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2. Intentionality (Intentionality on PhilPapers)

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Bermúdez, José Luis (2003). Thinking Without Words. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Thinking Without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Jose Luis Bermudez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. The book is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior
Cappelen, Herman & Lepore, Ernie (1997). On an alleged connection between indirect speech and the theory of meaning. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):278–296.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A semantic theory T for a language L should assign content to utterances of sentences of L. One common assumption is that T will assign p to some S of L just in case in uttering S a speaker A says that p. We will argue that this assumption is mistaken
Chauviré, Christiane (2007). Dispositions or capacities?: Wittgenstein's social philosophy of mind. In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine (2005). The Body as Mirror of the World. Free Association.   (Google)
Chomsky, Noam (1995). Language and nature. Mind 104 (413):1-61.   (Google | More links)
Chomsky, Noam (1994). Naturalism and dualism in the study of language and mind. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2):181 – 209.   (Google)
Deonna, Julien A. & Scherer, Klaus R. (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.   (Google)
Abstract: Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life.
Dummett, Michael A. E. (1975). What is a theory of meaning? In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Evans, Gareth (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Geach, Peter (1957). Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Google)
Gibbs, Raymond W. (2006). Embodiment and Cognitive Science. New York ;Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book explores how people's subjective, felt experiences of their bodies in action provide part of the fundamental grounding for human cognition and language. Cognition is what occurs when the body engages the physical and cultural world and must be studied in terms of the dynamical interactions between people and the environment. Human language and thought emerge from recurring patterns of embodied activity that constrain ongoing intelligent behavior. We must not assume cognition to be purely internal, symbolic, computational, and disembodied, but seek out the gross and detailed ways that language and thought are inextricably shaped by embodied action. Embodiment and Cognitive Science describes the abundance of empirical evidence from many disciplines, including work on perception, concepts, imagery and reasoning, language and communication, cognitive development, and emotions and consciousness, that support the idea that the mind is embodied
Gibbons, John (2001). Knowledge in action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):579-600.   (Google | More links)
Green, Mitchell S. (2009). Speech acts, the handicap principle and the expression of psychological states. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them is suited to help us answer our question. I also argue that concepts from the evolutionary biology of communication provide one source of insight into how speech acts enable one to show, and thereby express, a psychological state
Harman, Gilbert (1998). Intentionality. In William Bechtel & George Graham (eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science. Blackwell.   (Google)
Harman, Gilbert (1990). Immanent and transcendent approaches to the theory of meaning. In Roger Gibson & Robert B. Barrett (eds.), Perspectives on Quine. Blackwell.   (Google)
Harman, Gilbert (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 227 | Google)
Katsafanas, Paul (forthcoming). Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford.   (Google)
Abstract: Lately, a number of philosophers have argued that agents can be more and less active in the production of their own actions. Some actions—principally reflective, deliberative ones—are said to involve agential activity; other actions—principally unreflective, non-deliberative ones—are said to be brought about in a more passive fashion. In this essay, I critique these claims. I show that philosophers employing the notion of agential activity have relied on one or more of the following claims, which have not been clearly distinguished in the literature: (1) that choice causes action, (2) that motives do not determine choice, and (3) that reflective deliberation suspends the effects of motives. These claims are closely related, and are often conflated in the literature. However, I argue that they are importantly distinct. I explicate and assess each of these claims, arguing that while there are precisifications of the first and second claims that render them true, there are philosophical arguments and results from empirical psychology indicating that the third claim is false. Moreover, I argue that the third claim is the crucial one; its truth is necessary in order to support the idea that reflective agency is paradigmatically active. As a result, the traditional accounts of agential activity must be rejected. I close by suggesting a new model of agential activity.
Makin, Gideon (2000). The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Metaphysicians of Meaning is the first book to challenge the accepted understanding of Russell's On Denoting and Frege's On Sense and Reference . Makin compares the work Russell did shortly before his famous essay "On Denoting" with the essay itself and argues that this comparison shows that the traditional view of the problem Russell was trying to solve is untenable. He then examines Frege's classic essay and argues that some of the less well-known views that Frege held have radical implications for our understanding of this essay
Moore, G. E. (1899). The nature of judgment. Mind 8 (30):176-193.   (Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1986). Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Blackwell.   (Cited by 52 | Google)
Russell, Bertrand (1910). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.   (Google)
Schiller, Aaron Allen (2007). Psychological Nominalism and the Plausibility of Sellars's Myth of Jones. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):435-454.   (Google)
Abstract: Part of Sellars’s general attack on the Myth of the Given is his endorsement of psychological nominalism, a view that implies that awareness of our own mental states is not given but must be earned. Sellars provides an account of how such awareness might have been earned with the Myth of Jones. Such an account is important for Sellars, for without it the Given can look necessary after all. But a problem with such accounts is that they can look extremely implausible. Sellars himself seems unconcerned to make his account plausible, and so others have stepped in here. But, I argue, they have done so in ways that fail to respect his psychological nominalism. This evinces, as well as reinforces, a lack of sensitivity to the scope of Sellars’s attack on the Given, the aim of which is the dismantling of “the entire framework of givenness.” In this essay, I show how one can make Sellars’s Myth of Jones plausible, while still respecting his psychological nominalism, by seeing how Jones’s thought is governed by the norms of rationality as interpretability.
Searle, John (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Smithies, Declan (2006). Rationality and the Subject's Point of View. Dissertation, New York University   (Google)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). Attitude and image, or, what will simulation theory let us eliminate?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Stich & Ravenscroft (1994) have argued that (contrary to most people's initial assumptions) a simulation account of folk psychology may be consistent with eliminative materialism, but they fail to bring out the full complexity or the potential significance of the relationship. Contemporary eliminativism (particularly in the Churchland version) makes two major claims: the first is a rejection of the orthodox assumption that realistically construed propositional attitudes are fundamental to human cognition; the second is the suggestion that with the advancement of scientific understanding of the mind it will be possible to entirely eliminate the mentalistic and intentional from our ontology, thus dissolving the mind-body problem. The first claim (which has been argued in detail) supplies the principal grounds for accepting the second, much more ambitious and significant, claim. Robert Gordon's (1995, 1996, 2000) radical simulation theory of "folk psychology", proposed initially (Gordon, 1986) as an alternative to "theory theory" accounts of self and interpersonal understanding, but subsequently developing into a quite general challenge to symbolic computational accounts of mind, is not merely consistent with, but actually provides considerable additional support for, the first eliminativist claim. However, although radical simulationism has no use for reified propositional attitudes, it relies on another family of mentalistic and intentional notions, including perspective taking, "seeing as", pretending, imagery, and, most centrally, imagination. It is thus inconsistent with eliminativist metaphysical ambitions. Nevertheless, from this perspective the mind-body problem is transformed. Its solution no longer depends on accounting directly for the intentionality of the attitudes, but rather on accounting for the intentionality of imagination. Although standard accounts of imagination derive its intentionality from that of the attitudes, the recently proposed "perceptual activity" theory of imagery and imagination (Thomas, 1999) can provide a direct account of the intentionality of imagination that is consistent with physicalism..
Wedgwood, Ralph (2009). The normativity of the intentional. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative. (This claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative.) But what exactly does this claim mean? And what reason is there for believing it? In this paper, I shall first try to clarify the content of the claim that the intentional is normative. Then I shall examine a number of the arguments that philosophers have advanced for this claim (and for the parallel claim that meaning is normative). As we shall see, many of these arguments are unsuccessful. However, I shall close by giving a sketch of what may be a successful argument for this claim
Wright, Crispin (1989). Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind: Sensation, privacy, and intention. Journal of Philosophy 86 (11):622-634.   (Google | More links)

2.1 Propositional Attitudes

287 / 496 entries displayed

Baker, Lynne Rudder (1995). Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Explaining Attitudes offers a timely and important challenge to the dominant conception of belief found in the work of such philosophers as Dretske and Fodor. According to this dominant view beliefs, if they exist at all, are constituted by states of the brain. Lynne Rudder Baker rejects this view and replaces it with a quite different approach - practical realism. Seen from the perspective of practical realism, any argument that interprets beliefs as either brain states or states of immaterial souls is a 'non-starter'. Practical realism takes beliefs to be states of the whole persons, rather like states of health. What a person believes is determined by what a person would do, say and think in various circumstances. Thus beliefs and other attitudes are interwoven into an integrated, commonsensical conception of reality
Field, Hartry H. (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Presenting a selection of thirteen essays on various topics at the foundations of philosophy--one previously unpublished and eight accompanied by substantial new postscripts--this book offers outstanding insight on truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes; semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of "factual defectiveness;" and issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. It will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics
Landy, David (2005). Inside doubt: On the non-identity of the theory of mind and propositional attitude psychology. Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a drastic improvement in our interpersonal relationships. I contend that these eliminativist arguments typically run together two distinct capacities: the folk psychological mechanisms which we use to understand one another, and scientific and philosophical guesses about the structure of those understandings. Both capacities are ontologically committed and therefore empirical. However, the commitments whose prospects look so dismal to the eliminativist, in particular the causal and logical image of propositional attitudes, belong to the guesses, and not necessarily to the underlying mechanisms. It is the commitments of traditional philosophical perspectives about the operation of our folk psychology which are contradicted by?new evidence and modeling methods in connectionist psychology. Our actual folk psychology was not clearly committed to causal, sentential propositional attitudes, and thus is not directly threatened by connectionist psychology
Ludwig, Kirk & Ray, Greg (1998). Semantics for opaque contexts. Philosophical Perspectives 12:141--66.   (Google)

