MindPapers: 2.2h. The Status of Narrow Content

Adams, Frederick R. & Fuller, Gary (1992). Names, contents, and causes. Mind and Language 7 (3):205-21. (Cited by 8 | Google | Annotation)

Adams, Frederick R.; Drebushenko, David; Fuller, Gary & Stecker, Robert A. (1990). Narrow content: Fodor's folly. Mind and Language 5:213-29. (Cited by 10 | Google | Annotation)

Adams, Frederick R. (1993). Reply to Russow's Fodor, Adams and Causal Properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63-65. (Google)

Antony, Louise M. (1990). Semantic anorexia: On the notion of content in cognitive science. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method. Cambridge University Press. (Google | Annotation)

Antony, Louise M. (manuscript). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought. (Google)

Aydede, Murat (1997). Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content? Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-58. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Bach, Kent (1996). Content: Wide vs. narrow. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. (Google | More links)

Baker, Lynne Rudder (1985). A farewell to functionalism. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):1-14. (Cited by 9 | Google | Annotation)

Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Content by courtesy. Journal of Philosophy 84 (April):197-213. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Baker, Lynne Rudder (1985). Just what do we have in mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:25-48. (Cited by 5 | Google | Annotation)

Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Saving Belief. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 50 | Google | Annotation)

Biro, John I. (1992). In defense of social content. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):277-93. (Google | Annotation)

Block, Ned (1995). Ruritania revisited. Philosophical Issues 6:171-187. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Block, Ned (1991). What narrow content is not. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 29 | Google | Annotation)

Branquinho, Joao (1999). The problem of cognitive dynamics. Grazer Philosophische Studien Grazen 56:2-15. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Braun, David M. (2002). Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)

Brown, Curtis (1993). Belief states and narrow content. Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Brown, Curtis (online). Narrow mental content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

Chalmers, David J. (2002). The components of content. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 46 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Chalmers, David J. (2003). The nature of narrow content. Philosophical Issues 13:46-66. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Cheng, Kam-Yuen (2002). Narrow content and historical accounts: Can Fodor live without them? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113. (Google)

Davies, Martin (1986). Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:263-83. (Cited by 4 | Google | Annotation)

Dennett, Daniel C. (1983). Beyond belief. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 58 | Google | Annotation)

Devitt, Michael (1990). The narrow representational theory of mind. In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. (Cited by 27 | Google | Annotation)

Field, Hartry (1990). "Narrow" aspects of intentionality and the information-theoretic approach to content. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Fodor, Jerry A. (1986). Individualism and supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:235-262. (Cited by 7 | Google | Annotation)

Georgalis, N. (1996). Awareness, understanding, and functionalism. Erkenntnis 44 (2):225-56. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Georgalis, Nicholas (2006). The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Georgalis, Nick (2006). First-person intentionality. In The Primacy of the Subjective. MIT Press. (Google)

Gertler, Brie (manuscript). The narrow mind. (Google)

Haas-Spohn, Ulrike (1999). Anti-individualism and cognitive semantics. DFG-Forschergruppe Logik in Der Philosophie 15. (Google)

Haas-Spohn, Ulrike (1994). Hidden Indexicality and Subjective Meaning. Dissertation, Universitaet Tuebingen (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1997). Discussion: [Explanation] is explanation better. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):154-160. (Google)

Jackson, Frank (2003). Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):55-70. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Jackson, Frank (2003). Representation and narrow belief. Philosophical Issues 13:99-112. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1993). Some content is narrow. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google | Annotation)

Jacob, Pierre (1990). Externalism revisited: Is there such a thing as narrow content? Philosophical Studies 143 (November):143-176. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Real narrow content. Mind and Language. (Google)

Kriegel, Uriah (online). The primacy of narrow content. (Google)

Lau, Joe (manuscript). Three motivations for narrow content. (Google)

LePore, Ernest & Loewer, Barry M. (1989). Dual aspect semantics. In Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation. Kluwer. (Cited by 10 | Google)

LePore, Ernest & Loewer, Barry M. (1986). Solipsistic semantics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:595-614. (Cited by 11 | Google | Annotation)

Loar, Brian (1987). Social content and psychological content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press. (Cited by 72 | Google | Annotation)

Loar, Brian (1987). Subjective intentionality. Philosophical Topics 15:89-124. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Ludwig, Kirk A. (1996). Singular thought and the cartesian theory of mind. NoÃ»s 30 (4):434-460. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)

Maloney, J. Christopher (1991). Saving psychological solipsism. Philosophical Studies 61 (March):267-83. (Google | Annotation)

Manfredi, Pat A. (1993). Two routes to narrow content: Both dead ends. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22. (Cited by 1 | Google)

McDermott, M. (1986). Narrow content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):277-88. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Morris, Katherine J. (1984). In defense of methodological solipsism: A reply to Noonan. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):399-412. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Newman, Andrew E. (2005). Two grades of internalism (pass and fail). Philosophical Studies 122 (2):153-169. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Noonan, Harold W. (1981). Methodological solipsism. Philosophical Studies 40 (September):269-274. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Putnam, Hilary (1987). Fodor and Block on narrow content. In Representation and Reality. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | Annotation)

Quillen, Keith (1986). Propositional attitudes and psychological explanation. Mind and Language 1:133-57. (Google | Annotation)

Recanati, F. (1990). Externalism and narrow content. NoÃ»s. (Google | Annotation)

Recanati, F. (1994). How narrow is narrow content? Dialectica 48 (3-4):209-29. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Rechenauer, Martin (1993). How not to taxonomize mental kinds. Acta Analytica 10 (10):135-141. (Google)

Rechenauer, Martin (1997). Individualism, individuation and that-clauses. Erkenntnis 46 (1):49-67. (Google | More links)

Sawyer, Sarah (2007). There is no viable notion of narrow content. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)

Schiffer, Stephen R. (1990). Fodor's character. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell. (Google)

Segal, Gabriel (2000). A Slim Book About Narrow Content. MIT Press. (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)

Segal, Gabriel (online). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions. (Google | More links)

Segal, Gabriel (2007). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)

Silverberg, Arnold (1995). Narrow content: A defense. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-27. (Google)

Stalnaker, Robert (1990). Narrow content. In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI. (Cited by 27 | Google | Annotation)

Stich, Stephen P. (1991). Narrow content meets fat syntax. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell. (Cited by 13 | Google | Annotation)

Taylor, Kenneth A. (1989). Narrow content functionalism and the mind-body problem. NoÃ»s 23 (3):355-72. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Taylor, Kenneth A. (1989). Supervenience and levels of meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:443-58. (Cited by 2 | Google | Annotation)

Toribio, Josefa (1995). Ruritania and ecology. In Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview. (Google | More links)

Vaughan, R. (1989). Searle's narrow content. Ratio 2 (2):185-90. (Google)

Voltolini, Alberto (1997). Is narrow content the same as content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized? In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter. (Google)

White, Stephen L. (1992). Narrow content and narrow interpretation. In The Unity of the Self. MIT Press. (Cited by 8 | Google | Annotation)

White, Stephen L. (1982). Partial character and the language of thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (October):347-65. (Cited by 35 | Google | Annotation)

Williams, Michael (1990). Social norms and narrow content. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15:425-462. (Google | Annotation)

Williamson, Timothy (1998). The broadness of the mental: Some logical issues. Philosophical Perspectives 12:389-410. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)

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