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2.5. Aspects of Intentionality (Aspects of Intentionality on PhilPapers)

2.5a Naturalism and Intentionality

Alfano, Mark (forthcoming). Nietzsche, naturalism, and the tenacity of the intentional. International Studies in Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demands that “psychology shall be
recognized again as the queen of the sciences.” While one might cast a dubious glance at the “again,” many of Nietzsche’s insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In Genealogy, he criticizes the “English psychologists” for the “inherent psychological absurdity” of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic
actions would be forgotten. Tabling whether this criticism is valid, we see Nietzsche’s methodological naturalism here: moral claims should be grounded in empirical psychological claims. Later in Genealogy, Nietzsche advances his own naturalistic account of the origins of good, bad, and evil.
Three cheers for methodological naturalism, but it was not Nietzsche’s innovation, and he did not pioneer its application to morality. The list of moral naturalists who appealed to psychology arguably includes Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Bentham, and Mill, among many others. If Nietzsche’s naturalism is to be worth the candle of contemporary scholarship, it must involve more than the methodological naturalism that predated him by centuries and to which he made no serious contribution. Nietzsche’s key contribution to naturalism is not his adherence to its methodology, but his discovery of certain psychological facts. In particular, he realized that mental states are not ordinary dyadic relations between a subject and an intentional content. Nietzsche discovered the tenacity of intentional states: when an intentional state loses its object (because the subject realizes the object does not exist, because the object is forbidden, or because of something else), a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. As Nietzsche puts it Genealogy, “Man would rather will the void than be void of will.” Nietzsche relies on the tenacity thesis in his explanation of the origin of bad conscience: “All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward […. They turn] against [their] possessors.” When hostility towards others becomes impossible, hostility does not disappear; instead, its object is replaced.
Bealer, George (1996). Materialism and the logical structure of intentionality. In Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis a feature which entails the existence of a nonphysical "level of organization"
Beckermann, Ansgar (1996). Is there a problem about intentionality? Erkenntnis 45 (1):1-24.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The crucial point of the mind-body-problem appears to be that mental phenome- na (events, properties, states) seem to have features which at first sight make it impossible to integrate these phenomena into a naturalistic world view, i.e. to identify them with, or to reduce them to, physical phenomena.1 In the contemp- orary discussion, there are mainly two critical features which are important in this context. The first of these is the feature of intentional states, e.g. beliefs and desires, to have a representational or semantic content. The problem of the naturalization of these states I will call the problem of intentionality. The second critical feature is the property of other mental states, e.g. perceptions and sensations, to have a qualitative aspect, i.e. that it is somehow, or feels in a characteristic way, to be in one of those states. The problem of the naturalization of these states is generally called the qualia-problem
Beckermann, Ansgar (1988). Why tropistic systems are not genuine intentional systems. Erkenntnis 29 (July):125-142.   (Google | More links)
Bestor, Thomas W. (1991). Naturalizing semantics: New insights or old folly? Inquiry 34 (September):285-310.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Boden, Margaret A. (1970). Intentionality and physical systems. Philosophy of Science 32 (June):200-214.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Bontly, Thomas D. (2001). Should Intentionality Be Naturalized? In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brentano, Franz Clemens (1874). Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge.   (Google)
Conee, Earl (1995). Supervenience and intentionality. In Supervenience: New Essays. Needham Heights: Cambridge.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Coseru, Christian (2009). Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach. Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of sva- samvitti (“self-awareness,” “self-cognition”) following similar attempts in the domains of phe- nomenology and analytic epistemology. I examine the extent to which recent work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and inten- tionality could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. I am also concerned with naturalism more generally, and the ways in which spe- cific models such as that of embodied cognition, can benefit from some of the valuable insights of Buddhist epistemology.
Devitt, Michael (1994). The methodology of naturalistic semantics. Journal of Philosophy 91 (10):519-44.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Dowell, J. L. (2004). From metaphysical to substantive naturalism: A case study. Synthese 138 (2):149-173.   (Google | More links)
Egan, Frances (2003). Naturalistic inquiry: Where does mental representation fit in? In Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Enc, Berent (1982). Intentional states of mechanical devices. Mind 91 (April):161-182.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Millikan, Ruth G. (2000). Naturalizing intentionality. In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosopy Documentation Center.   (Google)
Abstract: Brentano was surely mistaken, however, in thinking that bearing a relation to something nonexistent marks only the mental. Given any sort of purpose, it might not get fulfilled, hence might exhibit Brentano's relation, and there are many natural purposes, such as the purpose of one's stomach to digest food or the purpose of one's protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand, that are not mental, nor derived from anything mental. Nor are stomachs and reflexes "of" or"about" anything. A reply might be, I suppose, that natural purposes are "purposes" only in an analogical sense hence "fail to be fulfilled" only in an analogical way. They bear an analogy to things that have been intentionally designed by purposive minds, hence can fail to accomplish the purposes they analogically have. As such they also have only analogical "intentionality". Such a response begs the question, however, for it assumes that natural purposes are not purposes in the full sense exactly because they are not
Greenberg, Mark (2005). A new map of theories of mental content. Noûs 39 (1):299-320.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Haldane, John J. (1989). Naturalism and the problem of intentionality. Inquiry 32 (September):305-22.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Heil, John (2004). Natural intentionality. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Horowitz, Amir (1990). Intentional and physical relations. Manuscrito 13 (1):55-67.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1994). Naturalism and intentionality. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (2003). Chisholm's legacy on intentionality. Metaphilosophy 34 (5):649-662.   (Google | More links)
Madell, Geoffrey C. (1989). Physicalism and the content of thought. Inquiry 32 (1):107-21.   (Google)
Martin, C. B. & Pfeifer, Karl (1986). Intentionality and the non-psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):531-54.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Moran, Dermot (1996). The inaugural address: Brentano's thesis. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70 (70):1-27.   (Google)
Nelson, Raymond J. (1988). Mechanism and intentionality: The new world knot. In Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google)
Nochlin, Philip (1953). Reducibility and intentional words. Journal of Philosophy 50 (October):625-637.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Potrc, Matjaz (2001). Nonreductive realism and preservative irrealism. Acta Analytica 16 (26):61-74.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1989). The heart of the mind: Intentionality versus intelligence. In J. R. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.   (Google)
Rietveld, Erik (2008). The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions: Phenomena and Neurodynamics. Theory & Psychology 18 (3):341-361.   (Google)
Abstract: For Merleau-Ponty,consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective ‘I can’ and not explicit ‘I think that.’ The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (‘affordances’) and the organism’s capacities. From Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading ‘I can’ may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested that a better understanding of the self-organization of brain and behavior is important, I will re-read his descriptions of skillful coping in the light of recent ideas on neurodynamics. Affective processes play a crucial role in evaluating the motivational significance of objects and contribute to the individual’s prereflective responsiveness to relevant affordances.
