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2.2e. Externalism and the Theory of Vision (Externalism and the Theory of Vision on PhilPapers)

See also:
Burge, Tyler (1986). Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.   (Cited by 186 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Butler, Keith (1996). Content, computation, and individualism in vision theory. Analysis 56 (3):146-54.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Butler, Keith (1996). Individualism and Marr's computational theory of vision. Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Cain, M. J. (2000). Individualism, twin scenarios and visual content. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):441-463.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I address an important question concerning the nature of visual content: are the contents of human visual states and experiences exhaustively fixed or determined (in the non-causal sense) by our intrinsic physical properties? The individualist answers this question affirmatively. I will argue that such an answer is mistaken. A common anti-individualist or externalist tactic is to attempt to construct a twin scenario involving humanoid duplicates who are embedded in environments that diverge in such a way that it appears to be necessary to attribute divergent contents to their respective visual states. In the first half of the paper I discuss some of the twin scenarios that are prominent in the literature and argue that they fail to undermine individualism. Indeed I argue that due to important facts about our internal workings, a convincing externalist twin scenario involving humanoid protagonists cannot be constructed. However, I argue that such a result does not conclusively establish an individualist thesis and that in order to settle the question at issue it is necessary to construct an independently motivated theory of visual content. I attempt to do this in the second half of the paper by developing a theory at the core of which is the idea that the contents of our visual states and experiences are determined by the causal powers vis-
Davies, Martin (1991). Individualism and perceptual content. Mind 100 (399):461-84.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Egan, Frances (1996). Intentionality and the theory of vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Egan, Frances (1992). Individualism, computation, and perceptual content. Mind 101 (403):443-59.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Francescotti, Robert M. (1991). Externalism and Marr's theory of vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Kitcher, P. S. (1988). Marr's computational theory of vision. Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Kroustallis, Basileios (2006). Content individuation in Marr's theory of vision. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):57-71.   (Google)
Morton, P. (1993). Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Patterson, Sarah (1996). Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Segal, Gabriel (1991). Defence of a reasonable individualism. Mind 100 (399):485-94.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Segal, Gabriel (1989). Seeing what is not there. Philosophical Review 97 (April):189-214.   (Cited by 31 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1997). A clearer vision. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1993). Content, kinds, and individualism in Marr's theory of vision. Philosophical Review 102 (4):489-513.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1997). Junk representations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):345-361.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers and psychologists who approach the issue of representation from a computational or measurement theoretical perspective end up having to deny the possibility of junk representations?representations present in an organism's head but that enter into no psychological processes or produce no behaviour. However, I argue, a more functional perspective makes the possibility of junk representations intuitively quite plausible?so much so that we may wish to question those views of representation that preclude the possibility of junk representations. I explore some of the reasons we should care about the possibility of junk representations and conclude with some speculation about whether junk representations are in fact present in our heads
Silverberg, Arnold (2006). Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision. Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr
Wright, Wayne (online). Individualism, behavior, and Marr's theory of vision.   (Google)