MindPapers: 2.2g. Externalism and Self-Knowledge

Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). Social externalism and first-person authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2). (Google)

Abstract: Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”

Bar-On, Dorit (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression. Noûs 38 (3):430-55. (Google | More links)

Beebee, Helen (2002). Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Beebee, Helen (2001). Transfer of warrant, begging the question and semantic externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-374. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Berg, Jonathan (1998). First-person authority, externalism, and wh-knowledge. Dialectica 52 (1):41-44. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Bernecker, Sven (1996). Davidson on first-person authority and externalism. Inquiry 39 (1):121-39. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Bernecker, Sven (1996). Externalism and the attitudinal component of self-knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)

Bernecker, Sven (2000). Knowing the world by knowing one's mind. Synthese 123 (1):1-34. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Bernecker, Sven (2004). Memory and externalism. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632. (Google | More links)

Bernecker, Sven (1997). On knowing one's own mind. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter. (Google)

Bernecker, Sven (2006). Prospects for epistemic compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Bernecker, Sven (1998). Self-knowledge and closure. In Peter Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Bilgrami, Akeel (2003). A trilemma for redeployment. Philosophical Issues 13:22-30. (Google)

Bilgrami, Akeel (1992). Can externalism be reconciled with self-knowledge? Philosophical Topics 20 (1):233-68. (Cited by 11 | Google)

Bilgrami, Akeel (1991). Thought and its objects. Philosophical Issues 1:215-232. (Google | More links)

Boghossian, Paul A. (1989). Content and self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26. (Cited by 70 | Google | Annotation)

Boghossian, Paul A. (1992). Externalism and inference. Philosophical Issues 2:11-28. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)

Boghossian, Paul A. (1998). Replies to commentators. Philosophical Issues 9. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Boghossian, Paul A. (1994). The transparency of mental content. Philosophical Perspectives 8:33-50. (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)

Boghossian, Paul A. (1997). What the externalist can know A Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97:161-75. (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)

Brewer, Bill (2000). Externalism and A Priori knowledge of empirical facts. In Christopher Peacocke & Paul A. Boghossian (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxfordo. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)

Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called ‘externalist’ theory of empirical content, on which the contents of a person’s beliefs are determined in part by the nature of his extra-bodily environmental embedding, with a plausible account of self- knowledge, in particular, of a person’s knowledge of the contents of his own beliefs. A difficulty for this combination is thought to be that it leads to the availability of a kind non-empirical, a priori knowledge about the mind-independent physical world which is intuitively intolerable.1 The inference which is held to create this difficulty can be put like this

Brewer, Bill (2004). Self-knowledge and externalism. In J.M. Larrazabal & L.A. PC)rez Miranda (eds.), Language, Knowledge and Representation. Kluwer. (Google)

Brown, J. (2001). Anti-individualism and agnosticism. Analysis 61 (3):213-24. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

Brown, J. (2000). Critical reasoning, understanding and self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):659-676. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Brown, J. (2000). Reliabilism, knowledge, and mental content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:115-35. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

Brown, J. (1995). The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 55 (3):149-56. (Cited by 46 | Google)

Brown, J. (2003). The reductio argument and transmission of warrant. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Brown, Jessica (1999). Boghossian on externalism and privileged access. Analysis 59 (1):52-59. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2002). Anti-individualism and analyticity. Analysis 62 (1):87-91. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2000). Ambiguity and knowledge of content. Analysis 60 (3):257-60. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). A Priori knowledge of the world not easily available. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):109-114. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2004). Brewer on the McKinsey problem. Analysis 64 (1):41-43. (Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1998). Content externalism and a priori knowledge. Protosociology 11:149-159. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1997). Externalism and memory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):1-12. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2007). Externalism and privileged access are consistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2000). Externalism and the a prioricity of self-knowledge. Analysis 60 (1):132-136. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1997). Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Analysis 4 (4):287-90. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1994). Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world. Philosophical Review 103 (2):327-343. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2004). McKinsey redux? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. (Google)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2005). Noordhof on McKinsey-brown. Analysis 65 (285):86-88. (Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). Problems for a recent account of introspective knowledge. Facta Philosophica. (Google)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1993). Skepticism and externalism. Philosophia 22 (1-2):169-71. (Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1990). Scepticism about knowledge of content. Mind 99 (395):447-51. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1992). Semantic answers to skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):200-19. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1999). Transcendental arguments from content externalism. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1999). Two recent approaches to self-knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 13:251-71. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1995). Trying to get outside your own skin. Philosophical Topics 23:79-111. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Brueckner, Anthony L. (1992). What an anti-individualist knows A Priori. Analysis 52 (2):111-18. (Cited by 32 | Google | Annotation)

