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updated 2008-05-09
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
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Intentionality :: The Status of Intentionality :: Meaning Skepticism

Aldridge, V. C. (1987). Kripke on Wittgenstein on regulation. Philosophy 62 (July):375-384. (Google)
Allen, Barry G. (1989). Gruesome arithmetic: Kripke's sceptic replies. Dialogue 28 (2):257-264. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1985). Critical notice: Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):103-9. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1985). Review of Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Ethics 95:342-352. (Google)
Baker, G. P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1984). On misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's private language argument. Synthese 58 (3). (Google | More links)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1984). Critical study: On misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's private language argument. Synthese 58. (Google)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1986). Reply to mr Mounce. Philosophical Investigations 9:199-204. (Google)
Blackburn, Simon W. (1984). The individual strikes back. Synthese 58 (March):281-302. (Cited by 46 | Google)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1989). The rule-following considerations. Mind 98 (October):507-49. (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1990). The status of content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84. (Cited by 68 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1990). The status of content revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (December):264-278. (Cited by 14 | Google | Annotation)
Byrne, Alex (1996). On misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):339-343. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1996). The community view. Philosophical Review 105 (4):469-488. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Coates, Paul (1995). Kripke's skeptical paradox: Normativeness and meaning. Mind 1986 (January):77-80. (Google)
Coates, Paul (1997). Meaning, mistake, and miscalculation. Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Collins, A. (1992). On the paradox Kripke finds in Wittgenstein. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18:74-88. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Davies, F. (1998). How sceptical is Kripke's 'sceptical solution'. Philsophia 26 (1-2):119-40. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Davies, S. (1988). Kripke, crusoe and Wittgenstein. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (March):52-66. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Delancey, Craig Stephen (2007). Meaning naturalism, meaning irrealism, and the work of language. Synthese 154 (2):231-257. (Google | More links)
Devitt, Michael (1990). Transcendentalism about content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (December):247-63. (Cited by 13 | Google | Annotation)
Devitt, Michael & Rey, Georges (1991). Transcending transcendentalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72:87-100. (Cited by 12 | Google | Annotation)
Devitt, Michael (1991). Transcending transcendentalism: A response to Boghossian. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (June):87-100. (Cited by 12 | Google | Annotation)
Forbes, Graeme R. (1983). Scepticism and semantic knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:223-37. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Gauker, Christopher (1995). A new skeptical solution. Acta Analytica 113 (14):113-129. (Google)
Gillett, Grant R. (1995). Humpty dumpty and the night of the triffids: Individualism and rule-following. Synthese 105 (2):191-206. (Google)
Ginet, Carl A. (1992). The dispositionalist solutions to Wittgenstein's problem about understanding a rule: Answering Kripke's objection. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17:53-73. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Goldfarb, Warren D. (1982). Kripke on Wittgenstein on rules. Journal of Philosophy 82 (September):471-488. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Hacking, Ian (1993). On Kripke's and Goodman's uses of 'grue'. Philosophy 68 (265):269-295. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hanfling, Oswald (1985). Was Wittgenstein a sceptic? Philosophical Investigations 8 (January):1-16. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Haukioja, Jussi (2006). Hindriks on rule-following. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):219-239. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Haukioja, Jussi (2004). Kripke's finiteness objection to dispositionalist theories of meaning. In M.E. Reicher & J.C. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. (Google)
Haukioja, Jussi (2002). Soames and Zalabardo on Kripke's Wittgenstein. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):157-73. (Google | More links)
Hindriks, Frank A. (2004). A modest solution to the problem of rule-following. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Hoffman, Paul (1985). Kripke on private language. Philosophical Studies 47 (January):23-28. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Hohwy, Jakob (2003). A reduction of kripke-wittgenstein's objections to dispositionalism about meaning. Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-68. (Google | More links)
Hohwy, Jakob (2001). Semantic primitivism and normativity. Ratio 14 (1):1-17. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Horwich, Paul (1990). Wittgenstein and Kripke on the nature of meaning. Mind and Language 5 (2):105-121. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Humphrey, John (online). Some oddities in Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. (Google)
Humphrey, John (online). With factualist friends, Kripke's Wittgenstein needs no enemies: On Byrne's case for Kripke's Wittgenstein being a factualist about meaning attributions. (Google)
Humphrey, John A. (1996). Kripke's Wittgenstein and the impossibility of private language: The same old story? Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):197-207. (Google)
Humphrey, John A. (1999). Quine, Kripke's Wittgenstein, simplicity and sceptical solutions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):43-55. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Inwagen, P. (1992). There is no such thing as addition. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17:138-159. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jackman, Henry (2003). Foundationalism, coherentism, and rule-following skepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):25-41. (Google)
