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2.5b. Kripkenstein on Meaning (Kripkenstein on Meaning on PhilPapers)

See also:
Aldridge, Virgil C. (1987). Kripke on Wittgenstein on Regulation. Philosophy 62 (241):375-384.   (Google)
Allen, Barry G. (1989). Gruesome arithmetic: Kripke's sceptic replies. Dialogue 28 (2):257-264.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1985). Critical notice: Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):103-9.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1985). Review of Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Ethics 95:342-352.   (Google)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1984). Critical study: On misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's private language argument. Synthese 58.   (Google)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1984). On misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's private language argument. Synthese 58 (3):407-450.   (Google | More links)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1986). Reply to mr Mounce. Philosophical Investigations 9:199-204.   (Google)
Bird, Alexander (2009). Kripke. In Christopher Belshaw & Gary Kemp (eds.), Twelve Modern Philosophers. Wiley--Blackwell.   (Google)
Blackburn, Simon W. (1984). The individual strikes back. Synthese 58 (March):281-302.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1989). The rule-following considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1990). The status of content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.   (Cited by 68 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1990). The status of content revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (December):264-278.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
Byrne, Alex (1996). On misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):339-343.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (1996). The community view. Philosophical Review 105 (4):469-488.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Coates, Paul (1995). Kripke's skeptical paradox: Normativeness and meaning. Mind 1986 (January):77-80.   (Google)
Coates, Paul (1997). Meaning, mistake, and miscalculation. Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Collins, A. (1992). On the paradox Kripke finds in Wittgenstein. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18:74-88.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Davies, F. (1998). How sceptical is Kripke's 'sceptical solution'. Philsophia 26 (1-2):119-40.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Davies, S. (1988). Kripke, crusoe and Wittgenstein. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (March):52-66.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Delancey, Craig Stephen (2007). Meaning naturalism, meaning irrealism, and the work of language. Synthese 154 (2):231-257.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful utterance. This cost has an objective measure, called Kolmogorov Complexity. I illustrate the use of this measure for a naturalist theory of meaning by showing how it offers a straight solution to one of the most influential arguments for meaning irrealism: the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke
Devitt, Michael (1990). Transcendentalism about content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (December):247-63.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Devitt, Michael & Rey, Georges (1991). Transcending transcendentalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72:87-100.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
Devitt, Michael (1991). Transcending transcendentalism: A response to Boghossian. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (June):87-100.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
Forbes, Graeme R. (1983). Scepticism and semantic knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:223-37.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Frances, Bryan (forthcoming). Saul Kripke on Meaning and Linguistic Understanding. In Barry Lee (ed.), Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: This chapter introduces Kripke's work to advanced undergraduates, mainly focussing on his "A Puzzle About Belief" and "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".
Gauker, Christopher (1995). A new skeptical solution. Acta Analytica 113 (14):113-129.   (Google)
Abstract: Kripke's puzzle about rule-following is a form of the traditional problem of the nature of linguistic meaning. A skeptical solution explains not what meaning is but the role that talk of meaning plays in the linguistic community. Contrary to what some have claimed, the skeptical approach is not self-refuting. However, Kripke's own skeptical solution is inadequate. He has not adequately explained the conditions under which we are justified in attributing meanings or the utility of the practice of attributing meanings. An alternative skeptical solution may be founded on a nonepistemic conception of assertibility. Roughly, a sentence is assertible if it facilitates cooperation. The function of meaning-talk is to resolve certain sorts of conflicts in assertion. Attributions of meaning to persons outside the community may be a proper expression of a practice whose reason for being lies entirely within the community.
