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2.8. Intentionality, Misc (Intentionality, Misc on PhilPapers)

Addis, Laird (1989). Natural Signs: A Theory of Intentionality. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Alanen, Lilli K. (1992). Thought-talk: Descartes and Sellars on intentionality. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1):19-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Aquila, Richard E. (1989). Intentionality, content, and primitive mental directedness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):583-604.   (Google | More links)
Armstrong, Edward G. (1977). Intersubjective intentionality. Midwestern Journal of Philosophy 5:1-11.   (Google)
Barton Jr, W. B. (1963). Intentionality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 1:14-19.   (Google)
Bechtel, P. William (1978). Indeterminacy and intentionality: Quine's purported elimination of propositions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (November):649-661.   (Google | More links)
Bergmann, Gustav (1955). Intentionality. Archivio Di Filosofia 3:177-216.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1989). Realism without internalism: A critique of Searle on intentionality. Journal of Philosophy 86 (February):57-72.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Blackman, Larry L. (2002). Mind as intentionality alone. Metaphysica 3 (2):41-64.   (Google)
Bonomi, Andrea (1986). A problem about intentionality. Topoi 5 (September):91-100.   (Google | More links)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2006). Moral rights and human culture. ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 13 (4):603-620.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue that there is no moral justification for the conviction that rights should be reserved to humans. In particular, I reject James Griffin’s view on the moral relevance of the cultural dimension of humanity. Drawing from the original notion of individual right introduced in the Middle Ages and the development of this notion in the eighteenth century, I emphasise that the practice of according rights is justified by the interest in safeguarding the powers of reason and autonomy that some individuals can exercise. Since we are in no position to rule out that non-humans can exercise these capacities, I conclude that rights should not be reserved to humans. This will lead to a reformulation of the reasons why so-called ‘marginal’ humans and non-human animals can be granted some basic rights. Being human is neither necessary nor sufficient for holding rights. All individuals, human or non-human, who can exercise reason and autonomy to some extent can be accorded basic rights in virtue of their having morally relevant preferences.
Brandl, Johannes L. (2005). The immanence theory of intentionality. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Brown, Stuart C. (1963). Intentionality intensified. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (October):357-360.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (forthcoming). Intentionality. In J. Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some things are _about_, or are _directed on_ , or _represent_, other things. For example, the sentence 'Cats are animals' is about cats (and about animals), this article is about intentionality, Emanuel Leutze's most famous painting is about Washington's crossing of the Delaware, lanterns hung in Boston's North Church were about the British, and a map of Boston is about Boston. In contrast, '#a$b', a blank slate, and the city of Boston are not about anything. Many mental states and events also have "aboutness": the belief that cats are animals is about cats, as is the fear of cats, the desire to have many cats, and seeing that the cats are on the mat. Arguably some mental states and events are not about anything: sensations, like pains and itches, are often held to be examples. Actions can also be about other things: hunting for the cat is about the cat, although tripping over the cat is not. This -- rather vaguely characterized -- phenomenon of "aboutness" is called _intentionality_. Something that is about (directed on, represents) something else is said to "have intentionality", or (in the case of mental states) is said to be an "intentional mental state"
Calderon, Castaneda & Neri, Hector (eds.) (1966). Intentionality, Minds, And Perception. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1954). On the uses of intentional words. Journal of Philosophy 51 (July):436-440.   (Google | More links)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1984). The primacy of the intentionality. Synthese 61 (October):89-110.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Cornman, James W. (1962). Intentionality and intensionality. Philosophical Quarterly 12 (January):44-52.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Cornman, James W. (1964). The extent of intentionality. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (October):355-357.   (Google | More links)
Coseru, Christian (2009). Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Perhaps no other classical philosophical tradition, East or West, offers a more complex and counter-intuitive account of mind and mental phenomena than Buddhism. While Buddhists share with other Indian philosophers the view that the domain of the mental encompasses a set of interrelated faculties and processes, they do not associate mental phenomena with the activity of a substantial, independent, and enduring self or agent. Rather, Buddhist theories of mind center on the doctrine of no-self (Pāli anatta, Skt.[1] anātma), which postulates that human beings are reducible to the physical and psychological constituents and processes which comprise them.
