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2.2g. Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Externalism and Self-Knowledge on PhilPapers)

See also:
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). Social externalism and first-person authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”
Bar-On, Dorit (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression. Noûs 38 (3):430-55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There
Beebee, Helen (2002). Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Beebee, Helen (2001). Transfer of warrant, begging the question and semantic externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-374.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (1996). Davidson on first-person authority and externalism. Inquiry 39 (1):121-39.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (1996). Externalism and the attitudinal component of self-knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Berg, Jonathan (1998). First-person authority, externalism, and wh-knowledge. Dialectica 52 (1):41-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (2000). Knowing the world by knowing one's mind. Synthese 123 (1):1-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (2004). Memory and externalism. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.   (Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (1997). On knowing one's own mind. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Bernecker, Sven (2006). Prospects for epistemic compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels
Bernecker, Sven (1998). Self-knowledge and closure. In Peter Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (2003). A trilemma for redeployment. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):22-30.   (Google | More links)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1992). Can externalism be reconciled with self-knowledge? Philosophical Topics 20 (1):233-68.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1991). Thought and its objects. Philosophical Issues 1:215-232.   (Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1989). Content and self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 70 | Annotation | Google)
Boghossian, Paul (1989). Content and self-knowledge. In Christopher S. Hill (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. University of Arkansas Press.   (Google)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1992). Externalism and inference. Philosophical Issues 2:11-28.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1998). Replies to commentators. Philosophical Issues 9:253-260.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1994). The transparency of mental content. Philosophical Perspectives 8:33-50.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
Boghossian, Paul A. (1997). What the externalist can know A Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):161-75.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and not merely at that of reference: what concepts we think in terms of -- and not just what they happen to pick out -- is said by the externalist to depend upon environmental facts. By a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, I mean the view that we are able to know, without the benefit of empirical investigation, what our thoughts are in our own case. Suppose I entertain a thought that I would express with the sentence `Water is wet'. According to the traditional doctrine, I can know without empirical investigation (a) that I am entertaining a thought; (b) that it has a particular conceptual content, and (c) that its content is that water is wet
Brewer, Bill (2000). Externalism and A Priori knowledge of empirical facts. In Christopher Peacocke & Paul A. Boghossian (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxfordo.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
Brewer, Bill (2004). Self-knowledge and externalism. In J.M. Larrazabal & L.A. PC)rez Miranda (eds.), Language, Knowledge and Representation. Kluwer.   (Google)
Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
Brown, J. (2001). Anti-individualism and agnosticism. Analysis 61 (3):213-24.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brown, Jessica (1999). Boghossian on externalism and privileged access. Analysis 59 (1):52-59.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Brown, J. (2000). Critical reasoning, understanding and self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):659-676.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Brown, J. (2000). Reliabilism, knowledge, and mental content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-35.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brown, J. (1995). The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 55 (3):149-56.   (Cited by 46 | Google)
Brown, J. (2003). The reductio argument and transmission of warrant. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2002). Anti-individualism and analyticity. Analysis 62 (1):87-91.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2000). Ambiguity and knowledge of content. Analysis 60 (3):257-60.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). A Priori knowledge of the world not easily available. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):109-114.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2004). Brewer on the McKinsey problem. Analysis 64 (1):41-43.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1998). Content externalism and a priori knowledge. Protosociology 11:149-159.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1997). Externalism and memory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):1-12.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2007). Externalism and privileged access are consistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2000). Externalism and the a prioricity of self-knowledge. Analysis 60 (1):132-136.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1997). Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1994). Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world. Philosophical Review 103 (2):327-343.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2004). McKinsey redux? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2005). Noordhof on McKinsey-brown. Analysis 65 (285):86-88.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). Problems for a recent account of introspective knowledge. Facta Philosophica.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1993). Skepticism and externalism. Philosophia 22 (1-2):169-71.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1990). Scepticism about knowledge of content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1992). Semantic answers to skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):200-19.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1999). Transcendental arguments from content externalism. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1999). Two recent approaches to self-knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 13:251-71.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1995). Trying to get outside your own skin. Philosophical Topics 23:79-111.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1992). What an anti-individualist knows A Priori. Analysis 52 (2):111-18.   (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1988). Individualism and self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.   (Cited by 152 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Mental agency in authoritative self-knowledge: Reply to Kobes. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1998). Memory and self-knowledge. In Peter Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Some reflections on scepticism: Reply to Stroud. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Butler, Keith (1998). Externalism and skepticism. Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.   (Google)
Butler, Keith (1997). Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Butler, Keith (2000). Problems for semantic externalism and A Priori refutations of skeptical arguments. Dialectica 54 (1):29-49.   (Google | More links)
Chase, James (2001). Is externalism about content inconsistent with internalism about justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):227-46.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Child, William (2006). Wittgenstein's externalism: Context, self-knowledge & the past. In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
Corbi, Josep E. (1998). A challenge to Boghossian's incompatibilist argument. Philosophical Issues 9.   (Google | More links)
Cullison, Andrew (2007). Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
Davies, Martin (2000). Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome prospect of transferring a ‘non-empirical’ warrant from premises about our own mental states and about philosophical theory to a conclusion about external environment or internal architecture seems to depend upon little more than the possibility of knowledge by inference. (The use of the scare-quoted term ‘non-empirical’ is explained a couple of paragraphs further on.)
