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Intentionality :: The Status of Intentionality :: Rule-Following

Ackermann, D. F. (1983). Wittgenstein, rules and origin - privacy. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1:63-69. (Google)
Alward, Peter (online). Are functional properties causally potent? (Google | More links)
Armstrong, Benjamin F. (1984). Wittgenstein on private languages: It takes two to talk. Philosophical Investigations 7 (January):46-62. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1954). Can there be a private language? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 27. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1990). Malcolm on language and rules. Philosophy 65 (252):167-179. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1984). Scepticism, Rules and Language. Blackwell. (Cited by 62 | Google)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1985). Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity. Blackwell. (Cited by 56 | Google | More links)
Bar-On, Dorit (1992). On the possibility of a solitary language. Noûs 26 (1):27-46. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bloor, David (1997). Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions. Routledge. (Cited by 76 | Google | More links)
Budd, Malcolm (1984). Wittgenstein on meaning, interpretation and rules. Synthese 58 (March):303-324. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1984). Baker and Hacker's Wittgenstein. Synthese 58:451-79. (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1985). Ruling-out realism. Philosophia 15 (September):61-78. (Google | More links)
Champlin, T. Stephen (1992). Solitary rule-following. Philosophy 67 (261):285-306. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Craig, Edward (1997). Meaning and privacy. In Bob Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Davidson, Donald (1992). The second person. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17:255-267. (Cited by 62 | Google)
Diamond, Cora (1989). Rules: Looking in the right place. In Dayton Z. Phillips & Peter G. Winch (eds.), Wittgenstein. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Dwyer, Philip (1989). Freedom and rule-following in Wittgenstein and Sartre. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (September):49-68. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ebbs, Gary (1997). Rule-Following and Realism. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Eldridge, Richard T. (1986). The normal and the normative: Wittgenstein's legacy, Kripke, and Cavell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):555-575. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Finkelstein, David H. (2000). Wittgenstein on rules and platonism. In Alice Crary & Rupert Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein. Routledge. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gottlieb, D. F. (1983). Wittgenstein's critique of the "tractatus" view of rules. Synthese 56 (August):239-251. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hacking, Ian (1985). Rules, scepticism, proof, Wittgenstein. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Google)
Hale, Bob (1997). Rule-following, objectivity and meaning. In Bob Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Hanfling, Oswald (1984). What does the private language argument prove? Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):468-481. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Haukioja, Jussi (2004). Is solitary rule-following possible? Philosophia 32 (1-4):131-154. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Heil, John & Martin, C. B. (1998). Rules and powers. Philosophical Perspectives 12:283-312. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hetherington, Stephen C. (1991). Kripke and McGinn on Wittgensteinian rule-following. Philosophia 21 (1-2):89-100. (Google | More links)
Holtzman, S. & Leich, Christopher M. (eds.) (1981). Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Huff, Douglas (1981). Family resemblances and rule-governed behavior. Philosophical Investigations 4:1-23. (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Wittgenstein on practice and the myth of the giving. In Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Krebs, V. (1986). Objectivity and meaning: Wittgenstein on following rules. Philosophical Investigations 9 (July):177-186. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Malcolm, Norman (1989). Wittgenstein on language and rules. Philosophy 64 (January):5-28. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Martin, C. B. & Heil, John (1998). Rules and powers. Philosophical Perspectives 12:283-312. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
McDowell, John (1991). Intentionality and interiority in Wittgenstein: Comment on Crispin Wright. In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 12 | Google)
McDowell, John (1992). Meaning and intentionality in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17:40-52. (Cited by 20 | Google)
McDowell, John (1981). Non-cognitivism and rule-following. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. (Cited by 44 | Google)
McDowell, John (1984). Wittgenstein on following a rule. Synthese 58 (March):325-364. (Cited by 78 | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1984). Wittgenstein on Meaning. Blackwell. (Cited by 69 | Google)
Miller, Alexander (2004). Rule-following and externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Miller, Alexander & Wright, C. (eds.) (2002). Rule-Following and Meaning. Acumen. (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Miller, Alexander (1998). Rule-following, response-dependence, and McDowell's debate with anti-realism. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Minar, Edward H. (1991). Wittgenstein and the 'contingency' of community. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):203-234. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Miscevic, Nenad (1996). The skeptic and the hoverfly (a teleo-computational view of rule-following). Acta Analytica 17 (16):171-187. (Google)
Moser, Paul K. (1992). Beyond the private language argument. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):77-89. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Moser, Paul K. (1991). Malcolm on Wittgenstein on rules. Philosophy 66 (January):101-105. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mounce, H. O. (1986). Following a rule. Philosophical Investigations 9 (July):187-198. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pettit, Philip (2005). On rule-following, folk psychology, and the economy of esteem: A reply to Boghossian, Dreier and Smith. Philosophical Studies 124 (2):233-259. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Putnam, Hilary (1983). Analyticity and apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine. In Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Putnam, Hilary (1996). On Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (70):243-264. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Read, Rupert (2000). What 'there can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word' could possibly mean. In Alice Crary & Rupert Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein. Routledge. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rhees, Rush (1954). Can there be a private language? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 28. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Smart, J. J. C. (1992). Wittgenstein, following a rule, and scientific psychology. In Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), The Scientific Enterprise. Kluwer. (Google)
Stroud, Barry G. (1996). Mind, meaning and practice. In Hans D. Sluga & D. G. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Stroud, Barry G. (1965). Wittgenstein and logical necessity. Philosophical Review 74 (October):504-518. (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Tait, William W. (1986). Wittgenstein and the 'skeptical paradoxes'. Journal of Philosophy 9 (September):475-488. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Tanney, Julia (2000). Playing the rule-following game. Philosophy 75 (292):203-224. (Google | More links)
Temkin, J. (1986). A private language argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24:109-121. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Traiger, Saul (1994). The secret operations of the mind. Minds and Machines 4 (3):303-315. (Google | More links)
Verheggen, Claudine (1995). Wittgenstein and 'solitary' languages. Philosophical Investigations 18 (4):329-347. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Voltolini, Alberto (2001). Why the computational account of rule-following cannot rule out the grammatical account. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):82-104. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Walton, Douglas N. & Strongman, K. T. (1998). Neonate crusoes, the private language argument and psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):443-65. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Williams, Michael (1991). Blind obedience: Rules, community and the individual. In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Williams, Michael (1983). Wittgenstein on representation, privileged objects and private language. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (March):57-78. (Google)
Wright, C. (1981). Rule-following, objectivity and the theory of meaning. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Wright, C. (2001). Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes From Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Wright, C. (1991). Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind: Sensation, privacy and intention. In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. De Gruyter. (Cited by 23 | Google)
Wright, C. (1980). Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 49 | Google)
Wright, C. (1989). Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and the central project of theoretical linguistics. In A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell. (Cited by 41 | Google)
Zalabardo, José L. (1989). Rules, communities and judgement. Critica 21 (63):33-58. (Google)

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