Crane, Tim (1998). Intentionality as the mark of the mental. In Tim Crane (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which derives from scholastic discussions of concepts or intentiones.2 Rather, his originality consists in his claim that the concept of intentionality marks out the subject matter of psychology: the mental. His view was that intentionality ‘is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything like it’.3 This is Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental. Despite the centrality of the concept of intentionality in contemporary philosophy of mind, and despite the customary homage paid to Brentano as the one who revived the terminology and placed the concept at the centre of philosophy, Brentano’s thesis is widely rejected by contemporary philosophers of mind. What is more, its rejection is not something which is thought to require substantial philosophical argument. Rather, the falsity of the thesis is taken as a starting-point in many contemporary discussions of intentionality, something so obvious that it only needs to be stated to be recognised as true. Consider, for instance, these remarks from the opening pages of Searle’s Intentionality: Some, not all, mental states and events have Intentionality. Beliefs, fears, hopes and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of nervousness, elation and undirected anxiety that are not Intentional.... My beliefs and desires must always be about something. But my nervousness and undirected anxiety need not in that way be about anything.4 Searle takes this as obvious, so obvious that it is not in need of further argument or elucidation..
Crane, Tim (2007). Review of Gábor Forrai, George kampis (eds.), Intentionality: Past and Future. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (1).   (Google)
Cunningham, Suzanne (1997). Two faces of intentionality. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):445-460.   (Google | More links)
Davies, Kim (1982). Intentionality: Spontaneous ascription and deep intuition. Analysis 42 (June):169-171.   (Google)
Davies, David (1992). Perspectives on intentional realism. Mind and Language 7 (3):264-285.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. & Haugeland, John (1987). Intentionality. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Intentionality is aboutness. Some things are about other things: a belief can be about icebergs, but an iceberg is not about anything; an idea can be about the number 7, but the number 7 is not about anything; a book or a film can be about Paris, but Paris is not about anything. Philosophers have long been concerned with the analysis of the phenomenon of intentionality, which has seemed to many to be a fundamental feature of mental states and events
Double, Richard (1984). Searle's answer to 'Hume's problem'. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22:435-438.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1980). The intentionality of cognitive states. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5:281-294.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Field, Hartry (1986). Stalnaker on intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's inquiry. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April):98-112.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Fitch, W. Tecumseh (2008). Nano-intentionality: A defense of intrinsic intentionality. Biology and Philosophy 23 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: I suggest that most discussions of intentional systems have overlooked an important aspect of living organisms: the intrinsic goal-directedness inherent in the behaviour of living eukaryotic cells. This goal directedness is nicely displayed by a normal cell’s ability to rearrange its own local material structure in response to damage, nutrient distribution or other aspects of its individual experience. While at a vastly simpler level than intentionality at the human cognitive level, I propose that this basic capacity of living things provides a necessary building block for cognition and high-order intentionality, because the neurons that make up vertebrate brains, like most cells in our body, embody such capacities. I provisionally dub the capacities in question “nano-intentionality”: a microscopic form of “aboutness”. The form of intrinsic intentionality I propose is thoroughly materialistic, fully compatible with known biological facts, and derived non-mysteriously through evolution. Crucially, these capacities are not shared by any existing computers or computer components, and thus provide a clear, empirically-based distinction between brains and currently existing artificial information processing systems. I suggest that an appreciation of this aspect of living matter provides a potential route out of what may otherwise appear to be a hopeless philosophical quagmire confronting information-processing models of the mind
Flores, Albert (1978). On the thesis of intentionality. Philosophia 7 (July):501-514.   (Google | More links)
Follesdal, Dagfinn (1982). Intentionality and behaviorism. In Logic, Methodology & Philosophy Of Science. Amsterdam: North-Holland.   (Google)
Forrai, G (ed.) (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.   (Google)
Geach, Peter T. (1976). Two kinds of intentionality? The Monist 59 (July):306-320.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Geisz, Steven F. (2009). Turning representation inside out: An adverbial approach to the metaphysics of language and mind. Philosophical Forum 40 (4):437-471.   (Google)
Abstract: In order to resolve problems about the normative aspects of representation without having to (1) provide a naturalized theory of intentional/semantic properties, (2) accept non-natural intentional/semantic properties into our worldview, or (3) eliminate intentionality, this article questions a basic assumption about the metaphysics of representation: that representation involves representation-objects. An alternative, nonreifying approach to the metaphysics of representation is introduced and developed in detail. The argumentative strategy is as follows. First, an adverbial view of linguistic representation is introduced. Two potential objections are identified and considered. To respond to these objections, relationships between physical form and linguistic/representational form are examined. In the process, two ways of idealizing away from the heterogeneous details of actual language use are introduced: idealization toward homogeneity and idealization toward complete heterogeneity. I argue that an adverbial view of linguistic representation both allows for and requires that we idealize toward complete heterogeneity and that doing so has important implications for (1) our understanding of the relationship between physical form and representational form and (2) property attribution in general. These implications provide further indirect support for the alternative metaphysics of representation developed here
