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2.5c. Rule-Following (Rule-Following on PhilPapers)

See also:
Ackermann, D. F. (1983). Wittgenstein, rules and origin - privacy. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1:63-69.   (Google)
Alward, Peter (online). Are functional properties causally potent?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has recently[1] argued that a solution to the exclusion argument against the intelligibility of mental causation is to found if mental properties can be shown to be reducible to physical properties
Ammereller, Erich (2004). Puzzles about rule-following : Pi 185-242. In Erich Ammereller & Eugen Fisher (eds.), Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the Philosophical Investigations. Routledge.   (Google)
Armstrong, Benjamin F. (1984). Wittgenstein on private languages: It takes two to talk. Philosophical Investigations 7 (January):46-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1954). Can there be a private language? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. vol. 28.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1990). Malcolm on language and rules. Philosophy 65 (252):167-179.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1984). Scepticism, Rules and Language. Blackwell.   (Cited by 62 | Google)
Baker, Gordon P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (1985). Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity. Blackwell.   (Cited by 56 | Google | More links)
Bar-On, Dorit (1992). On the possibility of a solitary language. Noûs 26 (1):27-46.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bernasconi-Kohn, Lorenzo (2006). How not to think about rules and rule following: A response to Stueber. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This article offers a critique of Karsten Stueber’s account of rule following as presented in his article "How to Think about Rules and Rule Following." The task Stueber sets himself is of defending the idea that human practices are bound and guided by rules (both causally and normatively) while avoiding the discredited "cognitive model of rule following." This article argues that Stueber’s proposal is unconvincing because it falls foul of the very problems it sets out to avoid. Stueber’s defense of rules as normative guides is shown to be either circular or burdened with an infinite regress, while his account of rules as causal determinants of our actions is shown to lapse back into the "cognitive model" that he explicitly rejects. Key Words: rules • rule following • norms • causes • social science
Blackburn, Simon (1981). Reply : Rule-following and moral realism. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. Routledge.   (Google)
Bloor, David (1997). Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions. Routledge.   (Cited by 76 | Google)
Abstract: David Bloor's challenging new evaluation of Wittgenstein's account of rules and rule-following brings together the rare combination of philosophical and sociological viewpoints. Wittgenstein enigmatically claimed that the way we follow rules is an "institution" without ever explaining what he meant by this term. Wittgenstein's contribution to the debate has since been subject to sharply opposed interpretations by "collectivist" and "individualist" readings by philosophers; in the light of this controversy, Bloor argues convincingly for a collectivist, sociological understanding of Wittgenstein's later work. Accessible and simply written, this book provides the first consistent sociological reading of Wittgenstein's work for many years
Boghossian, Paul A. (1993). Sense, reference and rule-following. Philosophical Issues 4:135-141.   (Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1989). The rule-following considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Bridges, Jason (online). Rule-following skepticism, properly so called.   (Google)
Budd, Malcolm (1984). Wittgenstein on meaning, interpretation and rules. Synthese 58 (March):303-324.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Burbules, Nicholas C. & Smith, Richard (2005). 'What it makes sense to say': Wittgenstein, rule-following and the nature of education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (3):425–430.   (Google | More links)
Cain, M. J. (2006). Concept nativism and the rule following considerations. Acta Analytica 21 (38):77-101.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the most prominent and familiar features of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations generate a powerful argument for the thesis that most of our concepts are innate, an argument that echoes a Chomskyan poverty of the stimulus argument. This argument has a significance over and above what it tells us about Wittgenstein’s implicit commitments. For, it puts considerable pressure on widely held contemporary views of concept learning, such as the view that we learn concepts by constructing prototypes. This should lead us to abandon our general default hostility to concept nativism and be much more sceptical of claims made on behalf of learning theories
Carruthers, Peter (1984). Baker and Hacker's Wittgenstein. Synthese 58 (3):451-79.   (Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (1985). Ruling-out realism. Philosophia 15 (1-2):61-78.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The case for anti-realism in the theory of meaning, as presented by Dummen and Wright, 1 is only partly convincing. There is, I shall suggest, a crucial lacuna in the argument, that can only be filled by the later Wittgenstein's following-a-rule considerations. So it is the latter that provides the strongest argument for the rejection of semantic realism.