Gillett, Grant R. (1995). Humpty dumpty and the night of the triffids: Individualism and rule-following. Synthese 105 (2):191-206.   (Google | More links)
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Hacking, Ian (1993). On Kripke's and Goodman's uses of 'grue'. Philosophy 68 (265):269-295.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Handfield, Toby & Bird, Alexander (2008). Dispositions, rules, and finks. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285-98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke-Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to repair dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes - interfering dispositions and conditions - to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all cases, at least some of the interfering dispositions are both relatively permanent and intrinsic to the agent. The presence of these instrinsic and relatively permanent states renders the ascription of a rule-following disposition to the agent false
Hanfling, Oswald (1985). Was Wittgenstein a sceptic? Philosophical Investigations 8 (January):1-16.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Haukioja, Jussi (2006). Hindriks on rule-following. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):219-239.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks
Haukioja, Jussi (2004). Kripke's finiteness objection to dispositionalist theories of meaning. In M.E. Reicher & J.C. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.   (Google)
Abstract: It is often thought that Blackburn and Boghossian have provided an effective reply to the finiteness objection to dispositional theories of meaning, presented by Kripke's Wittgenstein. In this paper I distinguish two possible readings of the sceptical demand for meaning-constitutive facts. The demand can be formulated in one of two ways: an A-question or a B-question. Any theory of meaning will give one of these explanatory priority over the other. I will then argue that the standard reply only works if B-questions are seen as prior, while the dominant dispositionalist theories of meaning see A-questions as prior
Haukioja, Jussi (2002). Soames and Zalabardo on Kripke's Wittgenstein. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):157-73.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Two counterarguments, given by Scott Soames and Jos
Hindriks, Frank A. (2004). A modest solution to the problem of rule-following. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Hoffman, Paul (1985). Kripke on private language. Philosophical Studies 47 (1):23-28.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Hohwy, Jakob (2003). A reduction of kripke-wittgenstein's objections to dispositionalism about meaning. Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-68.   (Google)
Hohwy, Jakob (2001). Semantic primitivism and normativity. Ratio 14 (1):1-17.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Horwich, Paul (1990). Wittgenstein and Kripke on the nature of meaning. Mind and Language 5 (2):105-121.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Humphrey, John A. (1996). Kripke's Wittgenstein and the impossibility of private language: The same old story? Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):197-207.   (Google)
Humphrey, John A. (1999). Quine, Kripke's Wittgenstein, simplicity and sceptical solutions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):43-55.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Humphrey, John (online). With factualist friends, Kripke's Wittgenstein needs no enemies: On Byrne's case for Kripke's Wittgenstein being a factualist about meaning attributions.   (Google)
Abstract: _Private Language_ is that it almost universally sees KW as offering, in his sceptical solution, an account of meaning attributions (i.e., statements of the form, "X means such-and-so by 's'"; hereafter, MAs) which takes their legitimate attribution to be a function of something other than facts or truth conditions. KW is almost universally read as having rejected any account of meaning attributions which takes them to be stating facts or corresponding to facts. In a word, KW is understood as offering a nonfactualist account of MAs. And given that KW's sceptical challenge to the possibility of meaning rests on his negative assertions that there are no meaning facts, and that KW offers a sceptical solution to the sceptic's claim that meaning is impossible, i.e., a solution that by definition "begins . . . by conceding that the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswerable" (K, p. 66), it seems impossible that there would be any doubts about the accuracy of the "almost universal" reading of KW as a nonfactualist
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Jackman, Henry (2003). Foundationalism, coherentism, and rule-following skepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):25-41.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands semantic justification in foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments lead not to a type of skepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about semantic justification, and thus a holist about semantic facts
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Abstract: The discussion between Searle and the Churchlands over whether or not symbolmanipulating computers generate semantics will be confronted both with the rulesceptical considerations of Kripke/Wittgenstein and with Wittgenstein's privatelanguage argument in order to show that the discussion focuses on the wrong place: meaning does not emerge in the brain. That a symbol means something should rather be conceived as a social fact, depending on a mutual imputation of linguistic competence of the participants of a linguistic practice to one another. The alternative picture will finally be applied to small children, animals, and computers as well
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