Rowlands, Mark (2006). The normativity of action. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):401-416.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The concept of action is playing an increasingly prominent role in attempts to explain how subjects can represent the world. The idea is that at least some of the role traditionally assigned to internal representations can, in fact, be played by the ability of subjects to act on the world, and the exercise of that ability on appropriate occasions. This paper argues that the appeal to action faces a serious dilemma. If the concept of action employed is a representational one, then the appeal to action is circular: representation has been presupposed rather than explained. However, if the concept of action employed is a non-representational one, then the appeal to action will be inadequate: in particular, the appeal will fail to account for the normativity of representation. The way out of this dilemma is to develop a conception of action that is normative, but where this normativity is not inherited from the action's connection to distinct representational states. The normative status of such actions would be sui generis. This paper argues that such a conception of action is available
Searle, John R. (1984). Intentionality and its place in nature. Synthese 38 (October):87-100.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Silvers, Stuart (1991). On naturalizing the semantics of mental representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (March):49-73.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Smith, David Woodruff (1999). Intentionality naturalized? In Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. & Laurence, Stephen (1994). Intentionality and naturalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19:159-82.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: ...the deepest motivation for intentional irrealism derives not from such relatively technical worries about individualism and holism as we
Thomas, Sid (1962). Professor Sellars on meaning and aboutness. Philosophical Studies 13 (5):68-74.   (Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (1994). Naturalism and the problem of intentionality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (September):122-42.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Ward, Andrew (1999). Naturalism and the mental realm. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):157-167.   (Google)
Windes, James D. (1975). Intentionality, behavior, and identity theory. Behaviorism 3:156-161.   (Google)

2.5c Rule-Following

Ackermann, D. F. (1983). Wittgenstein, rules and origin - privacy. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1:63-69.   (Google)
Alward, Peter (online). Are functional properties causally potent?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has recently[1] argued that a solution to the exclusion argument against the intelligibility of mental causation is to found if mental properties can be shown to be reducible to physical properties
Ammereller, Erich (2004). Puzzles about rule-following : Pi 185-242. In Erich Ammereller & Eugen Fisher (eds.), Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the Philosophical Investigations. Routledge.   (Google)
Armstrong, Benjamin F. (1984). Wittgenstein on private languages: It takes two to talk. Philosophical Investigations 7 (January):46-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1954). Can there be a private language? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. vol. 28.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1990). Malcolm on language and rules. Philosophy 65 (252):167-179.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1984). Scepticism, Rules and Language. Blackwell.   (Cited by 62 | Google)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1985). Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity. Blackwell.   (Cited by 56 | Google | More links)
Bar-On, Dorit (1992). On the possibility of a solitary language. Noûs 26 (1):27-46.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bernasconi-Kohn, Lorenzo (2006). How not to think about rules and rule following: A response to Stueber. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This article offers a critique of Karsten Stueber’s account of rule following as presented in his article "How to Think about Rules and Rule Following." The task Stueber sets himself is of defending the idea that human practices are bound and guided by rules (both causally and normatively) while avoiding the discredited "cognitive model of rule following." This article argues that Stueber’s proposal is unconvincing because it falls foul of the very problems it sets out to avoid. Stueber’s defense of rules as normative guides is shown to be either circular or burdened with an infinite regress, while his account of rules as causal determinants of our actions is shown to lapse back into the "cognitive model" that he explicitly rejects. Key Words: rules • rule following • norms • causes • social science
Blackburn, Simon (1981). Reply : Rule-following and moral realism. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. Routledge.   (Google)
Bloor, David (1997). Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions. Routledge.   (Cited by 76 | Google)
Abstract: David Bloor's challenging new evaluation of Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following brings together the rare combination of philosophical and sociological viewpoints. Wittgenstein enigmatically claimed that the way we follow rules is an "institution" without ever explaining what he meant by this term. Wittgenstein's contribution to the debate has since been subject to sharply opposed interpretations by "collectivist" and "individualist" readings by philosophers; in the light of this controversy, Bloor argues convincingly for a collectivist, sociological understanding of Wittgenstein's later work. Accessible and simply written, this book provides the first consistent sociological reading of Wittgenstein's work for many years
Boghossian, Paul A. (1993). Sense, reference and rule-following. Philosophical Issues 4:135-141.   (Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1989). The rule-following considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Bridges, Jason (online). Rule-following skepticism, properly so called.   (Google)
Budd, Malcolm (1984). Wittgenstein on meaning, interpretation and rules. Synthese 58 (March):303-324.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Burbules, Nicholas C. & Smith, Richard (2005). 'What it makes sense to say': Wittgenstein, rule-following and the nature of education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (3):425–430.   (Google | More links)
Cain, M. J. (2006). Concept nativism and the rule following considerations. Acta Analytica 21 (38):77-101.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the most prominent and familiar features of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations generate a powerful argument for the thesis that most of our concepts are innate, an argument that echoes a Chomskyan poverty of the stimulus argument. This argument has a significance over and above what it tells us about Wittgenstein’s implicit commitments. For, it puts considerable pressure on widely held contemporary views of concept learning, such as the view that we learn concepts by constructing prototypes. This should lead us to abandon our general default hostility to concept nativism and be much more sceptical of claims made on behalf of learning theories
Carruthers, Peter (1984). Baker and Hacker's Wittgenstein. Synthese 58 (3):451-79.   (Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (1985). Ruling-out realism. Philosophia 15 (1-2):61-78.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The case for anti-realism in the theory of meaning, as presented by Dummen and Wright, 1 is only partly convincing. There is, I shall suggest, a crucial lacuna in the argument, that can only be filled by the later Wittgenstein's following-a-rule considerations. So it is the latter that provides the strongest argument for the rejection of semantic realism.
By 'realism', throughout, I should be taken as referring to any conception of meaning that leaves open the possibility that a sentence may have a determinate truth-value although we are incapable - either in practice or in principle - of discovering what truth-value it has ('the possibility of veritication-transcendence' for short). 2 I shall say nothing further about what an anti-realist semantics might look like, nor about the possible consequences for logic, epistemology and metaphysics, beyond the fact that it must involve the rejection of any such conception of meaning.