Knorpp, William Max (2003). How to talk to yourself or Kripke's Wittgenstein's solitary language argument and why it fails. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):215–248. (Google)
Kober, Michael (1998). Kripkenstein meets the chinese room: Looking for the place of meaning from a natural point of view. Inquiry 41 (3):317-332. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Kremer, Michael (2000). Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):571-584. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Kripke, Saul A. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 784 | Google)
Kusch, Martin (2005). Fodor V. Kripke: Semantic dispositionalism, idealization, and ceteris paribus clauses. Analysis 65 (286):156-63. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Lance, Mark N. & O'Leary-Hawthorne, John (1997). The Grammar of Meaning. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Landers, S. (1990). Wittgenstein, realism, and CLS: Undermining rule scepticism. Law and Philosophy 9 (2):177-203. (Google | More links)
Lewis, A. (1988). Wittgenstein and rule-scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (July):280-304. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Maddy, Penelope (1986). Mathematical alchemy. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 46 (September):555-575. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
McDonough, Richard M. (1991). Wittgenstein's refutation of meaning-scepticism. In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. De Gruyter. (Google)
McGinn, M. (1984). Kripke on Wittgenstein's sceptical problem. Ratio 26 (June):19-32. (Cited by 2 | Google)
McManus, Denis (2000). Boghossian, Miller and Lewis on dispositional theories of meaning. Mind and Language 15 (4):393-399. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Miller, Alexander (1997). Boghossian on reductive dispositionalism about content: The case strengthened. Mind and Language 12 (1):1-10. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Miller, Alexander (1999). Horwich, meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Millikan, Ruth G. (1990). Truth, rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox. Philosophical Review 99 (3):323-53. (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Montminy, Martin (2005). Meaning skepticism and normativity. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Oderberg, David S. (1987). Kripke and "quus". Theoria 53:115-20. (Google)
Pettit, Philip (1990). The reality of rule-following. Mind 99 (393):1-21. (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Preti, Consuelo (2002). Normativity and meaning: Kripke's skeptical paradox reconsidered. Philosophical Forum 33 (1):39-62. (Google | More links)
Puhl, Klaus (ed.) (1991). Meaning Scepticism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Putnam, Hilary (1985). Why reason can't be naturalized. In Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 47 | Google)
Read, Rupert (1995). The unstatability of Kripkean scepticism. Philosophical Papers 24 (1):67-74. (Google)
Rudebusch, George (1986). Hoffman on Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical Research Archives 12:177-182. (Google)
Sartorelli, Joseph J. (1991). McGinn on content scepticism and Kripke's sceptical argument. Analysis 51 (March):79-84. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1986). Kripkenstein meets the remnants of meaning. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):147-162. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Schroeder, Timothy (2003). Donald Davidson's theory of mind is non-normative. Philosopher's Imprint 3 (1):1-14. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Scruton, Roger (1984). Critical notice: Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Mind 93:592-602. (Google)
Searle, John R. (1984). Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person. Journal of Philosophy 84 (March):123-146. (Cited by 24 | Google)
Searle, John R. (2002). Skepticism about rules and intentionalilty. In Consciousness and Language. Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Shanker, Stuart G. (1984). Sceptical confusions about rule-following. Mind 93 (July):423-29. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Shogenji, T. (1992). Boomerang defense of rule following. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):115-122. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shogenji, T. (1993). Modest scepticism about rule-following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):486-500. (Google | More links)
Shogenji, T. (1995). The problem of rule-following in compositional semantics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):97-108. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Soames, Scott (1998). Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 12:313-48. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Soames, Scott (1998). Skepticism about meaning, indeterminacy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp 23. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Sprevak, Mark D. (forthcoming). Kripke's paradox and the church-Turing thesis. Synthese. (Google | More links)
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Summerfield, Donna M. (1990). On taking the rabbit of rule-following out of the hat of representation: A response to Pettit's The Reality of Rule-Following. Mind 99 (395):425-432. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Summerfield, Donna M. (1990). Philosophical investigations 201: A Wittgensteinian reply to Kripke. Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (3):417-438. (Google)
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Wilson, George M. (1998). Semantic realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):99-122. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Winch, Peter G. (1983). Critical study: Facts and superfacts. Philosophical Quarterly 33:398-404. (Google)
Wright, C. (1984). Kripke's account of the argument against private language. Journal of Philosophy 81 (December):759-78. (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Zalabardo, José L. (1997). Kripke's normativity argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):467-488. (Cited by 11 | Google)

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