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2.5e. Meaning Holism (Meaning Holism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Anthony, Louise (1993). Conceptual connection and the observation/ theory distinction. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)
Becker, K. (1998). On the perfectly general nature of instability in meaning holism. Journal of Philosophy 95 (12):635-640.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Becker, K. (2001). Understanding Quine's famous `statement'. Erkenntnis 55 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   I argue that Quine''s famous claim, any statement can be held true come what may, demands an interpretation that implies that the meanings of the expressions in the held-true statement change. The intended interpretation of this claim is not clear from its context, and so it is often misunderstood by philosophers (and is misleadingly taught to their students). I explain Fodor and Lepore''s (1992) view that the above interpretation would render Quine''s assertion entirely trivial and reply, on both textual and philosophical grounds, that only this trivial reading is consistent with Quine''s famous denial of analyticity. I also explain briefly how the trivial reading lends support to meaning holism, which, regardless of one''s views of its consequences, is an important position in the philosophy of language and mind
Belnap, Nuel D. & Massey, Gerald J. (1990). Semantic holism. Studia Logica 49 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: A bivalent valuation is snt iff sound (standard PC inference rules take truths only into truths) and non-trivial (not all wffs are assigned the same truth value). Such a valuation is normal iff classically correct for each connective. Carnap knew that there were non-normal snt valuations of PC, and that the gap they revealed between syntax and semantics could be jumped as follows. Let VAL snt be the set of snt valuations, and VAL nrm be the set of normal ones. The bottom row in the table for the wedge is not semantically determined by VAL snt, but if one deletes from VAL snt all those valuations that are not classically correct at the aforementioned row, one jumps straights to VAL nrm and thus to classical semantics. The conjecture we call semantic holism claims that the same thing happens for any semantic indeterminacy in any row in the table of any connective of PC, i.e., to remove it is to jump straight to classical semantics. We show (i) why semantic holism is plausible and (ii) why it is nevertheless false. And (iii) we pose a series of questions concerning the number of possible steps or jumps between the indeterminate semantics given by VAL snt and classical semantics given by VAL nrm
Berg, Jonathan (1993). Inferential roles, Quine, and mad holism. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bezuidenhout, Anne L. (1993). The impossibility of punctate mental representations. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1998). Why holism is harmless and necessary. Philosophical Perspectives 12:105-126.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1995). An argument for holism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:151-70.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Block, Ned (1993). Holism, hyper-analyticity and hyper-compositionality. Mind and Language 8 (1):1-26.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1996). Holism, mental and semantic. In Edward Craig (ed.), [Book Chapter] (Unpublished). Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Mental (or semantic) holism is the doctrine that the identity of a belief content (or the meaning of a sentence that expresses it) is determined by its place in the web of beliefs or sentences comprising a whole theory or group of theories. It can be contrasted with two other views: atomism and molecularism. Molecularism characterizes meaning and content in terms of relatively small parts of the web in a way that allows many different theories to share those parts. For example, the meaning of 'chase' might be said by a molecularist to be try to catch. Atomism characterizes meaning and content in terms of none of the web; it says that sentences and beliefs have meaning or content independently of their relations to other sentences or beliefs. One major motivation for holism has come from reflections on the natures of confirmation and learning. As Quine (1953) observed, claims about the world are confirmed not individually, but only in conjunction with theories of which they are a part. And typically, one cannot come to understand scientific claims without understanding a significant chunk of the theory of which they are a part. For example, in learning the Newtonian concepts of 'force', 'mass', kinetic energy' and 'momentum', one doesn't learn any definitions of these terms in terms that are understood beforehand, for there are no such definitions. Rather, these theoretical terms were all learned together in conjunction with procedures for solving problems. The major problem with holism is that it threatens to make generalization in psychology virtually impossible. If the content of any state depends on all others, it would be extremely unlikely that any two believers would ever share a state with the same content. Moreover, holism would appear to conflict with our ordinary conception of reasoning. What sentences one accepts influence what one infers. if i accept a sentence and then later reject it, i thereby change the inferential role of that sentence, so the meaning of what i accept wouldn't be the same as what i later reject. but then it would be difficult to understand on this view how one could rationally --or even irrationally!-- change one's mind. and agreement and translation are also problematic for much the same reason. holists have responded (1) by proposing that we should think not in terms of "same/different" meaning but in terms of a gradient of similarity of meaning, (2) by proposing "two factor" theories or (3) by simply accepting the consequence that there is no real difference between changing meanings and changing beliefs