By 'realism', throughout, I should be taken as referring to any conception of meaning that leaves open the possibility that a sentence may have a determinate truth-value although we are incapable - either in practice or in principle - of discovering what truth-value it has ('the possibility of veritication-transcendence' for short). 2 I shall say nothing further about what an anti-realist semantics might look like, nor about the possible consequences for logic, epistemology and metaphysics, beyond the fact that it must involve the rejection of any such conception of meaning.
Champlin, T. Stephen (1992). Solitary rule-following. Philosophy 67 (261):285-306.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Cheng, Kai-Yuan (forthcoming). A new look at the problem of rule-following: A generic perspective. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to look at the problem of rule-following—notably discussed by Kripke (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 1982 ) and Wittgenstein (Philosophical investigations, 1953 )—from the perspective of the study of generics. Generics are sentences that express generalizations that tolerate exceptions. I first suggest that meaning ascriptions be viewed as habitual sentences, which are a sub-set of generics. I then seek a proper semantic analysis for habitually construed meaning sentences. The quantificational approach is rejected, due to its persistent difficulties. Instead, a cognitive approach is adopted, where psychological considerations of meaning attributors play a crucial role. This account is then compared with the picture of meaning offered by Kripke and Wittgenstein, respectively. I show how this fresh way of conceiving of meaning sentences respects some of their insights while avoiding some of the drawbacks, and serves to improve the framework in which the current debate and inquiry about rule-following are conducted
Cozzo, Cesare (2004). Rule-following and the objectivity of proof. In Annalisa Coliva & Eva Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il poligrafo.   (Google)
Abstract: Ideas on meaning, rules and mathematical proofs abound in Wittgenstein’s writings. The undeniable fact that they are present together, sometimes intertwined in the same passage of Philosophical Investigations or Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, does not show, however, that the connection between these ideas is necessary or inextricable. The possibility remains, and ought to be checked, that they can be plausibly and consistently separated. I am going to examine two views detectable in Wittgenstein’s works: one about proofs, the other about meaning and rules. The first is the denial of the objectivity of proof. The second is a conception of meaning stemming from the rule-following considerations. I shall argue that, though Wittgenstein seems to conjoin the two views, they can be, and should be, separated1
Craig, Edward (1997). Meaning and privacy. In Bob Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Croom, Adam M. (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Google)
Abstract: Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon which it relies, because this has been sufficiently misunderstood by critics and rarely articulated by commentators. After clarifying McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism, I extend the analysis to show that commentators of McDowell have failed to appreciate his argument and that critical responses have been weak. I argue against three challenges posed to McDowell, and show that the case of thick concepts should lead us to reject non-cognitivism.
Croom, Adam M. (2010). Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox. Dialogue 52 (2/3):103-109.   (Google)
Abstract: In §201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous “rule-following paradox.” The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule – the applications of which are potentially infinite – when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule-following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical position that there are no facts that we follow a rule but that there are still conditions under which we are warranted in asserting of others that they are following a rule. In this paper, I explain why Kripke’s solution to the rule-following paradox fails. I then offer an alternative.
