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2.2h. Narrow Content (Narrow Content on PhilPapers)

See also:
Adams, Frederick R. & Fuller, Gary (1992). Names, contents, and causes. Mind and Language 7 (3):205-21.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Adams, Frederick R.; Drebushenko, David; Fuller, Gary & Stecker, Robert A. (1990). Narrow content: Fodor's folly. Mind and Language 5:213-29.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Adams, Frederick R. (1993). Reply to Russow's Fodor, Adams and Causal Properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63-65.   (Google)
Antony, Louise M. (1990). Semantic anorexia: On the notion of content in cognitive science. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Antony, Louise M. (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (Google)
Arnold, Dan (2009). Svasamvitti as methodological solipsism: Narrow content and the problem of intentionality in buddhist philosophy of mind. In Mario D'Amato, Jay L. Garfield & Tom J. F. Tillemans (eds.), Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Aydede, Murat (1997). Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content? Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-58.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ABSTRACT. In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to the notion of narrow content in explaining Frege cases and cases involving the so-called deferential concepts. And for good reason: his notion of narrow content (1985-91) couldn't explain them. The only apparent change concerns his treatment of Twin Earth cases. However, I argue that the notion of broad content that his purely informational semantics delivers is, in some interesting sense, equivalent to the mapping notion of narrow content he officially gave up. For his pure informational semantics fails to avoid assigning disjunctive content to twins, since nomic covariations take care not only actual but also counterfactual contexts into account. I show that none of the attempts made by Fodor to block this consequence of his theory works. The present notion of broad content he now operates with is therefore in a position to take over all the important jobs that his previous notion of narrow content could do
Bach, Kent (1996). Content: Wide vs. narrow. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: narrow content as a function from context to wide content.)
Bernier, Paul (1993). Narrow content, context of thought, and asymmetric dependence. Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Biro, John I. (1992). In defense of social content. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):277-93.   (Annotation | Google)
Block, Ned (1995). Ruritania revisited. Philosophical Issues 6:171-187.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1991). What narrow content is not. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 29 | Annotation | Google)
Boër, Steven E. (2001). A slim book about narrow content. Gabriel M. A. Segal. Mind 110 (440).   (Google)
Braun, David M. (2002). Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Branquinho, Joao (1999). The problem of cognitive dynamics. Grazer Philosophische Studien Grazen 56:2-15.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan?s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans?s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan?s account and Evans?s account are on the whole defective (for different sorts of reason, of course); even though there are features of each of those views which seem to me to be along the right lines. On the other, and in spite of that, I claim that a broadly Fregean theory is still to be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal adequately with some important phenomena in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based demonstrative mode of presentation of an object (a spatio-temporal particular, a region in space, a period of time, etc.) turns out to be indispensable for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of an important range of mental states with propositional content over time
Brown, Curtis (1993). Belief states and narrow content. Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Brogaard, Berit, Centered worlds and the content of perception: Short version.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: 0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk on the day following the occurrence of my belief state in the actual world. Let us call propositional content which has a truth-value relative only to a possible world ‘non-relativistic content’. Non-relativistic content can be treated as either structured or unstructured. On the unstructured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set of possible worlds and bears the truth-value true just in case the actual world is a member of that set. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is working now’ at time t is the set of worlds in which Jim is working at t, and this content is true just in case the actual world is among those worlds. On the structured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set or conglomeration of properties and/or objects, where properties are features which objects possess regardless of who considers or observes them and regardless of when they are being considered or observed. Such properties are said to be (or represent) functions from possible worlds to extensions. Relative to a possible world they determine a set of objects instantiating the property. For example, relative to the actual world the property of being human determines the set of actual humans. Not all content is non-relativistic. Let us say that propositional content is relativistic just in case it possesses a truth-value only relative to a centered world. A centered world is a possible world in which an individual and a time are marked, where the marked individual..
Chalmers, David J. (2002). The components of content. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 46 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html
Chalmers, David (manuscript). The components of content (1995 version). .   (Google)
Abstract: (1) Is content in the head? I believe that water is wet. My twin on Twin Earth, which is just like Earth except that H2O is replaced by the superficially identical XYZ, does not. His thoughts concern not water but twin water: I believe that water is wet, but he believes that twin water is wet. It follows that that what a subject believes is not wholly determined by the internal state of the believer. Nevertheless, the cognitive similarities between me and my twin are striking. Is there some wholly internal aspect of content that we might share?
Chalmers, David J. (2003). The nature of narrow content. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
Cheng, Kam-Yuen (2002). Narrow content and historical accounts: Can Fodor live without them? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.   (Google)
Crawford, Sean (2003). Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect causal powers, it is false that no relational psychological properties do. Examples of relational psychological properties that do affect causal powers are given and psychological laws are sketched that subsume twins in virtue of them instantiating these relational properties rather than them sharing the narrow contents of their thoughts
Davies, Martin (1986). Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:263-83.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Davies, Martin (1986). Individualism and supervenience: Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1983). Beyond belief. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 58 | Annotation | Google)
Devitt, Michael (1990). The narrow representational theory of mind. In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google)
Field, Hartry (1990). "Narrow" aspects of intentionality and the information-theoretic approach to content. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1991). A modal argument for narrow content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 43 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1986). Individualism and supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:235-262.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Frances, Bryan (ms). A philosophically inexpensive introduction to twin-earth.   (Google)
Abstract: I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also briefly discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument
Frances, Bryan (1999). On the explanatory deficiencies of linguistic content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining their actions. I argue that the considerations motivating this view are best handled with just the ordinary ‘that’-clause contents.