2.1a The Language of Thought

73 / 86 entries displayed

Antony, Louise M. (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (Google)
Arikha, Noga (2005). Deafness, ideas and the language of thought in the late 1600s. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):233 – 262.   (Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat (1995). Connectionism and the language of thought. CSLI Technical Report.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical
Aydede, Murat (1997). Language of thought: The connectionist contribution. Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not implementation models because, it is claimed, the way they obtain syntax and structure sensitivity is not "concatenative," hence "radically different" from the way classicists handle them. In this paper, I offer an analysis of what it is to physically satisfy/realize a formal system. In this context, I examine the minimal truth-conditions of LOT Hypothesis. From my analysis it will follow that concatenative realization of formal systems is irrelevant to LOTH since the very notion of LOT is indifferent to such an implementation level issue as concatenation. I will conclude that to the extent to which they can explain the law-like cognitive regularities, a certain class of connectionist models proposed as radical alternatives to the classical LOT paradigm will in fact turn out to be LOT models, even though new and potentially very exciting ones
Aydede, Murat (online). The language of thought hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 1 *Common Sense Conception of Beliefs and Other Propositional Attitudes 2 What is the Language of Thought Hypothesis? 3 Status of LOTH 4 Scope of LOTH 5 *Natural Language as Mentalese? 6 *Nativism and LOTH 7 Naturalism and LOTH
Aydede, Murat (ms). Language of thought hypothesis: State of the art.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over representations. Most of the arguments for LOTH derive their strength from their ability to explain certain empirical phenomena like productivity, systematicity of thought and thinking
Barwise, Jon (1987). Unburdening the language of thought. Mind and Language 2:82-96.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Beckermann, Ansgar (1994). Can there be a language of thought? In G. White, B. Smith & R. Casati (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: 1. Cognitive sciences in a broad sense are simply all those sciences which concern themselves with the analysis and explanation of cognitive capacities and achievements. If one speaks of _cognitive science_ in the singular, however, usually something more is meant. Cognitive science is not only characterized by a specific object of research, but also through a particular kind of explanatory paradigm, i.e. the information processing paradigm. Stillings _et. al. _for example begin their book _Cognitive Science _as follows: <blockquote> Cognitive scientists view the human mind as a complex system that receives, stores,<br> retrieves, transforms, and transmits information. (Stillings 1987: 1) </blockquote> The information processing paradigm however, leads directly to the paradigm of symbol processing, because a system can, as it seems, only receive, store and process information if it has at its disposal a system of internal representations or _symbols_, i.e. an internal language in which this information is encoded. At least this appears to be an idea which suggests itself and which Peter Hacker expresses as follows
Blumson, Ben (online). Mental maps.   (Google)
Abstract: It’s often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity for the Language of Thought Hypothesis – the hypothesis that mental structure is language-like. In this paper, I argue that the Map Hypothesis does not undermine the argument, because it is not in fact a genuine alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis
Braddon-Mitchell, David & Fitzpatrick, J. (1990). Explanation and the language of thought. Synthese 83 (1):3-29.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cargile, James (2010). The language of thought revisited. Analysis 70 (2).   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1999). Is there synonymy in Ockham's mental language. In P. V. Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: William of Ockham's semantic theory was founded on the idea that thought takes place in a language not unlike the languages in which spoken and written communication occur. This mental language was held to have a number of features in common with everyday languages. For example, mental language has simple terms, not unlike words, out of which complex expressions can be constructed. As with words, each of these terms has some meaning, or signification; in fact Ockham held that the signification of everyday words derives precisely from the signification of mental terms. Furthermore, the meaning of a mental expression depends directly on the meaning of its constituent terms, as is the case with expressions in more familiar languages
Cole, David (2009). Jerry Fodor, lot 2: The language of thought revisited , new York: Oxford university press, 2008, X+228, $37.95, isbn 978-0-119-954877-. Minds and Machines 19 (3).   (Google)
Crane, Tim (1990). The language of thought: No syntax without semantics. Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin (1992). Aunty's own argument for the language of thought. In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Davies, Martin (1991). Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought. Philosophy and connectionist theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Annotation | Google)
Davies, Martin (1991). Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought. In W Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the argument for the language of thought hypothesis. The argument for an opposition between connectionism and the language of thought comes towards the end (Section 8), along with some discussion of the potential eliminativist consequences (Sections 9 and
Davies, Martin (1998). Language, thought, and the language of thought (aunty's own argument revisited). In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter, I shall be examining an argument for the language of thought hypothesis
DeWitt, Richard (1995). Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought. Psyche 1.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (1990). Conceptual dependency as the language of thought. Synthese 82 (2):275-96.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Egan, M. F. (1991). Propositional attitudes and the language of thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (September):379-88.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Field, Hartry (1978). Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-18.   (Cited by 179 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 1815 | Annotation | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1987). Why there still has to be a language of thought. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Garson, James W. (1998). Chaotic emergence and the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):303-315.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore the merits of the idea that dynamical systems theory (also known as chaos theory) provides a model of the mind that can vindicate the language of thought (LOT). I investigate the nature of emergent structure in dynamical systems to assess its compatibility with causally efficacious syntactic structure in the brain. I will argue that anyone who is committed to the idea that the brain's functioning depends on emergent features of dynamical systems should have serious reservations about the LOT. First, dynamical systems theory casts doubt on one of the strongest motives for believing in the LOT: principle P, the doctrine that structure found in an effect must also be found in its cause. Second, chaotic emergence is a double-edged sword. Its tendency to cleave the psychological from the neurological undermines foundations for belief in the existence of causally efficacious representations. Overall, a dynamic conception of the brain sways us away from realist conclusions about the causal powers of representations with constituent structure
Garson, James W. (2002). Evolution, consciousness, and the language of thought. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Gauker, Christopher (1998). Are there wordlike concepts too? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-71.   (Google)
Abstract: Millikan proposes that there are mapping functions through which spoken sentences represent reality. Such mappings seem to depend on thoughts that words express and on concepts as components of such thoughts, but such concepts would conflict with Millikan's other claims about concepts and language
Glock, Hans-Johann (2010). Reviews lot 2: The language of thought revisited by Jerry A. Fodor oxford university press, 2008. Philosophy 85 (1):164-167.   (Google)
Horsey, Richard (2001). Definitions: Implications for syntax, semantics, and the language of thought, by Annabel Cormack. Mind and Language 16 (3):345–349.   (Google | More links)
Johnson, Kent (2004). On the systematicity of the language of thought. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):111-139.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Knowles, Jonathan (1998). The language of thought and natural language understanding. Analysis 58 (4):264-272.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2004). Another argument against the thesis that there is a language of thought. Communication and Cognition 37 (2):83-103.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Laurence, Stephen & Margolis, Eric (1997). Regress arguments against the language of thought. Analysis 57 (1):60-66.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Leeds, Stephen (2002). Perception, transparency, and the language of thought. Noûs 36 (1):104-129.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1988). Demonstrating in mentalese. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Losonsky, Michael (1992). Leibniz's adamic language of thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (4).   (Google)
Machery, Edouard (2005). You don't know how you think: Introspection and language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content of our thoughts with their vehicles: while sententialism is a thesis about the vehicles of our thoughts, inner speech sentences are the content of auditory or articulatory images. The rebuttal of the introspective argument for sententialism is shown to have a general significance in cognitive science: introspection does not tell us how we think. The problem The introspective argument for sententialism The argument for the blindness of introspection thesis Objections and replies Conclusion
Markic, Olga (1999). Connectionism and the language of thought: The cross-context stability of representations. Acta Analytica 22 (22):43-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Markic, Olga (2001). Is language of thought a conceptual necessity? Acta Analytica 16 (26):53-60.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McDonough, Richard (1994). Wittgenstein's reversal on the `language of thought' doctrine. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):482-494.   (Google | More links)
Pollock, John L. (1990). Understanding the language of thought. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):95-120.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Rantala, V. & Vaden, Tere (1997). Minds as connoting systems: Logic and the language of thought. Erkenntnis 46 (3):315-334.   (Google | More links)
Rescorla, Michael (2009). Cognitive maps and the language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric rather than logical structure. They thereby demonstrate the possibility of rational cognitive processes in an exclusively non-logical representational medium. Furthermore, they offer much promise for the empirical study of animal navigation.
Rey, Georges (1995). A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought. Philosophical Perspectives 9:201-22.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1991). Sensations in a language of thought. Philosophical Issues 1:73-112.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Rives, Bradley, Review of LOT 2: The language of thought revisited.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been over thirty years since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s landmark book The Language of Thought (LOT 1). In LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Fodor provides an update on his thoughts concerning a range of topics that have been the focus of his work in the intervening decades. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), the central thesis of LOT 1, remains intact in LOT 2: mental states are relations between organisms and syntactically-structured mental representations, and mental processes are computations defined over such representations. The differences between LOT 1 and LOT 2 are mostly differences of focus. Whereas LOT 1 had a number of targets—e.g. reductionism, behaviorism, empiricism, and operationalism—LOT 2 identifies “pragmatism” as the main enemy of the “Cartesian” kind of mentalism Fodor favors (pp. 11-12). Moreover, unlike LOT 1, a main aim of LOT 2 is to defend a theory of concepts that is atomistic and referentialist: lexical concepts lack structure, and their meaning is determined by their relation to the world and not by their relations to other concepts (pp. 16-20). In addition to new discussions of concepts and content, LOT 2 treats us to Fodor’s latest thoughts on compositionality, computationalism, nativism, nonconceptual content, and the causal theory of reference. Although those familiar with Fodor’s work over the last thirty years will find its main conclusions unsurprising, LOT 2 is nevertheless an exciting, breezily written book that’s full of stimulating arguments and (in standard Fodor style) immensely interesting digressions. In the Introduction, Fodor bundles together a number of distinct doctrines under “pragmatism”—e.g., that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that in the order of intentional explanation” (p. 10), and that “the distinctive function of the mind is guiding action” (p. 13). But it’s clear by Chapter 2 that his main target is “concept pragmatism,” according to which concepts are individuated by their inferential properties. Fodor’s “Cartesianism,” in contrast, has it that none of the epistemic properties of concepts are constitutive..
Rives, Bradley (2009). Lot 2: The language of thought revisited. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):525 – 529.   (Google)
Rowlands, Mark (1994). Connectionism and the language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the level of cognition. I shall argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is based on a crucial misunderstanding, the same misunderstanding which motivates the entire language of thought hypothesis
Rupert, Robert D. (2001). Coining terms in the language of thought: Innateness, emergence, and the lot of Cummins's argument against the causal theory of mental content. Journal of Philosophy 98 (10):499-530.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,
Rupert, Robert (2008). Causal theories of mental content. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380.   (Google | More links)
Rupert, Robert (2008). Frege’s puzzle and Frege cases: Defending a quasi-syntactic solution. Cognitive Systems Research 9:76-91.   (Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (1998). On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought. Synthese 117 (1):95-131.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1987). Intentionality and the language of thought. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:35-55.   (Google)
Schroder, Jurgen (1998). Knowledge of rules, causal systematicity, and the language of thought. Synthese 117 (3):313-330.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive consequence: it groups together distributed connectionist systems with look-up tables. To avoid this consequence, a modified construal of causal systematicity is proposed and Davies' argument for the causal systematicity of thought is shown to be question-begging. It is briefly sketched how the modified construal links up with multiple dispositions of the same categorical base. Finally, the question of the causal efficacy of single rules is distinguished from the question of their psychological reality: implicit rules might be psychologically real without being causally efficacious
Schneider, Susan (2009). Lot, ctm, and the elephant in the room. Synthese 170 (2):235-250.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol
Schneider, Susan, The central system as a computational engine.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Language of Thought program has a suicidal edge. Jerry Fodor, of all people, has argued that although LOT will likely succeed in explaining modular processes, it will fail to explain the central system, a subsystem in the brain in which information from the different sense modalities is integrated, conscious deliberation occurs, and behavior is planned. A fundamental characteristic of the central system is that it is “informationally unencapsulated” -- its operations can draw from information from any cognitive domain. The domain general nature of the central system is key to human reasoning; our ability to connect apparently unrelated concepts enables the creativity and flexibility of human thought, as does our ability to integrate material across sensory divides. The central system is the holy grail of cognitive science: understanding higher cognitive function is crucial to grasping how humans reach their highest intellectual achievements. But according to Fodor, the founding father of the LOT program and the related Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the holy grail is out of reach: the central system is likely to be non-computational (Fodor 1983, 2000, 2008). Cognitive scientists working on higher cognitive function should abandon their efforts. Research should be limited to the modules, which for Fodor rest at the sensory periphery (2000).1 Cognitive scientists who work in the symbol processing tradition outside of philosophy would reject this pessimism, but ironically, within philosophy itself, this pessimistic streak has been very influential, most likely because it comes from the most well-known proponent of LOT and CTM. Indeed, pessimism about centrality has become assimilated into the mainstream conception of LOT. (Herein, I refer to a LOT that appeals to pessimism about centrality as the “standard LOT”). I imagine this makes the standard LOT unattractive to those philosophers with a more optimistic approach to what cognitive science can achieve..
Schneider, Susan (2009). The language of thought. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the language of thought (or
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1994). The language-of-thought relation and its implications. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):263-85.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Schneider, Susan (2009). The nature of symbols in the language of thought. Mind and Language 24 (5):523-553.   (Google)
Abstract: The core of the language of thought program is the claim that thinking is the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Yet LOT has said little about symbol natures, and existing accounts are highly controversial. This is a major flaw at the heart of the LOT program: LOT requires an account of symbol natures to naturalize intentionality, to determine whether the brain even engages in symbol manipulations, and to understand how symbols relate to lower-level neurocomputational states. This paper provides the much-needed theory of symbols, and in doing so, alters the LOT program in significant respects
Schneider, Susan (forthcoming). The nature of primitive symbols in the language of thought. Mind and Language.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper provides a theory of the nature of symbols in the language of thought (LOT). My discussion consists in three parts. In part one, I provide three arguments for the individuation of primitive symbols in terms of total computational role. The first of these arguments claims that Classicism requires that primitive symbols be typed in this manner; no other theory of typing will suffice. The second argument contends that without this manner of symbol individuation, there will be computational processes that fail to supervene on syntax, together with the rules of composition and the computational algorithms. The third argument says that cognitive science needs a natural kind that is typed by total computational role. Otherwise, either cognitive science will be incomplete, or its laws will have counterexamples. Then, part two defends this view from a criticism, offered by both Jerry Fodor and Jesse Prinz, who respond to my view with the charge that because the types themselves are individuated
Silby, Brent (ms). Revealing the language of thought.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Smolensky, Paul (1991). Connectionism, constituency and the language of thought. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 68 | Annotation | Google)
Sorensen, Roy A. (1991). Vagueness within the language of thought. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):389-413.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (1991). How to do semantics for the language of thought. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Teng, Norman Y. (1999). The language of thought and the embodied nature of language use. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):237-251.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
ter Hark, Michel (1995). Connectionism, behaviourism, and the language of thought. In Cognitive Patterns in Science and Common Sense. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)
Viger, Christopher D. (2001). Locking on to the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I demonstrate that locking on, a key notion in Jerry Fodor's most recent theory of content, supplemented informational atomism (SIA), is cashed out in terms of asymmetric dependence, the central notion in his earlier theory of content. I use this result to argue that SIA is incompatible with the language of thought hypothesis because the constraints on the causal relations into which symbols can enter imposed by the theory of content preclude the causal relations needed between symbols for them to serve as the elements of the medium of thought
Viger, Christopher D. (2005). Learning to think: A response to the language of thought argument for innateness. Mind and Language 20 (3):313-25.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Jerry Fodor's argument for an innate language of thought continues to be a hurdle for researchers arguing that natural languages provide us with richer conceptual systems than our innate cognitive resources. I argue that because the logical/formal terms of natural languages are given a usetheory of meaning, unlike predicates, logical/formal terms might be learned without a mediating internal representation. In that case, our innate representational system might have less logical structure than a natural language, making it possible that we augment our innate representational system and improve our ability to think by learning a natural language
Vinueza, Adam (2000). Sensations and the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind the sensational sentences thesis, and argue that the intentionalist version is either false or collapses into the standard functionalist thesis
Weiskopf, Daniel (2002). A critical review of Jerry A. Fodor's the mind doesn't work that way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551 – 562.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The "New Synthesis" in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn't work that way , Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is an open question. Massive modularity also lacks some of the invidious commitments Fodor ascribes to it. Furthermore, Fodor's anti-adaptationist arguments are in tension with his nativism about the contents of modular systems. The New Synthesis thus has points worth preserving
White, Stephen L. (1982). Partial character and the language of thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (October):347-65.   (Cited by 35 | Annotation | Google)
Wilson, Mark (2009). Review of Jerry A. Fodor, Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).   (Google)
Yagisawa, Takashi (1994). Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's The Language-of-Thought Relation and its Implications. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):287-96.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

