Cognitive Patterns in Science and Common Sense. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)
Heil, John & Mele, Alfred R. (1991). Mental causes. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (January):61-71.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (1992). Externalism and mental causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:203-19.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (1993). Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content. Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Klein, M. (1996). Externalism, content, and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:159-76.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lalor, Brendan J. (1997). It is what you think: Intentional potency and anti-individualism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):165-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue against the worried view that intentional properties might be epiphenomenal. In naturalizing intentionality we ought to reject both the idea that causal powers of intentional states must supervene on local microstructures, and the idea that local supervenience justifies worries about intentional epiphenomenality since our states could counterfactually lack their intentional properties and yet have the same effects. I contend that what's wrong with even the good guys (e.g. Dennett, Dretske, Allen) is that they implicitly grant that causal powers supervene locally. Finally, I argue that once we see the truth of an anti-individualism which sees cognition as a fundamentally embedded activity, it becomes clear both that granting local supervenience is granting too much, and that intentional properties do work that mere neurological properties could never do. I also suggest how a transcendental argument for intentional potency might go
Lin, Martin (online). Against wide causation.   (Google)
Abstract: It is commonly held that the content of an agents propositional attitudes play a causal role in generating her actions. It is also commonly held that the content of a mental state is at least partially determined by the relations that an agents internal states bear to her history and environment. But can these two claims peacefully coexist? It seems that they cannot, for relations to history and environment cannot be causally relevant. It makes no di?erence whether the coin dropped into the vending machine was pressed at the mint or in the counterfeiters workshop; its intrinsic features alone determine its e?ect on the vending machine. Causal powers are narrow, whereas content appears to be wide
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1993). Causal relevance and thought content. Philosophical Quarterly 43 (176):334-53.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
McGinn, Colin (1991). Conceptual causation. Mind 100:525-46.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Montgomery, Richard (1995). Non-cartesian explanations meet the problem of mental causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):221-41.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Newman, Anthony (2006). The burning barn fallacy in defenses of externalism about mental content. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:37-57.   (Google)
Noordhof, Paul (1999). Causation by content? Mind and Language 14 (3):291-320.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Owens, Joseph (1993). Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):242-61.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1993). Externalist explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:203-30.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
Robb, David & Heil, John (online). Mental Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Worries about mental causation are prominent in contemporary discussions of the mind and human agency. Originally, the problem of mental causation was that of understanding how a mental substance (thought to be immaterial) could interact with a material substance, a body. Most philosophers nowadays repudiate immaterial minds, but the problem of mental causation has not gone away. Instead, focus has shifted to mental properties. How could mental properties be causally relevant to bodily behavior? How could something mental qua mental cause what it does? After looking at the traditional Problem of Interaction, we survey various versions of the property-based problem and look at proposed solutions to them.
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1994). Content and context. Philosophical Perspectives 8:17-32.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Russow, L. M. (1993). Fodor, Adams, and causal properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.   (Google)
Saidel, Eric (1994). Content and causal powers. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):658-65.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Segal, Gabriel & Sober, Elliott (1991). The causal efficacy of content. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):1-30.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Seymour, Daniel (1993). Some of the difference in the world: Crane on intentional causation. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (170):83-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shea, Nicholas (2003). Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism
Sturgeon, Scott (1994). Good reasoning and cognitive architecture. Mind and Language 9 (1):88-101.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
van Gulick, Robert (1989). Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work. In Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation. Kluwer.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2006). Brain and consciousness: Exits from the labyrinth. Social Sciences 37 (2):51-66.   (Google)
Walsh, Denis M. (1999). Alternative individualism. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):628-648.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Warren, Dona (1999). Externalism and causality: Simulation and the prospects for a reconciliation. Mind and Language 14 (1):154-176.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wilson, Robert A. (1993). Against A Priori arguments for individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):60-79.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Wilson, Robert A. (1992). Individualism, causal powers, and explanation. Philosophical Studies 68 (2):103-39.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Yablo, Stephen (1997). Wide causation. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (11):251-281.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)