Brandl, Johannes L. (1993). Semantic holism is here to stay. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Brigandt, Ingo (2004). Holism, concept individuation, and conceptual change. In M. Hernandez Iglesias (ed.), Proceedings of the 4th Congress of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper discusses concept individuation in the context of scientific concepts and conceptual change in science. It is argued that some concepts can be individuated in different ways. A particular term may be viewed as corresponding to a single concept (which is ascribed to every person from a whole scientific field). But at the same time, we can legitimately individuate in a more fine grained manner, i.e., this term can also be considered as corresponding to two or several concepts (so that each of these concepts is attributed to a smaller group of persons only). The reason is that there are different philosophical and explanatory interests that underlie a particular study of the change of a scientific term. These interests determine how a concept is to be individuated; and as the same term can be subject to different philosophical studies and interests, its content can be individuated in different ways
Callaway, H. G. (1992). Meaning holism and semantic realism (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning without Analyticity). Dialectica 46 (1):41-59.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Reconciliation of semantic holism with interpretation of individual expressions is advanced here by means of a relativization of sentence meaning to object language theories viewed as idealizations of belief-systems. Fodor's view of the autonomy of the special sciences is emphasized and this is combined with detailed replies to his recent criticisms of meaning holism. The argument is that the need for empirical evidence requires a holistic approach to meaning. Thus, semantic realism requires semantic holism.
Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1989). Semantic holism without semantic socialism: Twin earths, thinking, language, bodies, and the world. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14:101-126.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1998). Conceptual similarity across sensory and neural diversity: The fodor/lepore challenge answered. Journal Of Philosophy 95 (1):5-32.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Review author[s]: Paul M. (1993). State-space semantics and meaning holism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):667-672.   (Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (1999). Holism: Some reasons for buyer's remorse. Analysis 59 (2):63-71.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (1999). Holism, thought, and the fate of metaphysics: Counter-reply to Heal. Analysis 59 (2):79-85.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Cornwell, William (2002). Epistemological holism and semantic holism. In Perspectives on Coherentism. Aylmer, Québec: Éditions Du Scribe.   (Google)
Cozzo, Cesare (2002). Does epistemological holism lead to meaning holism? Topoi 21 (1-2):25-45.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are various proposals for a general characterization of holism1. In this paper I propose the following: a variety of holism is the view that every X of an appropriate kind, which is part of a relevant whole W, cannot be legitimately separated or taken in isolation from W. Then, I distinguish two general kinds of holism, depending on two different reasons which can debar us from taking X in isolation from W. One reason can be that separating X from W always amounts to transforming X into something else. Correspondingly, a strong holism is the view that if the whole W is modified anywhere, X ceases to be X and becomes something else. Another reason why it may be illegitimate to consider X in isolation from W can be that if we separate X from W, nothing that we know entitles us to exclude that X might be transformed into something else. Correspondingly, virtual holism is the view that if the whole W is modified anywhere, we can never rule out that X ceases to be X and becomes something else
Devitt, Michael (1994). A critique of the case for semantic holism. Philosophical Perspectives 8:281-306.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Devitt, Michael (1993). Localism and analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):641-646.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Devitt, Michael (1994). Semantic localism: Who needs a principled basis? In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Esfeld, Michael (1998). Holism and analytic philosophy. Mind 107 (426):365-80.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. & Lepore, Ernest (1999). All at sea in semantic space: Churchland on meaning similarity. Journal Of Philosophy 96 (8):381-403.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. & LePore, Ernest (1992). Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Blackwell.   (Cited by 341 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. & LePore, Ernest (1993). Precis of holism: A shopper's guide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):637-682.   (Annotation | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. & LePore, Ernest (1993). Reply to Block and Boghossian. Mind and Language 8 (1):41-48.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (1993). Holism without meaning: A critical review of Fodor and Lepore's holism: A shopper's guide. Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):441-49.   (Google)