2.1b The Intentional Stance

Andrews, Kristin (2000). Our understanding of other minds: Theory of mind and the intentional stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a `theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all but meaningless. This entailment should not be accepted; instead, Dennett's position that intentional behaviour is best predictable via the intentional stance should be rejected in favour of a pluralistic view of behaviour prediction. I introduce an additional method which humans often use to predict intentional and non-intentional behaviour, which could be called the inductive stance.
Bechtel, William P. (1985). Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance. Cognitive Science 9:265-92.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Beisecker, David (2002). Dennett and the Quest for real meaning: In defense of a myth. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2003). Inconsistency and interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge.
Bradshaw, Denny E. (1998). Patterns and descriptions. Philosophical Papers 27 (3):181-202.   (Google)
Cam, Philip (1984). Dennett on intelligent storage. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):247-62.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (1990). Belief, opinion and consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):139-154.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Cohen, B. (1995). Patterns lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's realism about beliefs. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1):17-31.   (Google)
Cummins, Robert E. (1981). What can be learned from brainstorms? Philosophical Topics 12:83-92.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Davies, David (1995). Dennett's stance on intentional realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):299-312.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.   (Cited by 873 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1971). Intentional systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.   (Cited by 233 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1981). Making sense of ourselves. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):63-81.   (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1988). Precis of the intentional stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9:13-25.   (Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Real patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.   (Cited by 189 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist
Dennett, Daniel C. (1990). The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) 50:177-194.   (Cited by 41 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: I want to explore four different exercises of interpretation: (1) the interpretation of texts (or hermeneutics), (2) the interpretation of people (otherwise known as "attribution" psychology, or cognitive or intentional psychology), (3) the interpretation of other artifacts (which I shall call artifact hermeneutics), (4) the interpretation of organism design in evolutionary biology--the controversial interpretive activity known as adaptationism
Dennett, Daniel C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1920 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
Fodor, Jerry A. & Lepore, Ernest (1993). Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1981). Three cheers for propositional attitudes. In Jerry A. Fodor (ed.), RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1994). On the evolution of intentionality as seen from the intentional stance. Inquiry 37 (3):287-310.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Foxall, Gordon R. (1999). The contextual stance. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional systems is an exemplar of the interpretive stance radical behaviorism requires; a corresponding interpretive position can be based initially on a radical behaviorist view of human behavior and its determinants. This "contextual stance" is ontologically and methodologically distinct from the intentional stance over the range of explanations for which scientific psychology, cognitive or behaviorist, is responsible
Griffin, Richard (ms). The intentional stance: Developmental and neurocognitive perspectives.   (Google)
Abstract: Nowhere in the psychological sciences has the philosophy of mind had more influence than on the child development literature generally referred to as children’s ‘theory of mind.’ Developmental journals may seem to be an unlikely place to find Brentano, Frege, and Dennett alongside descriptions of referential opacity and the principle of substitutivity, but it is not at all uncommon in this literature. While the many problems and complexities of the propositional attitude literature are still hotly debated by philosophers, and often ill understood by scientists working in this area, a great deal of empirical progress has already been made. We have Dan Dennett to thank for this extraordinary dialogue between these disciplines
Haugeland, John (1993). Pattern and being. In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Heitner, Reese M. (2000). Is design relative or real? Dennett on intentional relativism and physical realism. Minds and Machines 10 (2):267-83.   (Google | More links)
Hornsby, Jennifer (1992). Physics, biology, and common-sense psychology. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Joslin, David (2006). Real realization: Dennett's real patterns versus Putnam's ubiquitous automata. Minds and Machines 16 (1):29-41.   (Google | More links)
Kenyon, Timothy A. (2000). Indeterminacy and realism. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1993). Indeterminacy of interpretation, idealization, and norms. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):213-223.   (Google | More links)
Lyons, William E. (1990). Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology I: The modern reduction of intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):247-69.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In rounded terms and modem dress a theory of intentionality is a theory about how humans take in information via the senses and in the very process of taking it in understand it and, most often, make subsequent use of it in guiding human behaviour. The problem of intentionality in this century has been the problem of providing an adequate explanation of how a purely physical causal system, the brain, can both receive information and at the same time understand it, that is, to put it even more briefly, how a brain can have semantic content. In these two articles, one in this issue of the journal and one in the next, I engage in a critical examination of the two most thoroughly canvassed approaches to the theory and problem of intentionality in philosophical psychology over the last hundred years. In the first article, entitled 'The modern reduction of intentionality, ' I examine the approach pioneered by Carnap and reaching its apotheosis in the work of Daniel Dennett. In the second article, entitled 'The return to representation, 'I examine the approach which can be traced back to the work of Noam Chomsky but which has been given its canonical treatment in the work of Jerry Fodor
McCulloch, Gregory (1990). Dennett's little grains of salt. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):1-12.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. & O'Leary-Hawthorne, John (1995). Dennett's logical behaviorism. Philosophical Topics 22:189-258.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2000). Why intentional systems theory cannot reconcile physicalism with realism about belief and desire. Protosociology 14:145-157.   (Google)
Menuge, Angus (2003). A critique of Dennett's evolutionary account of intentionality. Pcid 2.   (Google)
Millikan, Ruth G. (2000). Reading mother nature's mind. In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I try to focus our differences by examining the relation between what Dennett has termed "the intentional stance" and "the design stance." Dennett takes the intentional stance to be more basic than the design stance. Ultimately it is through the eyes of the intentional stance that both human and natural design are interpreted, hence there is always a degree of interpretive freedom in reading the mind, the purposes, both of Nature and of her children. The reason, or at least a reason, is that intentional interpretation is holistic, hence indeterminate, for the kinds of reasons given by Davidson and Quine. In contrast, I take the design stance to be more basic than the intentional stance. Intentional attributions express our best guesses about the locations of effects of certain kinds of natural design. And although there is often indeterminacy, ambiguity, or vagueness concerning what it is that natural selection (or learning) has selected for, these indeterminacies and vaguenesses are local, not holistic. There is reason to suppose that the better portion of Nature's purposes and the intentional states of her children are determinate in content within quite closely defined limits. I propose to defend this position as well as I can, so as to call from Dennett his own views on precisely where our paths separate (if they really do)
Mirolli, Marco (2002). A naturalistic perspective on intentionality: Interview with Daniel Dennett. Mind and Society 3 (6):1-12.   (Google)
Narayanan, Ajit (1996). The intentional stance and the imitation game. In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Nelkin, Norton (1994). Patterns. Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.   (Annotation | Google)
Price, Huw (1995). Psychology in perspective. In M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: [email: huw@extro.su.oz.au] If recent literature is to be our guide, the main place of philosophy in the study of the mind would seem to be to determine the place of psychology in the study of the world. One distinctive kind of answer to this question begins by noting the central role of intentionality in psychology, and goes on to argue that this sets psychology apart from the natural sciences. Sometimes to be thus set apart is to be exiled, or rejected, but more often it is a protective move, intended to show that psychology is properly insulated from the reductionist demands of natural science. I am interested here in the general issue as to how this move to insulate intentional psychology should best be characterised-how to make sense of the idea that there can be a legitimate enterprise of this kind. I shall concentrate on what is perhaps the best known version of such a view, that of Daniel Dennett. I think that my conclusions apply to other versions as well, but Dennett provides a particularly accessible example
Radner, Daisie M. & Radner, Michael (1995). Cognition, natural selection, and the intentional stance. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):109-19.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2001). A Kantian stance on the intentional stance. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Richardson, Robert C. (1980). Intentional realism or intentional instrumentalism? Cognition and Brain Theory 3:125-35.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Richard, Mark E. (1995). What isn't a belief? Philosophical Topics 22:291-318.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Instrumentalism: Back from the Brink? In Lynne Rudder Baker (ed.), Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1989). Instrumental intentionality. Philosophy of Science 56 (June):303-16.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2000). Real patterns and surface metaphysics. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Naturalism is supposed to be a Good Thing. So good in fact that everybody wants to be a naturalist, no matter what their views might be1. Thus there is some confusion about what, exactly, naturalism is. In what follows, I am going to be pretty much, though not exclusively, concerned with the topics of intentionality and consciousness, which only deepens the confusion for these are two areas
Sharpe, R. A. (1989). Dennett's journey towards panpsychism. Inquiry 32 (2):233-40.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shoham, Yoav (1991). Implementing the intentional stance. In Philosophy and AI. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Slors, Marc V. P. (2007). Intentional systems theory, mental causation and empathic resonance. Erkenntnis 67 (2):321-336.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the first section of this paper I argue that the main reason why Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory (IST) has been perceived as behaviourist or antirealist is its inability to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. The rest of the paper is devoted to the claim that by emending the theory with a phenomenon called ‘empathic resonance’ (ER), it can account for the various explananda in the mental causation debate. Thus, IST + ER is a much more viable option than IST, even though IST + ER assigns a crucial role to the phenomenology of agency, a role that is incompatible with Dennett’s writings on consciousness
Slors, Marc (1996). Why Dennett cannot explain what it is to adopt the intentional stance. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):93-98.   (Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. (1981). Dennett on intentional systems. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):39-62.   (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1980). Headaches. Philosophical Books 21:65-73.   (Annotation | Google)
Talvitie, Vesa (2003). Repressed contents reconsidered: Repressed contents and Dennett's intentional stance approach. Theoria Et Historia Scientiarum 7 (2):19-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Viger, Christopher D. (2000). Where do Dennett's stances stand? Explaining our kinds of minds. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Google)
Weber, Marcel, Behavioral traits, the intentional stance, and biological functions.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been claimed that the intentional stance is necessary to individuate behavioral traits. This thesis, while clearly false, points to two interesting sets of problems concerning biological explanations of behavior: The first is a general in the philosophy of science: the theory-ladenness of observation. The second problem concerns the principles of trait individuation, which is a general problem in philosophy of biology. After discussing some alternatives, I show that one way of individuating the behavioral traits of an organism is by a special use of the concept of biological function, as understood in an enriched causal role (not selected effect) sense. On this view, a behavioral trait is essentially a special kind of regularity, namely a regularity that is produced by some regulatory mechanism. Regulatory mechanisms always require goal states, which can only be provided by functional considerations. As an example from actual (as opposed to folk) science, I examine the case of social behavior in nematodes. I show that the attempt to explain this phenomenon actually transformed it. This supports the view that scientific explanation does not explain an explanandum phenomenon that is given prior to the explanation; rather, the explanandum is changed by the explanation. This means that there could be a plurality of stances that have some heuristic value initially, but which will be abandoned in favor of a functional characterization eventually
Webb, Sherisse (1994). Witnessed behavior and Dennett's intentional stance. Philosophical Topics 22:457-70.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Wilkerson, William S. (1997). Real patterns and real problems: Making Dennett respectable on patterns and beliefs. Southern Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):557-70.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Yu, Paul & Fuller, Gary (1986). A critique of Dennett. Synthese 66 (March):453-76.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)