Davidson, Donald (1992). The second person. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17:255-267.   (Cited by 62 | Google)
Diamond, Cora (1989). Rules: Looking in the right place. In Dayton Z. Phillips & Peter G. Winch (eds.), Wittgenstein.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Dwyer, Philip (1989). Freedom and rule-following in Wittgenstein and Sartre. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (September):49-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ebbs, Gary (1997). Rule-Following and Realism. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Eldridge, Richard T. (1986). The normal and the normative: Wittgenstein's legacy, Kripke, and Cavell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):555-575.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Finkelstein, David H. (2000). Wittgenstein on rules and platonism. In Alice Crary & Rupert Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein. Routledge.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Gerrans, Philip (1998). How to be a conformist, part II. simulation and rule following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):566 – 586.   (Google)
Gerrans, Philip, Tacit knowledge, rule following and Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy of social science.   (Google)
Abstract: Pierre Bourdieu has developed a philosophy of social science, grounded in the phenomenological tradition, which treats knowledge as a practical ability embodied in skilful behaviour, rather than an intellectual capacity for the representation and manipulation of propositional knowledge. He invokes Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following as one way of explicating the idea that knowledge is a skill. Bourdieu’s conception of tacit knowledge is a dispositional one, adopted to avoid a perceived dilemma for methodological individualism. That dilemma requires either the explanation of regularities in social behaviour as the result of the tacit representation of procedural rules (‘legalism’) or the self-conscious representation of behavioural goals (‘voluntarism’) by individuals. After explaining the apparent dilemma, I then argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule following actually undermine, rather than support, a dispositional solution. Nonetheless, the philosophy of social science can survive without a dispositional account of knowledge. Such a social science needs, firstly, to embrace one horn of the dilemma, voluntarism, provided that the relevant regularities can be explained as unintended consequences of agents’ self-represented intentions. Secondly, such a social science should treat theorists’ interpretations as unifying generalizations, not hypotheses about the acquisition of tacit knowledge. Finally, where appeal to cognitive psychology can distinguish otherwise equivalent theories in social science, social science should incorporate the data of cognitive psychology concerning tacit mental processes
Gillett, Grant R. (1995). Humpty dumpty and the night of the triffids: Individualism and rule-following. Synthese 105 (2):191-206.   (Google | More links)
Gottlieb, D. F. (1983). Wittgenstein's critique of the "tractatus" view of rules. Synthese 56 (August):239-251.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Guardo, Andrea (forthcoming). Kripke's account of the rule-following considerations. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: This paper argues that most of the alleged straight solutions to the sceptical paradox which Kripke (1982) ascribed to Wittgenstein can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. The dilemma is proved to be a by-product of a foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification, as applied to linguistic behaviour. It is maintained that the assumption is unnecessary and that the dilemma is therefore spurious. To this end, an alternative conception of the justification of linguistic behaviour is outlined, a conception that vindicates some of the insights behind Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical solution of the paradox. This alternative conception is defended against two objections (both familiar from McDowell's works): (1) that it would imply that for the linguistic community there is no authority, no standard to meet and, therefore, no possibility of error and (2) that it would lead to a kind of idealism
Hacking, Ian (1985). Rules, scepticism, proof, Wittgenstein. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hadley, Robert F. (1990). Connectionism, rule-following, and symbolic manipulation. Proc AAAI 3 (2):183-200.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Hale, Bob (1997). Rule-following, objectivity and meaning. In Bob Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Hanfling, Oswald (1984). What does the private language argument prove? Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):468-481.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hattiangadi, Anandi (2003). Making it implicit: Brandom on rule-following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):419-31.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Hattiangadi, Anandi (2007). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Haukioja, Jussi (2006). Hindriks on rule-following. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):219-239.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks
Haukioja, Jussi (2005). Is solitary rule-following possible? Philosophia 32 (1-4):131-154.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discover whether or not a solitary individual, a human being isolated from birth, could become a rule-follower. The argumentation against this possibility rests on the claim that such an isolate could not become aware of a normative standard, with which her actions could agree or disagree. As a consequence, theorists impressed by this argumentation adopt a view on which the normativity of rules arises from corrective practices in which agents engage in a community. However, it has been suggested that an isolated individual could engage in such a practice by herself. Three prospective examples of such cases are considered, and the possibility of solitary rule-following is vindicated. Furthermore, the nature of the goals at which rule-following practices generally aim is clarified
Heal, Jane (2009). Rule-following and its ramifications. Analysis 69 (3).   (Google)
Heil, John & Martin, C. B. (1998). Rules and powers. Philosophical Perspectives 12:283-312.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hershfield, Jeffrey (2005). Rule following and the background. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: . In his work on language John Searle favors an Austinian approach that emphasizes the speech act as the basic unit of meaning and communication, and which sees speaking a language as engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior. He couples this with a strident opposition to cognitivist approaches that posit unconscious rule following as the causal basis of linguistic competence. In place of unconscious rule following Searle posits what he calls the Background, comprised of nonintentional (nonrepresentational) mental phenomena. I argue that these two aspects of his philosophy of language cannot be reconciled. In order to preserve his view of language as a rule-governed activity, he must embrace the cognitivist idea of unconscious rule following. Finally, I try to show how such an accommodation would be far less traumatic to Searle’s philosophical system than it might otherwise seem
Hetherington, Stephen C. (1991). Kripke and McGinn on Wittgensteinian rule-following. Philosophia 21 (1-2):89-100.   (Google | More links)
Hindriks, Frank A. (2004). A modest solution to the problem of rule-following. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Holton, Richard & Price, Huw (2003). Ramsey on saying and whistling: A discordant note. Noûs 37 (2):325–341.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In 'General Propositions and Causality' Ramsey rejects his earlier view that universal generalizations are infinite conjunctions, arguing that they are not genuine propositions at all. We argue that his new position is unstable. The issues about infinity that lead Ramsey to the new view are essentially those underlying Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. If they show that generalizations are not genuine propositions, they show that there are no genuine propositions. The connection raises interesting historical questions about the direction of influence between Ramsey and Wittgenstein, the origin of the rule-following argument, and the influence of writers such as Brouwer.
Holtzman, S. & Leich, Christopher M. (eds.) (1981). Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Huff, Douglas (1981). Family resemblances and rule-governed behavior. Philosophical Investigations 4 (3):1-23.   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Wittgenstein on practice and the myth of the giving. In Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jackman, Henry (2003). Foundationalism, coherentism, and rule-following skepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):25-41.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands semantic justification in foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments lead not to a type of skepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about semantic justification, and thus a holist about semantic facts
Kavka, Gregory S. (1995). The rationality of rule-following: Hobbes's dispute with the foole. Law and Philosophy 14 (1).   (Google)
Kraft, Tim (2009). Oughts and thoughts: Rule-following and the normativity of content, by Anandi Hattiangadi. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):336-341.   (Google)
Krebs, V. (1986). Objectivity and meaning: Wittgenstein on following rules. Philosophical Investigations 9 (July):177-186.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Landy, David (2008). Hegel's account of rule-following. Inquiry 51 (2):170 – 193.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I here discuss Hegel's rule-following considerations as they are found in the first four chapters of his Phenomenology of Spirit. I begin by outlining a number of key premises in Hegel's argument that he adopts fairly straightforwardly from Kant's Transcendental Deduction. The most important of these is that the correctness or incorrectness of one's application of a rule must be recognizable as such to the rule-follower. Supplementing Hegel's text as needed, I then argue that it is possible for an experiencing subject to follow a rule only where there is a community of individuals whose agreement can provide a standard for the correctness and incorrectness of his use. I further argue that a community must consist of members that are compresent, and thus that a collection of time-slices of an individual will not serve this purpose. I conclude by raising a potential problem for Hegel's account of rule-following concerning the correctness and incorrectness of the judgments of a community, and pointing to a possible line of response to this problem