Champlin, T. Stephen (1992). Solitary rule-following. Philosophy 67 (261):285-306.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Cheng, Kai-Yuan (forthcoming). A new look at the problem of rule-following: A generic perspective. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to look at the problem of rule-following—notably discussed by Kripke (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 1982 ) and Wittgenstein (Philosophical investigations, 1953 )—from the perspective of the study of generics. Generics are sentences that express generalizations that tolerate exceptions. I first suggest that meaning ascriptions be viewed as habitual sentences, which are a sub-set of generics. I then seek a proper semantic analysis for habitually construed meaning sentences. The quantificational approach is rejected, due to its persistent difficulties. Instead, a cognitive approach is adopted, where psychological considerations of meaning attributors play a crucial role. This account is then compared with the picture of meaning offered by Kripke and Wittgenstein, respectively. I show how this fresh way of conceiving of meaning sentences respects some of their insights while avoiding some of the drawbacks, and serves to improve the framework in which the current debate and inquiry about rule-following are conducted
Cozzo, Cesare (2004). Rule-following and the objectivity of proof. In Annalisa Coliva & Eva Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il poligrafo.   (Google)
Abstract: Ideas on meaning, rules and mathematical proofs abound in Wittgenstein’s writings. The undeniable fact that they are present together, sometimes intertwined in the same passage of Philosophical Investigations or Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, does not show, however, that the connection between these ideas is necessary or inextricable. The possibility remains, and ought to be checked, that they can be plausibly and consistently separated. I am going to examine two views detectable in Wittgenstein’s works: one about proofs, the other about meaning and rules. The first is the denial of the objectivity of proof. The second is a conception of meaning stemming from the rule-following considerations. I shall argue that, though Wittgenstein seems to conjoin the two views, they can be, and should be, separated1
Craig, Edward (1997). Meaning and privacy. In Bob Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Croom, Adam M. (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Google)
Abstract: Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon which it relies, because this has been sufficiently misunderstood by critics and rarely articulated by commentators. After clarifying McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism, I extend the analysis to show that commentators of McDowell have failed to appreciate his argument and that critical responses have been weak. I argue against three challenges posed to McDowell, and show that the case of thick concepts should lead us to reject non-cognitivism.
Croom, Adam M. (2010). Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox. Dialogue 52 (2/3):103-109.   (Google)
Abstract: In §201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous “rule-following paradox.” The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule – the applications of which are potentially infinite – when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule-following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical position that there are no facts that we follow a rule but that there are still conditions under which we are warranted in asserting of others that they are following a rule. In this paper, I explain why Kripke’s solution to the rule-following paradox fails. I then offer an alternative.
Davidson, Donald (1992). The second person. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17:255-267.   (Cited by 62 | Google)
Diamond, Cora (1989). Rules: Looking in the right place. In Dayton Z. Phillips & Peter G. Winch (eds.), Wittgenstein.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Dwyer, Philip (1989). Freedom and rule-following in Wittgenstein and Sartre. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (September):49-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ebbs, Gary (1997). Rule-Following and Realism. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Eldridge, Richard T. (1986). The normal and the normative: Wittgenstein's legacy, Kripke, and Cavell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):555-575.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Finkelstein, David H. (2000). Wittgenstein on rules and platonism. In Alice Crary & Rupert Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein. Routledge.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gerrans, Philip (1998). How to be a conformist, part II. simulation and rule following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):566 – 586.   (Google)
Gerrans, Philip, Tacit knowledge, rule following and Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy of social science.   (Google)
Abstract: Pierre Bourdieu has developed a philosophy of social science, grounded in the phenomenological tradition, which treats knowledge as a practical ability embodied in skilful behaviour, rather than an intellectual capacity for the representation and manipulation of propositional knowledge. He invokes Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following as one way of explicating the idea that knowledge is a skill. Bourdieu’s conception of tacit knowledge is a dispositional one, adopted to avoid a perceived dilemma for methodological individualism. That dilemma requires either the explanation of regularities in social behaviour as the result of the tacit representation of procedural rules (‘legalism’) or the self-conscious representation of behavioural goals (‘voluntarism’) by individuals. After explaining the apparent dilemma, I then argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule following actually undermine, rather than support, a dispositional solution. Nonetheless, the philosophy of social science can survive without a dispositional account of knowledge. Such a social science needs, firstly, to embrace one horn of the dilemma, voluntarism, provided that the relevant regularities can be explained as unintended consequences of agents’ self-represented intentions. Secondly, such a social science should treat theorists’ interpretations as unifying generalizations, not hypotheses about the acquisition of tacit knowledge. Finally, where appeal to cognitive psychology can distinguish otherwise equivalent theories in social science, social science should incorporate the data of cognitive psychology concerning tacit mental processes
Gillett, Grant R. (1995). Humpty dumpty and the night of the triffids: Individualism and rule-following. Synthese 105 (2):191-206.   (Google | More links)
Gottlieb, D. F. (1983). Wittgenstein's critique of the "tractatus" view of rules. Synthese 56 (August):239-251.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Guardo, Andrea (forthcoming). Kripke's account of the rule-following considerations. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: This paper argues that most of the alleged straight solutions to the sceptical paradox which Kripke (1982) ascribed to Wittgenstein can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. The dilemma is proved to be a by-product of a foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification, as applied to linguistic behaviour. It is maintained that the assumption is unnecessary and that the dilemma is therefore spurious. To this end, an alternative conception of the justification of linguistic behaviour is outlined, a conception that vindicates some of the insights behind Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical solution of the paradox. This alternative conception is defended against two objections (both familiar from McDowell's works): (1) that it would imply that for the linguistic community there is no authority, no standard to meet and, therefore, no possibility of error and (2) that it would lead to a kind of idealism
Hacking, Ian (1985). Rules, scepticism, proof, Wittgenstein. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hadley, Robert F. (1990). Connectionism, rule-following, and symbolic manipulation. Proc AAAI 3 (2):183-200.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Hale, Bob (1997). Rule-following, objectivity and meaning. In Bob Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Hanfling, Oswald (1984). What does the private language argument prove? Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):468-481.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hattiangadi, Anandi (2003). Making it implicit: Brandom on rule-following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):419-31.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Hattiangadi, Anandi (2007). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Haukioja, Jussi (2006). Hindriks on rule-following. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):219-239.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks
Haukioja, Jussi (2005). Is solitary rule-following possible? Philosophia 32 (1-4):131-154.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discover whether or not a solitary individual, a human being isolated from birth, could become a rule-follower. The argumentation against this possibility rests on the claim that such an isolate could not become aware of a normative standard, with which her actions could agree or disagree. As a consequence, theorists impressed by this argumentation adopt a view on which the normativity of rules arises from corrective practices in which agents engage in a community. However, it has been suggested that an isolated individual could engage in such a practice by herself. Three prospective examples of such cases are considered, and the possibility of solitary rule-following is vindicated. Furthermore, the nature of the goals at which rule-following practices generally aim is clarified
Heal, Jane (2009). Rule-following and its ramifications. Analysis 69 (3).   (Google)
Heil, John & Martin, C. B. (1998). Rules and powers. Philosophical Perspectives 12:283-312.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hershfield, Jeffrey (2005). Rule following and the background. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: . In his work on language John Searle favors an Austinian approach that emphasizes the speech act as the basic unit of meaning and communication, and which sees speaking a language as engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior. He couples this with a strident opposition to cognitivist approaches that posit unconscious rule following as the causal basis of linguistic competence. In place of unconscious rule following Searle posits what he calls the Background, comprised of nonintentional (nonrepresentational) mental phenomena. I argue that these two aspects of his philosophy of language cannot be reconciled. In order to preserve his view of language as a rule-governed activity, he must embrace the cognitivist idea of unconscious rule following. Finally, I try to show how such an accommodation would be far less traumatic to Searle’s philosophical system than it might otherwise seem
Hetherington, Stephen C. (1991). Kripke and McGinn on Wittgensteinian rule-following. Philosophia 21 (1-2):89-100.   (Google | More links)
Hindriks, Frank A. (2004). A modest solution to the problem of rule-following. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Holton, Richard & Price, Huw (2003). Ramsey on saying and whistling: A discordant note. Noûs 37 (2):325–341.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In 'General Propositions and Causality' Ramsey rejects his earlier view that universal generalizations are infinite conjunctions, arguing that they are not genuine propositions at all. We argue that his new position is unstable. The issues about infinity that lead Ramsey to the new view are essentially those underlying Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. If they show that generalizations are not genuine propositions, they show that there are no genuine propositions. The connection raises interesting historical questions about the direction of influence between Ramsey and Wittgenstein, the origin of the rule-following argument, and the influence of writers such as Brouwer.