2.1c Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes

Berm, (2006). Arguing for eliminativism. In Brian L Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bertolet, Rod (1994). Saving eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):87-100.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: This paper contests Lynne Rudder Baker's claim to have shown that eliminative materialism is bound to fail on purely conceptual grounds. It is argued that Baker's position depends on knowing that certain developments in science cannot occur, and that we cannot know that this is so. Consequently, the sort of argument Baker provides is question-begging. For similar reasons, the confidence that the proponents of eliminative materialism have in it is misplaced
Bickle, John (1992). Revisionary physicalism. Biology and Philosophy 7 (4):411-30.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Blunt, Paul K. (1992). A defense of folk psychology. International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):487-98.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bogdan, Radu J. (1988). Mental attitudes and common sense psychology: The case against elimination. Noûs 22 (September):369-398.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary and principles implicitly define what counts as mental, then eliminating the theory is eliminating its subject matter. If the theory is shown to be false, then its subject matter does not exist. If, in other words, common sense psychology can be shown to describe and explain nothing real in human cognition, then the mental itself is a fiction
Campbell, Keith (1993). What motivates eliminativism? Mind and Language 8 (2):206-210.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Chater, Nick & Oaksford, Mike (1996). The falsity of folk theories: Implications for psychology and philosophy. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Cheyne, Colin (1993). Reduction, elimination, and firewalking. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):349-357.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 465 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: A Neurocomputationial Perspective illustrates the fertility of the concepts and data drawn from the study of the brain and of artificial networks that model the...
Churchland, Paul M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.   (Cited by 488 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1993). Evaluating our self-conception. Mind and Language 8 (2):211-22.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1980). Language, thought, and information processing. Noûs 14 (May):147-70.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1985). On the speculative nature of our self-conception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:157-173.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (2007). The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1993). Theory, taxonomy, and methodology: A reply to Haldane's Understanding Folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:313-19.   (Annotation | Google)
Clark, Andy (1996). Dealing in futures: Folk psychology and the role of representations in cognitive science. In Robert N. McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Clark, Andy (1993). The varieties of eliminativism: Sentential, intentional and catastrophic. Mind and Language 8 (2):223-233.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cling, Andrew (1990). Disappearance and knowledge. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):226-47.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cling, Andrew (1989). Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56 (May):53-75.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Cling, Andrew (1991). The empirical virtues of belief. Philosophical Psychology 4:303-23.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1985). A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:105-33.   (Annotation | Google)
Fricker, Elizabeth (1993). The threat of eliminativism. Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Garzon, Francisco Calvo (2001). Can we turn a blind eye to eliminativism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):485-498.   (Google)
Gibson, Roger (1995). A note on Boghossian's master argument. In Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview.   (Google | More links)
Graham, George & Horgan, Terence E. (1994). Southern fundamentalism and the end of philosophy. Philosophical Issues 5:219-247.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Greenwood, John D. (1992). Against eliminative materialism: From folk psychology to volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper it is argued that we would not be logically obliged or rationally inclined to reject the ontology of contentful psychological states postulated by folk psychology even if the explanations advanced by folk psychology turned out to be generally inaccurate or inadequate. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists such as Paul Churchland do not establish that folk psychological explanations are, or are likely to prove, generally inaccurate or inadequate. Most of Churchland's arguments—based upon developments within connectionist neuroscience—only cast doubt upon the adequacy of 'sentential' theories of cognitive processing, not upon scientifically developed forms of folk psychological explanation of behavior, such as those offered by contemporary social psychology. Finally, it is noted that Churchland's brand of eliminativism rests upon a crude reductive criterion of theoretical adequacy that has little to recommend it, and suggested that the recognized theoretical limitations of contemporary social psychology may be precisely due to its historical commitment to this reductive criterion
Greenwood, John D. (1991). Reasons to believe. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Haldane, John J. (1993). Theory, realism and common sense: A reply to Paul Churchland. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:321-327.   (Google)
Haldane, John J. (1988). Understanding folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:222-46.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hannan, Barbara (1993). Don't stop believing: The case against eliminative materialism. Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hannan, Barbara (1990). `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18:21-31.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Henderson, David K. & Horgan, Terence E. (2004). What does it take to be a true believer?: Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Henderson, David & Horgan, Terry (2004). What does it take to be a true believer? In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological” state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such
Hermes, Charles M. (2006). The overdetermination argument against eliminativism. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):113-119.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1987). Cognition is real. Behaviorism 15:13-25.   (Google)
Horst, Steven (1995). Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. & Woodward, James F. (1985). Folk psychology is here to stay. Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225.   (Cited by 51 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. & Graham, George (1991). In defense of southern fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies 62 (May):107-134.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. (1993). The austere ideology of folk psychology. Mind and Language 8 (2):282-297.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. & Henderson, David K. (2005). What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism. In Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hunter, Geoffrey (1995). The churchlands' eliminative materialism. Philosophical Investigations 18 (1):13-30.   (Google)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1993). Folk belief and commonplace belief. Mind and Language 8 (2):298-305.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1990). In defense of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54.   (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires
Keeley, Brian L. (2006). Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This collection offers an introduction to Churchland's work, as well as a critique of some of his most famous philosophical positions.
Kincaid, Harold (1990). Eliminativism and methodological individualism. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):141-148.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kitcher, P. S. (1984). In defense of intentional psychology. Journal of Philosophy 81 (February):89-106.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lahav, Ran (1992). The amazing predictive power of folk psychology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):99-105.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Livingston, Kenneth R. (1996). The neurocomputational mind meets normative epistemology. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):33-59.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The rapid development of connectionist models in computer science and of powerful computational tools in neuroscience has encouraged eliminativist materialist philosophers to propose specific alternatives to traditional mentalistic theories of mind. One of the problems associated with such a move is that elimination of the mental would seem to remove access to ideas like truth as the foundations of normative epistemology. Thus, a successful elimination of propositional or sentential theories of mind must not only replace them for purposes of our psychology, it must also replace them for purposes of the evaluation of our theories and explanations, psychological and otherwise. This paper briefly reviews eliminativist arguments for doubting the correctness of sentential accounts of explanation, understanding, and normative evaluation. It then considers Paul Churchland's (1989) proposed alternative norms, which are framed neurocomputationally. The alternative is found wanting in several specific ways. The arguments for eliminating propositionally-based norms are then re-examined and it is suggested that the need for wholesale elimination is overstated. A clear gap in the traditional epistemological story is identified, however, and a more modest set of norms is proposed as a way of filling this gap, rather than as a way of entirely replacing the traditional framework
Lockie, Robert (2003). Transcendental arguments against eliminativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):569-589.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Eliminativism was targeted by transcendental arguments from the first. Three responses to these arguments have emerged from the eliminativist literature, the heart of which is that such arguments are question-begging. These responses are shown to be incompatible with the position, eliminativism, they are meant to defend. Out of these failed responses is developed a general transcendental argument against eliminativism (the "Paradox of Abandonment"). Eliminativists have anticipated this argument, but their six different attempts to counter it are shown to be separately inadequate, mutually incompatible, and, again, incompatible with the position that they are seeking to defend.
Lycan, William G. (2005). A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism. In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oup.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations
Malone, Michael E. (1994). On assuming other folks have mental states. Philosophical Investigations 17 (1):37-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Melnyk, Andrew (1996). Testament of a recovering eliminativist. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S185-S193.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Nelson, Mark T. (1991). Eliminative materialism and substantive commitments. International Philosophical Quarterly (March) 39 (March):39-49.   (Google)
O'Brien, Gerard (1987). Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):49-70.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Philipse, Herman (1998). Shifting position? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):885-892.   (Google | More links)
Philipse, Herman (1997). The end of plasticity. Inquiry 40 (3):291-306.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Paul Churchland has become famous for holding three controversial and interrelated doctrines which he put forward in early papers and in his first book. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979): eliminative materialism, the doctrine of the plasticity of perception, and a general network theory of language. In his latest book, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (1995), Churchland aims to make some results of connectionist neuroscience available to the general public and explores the philosophical and social consequences that neuroscience is likely to have. I argue that these results of neuroscience refute the three doctrines that Churchland advocated in his earlier works. Yet youthful dreams do not die easily and Churchland is reluctant to relinquish his early views
Pitman, Michael M. (2003). Eliminative materialism and the integrity of science. South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):207-219.   (Google | More links)
Pojman, Paul (1994). Are beliefs and experiences candidates for elimination? Dialogue 37 (1):11-14.   (Google)
Ramsey, William; Stich, Stephen P. & Garon, J. (1991). Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 85 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Ramsey, William (1990). Where does the self-refutation objection take us? Inquiry 33 (December):453-65.   (Annotation | Google)
Reppert, Victor (1992). Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question. Metaphilosophy 23 (4):378-92.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Reppert, Victor (1991). Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation. Inquiry 34 (4):499-508.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Resnick, P. (1994). Intentionality is phlogiston. In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.   (Google)
Richards, G. (1996). On the necessary survival of folk psychology. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (1985). Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):60-67.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Rockwell, Teed, Beyond eliminative materialism: Some unnoticed implications of Paul Churchland's pragmatic pluralism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense 2) cannot claim that the concepts of Folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference. 3) cannot sustain Churchland's criticism of Dennett's "intentional stance" . 4) cannot claim to be a form of scientific realism, in the sense of believing that what science describes is somehow realer that what other conceptual systems describe
Roe, John H. (1992). Revisionary materialism: A critique of Stich. Conference 3 (2):67-75.   (Google)
Rosenberg, A. (1991). How is eliminative materialism possible? In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Rosenberg, A. (1999). Naturalistic epistemology for eliminative materialists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):335-358.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1988). Cognitive suicide. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1993). Eliminativism and an argument from science. Mind and Language 8 (2):180-188.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). The threat of cognitive suicide. In Lynne Rudder Baker (ed.), Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Saidel, Eric (1992). What price neurophilosophy? Philosophy of Science Association 1:461-68.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Schouten, Maurice K. D. & de Jong, Huib L. (1998). Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):489-509.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: The doctrine of eliminative materialism holds that belief-desire psychology is massively referentially disconnected. We claim, however, that it is not at all obvious what it means to be referentially (dis)connected. The two major accounts of reference both lead to serious difficulties for eliminativism: it seems that elimination is either impossible or omnipresent. We explore the idea that reference fixation is a much more local, partial, and context-dependent process than was supposed by the classical accounts. This pragmatic view suggests that elimination is not the prime model for understanding the complex relations between the mind and brain sciences, and that we have little ground for concluding that in general psychological kinds do not exist. We suggest that reference changes are better seen as continuous rather than completely eliminative
Schwartz, J. (1991). Reduction, elimination, and the mental. Philosophy of Science 58 (June):203-20.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Smith, Joseph Wayne (1982). Two recent self-referential arguments. Auslegung 9:333-346.   (Google)
Sterelny, Kim (1993). Refuting eliminative materialism on the cheap? Mind and Language 8 (2):306-15.   (Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. (1991). Do true believers exist? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:229-44.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1996). Deconstructing the mind. In Deconstructing the Mind. Oxford University Press, 1996.   (Cited by 93 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Over the last two decades, debates over the viability of commonsense psychology have been center stage in both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Eliminativists have argued that advances in cognitive science and neuroscience will ultimately justify a rejection of our "folk" theory of the mind, and of its ontology. In the first half of this book Stich, who was at one time a leading advocate of eliminativism, maintains that even if the sciences develop in the ways that eliminativists foresee, none of the arguments for ontological elimination are tenable. Rather than being resolved by science, he contends, these ontological disputes will be settled by a pragmatic process in which social and political considerations have a major role to play. In later chapters, Stich argues that the widespread worry about "naturalizing" psychological properties is deeply confused, since there is no plausible account of what naturalizing requires on which the failure of the naturalization project would lead to eliminativism. He also offers a detailed analysis of the many different notions of folk psychology to be found in philosophy and psychology, and argues that simulation theory, which purports to be an alternative to folk psychology, is not supported by recent experimental findings
Stich, Stephen P. (1992). What is a theory of mental representation? Mind 101 (402):243-61.   (Cited by 48 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Stoljar, Natalie (1988). Churchland's eliminativism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (December):489-497.   (Google | More links)
Tait, William W. (2002). The myth of the mind. Topoi 21 (1-2):65-74.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Of course, I do not mean by the title of this paper to deny the existence of something called
Taylor, Kenneth A. (1994). How not to refute eliminative materialism. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):101-125.   (Annotation | Google)
Abstract: This paper examines and rejects some purported refutations of eliminative materialism in the philosophy of mind: a quasi-transcendental argument due to Jackson and Pettit (1990) to the effect that folk psychology is “peculiarly unlikely” to be radically revised or eliminated in light of the developments of cognitive science and neuroscience; and (b) certain straight-out transcendental arguments to the effect that eliminativism is somehow incoherent (Baker, 1987; Boghossian, 1990). It begins by clarifying the exact topology of the dialectical space in which debates between eliminativist and anti-eliminativist ought to be framed. I claim that both proponents and opponents of eliminativism have been insufficiently attentive to the range of dialectical possibilities. Consequently, the debate has not, in fact, been framed within the correct dialectical setting. I then go onto to show how inattentiveness to the range of dialectical possibilities undermines both transcendental and quasi-transcendental arguments against eliminativism. In particular, I argue that the quasi-transcendentalist overestimates the degree to which folk psychology can be insulated from the advance of neuroscience and cognitive science just in virtue of being a functional theory. I argue further that transcendental arguments are fallacious and do not succeed against even the strongest possible form of eliminativism. Finally, I argue that that transcendental arguments are irrelevant. Even if such arguments do succeed against a certain'very strong form of eliminativism, they remain complete non-starters against certain weaker forms of eliminativism. And I argue that if any of these weaker forms is true, folk psychology is in trouble enough to vindicate Paul Ckurchland's claim that our common sense psychological framework is “a radically false and misleading conception of the causes of human behavior and the nature of cognitive activity”
Tomberlin, James E. (1994). Whither southern fundamentalism? Philosophical Issues 5.   (Google)
Trout, J. D. (1991). Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress. Synthese 87 (June):379-400.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Waskan, Jonathan A. (2003). Folk psychology and the gauntlet of irrealism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):627-656.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wright, C. (1995). Can there be a rationally compelling argument for anti-realism about ordinary ("folk") psychology? Philosophical Issues 6:197-221.   (Google | More links)
Wright, Crispin (1993). Eliminative materialism: Going concern or passing fancy? Mind and Language 8 (2):316-326.   (Cited by 1 | Google)