Davies, Martin (2000). Externalism and armchair knowledge. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can
Davies, Martin (2003). Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person (or other physical being) has M depends, not only on conditions inside the person
Davidson, Donald (1987). Knowing one's own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.   (Cited by 190 | Google)
Davies, Martin (2003). The problem of armchair knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2003). Externalism and self-knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2006). Representation, teleosemantics, and the problem of self-knowledge. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ebbs, Gary (2003). A puzzle about doubt. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ebbs, Gary (1996). Can we take our words at face value? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):499-530.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Ebbs, Gary (2001). Is skepticism about self-knowledge coherent? Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ebbs, Gary (2005). Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining. Analysis 65 (287):237-244.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Edwards, J. (1998). The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the transparency of sense experience. The simple theory of colour (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Ellis, Jonathan (2007). Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access. Synthese 159 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject
Falvey, Kevin & Owens, Joseph (1994). Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism. Philosophical Review 103 (1):107-37.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Falvey, Kevin (2003). Memory and knowledge of content. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Falvey, Kevin (2000). The compatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 60 (1):137-142.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Farkas, Katalin (2006). Semantic internalism and externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
Farkas, Katalin (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended here is not dualism--which is not adopted--but internalism. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted externalist thesis, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on certain features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view, which holds that the mind is autonomous, and though it is obviously affected by the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. Defenders of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; Katalin Farkas offers a defence of an uncompromising internalist Cartesian conception
Farkas, Katalin (2003). What is externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
Fernandez, Jordi (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):17-37.   (Google | More links)
Frapolli, Maria J. & Romero, E. (2003). Anti-individualism and basic self-knowledge. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Frapolli, Maria J. & Romero, E. (eds.) (2003). Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fumerton, Richard A. (2003). Introspection and internalism. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gallois, Andr (1994). Deflationary self-knowledge. In M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gallois, Andr (1996). Externalism and skepticism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):1-26.   (Annotation | Google)
Georgalis, N. (1994). Asymmetry of access to intentional states. Erkenntnis 40 (2):185-211.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Georgalis, N. (1990). No access for the externalist: Discussion of Heil's 'privileged access'. Mind 100 (393):101-8.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Gerken, Mikkel (2009). Conceptual equivocation and epistemic relevance. Dialectica 63 (2):117-132.   (Google)
Abstract: Much debate has surrounded "switching" scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation ( Burge 1988 ; Boghossian 1992, 1994 ). Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are "epistemically prevalent" and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives ( Ludlow 1995a ). Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them 'equivocational switching cases'. Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with regards to anti-individualism (or content externalism) and self-knowledge. However, the issue has wide-reaching consequences for many areas of epistemology. Arguably, the claim that equivocational switching cases are epistemically relevant may bear on the epistemology of inference, testimony, memory, group rationality and belief revision. Ludlow's argument proceeds from a now well-known "down to Earth" switching-case of a subject, Biff, who travels between the US and the UK. I argue that Ludlow's case-based argument fails to support the general claim that conceptual equivocational switching cases are prevalent and epistemically relevant. Thus, the discussion addresses the basis of some poorly understood issues regarding the epistemological consequences of anti-individualism. Simultaneously, the discussion is broadened from the narrow focus on self-knowledge. Finally, the critical discussion serves as the basis for some general reflections on epistemic relevance and the epistemic risks associated with conceptual equivocation. Specifically, I suggest that philosophy is an area where the risk of conceptual equivocation is extraordinarily high
Gertler, Brie (2004). We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does? Analysis 64 (1):44-47.   (Google | More links)
Gibbons, John (1996). Externalism and knowledge of content. Philsophical Review 105 (3):287-310.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Gibbons, John (2001). Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28.   (Google | More links)
Glock, H. J. & Preston, John M. (1995). Externalism and first-person authority. The Monist 78 (4):515-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2003). Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Given anti-individualism, a subjectmight have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking thatp, have complete and exhaustiveexplicational knowledge of all of the conceptscomposing the content that p, and yetstill need empirical information (e.g.regarding her embedding conditions and history)prior to being in a position to apply herexhaustive conceptual knowledge in aknowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed byanti-individualists: it squares with everythingthat compatibilist-minded anti-individualistshave said regarding e.g. the compatibility ofanti-individualism and basic self-knowledge;and more importantly it contains the crux of aresponse to McKinsey-style arguments againstanti-individualism
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2007). Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification. Nos 41 (2):178�203.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2002). Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2006). Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301�314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2002). Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception? Noûs 36 (4):597-621.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2000). Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy. Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that forming a justi?ed true self-ascriptive judgement about one
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2005). (Nonstandard) lessons from world-switching cases. Philosophia 32 (1-4):85-131.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2003). On our alleged A Priori knowledge that water exists. Analysis 63 (1):38-41.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2004). Review of Maria Frapolli (ed.), Esther Romero (ed.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (1).   (Google)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1997). Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument. Analysis 57 (3):211-19.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2005). The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):135-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory Argument.’