Holtzman, S. & Leich, Christopher M. (eds.) (1981). Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Huff, Douglas (1981). Family resemblances and rule-governed behavior. Philosophical Investigations 4 (3):1-23.   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Wittgenstein on practice and the myth of the giving. In Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jackman, Henry (2003). Foundationalism, coherentism, and rule-following skepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):25-41.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands semantic justification in foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments lead not to a type of skepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about semantic justification, and thus a holist about semantic facts
Kavka, Gregory S. (1995). The rationality of rule-following: Hobbes's dispute with the foole. Law and Philosophy 14 (1).   (Google)
Kraft, Tim (2009). Oughts and thoughts: Rule-following and the normativity of content, by Anandi Hattiangadi. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):336-341.   (Google)
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Landy, David (2008). Hegel's account of rule-following. Inquiry 51 (2):170 – 193.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I here discuss Hegel's rule-following considerations as they are found in the first four chapters of his Phenomenology of Spirit. I begin by outlining a number of key premises in Hegel's argument that he adopts fairly straightforwardly from Kant's Transcendental Deduction. The most important of these is that the correctness or incorrectness of one's application of a rule must be recognizable as such to the rule-follower. Supplementing Hegel's text as needed, I then argue that it is possible for an experiencing subject to follow a rule only where there is a community of individuals whose agreement can provide a standard for the correctness and incorrectness of his use. I further argue that a community must consist of members that are compresent, and thus that a collection of time-slices of an individual will not serve this purpose. I conclude by raising a potential problem for Hegel's account of rule-following concerning the correctness and incorrectness of the judgments of a community, and pointing to a possible line of response to this problem
Lang, Gerald (2001). The rule-following considerations and metaethics: Some false moves. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):190–209.   (Google | More links)
Long, Roderick T., Rule-following, praxeology, and anarchy.   (Google)
Abstract: JEL Classification: B41, B53, B31, B2, P48, A12 Abstract: Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has important implications for two aspects of Austrian theory. First, it makes it possible to reconcile the Misesian, Rothbardian, and hermeneutical approaches to methodology; second, it provides a way of defending a stateless legal order against the charge that such an order lacks, yet needs, a final arbiter
Lotfi, Shidan (2009). Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and moral particularism. Theoria 75 (2):100-116.   (Google)
Abstract: Moral particularists have seen Wittgenstein as a close ally. One of the main reasons for this is that particularists such as Jonathan Dancy and John McDowell have argued that Wittgenstein's so-called "rule-following considerations" (RFCs) provide support for their skepticism about the existence and/or role of rules and principles in ethics. In this paper, I show that while Wittgenstein's RFCs challenge the notion that competence with language, i.e., the ability to apply concepts properly, is like mechanically following a rule, he does not reject the idea that there are rules that govern proper use of language. I then argue that while the RFCs may, at best, support a weak form of particularism that denies that moral competence is dependent on an explicit grasp of rules, they do not support a stronger version of particularism that denies that there are any true rules or principles in ethics
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Miller, Alexander & Wright, C. (eds.) (2002). Rule-Following and Meaning. Acumen.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
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Miscevic, Nenad (1996). The skeptic and the hoverfly (a teleo-computational view of rule-following). Acta Analytica 17 (16):171-187.   (Google)
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Abstract: However, if Wittgenstein’s so called rule-following considerations are correct, then this reason for believing in the validity of (C), is mistaken. The conclusion of those considerations is that we must reject the idea that rules are things which determine possible cases of application before those cases are actually encountered and decided by speakers. If this is right, then there is no rule which determines the meanings of new sentences, i.e. before those sentences have actually been used. Therefore, it might seem that (C) is not valid for natural languages
Panjvani, Cyrus (2008). Rule-following, explanation-transcendence, and private language. Mind 117 (466):303-328.   (Google)
Abstract: I examine what I take to be an important consideration for the later Wittgenstein: the understanding of a rule does not exceed or transcend an understanding of explanations or instructions in the rule. I contend that this consideration plays a central role in the later Wittgenstein's views on rule-following. I first show that it serves as a key premiss in a sceptical argument concerning our ability to follow rules. I then argue that this consideration is vital to Wittgenstein's case against what I describe as a realist view of rules. This realist view requires that our understanding of a rule extend beyond what can be understood from any set of instructions or explanation. For Wittgenstein, because this is to transcend publicly available means of conveying understanding, this realist's understanding is a private understanding. He calls this private source of understanding an ‘intuition’ and the main line of argument against intuition in our understanding of a rule draws, appropriately, on what is called his ‘private language argument’. In this paper, I defend a non-verificationist reading of this argument and its use against the realist so-construed. CiteULike    Connotea    What's this?
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Pettit, Philip (2005). On rule-following, folk psychology, and the economy of esteem: A reply to Boghossian, Dreier and Smith. Philosophical Studies 124 (2):233-259.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Pettit, Philip (1990). The reality of rule-following. Mind 99 (393):1-21.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Preda, Alex (2000). Order with things? Humans, artifacts, and the sociological problem of rule-following. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (3):269–298.   (Google | More links)
Proudfoot, Diane (2004). The implications of an externalist theory of rule-following behavior for robot cognition. Minds and Machines 14 (3):283-308.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Given (1) Wittgensteins externalist analysis of the distinction between following a rule and behaving in accordance with a rule, (2) prima facie connections between rule-following and psychological capacities, and (3) pragmatic issues about training, it follows that most, even all, future artificially intelligent computers and robots will not use language, possess concepts, or reason. This argument suggests that AIs traditional aim of building machines with minds, exemplified in current work on cognitive robotics, is in need of substantial revision
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Rietveld, Erik (2008). Situated normativity: The normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action. Mind 117 (468):973-1001.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein’s insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, ‘directed discontent’, is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein’s ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert’s socio-cultural practice and the individual’s situated and lived normativity.
Savigny, Eike V. (1991). Self-conscious individual versus social soul: The rationale of Wittgenstein's discussion of rule following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):67-84.   (Google | More links)
Schlosser, Markus E. (forthcoming). The Metaphysics of Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (2008). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rule-following.
