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2.5f. Explanatory Role of Content (Explanatory Role of Content on PhilPapers)

See also:
Adams, Frederick R. (1991). Causal contents. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (1995). Syntax, semantics, and levels of explanation. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):361-367.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (1989). Does semantics run the psyche? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: If there is a dogma in the contemporary philosophy of the cognitive mind, it must be the notion that cognition is semantic causation or, differently put, that it is semantics that runs the psyche. This is what the notion of psychosemantics and (often) intentionality are all about. Another dogma, less widespread than the first but almost equally potent, is that common sense psychology is the implicit theory of psychosemantics. The two dogmas are jointly encapsulated in the following axiom. Mental attitudes such as beliefs and desires have essentially semantic contents, or are semantically evaluable. (This is why they are called propositional attitudes.) Mental attitudes have causal powers in virtue of their semantic properties. The content of an attitude has causal powers qua semantic, or more exactly in virtue of its syntactic structure which reflects relevant semantic properties and relations. (Propositions attitudinized cause in virtue of their semantically sensitive syntax.) It is the fact that mental attitudes cause in virtue of being semantic that explains why the cognitive mind is essentially semantic and why common sense psychology is implicitly true of the semantic mind
Braun, David M. (2000). Russellianism and psychological generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism
Burge, Tyler (2003). Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Cummins, Robert E. (1991). The role of mental meaning in psychological explanation. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Devitt, Michael (1991). Why Fodor can't have it both ways. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2003). Burge on mentalistic explanations, or why I am still epiphobic. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Dretske, Fred (1990). Does meaning matter? In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press.   (Cited by 688 | Google)
Abstract: In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
Dretske, Fred (1991). How beliefs explain: Reply to Baker. Philosophical Studies 113 (July):113-117.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1996). How reasons explain behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof. Mind and Language 11 (2):223-229.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1998). Minds, machines, and money: What really explains behavior. In Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2004). Psychological vs. biological explanations of behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32:167-177.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1989). Reasons and causes. Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1990). Reply: Causal relevance and explanatory exclusion. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1990). Reply to reviewers of explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819-839.   (Google)
Dretske, Fred (1994). Reply to Slater and Garcia-carpintero. Mind and Language 9 (2):203-8.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1987). The explanatory role of content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Elder, Crawford L. (1996). Content and the subtle extensionality of " -explains...". Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):320-32.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Field, Hartry (ms). Remarks on content and its role in explanation.   (Google)
Figdor, Carrie (2003). Can mental representations be triggering causes? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account of behavior can be extended to the case of intentional states, and that this extension provides a way to show how intentional properties can play the causal role that we wanted explained
Fodor, Jerry A. (1986). Banish discontent. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1990). Reply to Dretske's Does Meaning Matter?. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (1994). Dretske on the causal efficacy of meaning. Mind and Language 9 (2):181-202.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (1986). Why semantic properties won't earn their keep. Philosophical Studies 50 (September):223-36.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Grimaltos, Tobies & Moya, Carlos J. (1997). Belief, content, and cause. In European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Stanford: CSLI.   (Google)
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Horgan, Terence E. (1991). Actions, reasons, and the explanatory role of content. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (1998). What can the semantic properties of innate representations explain? In Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (1991). Dretske on how reasons explain behavior. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Lambert, Karel J. (1978). The place of the intentional in the explanation of behavior: A brief survey. Grazer Philosophische Studien 6:75-84.   (Google)
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Melnyk, Andrew (1996). The prospects for Dretske's account of the explanatory role of belief. Mind and Language 11 (2):203-15.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Millikan, Ruth G. (1990). Seismograph Readings for explaining behavior. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):807-812.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Noordhof, Paul (1996). Accidental associations, local potency, and a dilemma for Dretske. Mind and Language 11 (2):216-22.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Perry, John & Israel, David J. (1991). Fodor and psychological explanation. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: [In Meaning in Mind, edited by Barry Loewer and Georges Rey. Oxford: Basil Black- well, 1991, 165
Power, Nicholas P. (1996). Fodor's vindication of folk psychology and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.   (Google)
Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1987). What's in a mind? Synthese 70 (January):97-122.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1991). Dretske on the explanatory role of belief. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Schiffer, Stephen R. (online). An introduction to content and its role in explanation.   (Google)
Slater, Carol (1994). Discrimination without indication: Why Dretske can't lean on learning. Mind and Language 9 (2):163-80.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Tanney, Julia (2005). Reason-explanation and the contents of the mind. Ratio 18 (3):338-351.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: i> This paper takes a close look at the kinds of considerations we use to reach agreement in our ordinary (non-philosophical and non- theoretical) judgments about a person
Toribio, Josefa (1991). Causal efficacy, content and levels of explanation. Logique Et Analyse 34 (September-December):297-318.   (Google)
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Wallis, Charles (1994). Using representation to explain. In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.   (Google)
Ward, Andrew (2001). The compatibility of psychological naturalism and representationalism. Disputatio 11.   (Google)