Lang, Gerald (2001). The rule-following considerations and metaethics: Some false moves. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):190–209.   (Google | More links)
Long, Roderick T., Rule-following, praxeology, and anarchy.   (Google)
Abstract: JEL Classification: B41, B53, B31, B2, P48, A12 Abstract: Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has important implications for two aspects of Austrian theory. First, it makes it possible to reconcile the Misesian, Rothbardian, and hermeneutical approaches to methodology; second, it provides a way of defending a stateless legal order against the charge that such an order lacks, yet needs, a final arbiter
Lotfi, Shidan (2009). Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and moral particularism. Theoria 75 (2):100-116.   (Google)
Abstract: Moral particularists have seen Wittgenstein as a close ally. One of the main reasons for this is that particularists such as Jonathan Dancy and John McDowell have argued that Wittgenstein's so-called "rule-following considerations" (RFCs) provide support for their skepticism about the existence and/or role of rules and principles in ethics. In this paper, I show that while Wittgenstein's RFCs challenge the notion that competence with language, i.e., the ability to apply concepts properly, is like mechanically following a rule, he does not reject the idea that there are rules that govern proper use of language. I then argue that while the RFCs may, at best, support a weak form of particularism that denies that moral competence is dependent on an explicit grasp of rules, they do not support a stronger version of particularism that denies that there are any true rules or principles in ethics
Malcolm, Norman (1989). Wittgenstein on language and rules. Philosophy 64 (January):5-28.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Martin, C. B. & Heil, John (1998). Rules and powers. Philosophical Perspectives 12:283-312.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
McDowell, John (1991). Intentionality and interiority in Wittgenstein: Comment on Crispin Wright. In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
McDowell, John (1992). Meaning and intentionality in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):40-52.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
McDowell, John (1981). Non-cognitivism and rule-following. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge.   (Cited by 44 | Google)
McDowell, John (1984). Wittgenstein on following a rule. Synthese 58 (March):325-364.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
McGinn, Colin (1984). Wittgenstein on Meaning. Blackwell.   (Cited by 69 | Google)
McManus, Denis (1995). The epistemology of self-knowledge and the presuppositions of rule-following. The Monist 78 (4):496-514.   (Google)
Miller, Alexander (2004). Rule-following and externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Miller, Alexander & Wright, C. (eds.) (2002). Rule-Following and Meaning. Acumen.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Miller, Alexander (1998). Rule-following, response-dependence, and McDowell's debate with anti-realism. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Minar, Edward H. (1991). Wittgenstein and the 'contingency' of community. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):203-234.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Miscevic, Nenad (1996). The skeptic and the hoverfly (a teleo-computational view of rule-following). Acta Analytica 17 (16):171-187.   (Google)
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Abstract: However, if Wittgenstein’s so called rule-following considerations are correct, then this reason for believing in the validity of (C), is mistaken. The conclusion of those considerations is that we must reject the idea that rules are things which determine possible cases of application before those cases are actually encountered and decided by speakers. If this is right, then there is no rule which determines the meanings of new sentences, i.e. before those sentences have actually been used. Therefore, it might seem that (C) is not valid for natural languages
Panjvani, Cyrus (2008). Rule-following, explanation-transcendence, and private language. Mind 117 (466):303-328.   (Google)
Abstract: I examine what I take to be an important consideration for the later Wittgenstein: the understanding of a rule does not exceed or transcend an understanding of explanations or instructions in the rule. I contend that this consideration plays a central role in the later Wittgenstein's views on rule-following. I first show that it serves as a key premiss in a sceptical argument concerning our ability to follow rules. I then argue that this consideration is vital to Wittgenstein's case against what I describe as a realist view of rules. This realist view requires that our understanding of a rule extend beyond what can be understood from any set of instructions or explanation. For Wittgenstein, because this is to transcend publicly available means of conveying understanding, this realist's understanding is a private understanding. He calls this private source of understanding an ‘intuition’ and the main line of argument against intuition in our understanding of a rule draws, appropriately, on what is called his ‘private language argument’. In this paper, I defend a non-verificationist reading of this argument and its use against the realist so-construed. CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    What's this?