2.1d Propositional Attitudes, Misc

65 / 66 entries displayed

Anderson, C. Anthony (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Antony, Louise M. (2001). Brain states with attitude. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1975). Beliefs and desires as causes of actions: A reply to Donald Davidson. Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2002). Attitudes in action: A causal account. Manuscrito 25:47-78.   (Google)
Abstract: This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1995). Explaining Attitudes. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 75 | Google | More links)
Balaguer, Mark (1998). Attitudes without propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Barnes, Gerald W. (1977). Some remarks on belief and desire. Philosophical Review 86 (July):340-349.   (Google | More links)
Bealer, George (1998). Propositions. Mind 107 (425):1-32.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts to reduce propositions to extensional entities-either extensional functions or sets. The second group concerns problems of fine grained content-both traditional 'Cicero'/'Tully' puzzles and recent variations on them which confront scientific essentialism. After characterizing the problems, I outline a non-reductionist approach-the algebraic approach-which avoids the problems associated with reductionism. I then go on to show how the theory can incorporate non-Platonic (as well as Platonic) modes of presentation. When these are implemented nondescriptively, they yield the sort of fine-grained distinctions which have been eluding us. The paper closes by applying the theory to a cluster of remaining puzzles, including a pair of new puzzles facing scientific essentialism
Ben-Yami, Hanoch (1997). Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bennett, Jonathan (1991). Analysis without noise. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Boër, Steven E. (1994). Propositional attitudes and formal ontology. Synthese 98 (2).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data
Brownstein, Donald (1985). Individuating propositional attitudes. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):205-212.   (Google)
Clark, Austen (1994). Beliefs and desires incorporated. Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):404-25.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of which may initially seem remote from the topic at hand
Clark, Andy (1991). Radical ascent. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:211-27.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
David, Marian (2002). Content essentialism. Acta Analytica 17 (28):103-114.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Davies, David (1995). Davidson, indeterminacy, and measurement. Acta Analytica 10 (14):37-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Davies, David (1998). On gauging attitudes. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):129-54.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1989). What is present to the mind? In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1991). What is present to the mind. Philosophical Issues 1:197-213.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
De Clercq, Rafael (2006). Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386-402.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.
Devitt, Michael (1984). Thoughts and their ascription. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:385-420.   (Google)
Egan, M. F. (1989). What's wrong with the syntactic theory of mind. Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Elugardo, Reinaldo (2001). Brain states, causal explanation, and the attitudes. In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
Falk, Arthur E. (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
Falk, Arthur (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Philosophical Debates. University Press of America.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: First published in 2004, this book is a rigorous textbook on the metaphysics of the mind for advanced students of philosophy, covering the background they need to understand the debates and bringing them to the frontiers of current research. It is also a monograph on the nature of de re and de se states of mind, incorporating material the author published in journals. The short file you will see is only a gateway to more than two dozen other files which are rewrites of the book
Feit, Neil (2006). The doctrine of propositions, internalism, and global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.   (Google | More links)
Feldman, Richard H. (1986). Davidson's theory of propositional attitudes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goldstein, Irwin (1981). Cognitive pleasure and distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Explaining pleasure's 'intentional object', I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleased. Bernard Williams, Irving Thalberg, and Gilbert Ryle, who reject this analysis, are discussed.
Green, Mitchell S. (1999). Attitude ascription's affinity to measurement. International Journal Of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate her to P (for a different but equally adequate interpretive scheme could use a different proposition). In either case the only reality picked out by any system of ascription is what is common to all equivalent rivals. By emphasizing some contrasts between decision theory and belief-desire psychology, it is argued that if attitude ascription is appropriately analogous to measurement then not only is being related to a proposition an artifact of the system of representation chosen, so are belief and desire
Hieronymi, Pamela (2006). Controlling attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will
Hill, Christopher S. (1988). Intentionality, folk psychology, and reduction. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google)
Humberstone, I. L. (1992). Direction of fit. Mind 101 (401):59-83.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Jacquette, Dale (1990). Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence syntax. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):169-82.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (online). Truth, rationality, and humanity.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When we interpret someone in terms of their beliefs and desires, we are doing something other than merely describing them, but it is far from clear what this something else is. As Dennett puts it, while there is a growing consensus about the "not-purely-descriptive nature of intentional attribution," there remains considerable disagreement over which norms govern the play of this "dramatic interpretation game." This paper will discuss three candidates for specifying the content of these norms, truth, rationality and humanity. It will argue that while truth has frequently been taken to be the least plausible candidate, once the regulative rather than constitutive status of these norms are recognized, it turns out to be the best one. It will then close with a discussion of the 'indirect' role that rationality constraints can still be seen to play in a theory of belief
Kissine, Mikhail (2007). Direction of fit. Logique Et Analyse 198 (57):113-128.   (Google)
MacKenzie, J. S. (1916). Laws of thought. Mind 25 (99):289-307.   (Google | More links)
Margolis, Joseph (1977). Cognitive agents, mental states, and internal representation. Behaviorism 5:63-74.   (Google)
Matthews, Robert J. (1994). The measure of mind. Mind 103 (410):131-46.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McEvoy, Mark (2003). A defense of propositional functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:421-436.   (Google)
Millikan, Ruth G. (1986). Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content. Philosophical Review 95 (January):47-80.   (Cited by 48 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Montague, Michelle (2007). Against propositionalism. Noûs 41 (3):503–518.   (Google | More links)
Morton, Adam (1988). The explanatory depth of propositional attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 2:67-80.   (Google)
Moser, Paul K. (1990). Physicalism and intentional attitudes. Behavior and Philosophy 18:33-41.   (Google)
Muskens, Reinhard (1993). Propositional Attitudes. In R.E. Asher & J.M.Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Verbs such as know, believe, hope, fear, regret and desire are commonly taken to express an attitude that one may bear towards a proposition and are therefore called verbs of propositional attitude. Thus in (1) below the agent Cathy is reported to have a certain attitude
Peacocke, Christopher (1983). Between instrumentalism and brain-writing. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Sense and Content. Oxford University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Pelczar, Michael W. (2007). Forms and objects of thought. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises
Perry, John (1986). Circumstantial attitudes and benevolent cognition. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: From: _Language, Mind and Logic_, edited by Jeremy Butter?eld. 123
Possin, Kevin (1986). The case against Stich's syntactic theory of mind. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):405-18.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Pratt, Ian (1993). Analysis and the attitudes. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Recanati, Francois (2000). Opacity and the attitudes. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Rechtin, Lisbeth & Todd, William L. (1974). Propositional attitudes and self-reference. Philosophia 4 (April-July):271-295.   (Google | More links)
Richard, Mark E. (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 172 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues in the philosophy of mind are addressed
Robbins, Philip (2004). To structure, or not to structure? Synthese 139 (1):55-80.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rooney, Margaret M. (1980). What do we hope for: Some puzzles involving propositional hoping. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:75-92.   (Google)
Ross, Don (1986). Stich, Fodor and the status of belief. Eidos 5 (December):119-141.   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1994). Attitudes as nonentities. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Saidel, Eric (1998). Beliefs, desires, and the ability to learn. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):21-37.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Schroeder, Timothy (2006). Propositional attitudes. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Schwartz, J. (1992). Propositional attitude psychology as an ideal type. Topoi 11 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sher, George A. (1977). Armstrong and the interdependence of the mental. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (July):227-235.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Smith, D. M. (1994). Toward a perspicuous characterization of intentional states. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):103-20.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 415 | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1984). Relativism, rationality, and the limits of intentional ascription. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Poland, Jeffrey S. & Von Eckardt, Barbara (2000). In defense of the standard view. Protosociology 14:312-331.   (Google)
Zaitchik, Alan (1981). Reply to professor Fodor on physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):294-295.   (Google)

2.2 Content Internalism and Externalism

Harman, Gilbert (1988). Wide functionalism. In Stephen Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.), Cognition and Representation. Westview Press.   (Google)
Nelkin, Norton (1997). Consciousness and the origins of thought. Mind and Language 12 (2):178–180.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This book offers a comprehensive and broadly rationalist theory of the mind which continually tests itself against experimental results and clinical data. Taking issue with Empiricists who believe that all knowledge arises from experience and that perception is a non-cognitive state, Norton Nelkin argues that perception is cognitive, constructive, and proposition-like. Further, as against Externalists who believe that our thoughts have meaning only insofar as they advert to the world outside our minds, he argues that meaning is determined 'in the head'. Finally, he offers an account of how we acquire some of our most basic concepts, including the concept of the self and that of other minds

2.2a Is Content in the Head?