Sharrock, Wes & Button, Graham (1999). Do the right thing! Rule finitism, rule scepticism and rule following. Human Studies 22 (2-4).   (Google)
Abstract: Rule following is often made an unnecessary mystery in the philosophy of social science. One form of mystification is the issue of 'rule finitism', which raises the puzzle as to how a learner can possibly extend the rule to applications beyond those examples which have been given as instruction in the rule. Despite the claim that this problem originated in the work of Wittgenstein, it is clear that his philosophical method is designed to evaporate, not perpetuate, such problems. The supposed problem of rule finitism is malformed, deriving from misconceptions about the relation between understanding a rule and making an application of it
Shanker, Stuart G. (1984). Sceptical confusions about rule-following. Mind 93 (July):423-29.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Shogenji, T. (1992). Boomerang defense of rule following. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):115-122.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shogenji, T. (1993). Modest scepticism about rule-following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):486-500.   (Google | More links)
Shogenji, T. (1995). The problem of rule-following in compositional semantics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):97-108.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shogenji, Tomoji (2000). The problem of the criterion in rule-following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):501-525.   (Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1992). Wittgenstein, following a rule, and scientific psychology. In Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), The Scientific Enterprise. Kluwer.   (Google)
Soames, Scott (1998). Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 12:313-48.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Soames, Scott (1998). Skepticism about meaning, indeterminacy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp 23:211--50.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Stahl, Titus (2007). Practices, Norms and Recognition. Human Affairs 17 (1):10-21.   (Google)
Abstract: The problem of the social foundations of normativity can be illuminated by discussing the narrower question whether rule-following is necessarily a social matter. The problems with individualistic theories of rule-following seem to make such a conclusion unavoidable. Social theories of rule-following, however, seem to only push back one level the dilemma of having to choose either an infinite regress of interpretations or a collapse into non-normative descriptions. The most plausible of these models, Haugeland's conformism, can avoid these objections if it is supplemented with an ontologically reasonable concept of the collective attitude of a group. Groups of individuals who are bound to shared norms by recognizing each other as equipped with a standard authority of criticism have the necessary properties for ascribing to those groups such collective attitudes. Given such a weak notion of a collective attitude, there is hope for a plausible collectivist theory of rule-following.
Stenning, Keith & van Lambalgen, Michiel (2007). Logic in the study of psychiatric disorders: Executive function and rule-following. Topoi 26 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Executive function has become an important concept in explanations of psychiatric disorders, but we currently lack comprehensive models of normal executive function and of its malfunctions. Here we illustrate how defeasible logical analysis can aid progress in this area. We illustrate using autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as example disorders, and show how logical analysis reveals commonalities between linguistic and non-linguistic behaviours within each disorder, and how contrasting sub-components of executive function are involved across disorders. This analysis reveals how logical analysis is as applicable to fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning as it is to slow deliberate cogitation
Struck, James Timothy, Law and rule following as arbitrary-excessive rule following and law following as potentially violating too many human rights and freedoms and open to slavery like treatment of persons.   (Google)
Abstract: Laws from guardianship, monopoly, corruption, and fraud are open to arbitrariness. Arbitrariness is a normal concern as human rights and freedoms of too many persons are potentially violated. Slave like treatment of many persons would follow if guardianship, monopoly, corruption and fraud laws were applied to all persons. Application of laws can give rise to significant human rights violations and abuses. Laws become discriminatory when applied to many rather than just some persons. Rule following or citation is sometimes described as helpful with regard to evaluating the worth of a scientific article, Justice or judge, but rule following with regard to application of laws can result in discrimination against persons. We look at examples with regard to corruption, monopoly, guardianship and fraud to disclose that application of laws would violate rights of too many
Stroud, Barry G. (1996). Mind, meaning and practice. In Hans D. Sluga & D. G. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
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Stueber, Karsten R. (2005). How to think about rules and rule following. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This article will discuss the difficulties of providing a plausible account of rule following in the social realm. It will show that the cognitive model of rule following is not suited for this task. Nevertheless, revealing the inadequacy of the cognitive model does not justify the wholesale dismissal of understanding human practices as rule-following practices, as social theorists like Bourdieu or Dreyfus have argued. Instead it will be shown that rule-following behavior is best understood as being based on a set of complex dispositions. In this manner one is able to account for the causal explanatory role of the notion of a rule. Key Words: rules • norms • explanation • Bourdieu • Winch
Summerfield, Donna M. (1990). On taking the rabbit of rule-following out of the hat of representation: A response to Pettit's The Reality of Rule-Following. Mind 99 (395):425-432.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Tait, William W. (1986). Wittgenstein and the 'skeptical paradoxes'. Journal of Philosophy 83 (September):475-488.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Tanney, Julia (2000). Playing the rule-following game. Philosophy 75 (292):203-224.   (Google | More links)
Temkin, J. (1986). A private language argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24:109-121.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Thornton, Tim (1997). Intention, rule following and the strategic role of Wright's order of determination test. Philosophical Investigations 20 (2):136–151.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I believe that Wright’s constructivist account of intention is funda- mentally flawed [Wright 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1992]. To understand why it fails it is necessary first to locate the account in its broader strategic context. That context is Wright’s response to Wittgenstein’s account of rule following. When so located the diagnosis of the account’s failure is clear. Wright’s account of intention is a species of the interpretative approach to mental content which is explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein
Traiger, Saul (1994). The secret operations of the mind. Minds and Machines 4 (3):303-315.   (Google | More links)
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Voltolini, Alberto (2001). Why the computational account of rule-following cannot rule out the grammatical account. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):82-104.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent works, Chomsky has once more endorsed a computational view of rulefollowing, whereby to follow a rule is to operate certain computations on a subject’s mental representations. As is well known, this picture does not conform to what we may call the grammatical conception of rule-following outlined by Wittgenstein, whereby an elucidation of the concept of rule-following is aimed at by isolating grammatical statements regarding the phrase ‘to follow a rule’. As a result, Chomskyan and Wittgensteinian treatments of topics immediately connected with rule-following, namely linguistic competence and understanding, are utterly different from one another. There are two possible stances that computationalists like Chomsky may adopt with regard to the discrepancy between the two aforementioned modes of dealing with rule-following, namely a conciliatory and a non-conciliatory attitude. According to the former attitude, grammatical remarks on and computationallyoriented theories of rule-following investigate one and the same topic although admittedly at different levels, namely a conceptual and an empirical one. According to the latter attitude, grammatical remarks are just a preliminary step in the investigation of rule-following which scientific advancement, presently represented by computationally-oriented theories on this matter, is well entitled to put aside. In what follows, however, I will try to show that both stances are problematic. The conciliatory attitude simply does not work, for it hardly copes with the fact that the concept of rule-following does not supervene, even weakly, on the property of rule-following, namely the property instantiated in the mental/cerebral phenomena that computationally-oriented theories of rule-following study. To take the contrary attitude, on the other hand, is to end up with another disappointing result, namely that the computational treatment of rule-following ultimately deals with something different from that which we wished to gain knowledge of when we began our inquiry into rule-following..