Peacocke, Christopher (1981). Reply : Rule-following. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. Routledge.   (Google)
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Pettit, Philip (1990). The reality of rule-following. Mind 99 (393):1-21.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Preda, Alex (2000). Order with things? Humans, artifacts, and the sociological problem of rule-following. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 30 (3):269–298.   (Google | More links)
Proudfoot, Diane (2004). The implications of an externalist theory of rule-following behavior for robot cognition. Minds and Machines 14 (3):283-308.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Given (1) Wittgensteins externalist analysis of the distinction between following a rule and behaving in accordance with a rule, (2) prima facie connections between rule-following and psychological capacities, and (3) pragmatic issues about training, it follows that most, even all, future artificially intelligent computers and robots will not use language, possess concepts, or reason. This argument suggests that AIs traditional aim of building machines with minds, exemplified in current work on cognitive robotics, is in need of substantial revision
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Rietveld, Erik (2008). Situated normativity: The normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action. Mind 117 (468):973-1001.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein’s insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, ‘directed discontent’, is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein’s ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert’s socio-cultural practice and the individual’s situated and lived normativity.
Savigny, Eike V. (1991). Self-conscious individual versus social soul: The rationale of Wittgenstein's discussion of rule following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):67-84.   (Google | More links)
Schlosser, Markus E. (forthcoming). The Metaphysics of Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (2008). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rule-following.
Sharrock, Wes & Button, Graham (1999). Do the right thing! Rule finitism, rule scepticism and rule following. Human Studies 22 (2-4).   (Google)
Abstract: Rule following is often made an unnecessary mystery in the philosophy of social science. One form of mystification is the issue of 'rule finitism', which raises the puzzle as to how a learner can possibly extend the rule to applications beyond those examples which have been given as instruction in the rule. Despite the claim that this problem originated in the work of Wittgenstein, it is clear that his philosophical method is designed to evaporate, not perpetuate, such problems. The supposed problem of rule finitism is malformed, deriving from misconceptions about the relation between understanding a rule and making an application of it
Shanker, Stuart G. (1984). Sceptical confusions about rule-following. Mind 93 (July):423-29.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Shogenji, T. (1992). Boomerang defense of rule following. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):115-122.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shogenji, T. (1993). Modest scepticism about rule-following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):486-500.   (Google | More links)
Shogenji, T. (1995). The problem of rule-following in compositional semantics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):97-108.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shogenji, Tomoji (2000). The problem of the criterion in rule-following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):501-525.   (Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1992). Wittgenstein, following a rule, and scientific psychology. In Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), The Scientific Enterprise. Kluwer.   (Google)
Soames, Scott (1998). Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 12:313-48.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Soames, Scott (1998). Skepticism about meaning, indeterminacy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp 23:211--50.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Stahl, Titus (2007). Practices, Norms and Recognition. Human Affairs 17 (1):10-21.   (Google)
Abstract: The problem of the social foundations of normativity can be illuminated by discussing the narrower question whether rule-following is necessarily a social matter. The problems with individualistic theories of rule-following seem to make such a conclusion unavoidable. Social theories of rule-following, however, seem to only push back one level the dilemma of having to choose either an infinite regress of interpretations or a collapse into non-normative descriptions. The most plausible of these models, Haugeland's conformism, can avoid these objections if it is supplemented with an ontologically reasonable concept of the collective attitude of a group. Groups of individuals who are bound to shared norms by recognizing each other as equipped with a standard authority of criticism have the necessary properties for ascribing to those groups such collective attitudes. Given such a weak notion of a collective attitude, there is hope for a plausible collectivist theory of rule-following.