Genova, Anthony C. (1975). Opacity, inexistence and intentionality. Ratio 17 (December):237-246.   (Google)
Gurwitsch, Aron (1970). Towards a theory of intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (March):354-367.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hacker, P. M. S. (2001). An orrery of intentionality. Language and Communication 21 (2):119-141.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: P.M.S. Hacker 1. _The problems of Intentionality_ The problems of intentionality have exercised philosophers since the dawn of their subject. In the last century they were brought afresh into the limelight by Brentano. Famously he remarked that
Haldane, John J. (1996). Intentionality and one-sided relations. Ratio 9 (2):95-114.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Haldane, John J. (1992). Putnam on intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):671-682.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Harding, Sandra G. (1977). Harman's thoughts. Metaphilosophy 8 (January):62-71.   (Google | More links)
Haugeland, John (1990). The intentionality all-stars. Philosophical Perspectives 4:383-427.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hudin, Jennifer (2006). Motor intentionality and its primordiality. Inquiry 49 (6):573 – 590.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Is intentionality possible without representation? This paper considers the conditions under which intentionality without representation could occur and what sort of perceptual content such intentionality would have. In addition, it considers the constraints on non-representational intentional content in organisms that have representation. The paper is divided into three parts. The first section compares and contrasts two opposed positions on non-representational intentionality, those of Herbert Dreyfus and John Searle. The second section reviews a neurobiological model that accommodates the possibility of non-representational perceptual content. The final section provides a puzzle for theories of non-representational perceptual content, specifically in connection with the perception of representations. The puzzle of representation and perception illustrates a further need for all theories of perception, both philosophical and scientific: to provide a more finely developed definition of the notion of representation
Huemer, Wolfgang (2003). Husserl and Haugeland on constitution. Synthese 137 (3):345-368.   (Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (online). Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Jacquette, Dale (1998). Intentionality on the installment plan. Philosophy 73 (283):63-79.   (Google)
Stalnaker, Robert (2004). Lewis on intentionality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):199 – 212.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: David Lewis's account of intentionality is a version of what he calls 'global descriptivism'. The rough idea is that the correct interpretation of one's total theory is the one (among the admissible interpretations) that come closest to making it true. I give an exposition of this account, as I understand it, and try to bring out some of its consequences. I argue that there is a tension between Lewis's global descriptivism and his rejection of a linguistic account of the intentionality of thought. I distinguish some different senses in which Lewis's theory might permit, or be committed to, a kind of holism about intentional content, and I consider the sense in which Lewis's account might be said to be an internalist account, and the motivation for this kind of internalism
Jacob, Pierre (1997). What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 52 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology
Johnston, Mark (2007). Objective minds and the objectivity of our minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233-69.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1997). Chisholm on intentionality: De se, de re, and de dicto. In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court.   (Google)
King, Peter, Mediæval intentionality and pseudo-intentionality.   (Google)
Abstract: Wilfrid Sellars, in his essay “Being and Being Known,”1 sets out to explore “the profound truth contained in the Thomistic thesis that the senses in their way and the intellect in its way are informed by the natures of external objects and events” [§1]. Profound truth there may be, but Sellars also finds a profound error in the mediæval treatment of the intentionality of sensing on a par with the intentionality of thinking: There are many reasons for the plausibility of the idea that sense belongs to the intentional order. . . It is primarily due, however, to the fact that sensations have what I shall call a pseudo-intentionality which is easily mistaken for the genuine intentionality of the cognitive order. [§18] Sellars argues that thought is genuinely intentional, for it is (in good linguistic fashion) about the world, whereas sense merely seems to be about the world but in fact is not, although it is systematically correlated with the world—the ‘pseudo-intentionality’ he alludes to here. On Sellars’s reading, the ‘Thomistic’ view gets certain things right that the later Cartesian view gets wrong, such as distinguishing mental acts intrinsically rather than by their ‘content’, but it also gets some things wrong in its own right, notably in its claim that sensing has “genuine intentionality” the way thinking does, and so to take sensing as properly belonging to “the cognitive order” (i. e. to qualify as a kind of knowledge strictly speaking). Sellars is out to right the Thomistic wrongs, beginning with intentionality, where the mistake is easily made. For Sellars has his eye not only on intentionality, but on the consequent claim that episodes of (intentional) sensing play a foundationalist epistemological role, a view he elsewhere famously calls ‘The Myth of the Given’.2 There is no question that Sellars wants to make room for his own brand of social epistemology; his agenda is not historical but systematic. Yet in “Being and Being Known,” Sellars puts his case in historical rather than systematic terms..