Harrell, M. (1996). Confirmation holism and semantic holism. Synthese 109 (1):63-101.   (Google | More links)
Heal, Jane (1994). Semantic holism: Still a good buy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:325-39.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Heal, Jane (1999). Thoughts and holism: Reply to Cohen. Analysis 59 (2):71-78.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (online). Holism, context, and content.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper will argue that while traditional accounts of word meaning have problems accounting for how the referent of a non-ambiguous/non-indexical term can shift from context to context, a moderate version of semantic holism can do so by understanding the comparative weight of the extension-determining beliefs as itself something which can vary from context to context. The view will then be used to give an account of some of the more problematic cases in the literature associated with semantic externalism
Jackman, Henry (online). Holism, relevance, and thought content.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jackman, Henry (1999). Moderate holism and the instability thesis. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):361-69.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that popular criticisms of semantic holism (such as that it leaves the ideas of translation, disagreement and change of mind problematic) are more properly directed at an "instability assumption" which, while often associated with holism, can be separated from it. The versions of holism that follow from 'interpretational' account of meaning are not committed to the instability assumption and can thus avoid many of the problems traditionally associated with holism
Jorgensen, Andrew Kenneth (2009). Holism, communication, and the emergence of public meaning: Lessons from an economic analogy. Philosophia 37 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Holistic accounts of meaning normally incorporate a subjective dimension that invites the criticism that they make communication impossible, for speakers are bound to differ in ways the accounts take to be relevant to meaning, and holism generalises any difference over some words to a difference about all, and this seems incompatible with the idea that successful communication requires mutual understanding. I defend holism about meaning from this criticism. I argue that the same combination of properties (subjective origins of value, holism among values, and ultimate publicity of value) is exhibited by monetary value and take the emergence of equilibrium prices as a model for the emergence of public meanings
Kukla, Andr (1989). Meaning holism and intentional psychology. Analysis 49 (October):173-175.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
LePore, Ernest & Fodor, Jerry A. (1993). Reply to critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):673-682.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1993). Intentional chemistry. In Joseph Levine (ed.), Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Lormand, Eric (1996). How to be a meaning holist. Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):51-73.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Meaning holists hold, roughly, that each representation in a linguistic or mental system depends semantically on every other representation in the system. The main difficulty for holism is the threat it poses to meaning stability--shared meaning between representations in two systems. If meanings are holistically dependent, then semantic differences anywhere seem to balloon into semantic differences everywhere. My positive aim is to show how holism, even at its most extreme, can accommodate and also increase meaning stability. My negative aim is to provide reasons for rejecting various nonholist proposals, at least for systems of mental representations
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1993). Is content holism incoherent? Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:173-195.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mallon, Ron (online). Differences between interpersonal and intrapersonal belief ascription: A problem with Block's argument for holism.   (Google)
Abstract: instead he argues for a conditional: "if there is such a thing as narrow content, it is holistic," where holism is taken to be "the doctrine that any _substantial_ difference in W-beliefs, whether between two people or between one person at two times, requires a difference in the meaning or content of W" (153, 152)