Stenning, Keith & van Lambalgen, Michiel (2007). Logic in the study of psychiatric disorders: Executive function and rule-following. Topoi 26 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Executive function has become an important concept in explanations of psychiatric disorders, but we currently lack comprehensive models of normal executive function and of its malfunctions. Here we illustrate how defeasible logical analysis can aid progress in this area. We illustrate using autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as example disorders, and show how logical analysis reveals commonalities between linguistic and non-linguistic behaviours within each disorder, and how contrasting sub-components of executive function are involved across disorders. This analysis reveals how logical analysis is as applicable to fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning as it is to slow deliberate cogitation
Struck, James Timothy, Law and rule following as arbitrary-excessive rule following and law following as potentially violating too many human rights and freedoms and open to slavery like treatment of persons.   (Google)
Abstract: Laws from guardianship, monopoly, corruption, and fraud are open to arbitrariness. Arbitrariness is a normal concern as human rights and freedoms of too many persons are potentially violated. Slave like treatment of many persons would follow if guardianship, monopoly, corruption and fraud laws were applied to all persons. Application of laws can give rise to significant human rights violations and abuses. Laws become discriminatory when applied to many rather than just some persons. Rule following or citation is sometimes described as helpful with regard to evaluating the worth of a scientific article, Justice or judge, but rule following with regard to application of laws can result in discrimination against persons. We look at examples with regard to corruption, monopoly, guardianship and fraud to disclose that application of laws would violate rights of too many
Stroud, Barry G. (1996). Mind, meaning and practice. In Hans D. Sluga & D. G. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Stroud, Barry G. (1965). Wittgenstein and logical necessity. Philosophical Review 74 (October):504-518.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Stueber, Karsten R. (2005). How to think about rules and rule following. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This article will discuss the difficulties of providing a plausible account of rule following in the social realm. It will show that the cognitive model of rule following is not suited for this task. Nevertheless, revealing the inadequacy of the cognitive model does not justify the wholesale dismissal of understanding human practices as rule-following practices, as social theorists like Bourdieu or Dreyfus have argued. Instead it will be shown that rule-following behavior is best understood as being based on a set of complex dispositions. In this manner one is able to account for the causal explanatory role of the notion of a rule. Key Words: rules • norms • explanation • Bourdieu • Winch
Summerfield, Donna M. (1990). On taking the rabbit of rule-following out of the hat of representation: A response to Pettit's The Reality of Rule-Following. Mind 99 (395):425-432.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Tait, William W. (1986). Wittgenstein and the 'skeptical paradoxes'. Journal of Philosophy 83 (September):475-488.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Tanney, Julia (2000). Playing the rule-following game. Philosophy 75 (292):203-224.   (Google | More links)
Temkin, J. (1986). A private language argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24:109-121.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Thornton, Tim (1997). Intention, rule following and the strategic role of Wright's order of determination test. Philosophical Investigations 20 (2):136–151.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I believe that Wright’s constructivist account of intention is funda- mentally flawed [Wright 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1992]. To understand why it fails it is necessary first to locate the account in its broader strategic context. That context is Wright’s response to Wittgenstein’s account of rule following. When so located the diagnosis of the account’s failure is clear. Wright’s account of intention is a species of the interpretative approach to mental content which is explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein
Traiger, Saul (1994). The secret operations of the mind. Minds and Machines 4 (3):303-315.   (Google | More links)
Verheggen, Claudine (1995). Wittgenstein and 'solitary' languages. Philosophical Investigations 18 (4):329-347.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Verheggen, Claudine (2003). Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox and the objectivity of meaning. Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):285–310.   (Google | More links)
Voltolini, Alberto (2001). Why the computational account of rule-following cannot rule out the grammatical account. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):82-104.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent works, Chomsky has once more endorsed a computational view of rulefollowing, whereby to follow a rule is to operate certain computations on a subject’s mental representations. As is well known, this picture does not conform to what we may call the grammatical conception of rule-following outlined by Wittgenstein, whereby an elucidation of the concept of rule-following is aimed at by isolating grammatical statements regarding the phrase ‘to follow a rule’. As a result, Chomskyan and Wittgensteinian treatments of topics immediately connected with rule-following, namely linguistic competence and understanding, are utterly different from one another. There are two possible stances that computationalists like Chomsky may adopt with regard to the discrepancy between the two aforementioned modes of dealing with rule-following, namely a conciliatory and a non-conciliatory attitude. According to the former attitude, grammatical remarks on and computationallyoriented theories of rule-following investigate one and the same topic although admittedly at different levels, namely a conceptual and an empirical one. According to the latter attitude, grammatical remarks are just a preliminary step in the investigation of rule-following which scientific advancement, presently represented by computationally-oriented theories on this matter, is well entitled to put aside. In what follows, however, I will try to show that both stances are problematic. The conciliatory attitude simply does not work, for it hardly copes with the fact that the concept of rule-following does not supervene, even weakly, on the property of rule-following, namely the property instantiated in the mental/cerebral phenomena that computationally-oriented theories of rule-following study. To take the contrary attitude, on the other hand, is to end up with another disappointing result, namely that the computational treatment of rule-following ultimately deals with something different from that which we wished to gain knowledge of when we began our inquiry into rule-following..