Knell, Sebastian (2005). A deflationist theory of intentionality? Brandom's analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):73-90.   (Google)
Kneale, William C. (1968). Intentionality and intensionality, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:73-90.   (Google)
Knowles, Marion C. (1981). Some remarks on the intentionality of thought. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):267-279.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kunne, Wolfgang & Mulligan, Kevin (1987). The intentionality of thinking. In Speech Act And Sachverhalt. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google)
Laurier, Daniel (2005). Mind, Davidson and reality. Principia 9 (1-2):125-157.   (Google)
le Morvan, Pierre (2005). Intentionality: Transparent, translucent, and opaque. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.   (Google)
Abstract: Exploring intentionality from an externalist per- spective, I distinguish three kinds of intentionality in the case of seeing, which I call transparent, translucent, and opaque respec- tively. I then extend the distinction from seeing to knowing, and then to believing. Having explicated the three-fold distinction, I then critically explore some important consequences that follow from granting that (i) there are transparent and translucent in- tentional states and (ii) these intentional states are mental states. These consequences include: ?rst, that existential opacity is neither the mark of intentionality nor of the mental; second, that Sellars has not shown that all intentionality is non-relational; third, that a key Quinean argument for semantic indeterminacy rests on a false premise; fourth, that perceptual experience is intentional on Alston
Lowe, E. J. (1980). An analysis of intentionality. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (October):294-304.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (1982). Intentionality and intuition: A reply to Davies. Analysis 42 (March):85.   (Google)
Lowe, E. J. (1982). Intentionality: A reply to Stiffler. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (October):354-357.   (Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1975). Reply to Morick on intentionality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (June):697-699.   (Google)
Lyons, William E. (1995). Approaches to Intentionality. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Approach to Intentionality is an authoritative and accessible account of a problem central to contemporary philosopy of mind. Lyons first gives a critical survey of the current debate about the nature of intentionality, then moves on to offer an original new theory. The book is written throughout in a clear, direct, and lively style
Mabaquiao Jr, Napoleon M. (2006). Husserl's theory of intentionality. Philosophia 34 (1):24-49.   (Google)
Mackie, J. L. (1975). Problems of intentionality. In Edo Pivcevic (ed.), Phenomenology And Philosophical Understanding. London: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Malachowski, Alan (1988). Searle on first person meaning and indeterminacy. Theoria 54:25-30.   (Google | More links)
Marras, Ausonio (1968). Intentionality and cognitive sentences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (December):257-263.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Marras, Ausonio (1987). Intentionality and probability: Reply to Yoder. Philosophia 17 (3).   (Google | More links)
Marras, Ausonio (ed.) (1972). Intentionality, Mind, And Language. London: University Of Illinois Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: Chisholm, R. M. Sentences about believing.--Cornman, J. W. Intentionality and intensionality.--Marras, A. Intentionality and cognitive sentences.--Chisholm, R. M. Notes on the logic of believing.--Luce, D. R., Sleigh, R. C., and Chisholm, R. M. Discussion on "Notes on the logic of believing."--Lycan, W. G. On intentionality and the psychological.--Hempel, C. G. Logical analysis of psychology.--Carnap, R. Logical foundations of the unity of science.--Nagel, T. Physicalism.--Ryle, G. Dispositions.--Sellars, W. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.--Chisholm, R. M. and Sellars, W. The Chisholm-Sellars correspondence on intentionality.--Aune, B. Thinking.--Bergmann, G. Intentionality.--Sellars, W. Notes on intentionality.--Frege, G. On sense and nominatum.--Russell, B. On denoting.--Carnap, R. The analysis of belief sentences.--Putnam, H. Synonymity, and the analysis of belief sentences.--Quine, W. V. O. Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.--Linsky, L. Substitutivity and descriptions.--Hintikka, J. Semantics for propositional attitudes.--Rosenthal, D. M. and Sellars, W. The Rosenthal-Sellars correspondence on intentionality.--Bibliography (p. 505-523)
Marras, Ausonio (1982). Intentionality revisited. Philosophia 12 (December):21-35.   (Google | More links)
Margolis, Joseph (2004). Reflections on intentionality. In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
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McIntyre, Ronald & Smith, David Woodruff (1989). Theory of intentionality. In William R. McKenna & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook. University Press of America.   (Google)
Abstract: §1. Intentionality; §2. Husserl's Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality; §3. The Distinction between Content and Object; §4. Husserl's Theory of Content: Noesis and Noema; §5. Noema and Object; §6. The Sensory Content of Perception; §7. The Internal Structure of Noematic Sinne; §8. Noema and Horizon; §9. Horizon and Background Beliefs
