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Intentionality :: Concepts

See also:
Alvarez, Asuncion (2006). On Peacocke's theory of concepts. In E. Di Nucci & C McHugh (eds.), Content, Consciousness, and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Press. (Google)
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Asher, Nicholas M. (1988). Semantic competence, linguistic understanding, and a theory of concepts. Philosophical Studies 53 (January):1-36. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Atran, Scott (1989). Basic conceptual domains. Mind and Language 4:7-16. (Cited by 16 | Google)
Aydede, Murat (1998). Fodor on concepts and Frege puzzles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat (1999). What makes perceptual symbols perceptual? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:610-611 . (Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (2000). Review of Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Philosophical Review. (Google | More links)
Barber, Alex (1998). The pleonasticity of talk about concepts. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):53-86. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Barsalou, Lawrence W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. (Cited by 1129 | Google | More links)
Bealer, George (1998). A theory of concepts and concepts possession. Philosophical Issues 9:261-301. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Bealer, George (1998). Concept possession. Philosophical Issues 9:331-338. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bengson, John & Moffett, Marc A. (2007). Know-how and concept possession. Philosophical Studies 136 (1). (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (1999). Naturalism and conceptual norms. Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):77-85. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (1989). What do we need concepts for? Mind and Language 4:17-23. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bradshaw, Denny E. (1992). The nature of concepts. Philosophical Papers 21 (1):1-20. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Braisby, Nick (1998). Compositionality and the modelling of complex concepts. Minds and Machines 8 (4):479-508. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brandom, Robert B. (2002). Overcoming aduality of concepts and causes: A unifying thread in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In R.M. Gale (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell. (Google)
Brigandt, Ingo (online). Scientific practice, conceptual change, and the nature of concepts. (Google)
Brown, Harold I. (online). Conceptual comparison and conceptual innovation. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brown, Harold I. (1986). Sellars, concepts, and conceptual change. Synthese 68 (August):275-307. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Concepts, conceptions, reflective understanding: Reply to Peacocke. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1993). Concepts, definitions, and meaning. Metaphilosophy 24 (4):309-25. (Cited by 12 | Google)
Byrne, Darragh (2004). The 'compositional rigidity' of recognitionality. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):147-169. (Google | More links)
Cain, M. J. (2004). The return of the nativist. Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):1-20. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Camp, Elisabeth (online). Putting thoughts to work: Concepts, systematicity, and stimulus-independence and the generality constraint. (Google)
Campbell, John (1985). Possession of concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85:149-170. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Carey, Susan (manuscript). The Origin of Concepts, chapter . (Google)
Chen, Xiang (2001). Perceptual symbols and taxonomy comparison. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S200-S212. (Google | More links)
Clark, Andy & Prinz, Jesse J. (2004). Putting concepts to work: Some thoughts for the twenty-first century. Mind and Language 19 (1):57-69. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Cussins, Adrian (1990). The connectionist construction of concepts. In Margaret A. Boden (ed.), The Philosophy of AI. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 107 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1989). Concepts in the brain. Mind and Language 4:24-28. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Davis, Wayne A. (2005). Concepts and epistemic individuation (christopher peacocke). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325. (Google)
Davis, Wayne A. (2005). Concepts and epistemic individuation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Davis, Wayne A. (2005). Concept individuation, possession conditions, and propositional attitudes. Noûs 39 (1):140-66. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
de Rosa, Raffaella (2005). Prinz's problematic proxytypes. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):594-606. (Google)
DeMoss, David (2004). Hunting fat gnu: How to identify a proxytype. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-10. (Google)
Earl, Dennis (2006). Concepts and properties. Metaphysica 7 (1):67-85. (Google)
Evans, Jonathan S. B. T. (1989). Concepts and inference. Mind and Language 4:29-34. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1995). Concepts: A potboiler. Cognition 50:133-51. (Cited by 188 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 573 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (2004). Having concepts: A brief refutation of the twentieth century. Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47. (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (2003). Hume Variations. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (2000). Replies to critics. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):350-374. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1998). There are no recognitional concepts, not even RED. Philosophical Issues 9:1-14. (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. & LePore, Ernest (1996). The red Herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still can't be prototypes. Cognition 58:253-70. (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Franks, Bradley (1992). Realism and folk psychology in the ascription of concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gardenfors, Peter (1997). Meanings as conceptual structures. In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (1993). An extraterrestrial perspective on conceptual development. Mind and Language 8 (1):105-30. (Google)
Gauker, Christopher (2005). On the evidence for prelinguistic concepts. Theoria-Revista De Teoria Historia Y Fundamentos De La Ciencia 20 (3):287-297. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (1987). Concepts, structures, and meanings. Inquiry 30 (March):101-112. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Grandy, Richard E. (1990). Concepts, prototypes, and information. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell. (Google)
Grandy, Richard E. (1998). Recognitional concepts and compositionality. Philosophical Issues 9:21-25. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Haas-Spohn, Ulrike & Spohn, Wolfgang (2001). Concepts are beliefs about essences. In R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Albert Newen & Ulrich Nortmann (eds.), Proceedings of an International Symposium. Stanford, CSLI Publications. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Hampton, James A. (2000). Concepts and prototypes. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):299-307. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Hauser, Larry (1995). Doing without mentalese. Behavior And Philosophy 23 (2):42-47. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Higginbotham, James T. (1998). Conceptual competence. Philosophical Issues 9:149-162. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Higginbotham, James T. (1995). Fodor's concepts. In Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview. (Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. (1998). Recognitional concepts and the compositionality of concept possession. Philosophical Issues 9:27-33. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Horst, Steven (online). How (not) to give a theory of concepts. (Google)
Horwich, Paul (1998). Concept constitution. Philosophical Issues 9:15-19. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Jackendoff, Ray S. (1989). What is a concept, that a person may grasp it? Mind and Language 4:68-102. (Cited by 20 | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (online). Can semantic properties be noncausal? (Comment on fodor). (Google)
Johnson, Kent (2004). From impossible words to conceptual structure: The role of structure and processes in the lexicon. Mind and Language 19 (3):334-358. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Jutronic, Dunja (2001). Is there a third way of concept acquisition? Acta Analytica 16 (26):97-108. (Google)
Keil, Frank C. (1989). Spiders in the web of belief: The tangled relations between concepts and theories. Mind and Language 4:43-50. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Keil, Frank C. & Wilson, Robert A. (2000). The concept concept: The wayward path of cognitive science. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):308-318. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (1995). Two concepts of concept. Mind and Language 10 (4):402-22. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Kwong, Jack M. C. (2007). Is conceptual atomism a plausible theory of concepts? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45:413-434. (Google)
Kwong, Jack M. C. (2006). Why concepts can't be theories. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):309-325. (Google | More links)
Landau, Barbara (2000).