Walton, Douglas N. & Strongman, K. T. (1998). Neonate crusoes, the private language argument and psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):443-65.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article questions social constructionists' claims to introduce Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology. The philosophical fiction of a neonate Crusoe is introduced to cast doubt on the interpretations and use of the private language argument to support a new psychology developed by the constructionists. It is argued that a neonate Crusoe's viability in philosophy and apparent absence in psychology offends against the integrity of the philosophical contribution Wittgenstein might make to psychology. The consequences of accepting Crusoe's viability are explored as they appear in both philosophy and psychology
Whiting, Daniel (2007). Defending semantic generalism. Analysis 67 (296):303–311.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘Particularism’ is a meta-ethical theory resulting from a holistic doctrine in the theory of reasons. According to Jonathan Dancy, the foremost contemporary proponent of particularism, ‘a feature that is a reason in favour of an action in one case may be no reason at all in another, or even a reason against’ (2004: 190). From this, Dancy claims, it follows that the ‘possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles’ (2004: 7). This doctrine is of significant interest and import in its own right, and accordingly is the subject of considerable critical attention. The concern of this paper, however, is not meta-ethics but semantics
Whiting, Daniel (2008). Oughts and thoughts: Rule-following and the normativity of content – Anandi Hattiangadi. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):743-745.   (Google)
Whiting, Daniel (forthcoming). Particularly general and generally particular: language, rules and meaning. Logique et Analyse.   (Google)
Abstract: Semantic generalists and semantic particularists disagree over the role of rules or principles in linguistic competence and in the determination of linguistic meaning, and hence over the importance of the notions of a rule or of a principle in philosophical accounts of language. In this paper, I have argued that the particularist’s case against generalism is far from decisive and that by moderating the claims she makes on behalf of her thesis the generalist can accommodate many of the considerations that the particularist cites in support of her position.
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Abstract: This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, "the Rule-following Considerations".[2] So, let me begin by explaining my focus here
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Abstract: This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, "the Rule-following Considerations".[2] So, let me begin by explaining my focus here
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Wright, C. (1989). Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and the central project of theoretical linguistics. In A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell.   (Cited by 41 | Google)
Yamada, Masahiro (2010). Rule following: A pedestrian approach. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):283-311.   (Google)
Zalabardo, José L. (2009). One Strand in the rule-following considerations. Synthese 171 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that a target of the rule-following considerations is the thought that there are mental episodes in which a consciously accessible item guides me in my decision to respond in a certain way when I follow a rule. I contend that Wittgenstein’s position on this issue invokes a distinction between a literal and a symbolic reading of the claim that these processes of guidance take place. In the literal sense he rejects the claim, but in the symbolic sense he sees nothing wrong with it. I consider some arguments that Wittgenstein deploys against the literal sense of the claim
Zalabardo, Jos (1989). Rules, communities and judgement. Critica 21 (63):33-58.   (Google)

2.5f Explanatory Role of Content

Adams, Frederick R. (1991). Causal contents. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
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Bogdan, Radu J. (1989). Does semantics run the psyche? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: If there is a dogma in the contemporary philosophy of the cognitive mind, it must be the notion that cognition is semantic causation or, differently put, that it is semantics that runs the psyche. This is what the notion of psychosemantics and (often) intentionality are all about. Another dogma, less widespread than the first but almost equally potent, is that common sense psychology is the implicit theory of psychosemantics. The two dogmas are jointly encapsulated in the following axiom. Mental attitudes such as beliefs and desires have essentially semantic contents, or are semantically evaluable. (This is why they are called propositional attitudes.) Mental attitudes have causal powers in virtue of their semantic properties. The content of an attitude has causal powers qua semantic, or more exactly in virtue of its syntactic structure which reflects relevant semantic properties and relations. (Propositions attitudinized cause in virtue of their semantically sensitive syntax.) It is the fact that mental attitudes cause in virtue of being semantic that explains why the cognitive mind is essentially semantic and why common sense psychology is implicitly true of the semantic mind
Braun, David M. (2000). Russellianism and psychological generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism
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Dretske, Fred (1991). How beliefs explain: Reply to Baker. Philosophical Studies 113 (July):113-117.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1996). How reasons explain behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof. Mind and Language 11 (2):223-229.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1998). Minds, machines, and money: What really explains behavior. In Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2004). Psychological vs. biological explanations of behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32:167-177.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1989). Reasons and causes. Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1990). Reply: Causal relevance and explanatory exclusion. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1990). Reply to reviewers of explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819-839.   (Google)
Dretske, Fred (1994). Reply to Slater and Garcia-carpintero. Mind and Language 9 (2):203-8.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1987). The explanatory role of content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Elder, Crawford L. (1996). Content and the subtle extensionality of " -explains...". Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):320-32.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Field, Hartry (ms). Remarks on content and its role in explanation.   (Google)
Figdor, Carrie (2003). Can mental representations be triggering causes? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account of behavior can be extended to the case of intentional states, and that this extension provides a way to show how intentional properties can play the causal role that we wanted explained
Fodor, Jerry A. (1986). Banish discontent. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1990). Reply to Dretske's Does Meaning Matter?. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (1994). Dretske on the causal efficacy of meaning. Mind and Language 9 (2):181-202.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (1986). Why semantic properties won't earn their keep. Philosophical Studies 50 (September):223-36.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Grimaltos, Tobies & Moya, Carlos J. (1997). Belief, content, and cause. In European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Stanford: CSLI.   (Google)
Hassrick, B. (1995). Fred Dretske on the explanatory role of semantic content. Conference 6 (1):59-66.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1991). Actions, reasons, and the explanatory role of content. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (1998). What can the semantic properties of innate representations explain? In Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (1991). Dretske on how reasons explain behavior. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Lambert, Karel J. (1978). The place of the intentional in the explanation of behavior: A brief survey. Grazer Philosophische Studien 6:75-84.   (Google)
Mele, Alfred R. (1991). Dretske's intricate behavior. Philosophical Papers 20 (May):1-10.   (Google)
Melnyk, Andrew (1996). The prospects for Dretske's account of the explanatory role of belief. Mind and Language 11 (2):203-15.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Millikan, Ruth G. (1990). Seismograph Readings for explaining behavior. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):807-812.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Noordhof, Paul (1996). Accidental associations, local potency, and a dilemma for Dretske. Mind and Language 11 (2):216-22.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Perry, John & Israel, David J. (1991). Fodor and psychological explanation. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: [In Meaning in Mind, edited by Barry Loewer and Georges Rey. Oxford: Basil Black- well, 1991, 165
Power, Nicholas P. (1996). Fodor's vindication of folk psychology and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.   (Google)
Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1987). What's in a mind? Synthese 70 (January):97-122.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1991). Dretske on the explanatory role of belief. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Schiffer, Stephen R. (online). An introduction to content and its role in explanation.   (Google)
Slater, Carol (1994). Discrimination without indication: Why Dretske can't lean on learning. Mind and Language 9 (2):163-80.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Tanney, Julia (2005). Reason-explanation and the contents of the mind. Ratio 18 (3):338-351.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: i> This paper takes a close look at the kinds of considerations we use to reach agreement in our ordinary (non-philosophical and non- theoretical) judgments about a person
Toribio, Josefa (1991). Causal efficacy, content and levels of explanation. Logique Et Analyse 34 (September-December):297-318.   (Google)
Tuomela, Raimo (1990). Are reason-explanations explanations by means of structuring causes? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):813-818.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Wallis, Charles (1994). Using representation to explain. In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.   (Google)
Ward, Andrew (2001). The compatibility of psychological naturalism and representationalism. Disputatio 11.   (Google)

2.5g Collective Intentionality

Becchio, Cristina & Bertone, Cesare (2004). Wittgenstein running: Neural mechanisms of collective intentionality and we-mode. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):123-133.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Chant, Sara Rachel & Ernst, Zachary (2007). Group intentions as equilibria. Philosophical Studies 133 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology
Chant, Sara Rachel (2007). Unintentional collective action. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called 'aggregate action.' Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I shall call) 'unintentional collective actions.'