Malpas, J. E. (1992). Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning: Holism, Truth, Interpretation. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: J. E. Malpas discusses and develops the ideas of Donald Davidson, influential in contemporary thinking on the nature of understanding and meaning, and of truth and knowledge. He provides an account of Davidson's holistic and hermeneutical conception of linguistic interpretation, and, more generally, of the mind. Outlining its Quinean origins and the elements basic to Davidson's Radical Interpretation, J. E. Malpas' book goes on to elaborate this holism and to examine the indeterminacy of interpretation and the principle of charity. The metaphysical and epistemological consequences of Davidson's approach are considered, particularly in relation to scepticism and relativism, the realist/anti-realist debate, and the problem of truth. Parallels are drawn between the Davidsonian emphasis on the centrality of the notion of truth and Heidegger's notion of truth as aletheia, as the book looks to structuralist, hermeneutical and phenomenological sources to illuminate Davidson's position
Markic, Olga (1997). A localist network? In Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor.   (Google)
Margolis, Eric & Laurence, Stephen (1998). Multiple meanings and stability of content. Journal of Philosophy 95 (5):255-63.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Massey, Gerald J. (1990). Semantic holism is seriously false. Studia Logica 49 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Semantic Holism is the claim that any semantic path from inferential semantics (the indeterminate semantics forced by the classical inference rules of PC) reaches all the way to classical semantics if it is even one step long. In our joint paper Semantic Holism, Belnap and I showed that some such semantic paths are two steps long, but we left open a number of questions about the lengths of semantic paths. Here I answer the most important of these questions by showing that there are infinitely long semantic paths that begin at inferential semantics but that do not even reach classical semantics. I do this by showing how to construct such an infinite semantic path from the members of the family of (n–1)-out-of-n-disjunction connectives
McClamrock, Ron (1989). Holism without tears: Local and global effects in cognitive processing. Philosophy of Science 56 (June):258-74.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The suggestion that cognition is holistic has become a prominent criticism of optimism about the prospects for cognitive science. This paper argues that the standard motivation for this holism, that of epistemological holism, does not justify this pessimism. An illustration is given of how the effects of epistemological holism on perception are compatible with the view that perceptual processes are highly modular. A suggestion for generalizing this idea to conceptual cognitive processing is made, and an account of the holists' failure is offered
McDermott, M. (2001). Quine's holism and functionalist holism. Mind 110 (440):977-1025.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One central strand in Quine's criticism of common-sense notions of linguistic meaning is an argument from the holism of empirical content. This paper explores (with many digressions) the several versions of the argument, and discovers them to be uniformly bad. There is a kernel of truth in the idea that ?holism?, in some sense, ?undermines the analytic?synthetic distinction?, in some sense; but it has little to do with Quine's radical empiricism, or his radical scepticism about meaning
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1993). On punctate content and on conceptual role. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):653-660.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Mercier, Adele (1993). Normativism and the mental: A problem of language individuation. Philosophical Studies 72 (1):71-88.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: My aim in this paper is two?fold. I start by contrasting three versions of externalist arguments based on etiological considerations, whose differences are not often appreciated. My purpose in doing so is to isolate one of these versions of externalism as most supportive of current anti?individualist attitudes toward the mental. My second aim is to show that this version, which I call (for reasons soon to be clear) Dialectal Etiology , is marred to a greater extent than the other two by an important problem of language individuation.ii..
Miller, Alexander (2003). Does "belief holism" show that reductive dispositionalism about content could not be true? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (77):73-90.   (Google)
Miller, R. B. (1997). One bad and one not very good argument against holism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):234-40.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Nordby, Halvor (2006). The holism argument against 'modern philosophy of mind'. Sats 7 (1):157-174.   (Google | More links)
Pacherie, Elisabeth (1994). Holophobia. Acta Analytica 12 (12):105-112.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Pagin, Peter (1997). Is compositionality compatible with holism? Mind and Language 12 (1):11-33.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter Pagin Is the principle of semantic compositionality compatible with the principle of semantic holism? The question is of interest, since both principles have a lot that speaks for them, and since they do seem to be in conflict. The view that natural languages have compositional structure is almost unavoidable, since linguistic communication by means of new combinations of words would be virtually incomprehensible otherwise. And holism too seems generally plausible, since the meaning of an expression is directly connected with the way that expression interacts with other