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1999). The psychology and epistemology of self-knowledge. Synthese 118 (2):165-201.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1999). The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):136-56.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2003). What do you know when you know your own thoughts? In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1999). Word-ambiguity, world-switching, and knowledge of content: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 59 (263):212-217.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2000). Word-ambiguity, world-switching, and semantic intentions. Analysis 60 (267):260-264.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Greco, John (2004). Externalism and skepticism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Hall, Lisa L. (1998). The self-knowledge that externalists leave out. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):115-123.   (Google)
Haukioja, Jussi (2006). Semantic externalism and A Priori self-knowledge. Ratio 19 (2):149-159.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The argument known as the 'McKinsey Recipe' tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and _a priori _self- knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know _a priori _that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of 'natural kind concept': (i) a concept which _in fact _denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which _aims_ to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a _Dry Earth _scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two-dimensional semantics, using the notion of 'considering a possible world as actual', I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian's question: which concept would 'water' express on Dry Earth?
Heal, Jane (1998). Externalism and memory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):77-94.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Heil, John (1988). Privileged access. Mind 98 (April):238-51.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Hohwy, Jakob (2002). Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):235-52.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Hymers, Michael (1997). Realism and self-knowledge: A problem for Burge. Philosophical Studies 86 (3):303-325.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (2000). Deference and self-knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
Jacob, Pierre (2004). Do we know how we know our own minds yet? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (web). Incompatibility arguments and semantic self-knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been much discussion recently of what has been labeled the
Jacob, Pierre (ms). Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism?   (Google | More links)
Kennedy, Matthew (forthcoming). Naive Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one’s perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
Klaas, (2002). Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 56:297-317.   (Google)
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Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
Korman, Daniel Z. (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth. The Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word ‘water’ in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concering the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism.
Kraay, Klaas J. (2002). Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):297-317.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value
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Larkin, William S. (ms). Burge on our privileged access to the external world.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (ms). Concepts and introspection: An externalist defense of inner sense.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (online). Comments on Pryor's “externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning”.   (Google)
Abstract: I. Pryor on McKinsey:
A. Pryor’s Version of McKinsey-style Reasoning
1. Given authoritative self-knowledge, I can usually tell the contents of my own thoughts just by introspection.
So
I can know the following claim on the basis of reflection alone:
McK-1: I am thinking a thought with the content _water puts out fires_
Larkin, William S. (2000). Content skepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):33-43.   (Google)
Abstract: Skeptical theses in general claim that we cannot know what we think we know. Content skepticism in particular claims that we cannot know the contents of our own occurrent thoughtsat least not in the way we think we can. I argue that an externalist account of content does engender a mild form of content skepticism but that the condition is no real cause for concern. Content externalism forces us to reevaluate some of our assumptions about introspective knowledge, but it is compatible with privileged access and the distinctive epistemic character of introspective judgments
Larkin, William S. (online). Content skepticism and reliable self-knowledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Sub-Thesis 1: We should be contingent reliabilists to avoid the threat of an unacceptably strong content skeptical thesis posed by content externalism and the possibility of twin thoughts. The predominant strategy for resisting this threat has been to rely on the claim that introspective self-attributions are immune to brute error; but this claim is problematic from a naturalistic standpoint
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Ludlow, Peter (1995). Externalism, self-knowledge, and the prevalence of slow-switching. Analysis 55 (1):45-49.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
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Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism and memory: A problem? Acta Analytica 10 (14):69-76.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
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Abstract: Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.1 In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the issue of the individuation dependence of subjects' intentional states on factors beyond their bodies. His reason is that whereas externalism—the view that certain intentional states of persons are individuation-dependent on objects and/or phenomena external to their bodies—is a metaphysical thesis, authoritative self-knowledge is an epistemological matter. This being so, there is no reason to suppose that the two need conflict with one another
Macdonald, C. (1995). Externalism and first-person authority. Synthese 104 (1):99-122.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Majors, Brad & Sawyer, Sarah (2005). The epistemological argument for content externalism. Noûs 39 (1):257-280.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
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Manley, David (2007). Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-23.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay motivates a revised version of the epistemic condition of safety and then employs the revision to (i) challenge the traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute 'strong privileged access', and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge
McCulloch, Gregory (1999). Content externalism and cartesian scepticism: A reply to Brueckner. In Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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McKinsey, Michael (1994). Accepting the consequences of anti-individualism. Analysis 54 (2):124-8.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
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McKinsey, Michael (2007). Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
McKinsey, Michael (2002). Forms of externalism and privileged access. Philosophical Perspectives 16:199-224.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
McKinsey, Michael (2002). On knowing our own minds. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107-16.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection
McKinsey, Michael (2003). Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.1 One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always transmit to a known deductive consequence of that premise, and who contend that this fact under-mines my argument for incompatibilism. I will try to show here that the Davies/Wright point about transmission of warrant does not adversely affect my argument
McKinsey, Michael (2001). The semantic basis of externalism. In J. Campbell, M.O. Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth. New York: Seven Bridges Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: 1. The primary evidence and motivation for externalism in the philosophy of mind is provided by the semantic facts that support direct reference theories of names, indexi- cal pronouns, and natural kind terms. But many externalists have forgotten their sem- antic roots, or so I shall contend here. I have become convinced of this by a common reaction among externalists to the main argument of my 1991 paper AAnti-Individual- ism and Privileged Access.@ In that argument, I concluded that externalism is incompat- ible with the principle that we can have privileged, non-empirical knowledge of the contents of our own thoughts. The reaction in question amounts to a dismissive denial of one of my argument=s main premises. This premise, which I defended at length in the paper, is that an externalist thesis regarding a cognitive property should hold that possession of the property by a person _logically_, or _conceptually_, implies the existence of objects external to that person
McLaughlin, Brian P. & Tye, Michael (1998). Externalism, twin earth, and self-knowledge. In C. Macdonald, Peter K. Smith & C. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
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McLaughlin, Brian P. (2001). Introspecting thoughts. Facta Philosophica 3:77-84.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2003). McKinsey's challenge, warrant transmission, and skepticism. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2004). Of Ebbs's puzzle. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism, and skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):93-118.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism, and skepticism,I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):93–118.   (Google | More links)
Miller, Richard W. (1997). Externalist self-knowledge and the scope of the a priori. Analysis 57 (1):67-74.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Moya, Carlos J. (1998). Boghossian's reduction of compatibilism. Philosophical Issues 9:243-251.   (Google | More links)
Moya, Carlos J. (2003). Externalism, inclusion, and knowledge of content. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Nagasawa, Yujin (2002). Externalism and the memory argument. Dialectica 56 (4):335-46.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Nagasawa, Yujin (2000). 'Very-slow-switching' and memory (a critical note on Ludlow's paper). Acta Analytica 15 (25):173-175.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Noonan, P. (2004). Against absence-dependent thoughts. Analysis 64 (1):92-93.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Noonan, Harold W. (2000). McKinsey-brown survives. Analysis 60 (268):353-356.   (Google | More links)
Noordhof, Paul (2004). Outsmarting the McKinsey-brown argument? Analysis 64 (1):48-56.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which constitute the argument has been re?ned. It is based on three claims (where A partially serves to characterise the content of some belief state for which Externalism is true and E is some proposition about the external world)
Noordhof, Paul (2005). The transmogrification of a posteriori knowledge: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 65 (285):88-89.   (Google | More links)
Nuccetelli, Susana (2001). Is self-knowledge an entitlement? And why should we care? Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):143-155.   (Google)
Nuccetelli, Susana (2003). Knowing that one knows what one is talking about. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Nuccetelli, Susana (ed.) (2003). New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Abstract: This book shows that the debate over the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge has led to the investigation of a variety of topics, including the a...