Brown, J. (1998). Natural kind terms and recognitional capacities. Mind 107 (426):275-303.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a natural kind in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by Kripke and by Putman. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that (1) typically, an item that instantiates one natural kind instantiates several - 'the higher-level natural kinds problem', and (2) natural kinds often occur in nature in impure form - 'the composition problem' .On the account I propose, a term for a natural kind gains its reference by being associated with a recognitional capacity for that kind. I show how members of a scientifically ignorant community could have a recognitional capacity for a natural kind, say gold, as opposed to a certain kind of appearance, for instance the appearance that gold actually has. I argue that members of such a community can have recognitional capacities for particular natural kinds despite the actual or possible existence of duplicate kinds, e.g. water. After developing the account in detail, I show how it can deal with the two problems faced by Kripke's and Putnam's problem. The case of natural kind terms is crucial to the central debate in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind about whether we can refer non-descriptively to objects and kinds in the world. I take the account I propose to be a non-descriptive account of linguistic reference to natural kinds that can be used to support externalism in the philosophy of mind
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). Contents just aren't in the head. Erkenntnis 58 (1):1-6.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bruns, M. & Soldati, Gianfranco (1997). Object-dependent and property-dependent concepts. Dialectica 48 (3-4):185-208.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1995). The characteristic thesis of anti-individualism. Analysis 55 (3):146-48.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1982). Other bodies. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 94 | Annotation | Google)
Butler, Keith (1998). Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism. Kluwer.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Campbell, John (1982). Extension and psychic state: Twin earth revisited. Philosophical Studies 42 (June):67-90.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Chomsky, Noam A. (2003). Internalist explorations. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Christensen, Carleton B. (2001). Escape from twin earth: Putnam's 'logic' of natural kind terms. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):123-150.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , presumably in order to block such entailments. Part II then raises the decisive issue of at what cost these devices do the job they need to do. It argues that - apart from possessing no other motivation than their capacity to block the consequences derived in Part I - they only fulfil this blocking function if they render the theory unable to deal with fiction and related 'make-believe' activities. Part III indicates the affinity Putnam's account has with the classically 'denotative' view of meaning, and thus how its weaknesses may be seen as a variant of the classical weakness of 'denotative' approaches. It concludes that the theory is a conceptual muddle
Crane, Tim (1991). All the difference in the world. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (January):1-25.   (Cited by 25 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cummins, Robert E. (1991). Methodological reflections on belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Davis, Steven (2003). Arguments for externalism. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Devitt, Michael (2001). A shocking idea about meaning. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (218):471-494.   (Google)
Devitt, Michael (1990). Meanings just ain't in the head. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1993). The nature of thought. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Endicott, Ronald P. (forthcoming). Multiple realizability. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Multiple realizability is a key issue in debates over the nature of mind and reduction in the sciences. The subject consists of two parts:
Farkas, Katalin (2003). Does twin earth rest on a mistake? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.   (Google)
Farkas, Katalin (2008). Phenomenal intentionality without compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow.
Farkas, Katalin (2006). Semantic internalism and externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
Farkas, Katalin (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended here is not dualism--which is not adopted--but internalism. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted externalist thesis, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on certain features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view, which holds that the mind is autonomous, and though it is obviously affected by the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. Defenders of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; Katalin Farkas offers a defence of an uncompromising internalist Cartesian conception
Farkas, Katalin (2003). What is externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
Fisher, Justin C. (2007). Why nothing mental is just in the head. Nous 41 (2):318-334.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Mental internalists hold that an individuals mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individuals head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I construct a counter-example to mental internalism regarding all these features. My counter-example involves two creatures: a human and an alien from Pulse World. These creatures environments, behavioral dispositions and histories are such that it is intuitively clear that they are mentally quite different, even while they are, for a moment, exactly alike with respect to whats in their heads. I offer positive reasons for thinking that the case I describe is indeed possible. I then consider ways in which mental internalists might attempt to account for this case, but conclude that the only plausible option is to reject mental internalism and to adopt a particular externalist alternative a history-oriented version of teleo-functionalism
Floyd, Juliet (2005). Putnam's 'the meaning of meaning': Externalism in historical context. In Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Frances, Bryan (ms). A philosophically inexpensive introduction to twin-earth.   (Google)
Abstract: I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also briefly discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument
Frances, Bryan (online). Twin earth thought experiments.   (Google)
Abstract: Suppose that you had always had a physical twin, Chris, who on a different planet went through life having physical characteristics, sensory experiences, utterances, and brain processes exactly the same as yours in every physical and sensory respect. Chris
Gavran, Ana (2004). Tim Crane on the internalism-externalism debate. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):207-218.   (Google)
Green, Mitchell S. (2000). The status of supposition. Noûs 34 (3):376–399.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
Horowitz, Amir (2001). Contents just are in the head. Erkenntnis 54 (3):321-344.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Horowitz, Amir (2005). Externalism, the environment, and thought-tokens. Erkenntnis 63 (1):133-138.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Horowitz, Amir (1995). Putnam, Searle, and externalism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hyde, William H. (1981). On meaning the micro-state. Philosophical Investigations 4:25-34.   (Google)
Koethe, John L. (1992). And they ain't outside the head either. Synthese 90 (1):27-53.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Korman, Daniel Z. (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
Lau, Joe (online). Externalism about mental content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way
Liz, Manuel (2003). Intentional states: Individuation, explanation, and supervenience. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Longworth, Guy (2003). Where should we look for the mind? Think 5.   (Google)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1996). Duplicating thoughts. Mind and Language 11 (1):92-102.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (2003). Externalism, logical form, and linguistic intentions. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1993). Externalism, naturalism, and method. Philosophical Issues 4:250-264.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Mandelkar, S. (1991). An argument against the externalist account of psychological content. Philosophical Psychology 4:375-82.   (Annotation | Google)
McCulloch, Gregory (1992). The spirit of twin earth. Analysis 52 (3):168-174.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
McGilvray, James A. (1998). Meanings are syntactically individuated and found in the head. Mind and Language 13 (2):225-280.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
McGlone, Michael (forthcoming). Putnam on What Isn't in the Head. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” Putnam argues, among other things, that “‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head”. Putnam’s central arguments in favor of this conclusion are unsound. The arguments in question are the famous intra‐world Twin Earth arguments, given on pages 223‐ 227 of the article in question.
McKinsey, Michael (1991). The internal basis of meaning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):143-69.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Mundale, Jennifer & Bechtel, William P. (online). Multiple realizability revisited.   (Google)
Abstract: The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative fashion undercuts the likelihood that, at least within organic life forms, we are likely to find cases of multiply realized psychological functions
Owens, Joseph (2003). Anti-individualism, indexicality, and character. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Owens, Joseph (1983). Functionalism and the propositional attitudes. Noûs 17 (November):529-49.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Pelczar, Michael (forthcoming). Content internalism about indexical thought. American Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: Properly understood, content internalism is the thesis that any difference between the representational contents of two individuals' mental states reduces to a difference in those individuals' intrinsic properties. Some of the strongest arguments against internalism turn on the possibility for two "doppelgangers" –- perfect physical and phenomenal duplicates -– to differ with respect to the contents of those of their mental states that they can express using terms such as "I," "here," and "now." In this paper, I grant the stated possibility, but deny that it poses any threat to internalism. Despite their similarities, doppelgangers differ in some of their intrinsic properties, and it is to such intrinsic differences that differences of indexical content reduce.
Putnam, Hilary (1975). The meaning of 'meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.   (Cited by 1506 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard M. (2003). Some externalist strategies and their problems. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (7):21-34.   (Google)
Rosenberg, Alex (2001). On multiple realization: Comments and criticism and the special sciences. Journal of Philosophy XCVIII ( 7.   (Google)
Schroeter, Laura (2007). Illusion of transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.   (Google)
Abstract: It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity
Schroeter, Laura (2008). Why be an anti-individualist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.   (Google)
Abstract: Anti-individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject's environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti-individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti-individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent's commitment to refining her own representational practices in the light of new and surprising information about her environment. Since anti-individualism is an implicit part of responsible epistemic practices, we cannot abandon it without compromising our own epistemic agency. The story I tell about the regulation of one's own representational practices yields a new account of the identity conditions for anti-individualistic concepts
Searle, John R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1571 | Google | More links)
Abstract: John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (2005). Can psychology be a unified science? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):953-963.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has argued that if psychological kinds are multiply realizable then no single psychological theory can describe regularities ranging over psychological states. Instead, psychology must be fractured, with human psychology covering states realized in the human way, martian psychology covering states realized in the martian way, and so on. I show that even if one accepts the principles that motivate Kim
Silvers, Stuart (2003). Individualism, internalism, and wide supervenience. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Sosa, Ernest (1993). Abilities, concepts, and externalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Sosa, Ernest (1991). Between internalism and externalism. Philosophical Issues 1:179-195.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (1993). Twin earth revisited. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:297-311.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Stoneham, Tom (2003). Temporal externalism. Philosophical Papers 32 (1):97-107.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
van Brakel, Jaap (2005). On the inventors of XYZ. Foundations of Chemistry 7 (1):57-84.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I try to make as much sense aspossible of, first, the extensive philosophicalliterature concerned with the status of `Wateris H2O' and, second, the implications ofPutnam's invention of Twin Earth, anotherpossible world stipulated to be just like Earth, except that water is XYZ, notH2O
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2005). Naming natural kinds. Synthese 145 (1):65-87.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper discusses whether it can be known a priori that a particular term, such as water, is a natural kind term, and how this problem relates to Putnams claim that natural kind terms require an externalist semantics. Two conceptions of natural kind terms are contrasted: The first holds that whether water is a natural kind term depends on its a priori knowable semantic features. The second
Wilson, Robert A. (2002). Individualism. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Yalowitz, Steven (2002). Individualism, normativity, and the epistemology of understanding. Philosophical Studies 102 (1):43-92.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Zemach, Eddy M. (1976). Putnam's theory on the reference of substance terms. Journal of Philosophy 73 (March):116-27.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google | More links)