Georgalis, N. (1996). Awareness, understanding, and functionalism. Erkenntnis 44 (2):225-56.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Georgalis, Nick (2006). First-person intentionality. In The Primacy of the Subjective. MIT Press.   (Google)
Georgalis, Nicholas (2006). The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gertler, Brie (ms). The narrow mind.   (Google)
Haas-Spohn, Ulrike (1999). Anti-individualism and cognitive semantics. DFG-Forschergruppe Logik in Der Philosophie 15.   (Google)
Haas-Spohn, Ulrike (1994). Hidden Indexicality and Subjective Meaning. Dissertation, Universitaet Tuebingen   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1997). Discussion: [Explanation] is explanation better. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):154-160.   (Google)
Hunter, David (2003). Gabriel Segal's a slim book about narrow content. Noûs 37 (4):724–745.   (Google | More links)
Hunter, David, Gabriel Segal, a slim book about narrow content(mit press, 2000), 177 pp.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Mind-Body problem is the problem of saying how a person’s mental states and events relate to his bodily ones. How does Oscar’s believing that water is cold relate to the states of his body? Is it itself a bodily state, perhaps a state of his brain or nervous system? If not, does it nonetheless depend on such states? Or is his believing that water is cold independent of his bodily states? And, crucially, what are the notions of dependence and independence at issue here?
Jacob, Pierre (1990). Externalism revisited: Is there such a thing as narrow content? Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (2003). Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):55-70.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the only legitimate notion of content, but for anyone who takes seriously the representational nature of intentional states, it must be one legitimate and central notion of content. To discover that DNA has a double helix structure is to make a selection from the various possible structures
Jackson, Frank (2003). Representation and narrow belief. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):99-112.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1993). Some content is narrow. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: ONE way t0 defend narrow content is to produce a sentence 0f the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true 0f S if and 0nly if it is true 0f any duplicate from the skin in, any doppclgangcr, of S. N0toriously, this is hard to d0. Twin Earth examples are pervasivc.1 Another way to defend narrow content; is t0 show that Only 2. narrow notion can play thc causal explanatory r01c we require 0f contcnt in 2. properly scicntiicm psychology 0r cognitive science. Notoriously, this is hard t0 d0. The considerations—mcthod010gicaI solipsism, the principle 0f autonomy, 0r what:cvcr—invokcd to show that a broad notion 0f content cannot..
Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Real narrow content. Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content
Kriegel, Uriah & Horgan, Terry (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In T. Horgan & U. Kriegel (eds.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: We review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
Kriegel, Uriah (online). The primacy of narrow content.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I want to explore a line of thought that would create a new case for a strong form of content internalism. I will not argue that all representational content is narrow content. Rather, I will argue that the source of all representational content is a narrow content. This means that there would be no wide content in a world without narrow content. The argument I will pursue is fairly straightforward: 1) the only non-derivative kind of representation is conscious representation; 2) conscious representation is narrow; therefore, 3) the only non-derivative kind of representation is narrow. If so, there would be no content without narrow content
Lau, Joe (ms). Three motivations for narrow content.   (Google)
Abstract: In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for and believed is the very same thing. According to the thesis of externalism that has been defended most notably by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, not all of the contents of our mental states are determined by our intrinsic properties. Instead, the contents of our beliefs and desires are often determined in part by our relations to the environment. They are, so to speak, "wide" contents that are "not in our heads." Although externalism is accepted by most philosophers, many have argued that mental states with wide contents must also have a kind of content wholly determined by the intrinsic properties of the individuals who are in those states. This kind of content is called "narrow content". The aim of this paper is to distinguish between three rather different motivations for postulating narrow content. I argue that, given a certain conception of narrow content that I shall explain below, none of these three motivations succeed in establishing the existence of narrow content
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Loar, Brian (1987). Social content and psychological content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.   (Cited by 72 | Annotation | Google)
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Abstract: (1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..