Pagin, Peter (ms). Meaning holism.   (Google)
Abstract: The term ‘meaning holism’ (together with variants like ‘semantic holism’ and ‘linguistic holism’) has been used for a number of more or less closely interrelated ideas. According to one common view, meaning holism (MH) is the thesis that what a linguistic expression means depends on its relations to many or all other expressions within the same totality. Sometimes these relations are called ‘conceptual’ or ‘inferential’. A related idea is that what an expression means depends, mutually, on the meaning of the other expressions in the totality, or alternatively on some semantic property of this totality itself. The totality in question may be the language to which the expressions belong, or a theory formulation in that language. In this sense MH is contrasted e.g. with so-called atomistic theories, according to which each simple expression can have a meaning independently of all other expressions, or molecular theories according to which there are meaning dependencies but restricted to smaller parts and often unidirectional
Pataut, Fabrice (1997). Holism of content ascription and holism of belief content. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Penco, Carlo (2002). Holism, strawberries, and hair dryers. Topoi 21 (1-2):47-54.   (Google | More links)
Penco, Carlo (2007). Idiolect and context. In L. E. Hahn (ed.), Library of Living Philosphers: the Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I will compare some of Dummett and Davidson’s claims on the problem of communication and idiolects: how can we understand each other if we use different idiolects? First I define the problem, giving the alternative theses of (I) the priority of language over idiolects and (II) the priority of idiolects over language. I then present Dummett's claims supporting (I) and Davidson's claims supporting (II)
Penco, Carlo (2001). Local holism. In P. Bouquet (ed.), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. Kluwer.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is devoted to discuss a general tendency in contextualism which is known as "radical contextualism". In the first part I state the well known paradox of semantic holism, as discussed in philosophy of language: if meaning is holistic there is no possibility to share any meaning. In the second part I present the different answers to this paradox, from atomism to different forms of holism. In the third part I give a criticism of the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein as a supporter of global holism. I stress some similarities between Wittgenstein's thought and Multi Context theories in artificial inteligence. In the last part I give some argument against a rigid interpretation of "local holism": I claim the need to give restrictions to local holim and to develop a study of the connections between "default" properties and high level rules which are studied in Multi−Context theories
Penco, Carlo (2004). Wittgenstein, locality and rules. In Annalisa Coliva & Eva Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il Poligrafo.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper tries to give some substance to local holism, a picture that seems to fit Wittgenstein’s analysis of the working of language. In the first part I state the well-known paradox of semantic holism, as discussed in philosophy of language: if meaning is holistic there is no possibility to share any meaning. In the second part I present the different answers to this paradox, from atomism to different forms of holism. In the third part I give a criticism of the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein as a supporter of global holism. As an alternative lecture I will suggest some lines of Wittgenstein's thought leading towards a definition of local holism. Eventually I will show connections with ideas developed in Multi Context theories in artificial intelligence, which help to show a possible direction of inquiry about restrictions on locality
Perry, John (1994). Fodor and Lepore on holism. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):123-58.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Peregrin, Jaroslav (ms). Holistické pojetí jazyka.   (Google)
Abstract: Zdá se, že není nic přirozenějšího, než se spolu s Russellem domnívat, že „máme-li smysluplně hovořit a ne pouze vydávat zvuky, musíme slovům, která užíváme, dávat nějaký význam; a významem, který svým slovům dáváme, musí být něco, s čím jsme přišli do styku“. Naše slova přece musí, aby byla skutečně smysluplná, něco představovat! Od toho se odvíjí běžná poučka, která nám říká, že slova jazyka jsou symboly, to jest (podle Encyklopedie Britannica), „prvky komunikace, které mají představovat osobu, předmět, skupinu, proces nebo ideu“. Problém je ovšem v tom, že není zdaleka zřejmé, co to vůbec znamená něco představovat; a co to tedy znamená být symbolem. V běžném jazyce hovoříme o představování například tehdy, když říkáme, že herec na jevišti divadla představuje dánského prince Hamleta, nebo že krabička sirek, kterou použijeme namísto ztracené šachové figurky, představuje černou věž. Jak vůbec může dojít k tomu, aby něco (nebo někdo) představovalo něco (nebo někoho) jiného? Jednou ze možností jistě je, že to někdo vyhlásí a jiní to přijmou. V programu divadla se