2.2b Social Externalism

Antony, Michael V. (1993). Social relations and the individuation of thought. Mind 102 (406):247-61.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1988). Burge's new thought experiment: Back to the drawing room. Journal of Philosophy 85 (February):88-97.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). Social externalism and first-person authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”
Benejam, A. (2003). Thought experiments and semantic competence. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Bridges, Jason (2006). Davidson's transcendental externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):290-315.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson
Brown, Jessica (2000). Against temporal externalism. Analysis 60 (2):178-188.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). Defending Burge's thought experiment. Erkenntnis 55 (3):387-391.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Davidson and forms of anti-individualism: Reply to Hahn. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Descartes, bare concepts, and anti-individualism: Reply to Normore. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1979). Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:73-122.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1986). Intellectual norms and foundations of mind. Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.   (Cited by 68 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Psychology and the environment: Reply to Chomsky. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Replies from Tyler Burge. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Burge, Taylor (2003). Thought experiments: Reply to Donnellan. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). The indexical strategy: Reply to Owens. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Collins, John M. (2006). Temporal externalism, natural kind terms, and scientifically ignorant communities. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):55-68.   (Google | More links)
Loewer, Barry (2009). Why is there anything except physics? Synthese 170 (2):217-233.   (Google)
Abstract: In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor’s question it is immensely implausible
Davis, Andrew (2005). Social externalism and the ontology of competence. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):297-308.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Social externalism implies that many competences are not personal assets separable from social and cultural environments but complex states of affairs involving individuals and persisting features of social reality. The paper explores the consequences for competence identity over time and across contexts, and hence for the predictive role usually accorded to competences
Elugardo, Reinaldo (1993). Burge on content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):367-84.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Forbes, Graeme R. (1987). A dichotomy sustained. Philosophical Studies 51 (March):187-211.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Frapolli, Maria J. & Romero, E. (eds.) (2003). Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Frances, Bryan (1999). On the explanatory deficiencies of linguistic content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining their actions. I argue that the considerations motivating this view are best handled with just the ordinary ‘that’-clause contents.
Millikan, Ruth G. (1999). Historical kinds and the "special sciences". Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.   (Cited by 49 | Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (1991). Mental content and the division of epistemic labour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (September):302-18.   (Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (2003). Social externalism and linguistic communication. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. CSLI.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the expressive theory of communication, the primary function of language is to enable speakers to convey the content of their thoughts to hearers. According to Tyler Burge's social externalism, the content of a person's thought is relative to the way words are used in his or her surrounding linguistic community. This paper argues that Burge's social externalism refutes the expressive theory of communication.
Georgalis, Nicholas (2003). Burge's thought experiment: Still in need of defense. Erkenntnis 58 (2):267-273.   (Google | More links)
Georgalis, N. (1999). Rethinking Burge's thought experiment. Synthese 118 (2):145-64.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Green, Mitchell S. (2000). The status of supposition. Noûs 34 (3):376–399.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
Grimaltos, Tobies (2003). Terms and content. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Hahn, Martin & Ramberg, B. (eds.) (2003). Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hahn, Martin (2003). When swampmen get arthritis: "Externalism" in Burge and Davidson. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Haugeland, John (2004). Social cartesianism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Jackman, Henry (2000). Deference and self-knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
Jackman, Henry (1998). Individualism and interpretation. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):31-38.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: 'Interpretational' accounts of meaning are frequently treated as incompatible with accounts stressing language's 'social' character. However, this paper argues that one can reconcile interpretational and social accounts by distinguishing "methodological" from "ascriptional" individualism. While methodological individualism requires only that the meaning of one's terms ultimately be grounded in facts about oneself, ascriptional individualism requires that the meaning of one's terms be independent of how others use theirs. Interpretational accounts are committed only to methodological individualism, while arguments for languages social character are best understood as attacks on ascriptional individualism. As a result, one can recognize language's social character and still be an interpretationalist
Jackman, Henry (1996). Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There has frequently been taken to be a tension, if not an incompatibility, between "externalist" theories of content (which allow the make-up of one's physical environment and the linguistic usage of one's community to contribute to the contents of one's thoughts and utterances) and the "methodologically individualist" intuition that whatever contributes to the content of one's thoughts and utterances must ultimately be grounded in facts about one's own attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation I argue that one can underwrite such externalist theories within a methodologically individualistic framework by understanding semantic norms in terms of the need to reach, for each of one's terms, a type of "equilibrium." Each speaker's commitment to making her _own_ beliefs and applications consistent allows one to incorporate these 'external' factors into the contents of their thoughts and utterances in a way that remains methodologically individualistic. Methodologically individualistic accounts are typically taken to be unable to incorporate 'external' factors such as the world's physical make-up or communal usage because of arguments suggesting that the individual's own beliefs and usage underdetermine or even misidentify what, according to externalist accounts, they mean by their terms. These arguments, however, only seem plausible if one presupposes a comparatively impoverished conception of the individual's beliefs. The beliefs a speaker associates with a given term extend far beyond the handful of sentences they would produce if asked to list such beliefs. In particular, speakers have an implicit, but rich, understanding of their language, their world, and the relation between them. Speakers typically understand languages as shared temporally extended practices about which they can be, both individually and collectively, mistaken. Once this conception of language is taken into account, the ascriptions which purportedly forced 'non-individualistic' conceptions of content upon us (particularly ascriptions which seemed to tie what we meant to social use rather than our own beliefs) turn out to be ultimately grounded in the individual's own beliefs. Indeed, our self-conception does much more than merely underwrite 'non-individualistic' ascriptions..
Jackman, Henry (2005). Temporal externalism and our ordinary linguistic practices. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):365-380.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately re?ect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
Jackman, Henry (2006). Temporal externalism, constitutive norms, and theories of vagueness. In Tomas Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Our concept of truth is governed by two principles. The
Jackman, Henry (2005). Temporal externalism, deference, and our ordinary linguistic practice. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):365-380.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
Jackman, Henry (1999). We live forwards but understand backwards: Linguistic practices and future behavior. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):157-177.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ascriptions of content are sensitive not only to our physical and social environment, but also to unforeseeable developments in the subsequent usage of our terms. This paper argues that the problems that may seem to come from endorsing such 'temporally sensitive' ascriptions either already follow from accepting the socially and historically sensitive ascriptions Burge and Kripke appeal to, or disappear when the view is developed in detail. If one accepts that one's society's past and current usage contributes to what one's terms mean, there is little reason not to let its future usage to do so as well
Lewis, Harry A. (1985). Content and community. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:177-196.   (Google)
Liu, Jeeloo (2002). Physical externalism and social externalism: Are they really compatible? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:381-404.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Putnam and Burge have been viewed as launching a joint attack on individualism, the view that the content of one's psychological state is determined by what is in the head . Putnam argues that meanings are not in the head while Burge argues that beliefs are not in the head either, and both have come up with convincing arguments against individualism. It is generally conceived that Putnam's view is a version of physical externalism, which argues that factors in the physical environment play a role in determining the meanings of natural kind terms. Burge, on the other hand, is regarded as following up Putnam's argument to bring in factors in the social environment for the determination of belief. Burge's view has been commonly referred to as 'social externalism.' The general consensus in the field is that physical externalism and social externalism are compatible views. Furthermore, both Putnam and Burge seem to endorse each other’s position for the most part. In this paper, however, I shall argue against this general view to show that the two theories are deep down incompatible
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism and memory: A problem? Acta Analytica 10 (14):69-76.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory. Analysis 55 (3):157-59.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (ms). The myth of social content.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Social externalism is the view that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are logically determined at least in part by her linguistic community's standards for the use of her words. If social externalism is correct, its importance can hardly be overemphasized. The traditional Cartesian view of psychological states as essentially first personal and non-relational in character, which has shaped much theorizing about the nature of psychological explanation, would be shown to be deeply flawed
Onof, Christian & Marsh, Leslie (2008). Introduction to the special issue “perspectives on social cognition”. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: No longer is sociality the preserve of the social sciences, or ‘‘culture’’ the preserve of the humanities or anthropology. By the same token, cognition is no longer the sole preserve of the cognitive sciences. Social cognition (SC) or, sociocognition if you like, is thus a kaleidoscope of research projects that has seen exponential growth over the past 30 or so years.
Marqueze, J. (2003). On orthodox and heterodox externalisms. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
McKinsey, Michael (1993). Curing folk psychology of arthritis. Philosophical Studies 70 (3):323-36.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial thought experiment nor a second type of example that Burge describes supports either of these conclusions. Second, I will identify the proper conclusion to draw from Burge's discussion and show that this conclusion does not really pose a serious problem for individualism about the mental. And finally, I will argue that Burge's discussion does not in fact provide a conclusive reason for believing its proper conclusion
Millikan, Ruth G. (2003). In defense of public language. In Louise M. Antony & H. Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Normore, Calvin G. (2003). Burge, Descartes, and us. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Nordby, Halvor (2005). Davidson on social externalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):88-94.   (Google | More links)
Nordby, Halvor (2004). Incorrect understanding and concept possession. Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):55-70.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Tyler Burge has argued that an incorrect understanding of a word can be sufficient for possessing the concept the word literally expresses. His well-known 'arthritis' case involves a patient who understands 'arthritis' incorrectly, but who nevertheless, according to Burge, possesses the concept arthritis. Critics of Burge have objected that there is an alternative concept that best matches the patient's understanding and that this, therefore, is the patient's concept. The paper first argues that Burge's response to this objection is unconvincing. A better response is then developed. It is argued that there is no alternative concept that matches the incorrect understanding, since the patient thinks he has a partial understanding. This, together with points about ordinary psychological explanation and modes of presentations of concepts, establish that it is impossible to undermine Burge's social externalism by appealing to the idea that an alternative concept matches the incorrect understanding
Pagin, Peter (2006). Intersubjective externalism. In T. Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholar Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in T. Marvan (ed) What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholar Press, Newcastle upon Tyne, 39-54, 2006
Pitt, David (ms). The Burgean intuitions.   (Google)
Putnam, Hilary (1987). Meaning, other people, and the world. In Representation and Reality. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sawyer, Sarah (2003). Conceptual errors and social externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):265-273.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Verheggen, Claudine (2006). How social must language be? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2):203-219.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2004). Externalism and incomplete understanding. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):287-294.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2001). Social externalism and conceptual errors. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):217-31.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist can opt for a
Woodfield, Andrew (1998). Social externalism and conceptual diversity. In John M. Preston (ed.), Thought and Language. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Woodfield, Andrew (1982). Thought and the social community. Inquiry 25 (December):435-50.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Yalowitz, Steven (1999). Davidson's social externalism. Philosophia 27 (1-2):99-136.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