Burge, Tyler (1988). Individualism and self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63. (Cited by 152 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Burge, Tyler (2003). Mental agency in authoritative self-knowledge: Reply to Kobes. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. (Google)

Burge, Tyler (1998). Memory and self-knowledge. In Peter Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Burge, Tyler (2003). Some reflections on scepticism: Reply to Stroud. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. (Google)

Butler, Keith (1998). Externalism and skepticism. Dialogue 37 (1):13-34. (Google)

Butler, Keith (1997). Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)

Butler, Keith (2000). Problems for semantic externalism and A Priori refutations of skeptical arguments. Dialectica 54 (1):29-49. (Google)

Chase, James (2001). Is externalism about content inconsistent with internalism about justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):227-46. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Corbi, Josep E. (1998). A challenge to Boghossian's incompatibilist argument. Philosophical Issues 9. (Google)

Cullison, Andrew (online). Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing. (Google | More links)

Abstract: By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible

Davidson, Donald (1987). Knowing one's own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458. (Cited by 190 | Google)

Davies, Martin (2000). Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)

Abstract: This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome prospect of transferring a ‘non-empirical’ warrant from premises about our own mental states and about philosophical theory to a conclusion about external environment or internal architecture seems to depend upon little more than the possibility of knowledge by inference. (The use of the scare-quoted term ‘non-empirical’ is explained a couple of paragraphs further on.)

Davies, Martin (2000). Externalism and armchair knowledge. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)

Abstract: [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can’t_ know a priori that the external world exists, you also can’t know a priori that you are in the mental state in question.1

Davies, Martin (2003). Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Abstract: Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person (or other physical being) has M depends, not only on conditions inside the person’s skin, but also on the person’s environment and the way that the person is embedded in that environment. The dependence here is supposed to be conceptual rather than causal; it is the kind of dependence that can be revealed by philosophical theorising. This is an armchair methodology; so, if philosophical theorising yields knowledge, then it is a kind of _armchair knowledge_. Its status as knowledge does not depend on our conducting any detailed empirical investigation of the world around us. The puzzle for discussion in this paper arises when the possibility of armchair knowledge of an _externalist dependence_ _thesis_ about mental property M is put together with a thesis of first-person authority for that same mental property

Davies, Martin (2003). The problem of armchair knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)

Abstract: 1. McKinsey’s reductio argument: Externalism and self-knowledge In ‘Anti-individualism and privileged access’ (1991), Michael McKinsey asks us to consider the following three propositions, where ‘E’ says that some particular externalist condition for thinking that water is wet is met:²

(1) Oscar knows a priori that he is thinking that water is wet.
(2) The proposition that Oscar is thinking that water is wet conceptually
implies E.

(3) The proposition E cannot be known a priori, but only by empirical investigation

Dretske, Fred (2003). Externalism and self-knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Ebbs, Gary (2003). A puzzle about doubt. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Ebbs, Gary (1996). Can we take our words at face value? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):499-530. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Ebbs, Gary (2001). Is skepticism about self-knowledge coherent? Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Ebbs, Gary (2005). Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining. Analysis 3 (287):237-244. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Edwards, J. (1998). The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the transparency of sense experience. The simple theory of colour (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. (Google | More links)

Ellis, Jonathan (2007). Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access. Synthese 159 (1). (Google | More links)

Abstract: A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject’s thoughts are in part determined by environmental factors, it is argued, then the subject could not know the contents of these thoughts independently of empirical investigation. A related doctrine holds that a subject’s access to the phenomenal character of her experience is independent of empirical investigation. It is typically assumed that content externalism does not threaten this latter doctrine

Falvey, Kevin & Owens, Joseph (1994). Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism. Philosophical Review 103 (1):107-37. (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)

Falvey, Kevin (2003). Memory and knowledge of content. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Google)

Falvey, Kevin (2000). The compatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 60 (1):137-142. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

Fernandez, Jordi (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):17-37. (Google | More links)

Frapolli, Maria J. & Romero, E. (2003). Anti-individualism and basic self-knowledge. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli. (Google)

Fumerton, Richard A. (2003). Introspection and internalism. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Gallois, André (1994). Deflationary self-knowledge. In M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Gallois, André & O'Leary-Hawthorne, John (1996). Externalism and skepticism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):1-26. (Google | Annotation)

Georgalis, N. (1994). Asymmetry of access to intentional states. Erkenntnis 40 (2):185-211. (Cited by 9 | Google)

Georgalis, N. (1990). No access for the externalist: Discussion of Heil's 'privileged access'. Mind 100 (393):101-8. (Cited by 4 | Google | More

Search tips