Giere, Ronald N. (2004). The problem of agency in scienti?c distributed cognitive systems. Journal of Cognition and Culture 4 (3-4):759-774.   (Google)
Abstract: From the perspective of cognitive science, it is illuminating to think of much contemporary scienti?c research as taking place in distributed cognitive systems. This is particularly true of large-scale experimental and observational systems such as the Hubble Telescope. Clark, Hutchins, Knorr-Cetina, and Latour insist or imply such a move requires expanding our notions of knowledge, mind, and even consciousness. Whether this is correct seems to me not a straightforward factual question. Rather, the issue seems to be how best to develop a theoretical understanding of such systems appropriate to the study of science and technology. I argue that there is no need to attribute to such systems as a whole any form of cognitive agency. We can well understand the importance of such systems while restricting agency to the human components. The implication is that we think of these large-scale distributed cognitive systems not so much as uni?ed wholes, but as hybrid systems including both physical artifacts and ordinary humans
Gureckis, Todd M. & Goldstone, Robert L. (2006). Thinking in groups. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):293-311.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Harnad, Stevan (2005). Distributed processes, distributed cognizers and collaborative cognition. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 13 (3):01-514.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognition is thinking; it feels like something to think, and only those who can feel can think. There are also things that thinkers can do. We know neither how thinkers can think nor how they are able do what they can do. We are waiting for cognitive science to discover how. Cognitive science does this by testing hypotheses about what processes can generate what doing (“know-how”) This is called the Turing Test. It cannot test whether a process can generate feeling, hence thinking -- only whether it can generate doing. The processes that generate thinking and know-how are “distributed” within the heads of thinkers, but not across thinkers’ heads. Hence there is no such thing as distributed cognition, only collaborative cognition. Email and the Web have spawned a new form of collaborative cognition that draws upon individual brains’ real-time interactive potential in ways that were not possible in oral, written or print interactions
Hornsby, Jennifer (1997). Collectives and intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):429-434.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Hutchins, Edwin (1995). Cognition in the Wild. MIT Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
List, Christian (2003). Distributed cognition: A perspective from social choice theory. In M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S Voigt (eds.), Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy. Mohr Siebeck.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive system? Second, can a group acting as a distributed cognitive system be ‘rational’ and ‘track the truth’ in the outputs it produces? I argue that a group’s performance as a distributed cognitive system depends on its ‘aggregation procedure’ – its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ inputs into collective outputs – and I investigate the properties of an aggregation procedure that matter
List, Christian & Pettit, Philip (2006). Group agency and supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44:85-105.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. So, knowing what the group members individually think about some proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be 'set-wise', not 'proposition-wise'. Our account preserves the individualistic view that group agency is nothing mysterious, but also suggests that a group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with its members' corresponding individual judgments
Ludwig, Kirk (2007). Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics. Noûs 41 (3):355–393.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent
Mathiesen, Kay (2006). The epistemic features of group belief. Episteme 2 (3):161-175.   (Google)
Moffatt, Barton & Giere, Ronald N. (2003). Distributed cognition: Where the cognitive and the social merge. Social Studies of Science 33 (2):301-310.   (Google)
Abstract: Among the many contested boundaries in science studies is that between the cognitive and the social. Here, we are concerned to question this boundary from a perspective within the cognitive sciences based on the notion of distributed cognition. We first present two of many contemporary sources of the notion of distributed cognition, one from the study of artificial neural networks and one from cognitive anthropology. We then proceed to reinterpret two well-known essays by Bruno Latour, ‘Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands’ and ‘Circulating Reference: Sampling the Soil in the Amazon Forest’. In both cases we find the cognitive and the social merged in a system of distributed cognition without any appeal to agonistic encounters. For us, results do not come to be regarded as veridical because they are widely accepted; they come to be widely accepted because, in the context of an appropriate distributed cognitive system, their apparent veracity can be made evident to anyone with the capacity to understand the workings of the system
Pettit, Philip (1993). The Common Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 184 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What makes human beings intentional and thinking subjects? How does their intentionality and thought connect with their social nature and their communal experience? How do the answers to these questions shape the assumptions which it is legitimate to make in social explanation and political evaluation? These are the broad-ranging issues which Pettit addresses in this novel study. The Common Mind argues for an original way of marking off thinking subjects, in particular human beings, from other intentional systems, natural and artificial. It holds by the holistic view that human thought requires communal resources while denying that this social connection compromises the autonomy of individuals. And, in developing the significance of this view of social subjects--this holistic individualism--it outlines a novel framework for social and political theory. Within this framework, social theory is allowed to follow any of a number of paths: space is found for intentional interpretation and decision-theoretic reconstruction, for structural explanation and rational choice derivation. But political theory is treated less ecumenically. The framework raises serious questions about contractarian and atomistic modes of thought and it points the way to a republican rethinking of liberal commitments
Poirier, Pierre & Chicoisne, Guillaume (2006). A framework for thinking about distributed cognition. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):215-234.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rakoczy, Hannes (2008). Pretence as individual and collective intentionality. Mind and Language 23 (5):499-517.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract:  Focusing on early child pretend play from the perspective of developmental psychology, this article puts forward and presents evidence for two claims. First, such play constitutes an area of remarkable individual intentionality of second-order intentionality (or 'theory of mind'): in pretence with others, young children grasp the basic intentional structure of pretending as a non-serious fictional form of action. Second, early social pretend play embodies shared or collective we-intentionality. Pretending with others is one of the ontogenetically primary instances of truly cooperative actions. And it is a, perhaps the, primordial form of cooperative action with rudimentary rule-governed, institutional structure: in joint pretence games, children are aware that objects collectively get assigned fictional status, 'count as' something, and that this creates a normative space of warranted moves in the game. Developmentally, pretend play might even be a cradle for institutional phenomena more generally
Rupert, Robert D. (2005). Minding one's cognitive systems: When does a group of minds constitute a single cognitive unit? Episteme 1 (3):177-188.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins 1995). An appeal to group minds might, in the end, do indispensable explanatory work in the social or cognitive sciences. I am skeptical, though, and this essay lays out some of the reasons for my skepticism. The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the advocates of group minds (or group mental states), challenges that might be overcome as theoretical and empirical work proceeds. Nevertheless, these hurdles are, I think, genuine and substantive, so much so that my tentative conclusion will not be optimistic. If a group mind is supposed to be a single mental system having two or more minds as proper parts,1 the prospects for group minds seem dim