například napíše, že se hraje Hamlet, diváci si to přečtou a vědí, že člověk, který pobíhá po jevišti s lebkou, představuje onoho dánského prince. Člověk, který zjistí, že mu chybí šachová figurka, vezme krabičku sirek a prohlásí „Tato krabička bude představovat černou věž“. To je čirá konvence: lidé se o tom, že něco bude představovat něco jiného, jednoduše dohodnou. K takové dohodě sice není potřeba, aby s ní ti, kdo ji přijímají, nahlas vyslovovali souhlas; je k ní nicméně potřeba, aby ji někdo vyhlásil a někdo jiný jeho vyhlášení porozuměl a přijal ho. Z toho ovšem plyne, že o takto konvenční druh představování se jazyk opírat nemůže; alespoň ne obecně. Brání tomu fakt, že k ustanovení takové konvence už jazyk potřebujeme – potřebujeme tedy již nějaká slova, která něco 'představují', mít. Když již nějaký jazyk máme, není problém zavést konvencí další jazyk – jak je to ale s tím prvním jazykem? (Nebylo by možné, abychom konvenci ustanovili za pomoci nějakých pouze 'předjazykových' komunikačních prostředků? Nemůžeme konvenci, na jejímž základě nějaký typ zvuku představuje velryby, ustanovit třebs pomocí pouhého ukazování na velryby? Problém je zřejmě v tom, že rámec, který by byl potřeba k tomu, aby mohlo být to či ono gesto interpretováno jako ukázání, které ustanovuje, co bude daný zvuk představovat, by musel sestávat z tak komplexních komunikčaních praktik, že je opět stěží představitelný jinak než v podobě jazyka.) Samozřejmě, že konvence není tou jedinou cestou, jak může dojít k tomu, že něco představuje něco jiného..
Pessin, Andrew (1995). In defense of conceptual holism: Reply to Fodor and Lepore. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:269-280.   (Google)
Rapaport, William J. (2002). Holism, conceptual-role semantics, and syntactic semantics. Minds and Machines 12 (1):3-59.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Rapaport, William J. (2003). What did you mean by that? Misunderstanding, negotiation, and syntactic semantics. Minds and Machines 13 (3):397-427.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Resnik, Michael D. & Orlandi, Nicoletta (2003). Holistic realism: A response to Katz on holism and intuition. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):301-315.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1993). The unavailability of what we mean: A reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Senor, Thomas D. (1992). Two factor theories, meaning wholism and intentionalistic psychology: A reply to Fodor. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):133-151.   (Google)
Abstract: In the third chapter of his book Psychosemantics , Jerry A. Fodor argues that the truth of meaning holism (the thesis that the content of a psychological state is determined by the totality of that state's epistemic liaisons) would be fatal for intentionalistic psychology. This is because holism suggests that no two people are ever in the same intentional state, and so a psychological theory that generalizes over such states will be composed of generalizations which fail to generalize. Fodor then sets out to show that there is no reason to believe in holism by arguing that its primary foundation (i.e. functional-role semantics), when properly understood (i.e. when construed as a two-factor theory of content), is demonstrably false. In this paper, I argue two claims. First, I try to show that Fodor has seriously misrepresented two-factor theories and that his arguments against his strawman do nothing to indicate the falsity of the genuine article. Second, I argue that if one accepts meaning holism in the form of a two-factor theory, there is no particular reason to think that one is hereby committed to the futility of intentionalistic psychology. In making this point, I make a brief excursion into the psychological literature during which I discuss the belief perseverance phenomenon, the encoding specificity hypothesis, and a problem in human deductive reasoning. My second argument leads to a discussion of how such a psychology could be developed even if no two people are ever in the same intentional state
Silverberg, Arnold (1994). Meaning holism and intentional content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):29-53.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Stueber, Karsten R. (1997). Holism and radical interpretation: The limitations of a formal theory of meaning. In Analyomen 2, Volume II: Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Talmage, C. J. L. & Mercer, Mark (1991). Meaning holism and interpretability. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (July):301-15.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Talmage, C. J. L. (1998). Semantic localism and the locality of content. Erkenntnis 48 (1):101-111.   (Google | More links)
Weir, Alan (1985). Against holism. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (July):225-244.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Weitzman, Leora (1998). Is the possibility of massive error ruled out by semantic holism? Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):147-163.   (Google)
Whiting, Daniel (2008). Meaning holism and de re ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 575-599.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression.1 Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions
Yagisawa, Takashi (1993). The cost of meaning solipsism. In Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LaPore (eds.), Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)