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Abstract: Intentionality is usually defined as the directedness of the mind toward something other than itself. My desire for a cold beer is directed at the cold beer in front of me. Much of consciousness is intentional, my conscious experiences are usually directed at something. However, conscious experiences typically have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like for me to see the deep blue of the Pacific Ocean and to feel the warm water lapping over my feet, and to smell the briny breeze. An important question to answer concerning the relationship between intentionality and consciousness is whether all conscious states are intentional? Another question concerns the explanatory priority of intentionality and phenomenal character: Can phenomenal character be explained in terms of intentionality? Or is it the case that intentionality should be understood in terms of phenomenology? Philosophers from the analytic, phenomenological, and naturalistic traditions have all made important contributions to our understanding of intentionality and consciousness. Some philosophers, such as Dretske, think that our phenomenology is intentionally structured. Others, such as Horgan and Tienson think that intentionality is fundamentally determined by our phenomenology. This looks like an impasse; however it may well be resolved by a combination of contemporary accounts of representation combined with an embodied phenomenology.
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Rietveld, Erik (2008). Situated normativity: The normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action. Mind 117 (468):973-1001.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein’s insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, ‘directed discontent’, is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein’s ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert’s socio-cultural practice and the individual’s situated and lived normativity.
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Abstract: John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem
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Searle, John R. (1979). What is an intentional state? Mind 88 (January):74-92.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
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Abstract: This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008)
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Abstract: Intentionality, as Brentano originally introduced the term in modern philosophy, was meant to provide a distinctive characteristic definitively separating the mental from the physical.(1) Mental states have an intrinsic relationship to an object, to that which they are "about." Physical entities just are what they are, they cannot, by their very essence, refer to anything, they have no "outreach", as one might put it. Mental states have, as it were, an incomplete essence, they cannot exist at all unless they are completed by something other than themselves, their object. Brentano's position is opposed to all theories which represent the mental as only extrinsically related to the world, that is, to all theories in which mental states are themselves self-sufficient for their own existence and only secondarily relate to the world by means of something external to their nature, e.g., neurological causation, divine intervention, or pre-established harmony. In these later cases, any mental act whatsoever could be related to any object, or indeed to none, for the relation is external to the nature of the act, it is superimposed on it by outside forces. Brentano's point is that a mental act has, by its very essence, an Intentional object without which it would not be a mental act. It would therefore appear that since causality is an external relationship which could in principle relate any two things regardless of their nature, the Intentional relation between an act and its object cannot be a causal relation
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Abstract: One is often told that sentences expressing or reporting mental states endowed with intentionality—the feature of being “directed upon” an object that some mental states possess—contain contexts that both prevent those sentences to be existentially generalized and are filled by referentially opaque occurrences of singular terms. Failure of existential generalization and referential opacity have been traditionally said to be the basic characterizations of intentionality from a linguistic point of view. I will call those contexts directional contexts. In what follows, I will argue that this traditional conception is incorrect. First, the above characterizations do not provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts. Appearances notwithstanding, these characterizations are not the adequate linguistic counterparts of two elements folk-psychologically featuring intentionality, namely existence-independence and the possible apparent aspectual character of the intentional object, the target of a mental state endowed with intentionality. Indeed, they do not retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentional objects the above elements contain. I will replace failure of existential generalization and referential opacity with other linguistic factors, namely success of mere existentially unloaded particular quantification and pseudo-opacity. I will contend that they provide both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for directional contexts, and claim that these factors are the adequate counterparts of the above folk-psychological elements, precisely because they retain the prima facie ontological commitment to intentionalia those elements possess
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Abstract: Horwich’s paper is an intriguing and subtle attempt to extend deflationism from the theory of truth to the theory of meaning. Horwich endorses a use-theory of meaning which claims that one replacement instance of the schema “‘x’ means x”, e.g. “‘t1’ means t1”, is paraphrasable as U(‘t1’), while another replacement instance is..
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