Saaristo, Antti (2006). There is no escape from philosophy: Collective intentionality and empirical social science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):40-66.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article examines two empirical research traditions—experimental economics and the social identity approach in social psychology—that may be seen as attempts to falsify and verify the theory of collective intentionality, respectively. The article argues that both approaches fail to settle the issue. However, this is not necessarily due to the alleged immaturity of the social sciences but, possibly, to the philosophical nature of intentionality and intentional action. The article shows how broadly Davidsonian action theory, including Hacking’s notion of the looping effect of the human sciences, can be developed into an argument for the view that there is no theory-independent true nature of intentional action. If the Davidsonian line of thought is correct, the theory of collective intentionality is, in a sense, true if we accept the theory. Key Words: collective intentionality • experimental economics • social identity theory • Donald Davidson • Ian Hacking • constructivism • action • agency • philosophy of the social sciences
Schmid, Hans B. (2003). Can brains in vats think as a team? Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):201-218.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Tollefsen, Deborah (online). Collective intentionality. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Tollefsen, Deborah Perron (2002). Collective intentionality and the social sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there are significant reasons for social scientists and philosophers of social science to acknowledge the adequacy of macro-level explanations that involve the attribution of intentional states to groups. In section 5, the author considers and responds to some criticisms of the thesis she defends
Tomasello, Michael & Rakoczy, Hannes (2003). What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality. Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.   (Cited by 54 | Google | More links)
Tuomela, Raimo (online). Collective intentionality and social agents.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I will discuss a certain philosophical and conceptual program -- that I have called philosophy of social action writ large -- and also show in detail how parts of the program have been, and is currently being carried out. In current philosophical research the philosophy of social action can be understood in a broad sense to encompass such central research topics as action occurring in a social context (this includes multi-agent action); shared we-attitudes (such as we-intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes expressing collective intentionality and needed for the explication and explanation of social action; social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such as their goals and beliefs; social practices, and institutions (see e.g. Tuomela, 1995, 2000a, 2001). The theory of social action understood analogously in a broad sense would then involve not only philosophical but all other relevant theorizing about social action. Thus, in this sense, such fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Distributed AI (DAI) and the theory of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) fall within the scope of the theory of social action. DAI studies the social side of computer systems and includes various well-known areas ranging from human-computer interaction, computer-supported cooperative work, organizational processing, and distributed problem solving to the simulation of social systems
Tuomela, Raimo (1996). Philosophy and distributed artificial intelligence: The case of joint intention. In N. Jennings & G. O'Hare (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence. Wiley.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In current philosophical research the term 'philosophy of social action' can be used - and has been used - in a broad sense to encompass the following central research topics: 1) action occurring in a social context; this includes multi-agent action; 2) joint attitudes (or "we-attitudes" such as joint intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes needed for the explication and explanation of social action; 3) social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such as their goals and beliefs; 4) social norms and social institutions (see Tuomela, 1984, 1995). The theory of social action understood analogously in a broad sense would then involve not only philosophical but all other relevant theorizing about social action. Thus, in this sense, such fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Distributed AI (DAI) and the theory of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) fall within the scope of the theory of social action. DAI studies the social side of computer systems and includes various well-known areas ranging from Human Computer Interaction, Computer-Supported Cooperative Work, Organizational Processing, Distributed Problem Solving to Simulation of Social Systems and Organizations. Even if I am a philosopher with low artificial intelligence I will below try to say something about what the scope of DAI should be taken to be on conceptual and philosophical grounds. (In the later sections of the paper the central notion of joint intention will be the main topic - in order to illustrate how philosophers and DAI-researchers approach this issue.) Let us now consider the relationship between philosophy - especially philosophy of social action - and DAI. Both are concerned with social matters and in this sense seem to have a connection to social science proper. What kinds of questions should these areas of study be concerned with? In principle, ordinary social science should study all aspects of social life (in various societies and cultures), try to describe it and create general theories to explain it.
Vromen, Jack J. (2003). Collective intentionality, evolutionary biology and social reality. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle"s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that "collective intentionality" is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle"s dedication to a strong notion of collective intentionality considerably delimits the scope of his endeavor. Furthermore, evolutionary theory does not vindicate that an innate capacity for collective intentionality is a necessary precondition for cooperative behavior. 1
Wilson, Robert A. (2001). Group-level cognition. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S262-S273.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Zhang, Jiajie & Patel, Vimla L. (2006). Distributed cognition, representation, and affordance. Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):333-341.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)

2.5h Aspects of Intentionality, Misc

Crane, Tim (2008). Reply to Nes. Analysis 68 (299):215–218.   (Google | More links)
King, Peter, Mediæval intentionality and pseudo-intentionality.   (Google)
Abstract: Wilfrid Sellars, in his essay “Being and Being Known,”1 sets out to explore “the profound truth contained in the Thomistic thesis that the senses in their way and the intellect in its way are informed by the natures of external objects and events” [§1]. Profound truth there may be, but Sellars also finds a profound error in the mediæval treatment of the intentionality of sensing on a par with the intentionality of thinking: There are many reasons for the plausibility of the idea that sense belongs to the intentional order. . . It is primarily due, however, to the fact that sensations have what I shall call a pseudo-intentionality which is easily mistaken for the genuine intentionality of the cognitive order. [§18] Sellars argues that thought is genuinely intentional, for it is (in good linguistic fashion) about the world, whereas sense merely seems to be about the world but in fact is not, although it is systematically correlated with the world—the ‘pseudo-intentionality’ he alludes to here. On Sellars’s reading, the ‘Thomistic’ view gets certain things right that the later Cartesian view gets wrong, such as distinguishing mental acts intrinsically rather than by their ‘content’, but it also gets some things wrong in its own right, notably in its claim that sensing has “genuine intentionality” the way thinking does, and so to take sensing as properly belonging to “the cognitive order” (i. e. to qualify as a kind of knowledge strictly speaking). Sellars is out to right the Thomistic wrongs, beginning with intentionality, where the mistake is easily made. For Sellars has his eye not only on intentionality, but on the consequent claim that episodes of (intentional) sensing play a foundationalist epistemological role, a view he elsewhere famously calls ‘The Myth of the Given’.2 There is no question that Sellars wants to make room for his own brand of social epistemology; his agenda is not historical but systematic. Yet in “Being and Being Known,” Sellars puts his case in historical rather than systematic terms..
Lawlor, Krista (2007). A notional worlds approach to confusion. Mind and Language 22 (2):150–172.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: People often become confused, mistaking one thing for another, or taking two things to be the same. How should we assign semantic values to confused statements? Recently, philosophers have taken a pessimistic view of confusion, arguing that understanding confused belief demands significant departure from our normal interpretive practice. I argue for optimism. Our semantic treatment of confusion can be a lot like our semantic treatment of empty names. Surprisingly, perhaps, the resulting semantics lets us keep in place more of our everyday interpretive practices in the face of confused belief