Maloney, J. Christopher (1991). Saving psychological solipsism. Philosophical Studies 61 (March):267-83.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Manfredi, Pat A. (1993). Two routes to narrow content: Both dead ends. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: If psychology requires a taxonomy that categorizes mental states according to their causal powers, the common sense method of individuating mental states (a taxonomy by intentional content) is unacceptable because mental states can have different intentional content, but identical causal powers. This difference threatens both the vindication of belief/desire psychology and the viability of scientific theories whose posits include intentional states. To resolve this conflict, Fodor has proposed that for scientific purposes mental states should be classified by their narrow content. Such a classification is supposed to correspond to a classification by causal powers. Yet a state's narrow content is also supposed to determine its (broad) intentional content whenever that state is 'anchored' to a context. I examine the two most plausible accounts of narrow content implicit in Fodor's work, arguing that neither account can accomplish both goals
McDermott, M. (1986). Narrow content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):277-88.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
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Abstract: Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates full-stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone who believes that Aristotle was wise, for instance, must share that same belief. Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, sociolinguistic, or historical context. To have a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle himself (e.g., by hearing about him, or reading some of his works).An interesting third view, which I call
Noonan, Harold W. (1981). Methodological solipsism. Philosophical Studies 40 (September):269-274.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Putnam, Hilary (1987). Fodor and Block on narrow content. In Representation and Reality. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
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Recanati, F. (1990). Externalism and narrow content. Noûs 24.   (Annotation | Google)
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Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Content by courtesy. Journal of Philosophy 84 (April):197-213.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
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Sawyer, Sarah (2007). There is no viable notion of narrow content. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
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Segal, Gabriel (2000). A Slim Book About Narrow Content. MIT Press.   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.
Segal, Gabriel (1999). A Slim Book on Narrow Content. The Mit Press.   (Google)
Segal, Gabriel (online). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (Google)
Abstract: Tyler Burge (Burge (1979)) has developed a very influential line of anti-individualistic thought. He argued that the cognitive content of a person
Segal, Gabriel (2007). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Silverberg, Arnold (1995). Narrow content: A defense. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-27.   (Google)
Stalnaker, Robert (1990). Narrow content. In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google)
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Vaughan, R. (1989). Searle's narrow content. Ratio 2 (2):185-90.   (Google)
Voltolini, Alberto, Holistic narrow content?   (Google)
Abstract: 1. In the course of his philosophical development, Jerry Fodor has indicated two sorts of non-broad (i.e., non-truthconditional) content of mental representations, namely content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) and narrow content (NC) qua mapping function from contexts (of thought) to broad contents. According to the former conceptualization, mental state tokens which are truth-conditionally identical may be such that they cannot both truthfully ascribed to one and the same subject at the same time, for they differ in their respective DDC. In Fodor's own example, Oedipus' thoughts that he will marry Jocasta and that he will marry Mum are truth-conditionally identical, but different as far their DDC is concerned; one cannot indeed truthfully ascribe both thoughts to him simultaneously1. According to the latter conceptualization instead, mental state tokens of molecularly identical twins placed in different environments (such as Earth and Twin-Earth) are such that, although they differ in their truth-conditions, they share the same NC2. For instance, these twins respectively think that water quenches thirst and that twater (a liquid similar to water but its chemical composition) quenches thirst. Although these thoughts thus differ in broad content, they have the same NC: had the Twin-Earthling twin been brought up on Earth rather than on Twin-Earth where he actually lives, he would have thought that water quenches thirst rather than that twater quenches thirst3. According to Fodor's picture, both concepts are invoked for the purpose of psychology in order to account for one and the same thing, namely subjects' behavior. On the one hand, difference in behavior of a subject whose thought-tokens have the same truth-conditions may be ascribed to difference in the DDC of these tokens4. On the other hand, identity in behavior between two molecularly identical subjects whose thought-tokens have different truth-conditions is explained in terms of the NC- identity of these tokens5..
Voltolini, Alberto (1997). Is narrow content the same as content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized? In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Abstract: Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they cannot both be truthfully ascribed to a single subject at the same time. Some years ago (1987), Fodor postulated a notion of mental content which also went beyond that of a mental state's truth-conditions. States whose tokens differ in their truth-conditions, or broad content, might, he claimed, still share a narrow content (NC), which was causally responsible for the shared behavior of the subjects of these states. For instance, two molecularly identical individuals, living in environments in all respects the same, except for the chemical substance of the phenomenically indistinguishable liquids filling their respective lakes and rivers, would behave similarly when having truth-conditionally different thoughts regarding those liquids. According to Fodor, this sameness of behavior was causally dependent on the sameness of the NC of the two individuals' truth-conditionally different thoughts. Now, this way of individuating mental states is still of interest for semantics. Indeed, NC allows one contextually to fix the broad content of a mental state token. Echoing Kaplan's notion of character,1 Fodor explained NC as a function that mapped contexts (of thought) onto broad contents. NC was thus invoked by Fodor mainly in order to account for sameness of intentional behavior. But DDC also plays a role in explaining intentional behavior, precisely by explaining why a subject whose thought-tokens have identical truthconditions may behave differently..
Wakefield, Jerome C. (2002). Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily adequate broad-content psychology is nonetheless possible because Frege cases rarely occur in intentional-explanatory contexts, and they are not systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that demands intentional explanation. Thus, he claims, behaviors associated with Frege cases can be considered ceteris-paribus exceptions to broad-content intentional laws without significantly decreasing the explanatory power of intentional psychology. I argue that Frege cases are plentiful and systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that requires intentional explanation, specifically in the explanation of why certain actions are not performed. Consequently, Frege-case behaviors cannot be construed as ceteris-paribus exceptions to intentional laws without significantly eroding the explanatory power of intentional psychology and reducing the rationality of the agent. Fodor thus fails to save broad-content psychology from the prima facie objections against it based on Frege cases
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