Walton, Douglas N. & Strongman, K. T. (1998). Neonate crusoes, the private language argument and psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):443-65.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article questions social constructionists' claims to introduce Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology. The philosophical fiction of a neonate Crusoe is introduced to cast doubt on the interpretations and use of the private language argument to support a new psychology developed by the constructionists. It is argued that a neonate Crusoe's viability in philosophy and apparent absence in psychology offends against the integrity of the philosophical contribution Wittgenstein might make to psychology. The consequences of accepting Crusoe's viability are explored as they appear in both philosophy and psychology
Whiting, Daniel (2007). Defending semantic generalism. Analysis 67 (296):303–311.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘Particularism’ is a meta-ethical theory resulting from a holistic doctrine in the theory of reasons. According to Jonathan Dancy, the foremost contemporary proponent of particularism, ‘a feature that is a reason in favour of an action in one case may be no reason at all in another, or even a reason against’ (2004: 190). From this, Dancy claims, it follows that the ‘possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles’ (2004: 7). This doctrine is of significant interest and import in its own right, and accordingly is the subject of considerable critical attention. The concern of this paper, however, is not meta-ethics but semantics
Whiting, Daniel (2008). Oughts and thoughts: Rule-following and the normativity of content – Anandi Hattiangadi. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):743-745.   (Google)
Whiting, Daniel (forthcoming). Particularly general and generally particular: language, rules and meaning. Logique et Analyse.   (Google)
Abstract: Semantic generalists and semantic particularists disagree over the role of rules or principles in linguistic competence and in the determination of linguistic meaning, and hence over the importance of the notions of a rule or of a principle in philosophical accounts of language. In this paper, I have argued that the particularist’s case against generalism is far from decisive and that by moderating the claims she makes on behalf of her thesis the generalist can accommodate many of the considerations that the particularist cites in support of her position.
Williams, Michael (1991). Blind obedience: Rules, community and the individual. In Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Williams, Michael (1983). Wittgenstein on representation, privileged objects and private language. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (March):57-78.   (Google)
Wright, Crispin (ms). Rule-following without reasons: Wittgenstein's quietism and the constitutive question.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, "the Rule-following Considerations".[2] So, let me begin by explaining my focus here
Wright, Crispin (1981). Rule-following, objectivity and the theory of meaning. In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Wright, C. (2001). Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes From Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Wright, Crispin (2007). Rule-following without reasons: Wittgenstein's quietism and the constitutive question. Ratio 20 (4):481–502.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, "the Rule-following Considerations".[2] So, let me begin by explaining my focus here
Wright, Crispin (1989). Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind: Sensation, privacy and intention. Journal of Philosophy 86 (11):622-634.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Wright, C. (1980). Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 49 | Google)
Wright, C. (1989). Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and the central project of theoretical linguistics. In A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell.   (Cited by 41 | Google)
Yamada, Masahiro (2010). Rule following: A pedestrian approach. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):283-311.   (Google)
Zalabardo, José L. (2009). One Strand in the rule-following considerations. Synthese 171 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that a target of the rule-following considerations is the thought that there are mental episodes in which a consciously accessible item guides me in my decision to respond in a certain way when I follow a rule. I contend that Wittgenstein’s position on this issue invokes a distinction between a literal and a symbolic reading of the claim that these processes of guidance take place. In the literal sense he rejects the claim, but in the symbolic sense he sees nothing wrong with it. I consider some arguments that Wittgenstein deploys against the literal sense of the claim
Zalabardo, Jos (1989). Rules, communities and judgement. Critica 21 (63):33-58.   (Google)