Nuccetelli, Susana (1999). What anti-individualist cannot know A Priori. Analysis 59 (1):48-51.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Owens, David J. (2003). Externalis, Davidson, and knowledge of comparative content. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Google)
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Owens, David (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism and scepticism, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):119–142.   (Google | More links)
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Abstract: Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts
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Abstract: In the mid-nineties a large number of philosophers (most famously, Michael McKinsey, Jessica Brown and Paul Boghossian) raised and discussed a certain form of challenge to externalism. In Boghossian
Pritchard, Duncan & Kallestrup, Jesper (2004). An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content externalism must be incompatible with epistemic internalism. In a recent and influential paper, however, James Chase has challenged this conventional wisdom by offering a subtle defence of the view that content externalism and epistemic internalism are, in fact, compatible after all.2 Our aim here is twofold. First, to show that Chase is only able to achieve this result because he focuses upon the internalist conception of justification, rather than knowledge. Second, to formulate one prima facie argument which shows that an internalist conception of knowledge is incompatible with an externalist conception of content, an argument which, moreover, is not touched by Chase
Pritchard, Duncan (2003). McDowell on reasons, externalism and scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim
Pritchard, Duncan (2002). McKinsey paradoxes, radical skepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments. Synthese 130 (2):279-302.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Pryor, James (web). Externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning. In S C. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: (revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and so I couldn
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Sawyer, Sarah (1999). Am externalist account of introspectve knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):358-78.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Content Sceptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Sceptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism
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Sawyer, Sarah (2002). In defense of Burge's thesis. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):109-28.   (Google | More links)
Sawyer, Sarah (1998). Privileged access to the world. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):523-533.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
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Abstract: I here argue against the viability of Peter Ludlow’s modified version of Paul Boghossian’s argument for the incompatibility of semantic externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. Ludlow contends that slow switching is not merely actual but is, moreover, prevalent; it can occur whenever we shift between localized linguistic communities. It is therefore quite possible, he maintains, that we undergo unwitting shifts in our mental content on a regular basis. However, there is good reason to accept as plausible that despite their prevalence we are in fact able to readily adapt to such switches, as well as to the shifts in mental content that accompany them. The prevalence of slow switching between linguistic communities does not then necessarily entail incompatibility after all
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Abstract: Starting in the middle -- Epistemic possibilities and the knowledge argument -- Locating ourselves in the world -- Notes on models of self-locating belief -- Phenomenal and epistemic indistinguishability -- Acquaintance and essence -- Knowing what one is thinking -- After the fall.
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Abstract: Most current theories of meaning and mental content accept externalism. One of its forceful exponents is Ruth Garrett Millikan. She argues that externalism leads to the abandonment of "the last myth of the given", that is, of the idea that identity of meaning and mental content is somehow unproblematically given to us, and that we can easily recognize the sameness of meaning and mental content. If one refuses such a "mythical" giveness or meaning rationalism, one has to admit that there is no logical possibility known a priori . The paper tries to show that even if one abandons meaning rationalism one can still hold that there are logical possibilities known a priori . The claim is defended by arguing that a priori knowledge is not completely independent from experience and does not demand the absolute transparency of meaning from the first-person point of view. A priori knowledge requires only a priori justification, that is, such a justification that is based merely on relations between meanings or contents
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Abstract: The development of the semantic externalism in the 1970s was followed by a debate on the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Boghossian’s memory argument is one of the most important arguments against the compatibilist view. However, some compatibilists attack Boghossian’s argument by pointing out that his understanding of memory is internalistic. Ludlow and others developed the externalist view of memory to defend the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, the externalist view of memory undermines the epistemic status of memory since it gives memory a burden that is too heavy for it to carry. This paper argues that only if we take the content of memory to be narrow and take that of self-knowledge to be wide and replace Cartesian self-knowledge with contextually constrained self-knowledge, can the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge be effectively defended
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Warfield, Ted A. (1997). Externalism, privileged self-knowledge, and the irrelevance of slow switching. Analysis 57 (4):282-84.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Warfield, Ted A. (1995). Knowing the world and knowing our minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):525-545.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Warfield, Ted A. (1992). Privileged self-knowledge and externalism are compatible. Analysis 52 (4):232-37.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
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Abstract: The question of whether externalism about mental content is compatible with privileged access is a question of ongoing concern within philosophy of mind. Some philosophers think that Tyler Burge's early work on what he calls "basic self-knowledge" shows that externalism and privileged access are compatible. I critically assess this claim, arguing that Burge's work does not establish the compatbility thesis
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