2.2c Externalism and Psychological Explanation

Arjo, D. (1996). Sticking up for oedipus: Fodor on intentional generalizations and broad content. Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat & Robbins, P. (2001). Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Let's assume there are psychological generalizations that the folk rely upon in explaining and predicting the behavior of their fellows. Let's further assume these generalizations are intentional, in that they do their explanatory and predictive work by attributing to the subjects in their domain intentional mental states such as beliefs, desires, and the like. Then we can define a broad intentional psychology as one that adverts only to broad, viz. purely denotational/truth-conditional, mental contents in its generalizations; so the sentences expressing its generalizations should be transparently read. A narrow psychology is one that is not so restricted. [1] Accordingly, the sentences expressing narrow generalizations will contain opaque contexts, indicated by `that'-clauses (`believes that ...', `desires that ...', and the like). Here is an example of the sort of generalization we have in mind:
(G) If S desires that P and believes that S can bring it about that P, then, ceteris paribus, S will try
to bring it about that P.
In recent years, the question of whether such generalizations are broad or narrow has received considerable attention in philosophy of psychology. The general consensus among theorists has been that because generalizations like (G) are false when construed transparently, intentional psychology cannot be broad. For example, when read transparently, (G) seems to be falsified by Oedipus's story. Oedipus wished not to marry Mom and believed that he could achieve this, yet he did not avoid marrying her -- on the contrary. So Oedipus satisfied the antecedent and flouted the consequent of (G). In this way, Frege puzzles have served to motivate a narrow intentional psychology, where the intentional properties attributed to mental states are individuated more finely than denotations or truth-conditions
Bach, Kent (1982). "De re" belief and methodological solipsism. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1987). An externalist account of psychological content. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):191-226.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Buller, David J. (1997). Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of "narrow" functions). Philosophy of Science 64 (1):74-95.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology
Buller, David J. (1992). "Narrow"-mindedness breeds inaction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):59-70.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1986). Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.   (Cited by 186 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (1982). Two thought experiments reviewed. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):284-94.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Corazza, Eros (1994). Perspectival thoughts and psychological generalizations. Dialectica 48 (3-4):307-36.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Crawford, Sean (1998). In defence of object-dependent thoughts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210.   (Google | More links)
Crawford, Sean (2003). Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect causal powers, it is false that no relational psychological properties do. Examples of relational psychological properties that do affect causal powers are given and psychological laws are sketched that subsume twins in virtue of them instantiating these relational properties rather than them sharing the narrow contents of their thoughts
Davies, Martin (1986). Individualism and supervenience: Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.   (Google)
Dretske, Fred (2001). Where is the mind? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1992). What isn't wrong with folk psychology. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):1-13.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Egan, Frances (1991). Must psychology be individualistic? Philosophical Review 100 (April):179-203.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1982). Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (April):98-118.   (Cited by 23 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1980). Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:63-109.   (Cited by 225 | Annotation | Google)
Frances, Bryan (1999). On the explanatory deficiencies of linguistic content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining their actions. I argue that the considerations motivating this view are best handled with just the ordinary ‘that’-clause contents.
Gauker, Christopher (1987). Mind and chance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (September):533-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Globus, Gordon G. (1984). Can methodological solipsism be confined to psychology? Cognition and Brain Theory 7:233-46.   (Annotation | Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1997). [Explanation] is explanation better. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):154-60.   (Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (online). Belief attribution and rationality: A dilemma for Jerry Fodor.   (Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (2002). Can mental content explain behavior? In Languages of the Brain.   (Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (1993). Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content. Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Kitcher, P. S. (1985). Narrow taxonomy and wide functionalism. Philosophy of Science 52 (March):78-97.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kobes, Bernard W. (1989). Semantics and psychological prototypes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (March):1-18.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Losonsky, Michael (1995). Emdedded systems vs. individualism. Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject''s natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system''s interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational theorizing. Recent work in computational developmental psychology (by A. Karmiloff-Smith and J. Rutkowska) as well as artificial agents or embedded artificial systems (by L.P. Kaelbling, among others) casts doubt on these claims. In these computational models, the environment does not just trigger and sustain input for computational operations, but some computational operations actually involve environmental structures
Macdonald, Cynthia (1995). Anti-individualism and psychological explanation. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Macdonald, Cynthia (1992). Weak externalism and psychological reduction. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Maloney, J. Christopher (1985). Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Philosophy of Science 52 (September):451-69.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Marras, Ausonio (1985). The churchlands on methodological solipsism and computational psychology. Philosophy of Science 52 (June):295-309.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McClamrock, Ron (1995). Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Abstract: While the notion of the mind as information-processor--a kind of computational system--is widely accepted, many scientists and philosophers have assumed that this account of cognition shows that the mind's operations are characterizable independent of their relationship to the external world. Existential Cognition challenges the internalist view of mind, arguing that intelligence, thought, and action cannot be understood in isolation, but only in interaction with the outside world. Arguing that the mind is essentially embedded in the external world, Ron McClamrock provides a schema that allows cognitive scientists to address such long-standing problems in artificial intelligence as the "frame" problem and the issue of "bounded" rationality. Extending this schema to cover progress in other studies of behavior, including language, vision, and action, McClamrock reinterprets the importance of the organism/environment distinction. McClamrock also considers the broader philosophical question of the place of mind in the world, particularly with regard to questions of intentionality, subjectivity, and phenomenology. With implications for philosophy, cognitive and computer science, AI, and psychology, this book synthesizes state-of-the-art work in philosophy and cognitive science on how the mind interacts with the world to produce thoughts, ideas, and actions
McClamrock, Ron (1991). Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry. Philosophical Psychology 4:343-54.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: The issue of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and psychology has received enormous attention and discussion in the decade since the appearance Jerry Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism" [Fodor 1980]. But most of this discussion has focused on the consideration of the now infamous "Twin Earth" type examples and the problems they present for Fodor's notion of "narrow content". I think there is deeper and more general moral to be found in this issue, particularly in light of Fodor's more recent defense of his view in Psychosemantics [Fodor 1987]. Underlying this discussion are questions about the nature and plausibility of the claim that scientific explanation should observe a constraint of methodological individualism . My goal in what follows is to bring out this more general problem in Fodor's "internalist" account of the mental
Molyneux, Bernard (2007). Primeness, internalism and explanatory generality. Philosophical Studies 135 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson
Neander, Karen (ms). The narrow and the normative.   (Google)
Noonan, Harold W. (1984). Methodological solipsism: A reply to Morris. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):285-290.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Noonan, Harold W. (1990). Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy. Analysis 50 (January):1-9.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Noonan, Harold W. (1993). Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Noonan, Harold W. (1986). Russellian thoughts and methodological solipsism. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Owens, Joseph (1994). Psychological externalism and psychological explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):921-928.   (Google | More links)
Paprzycka, Katarzyna (2002). False consciousness of intentional psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):271-295.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to explanatory individualism, every action must be explained in terms of an agent's desire. According to explanatory nonindividualism, we sometimes act on our desires, but it is also possible for us to act on others' desires without acting on desires of our own. While explanatory nonindividualism has guided the thinking of many social scientists, it is considered to be incoherent by most philosophers of mind who insist that actions must be explained ultimately in terms of some desire of the agent. In the first part of the paper, I show that some powerful arguments designed to demonstrate the incoherence of explanatory nonindividualism fail. In the second part of the paper, I offer a nonindividualist explanation of the apparent obviousness of belief-desire psychology. I argue that there are two levels of the intelligibility of our actions. On the more fundamental (explanatory) level, the question "Why did the agent do something?" admits a variety of folk-psychological categories. But there is another (formation-of-self) level, at which the same question admits only of answers that ultimately appeal only to the agent's own desires. Explanatory individualism results from the confusion of the two levels
Patterson, Sarah (1991). Individualism and semantic development. Philosophy of Science 58 (March):15-35.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Patterson, Sarah (1990). The explanatory role of belief ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):313-32.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1993). Externalist explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:203-30.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
Perry, John (1998). Broadening the mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):223-231.   (Google | More links)
Pettit, Philip (1986). Broad-minded explanation and psychology. In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Petrie, Bradford (1990). Nonautonomous psychology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:539-59.   (Annotation | Google)
Rives, Bradley (2009). Concept cartesianism, concept pragmatism, and Frege cases. Philosophical Studies 144 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about rationality turn on the form, not the content, of thoughts. I then consider Jerry Fodor’s argument that ‘modes of presentation’ are not identical with Fregean senses, and argue that explanatory considerations should leads us to reject his ‘syntactic’ treatment of Frege cases. Rejecting the Cartesian treatment of Frege cases, however, is not tantamount to accepting Peacocke’s claim that reasons and rationality are central to the individuation of concepts. For I argue that we can steer a middle course between Fodor’s Cartesianism and Peacocke’s Pragmatism, and adopt a form of Pragmatism that is constrained by Fregean considerations, but at the same time denies that concepts are constitutively tied to reasons and rationality
Rowlands, Mark (1995). Against methodological solipsism: The ecological approach. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):5-24.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made to show how these principles can be extended to cognition as a whole. It is suggested that these principles may have a foundation in evolutionary biology
Rowlands, Mark (1991). Towards a reasonable version of methodological solipsism. Mind and Language 6:39-57.   (Google | More links)
Russow, Lilly-Marlene (1987). Stich on the foundations of cognitive psychology. Synthese 70 (March):401-413.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sawyer, Sarah (2006). The role of object-dependent content in psychological explanation. Teorema 25 (1):181-192.   (Google)
Segal, Gabriel (1989). The return of the individual. Mind 98 (January):39-57.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Sterelny, Kim (1990). Animals and individualism. In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.   (Google)
Stecker, Robert A.; Adams, Max F. & Fuller, Gary (1999). Object dependent thoughts, perspectival thoughts, and psychological generalization. Dialectica 53 (1):47-59.   (Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1978). Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis. The Monist 61 (October):573-91.   (Cited by 41 | Annotation | Google)
Tuomela, Raimo (1989). Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology. Philosophy of Science 56 (March):23-47.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Wakefield, Jerome C. (2002). Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily adequate broad-content psychology is nonetheless possible because Frege cases rarely occur in intentional-explanatory contexts, and they are not systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that demands intentional explanation. Thus, he claims, behaviors associated with Frege cases can be considered ceteris-paribus exceptions to broad-content intentional laws without significantly decreasing the explanatory power of intentional psychology. I argue that Frege cases are plentiful and systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that requires intentional explanation, specifically in the explanation of why certain actions are not performed. Consequently, Frege-case behaviors cannot be construed as ceteris-paribus exceptions to intentional laws without significantly eroding the explanatory power of intentional psychology and reducing the rationality of the agent. Fodor thus fails to save broad-content psychology from the prima facie objections against it based on Frege cases
Wallace, J. & Mason, H. E. (1990). On some thought experiments about mind and meaning. In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes. Csli.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wilson, Robert A. (1994). Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and individualism in psychology. Philosophy of Science 61 (1):55-75.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Wilson, Robert A. (1995). Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 58 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book offers the first sustained critique of individualism in psychology, a view that has been the subject of debate between philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Tyler Burge for many years. The author approaches individualism as an issue in the philosophy of science and by discussing issues such as computationalism and the mind's modularity he opens the subject up for non-philosophers in psychology and computer science. Professor Wilson carefully examines the most influential arguments for individualism and identifies the main metaphysical assumptions underlying them. Since the topic is so central to the philosophy of mind, a discipline generating enormous research and debate at present, the book has implications for a very broad range of philosophical issues including the naturalisation of intentionality, psychophysical supervenience, the nature of mental causation, and the viability of folk psychology
Wilson, Robert A. (2004). Recent work on individualism in the social, behavioural, and biological sciences. Biology and Philosophy 19 (3):397-423.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The social, behavioral, and a good chunk of the biological sciences concern the nature of individual agency, where our paradigm for an individual is a human being. Theories of economic behavior, of mental function and dysfunction, and of ontogenetic development, for example, are theories of how such individuals act, and of what internal and external factors are determinative of that action. Such theories construe individuals in distinctive ways
Wilson, Robert A. (2000). Some problems for alternative individualism. Philosophy of Science 67 (4):671-679.   (Google | More links)

2.2d Externalism and Mental Causation

Adams, Frederick R. (1993). Fodor's modal argument. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.   (Google)
Abstract: What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of this causal powers argument. I argue that Fodor's argument (in old or new dress) is a non sequitur. It neither establishes the existence of narrow content nor the need for a content other than broad content to explain intentional behavior
Barrett, J. (1997). Individualism and the cross-contexts test. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):242-60.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Jerry Fodor has defended the claim that psychological theories should appeal to narrow rather than wide intentional properties. One of his arguments relies upon the cross contexts test, a test that purports to determine whether two events have the same causally relevant properties. Critics have charged that this test is too weak, since it counts certain genuinely explanatory relational properties in science as being causally irrelevant. Further, it has been claimed, the test is insensitive to the fact that special scientific laws allow for exceptions which do not undermine those laws. This paper refines the cross contexts test to meet these objections while still allowing it to play its role in Fodor
Braun, David M. (1991). Content, causation, and cognitive science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (December):375-89.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (1989). Individuation and causation in psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 707 (4):303-22.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1995). Intentional properties and causation. In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates About Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1993). Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 76 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1995). Reply: Intentional properties and causation. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Butler, Keith (1996). Content, causal powers, and context. Philosophy of Science 63 (1):105-14.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Christensen, D. (1992). Causal powers and conceptual connections. Analysis 52 (3):163-8.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Dardis, Anthony B. (2002). Individualism and the new logical connections argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):83-102.   (Google)
de Muijnck, Wim (2002). Causation by relational properties. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):123-137.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In discussions on mental causation and externalism, it is often assumed that extrinsic, or relational, properties cannot have causal efficacy. In this paper I argue that this assumption is based on a category mistake, in that causal efficacy (dependence among events or states of affairs) is confused with causal influence (persistence of and interaction among objects). I then argue that relational properties are indeed causally efficacious, which I explain with the help of Dretske's notion of a 'structuring cause'
Figdor, Carrie (2009). Semantic externalism and the mechanics of thought. Minds and Machines 19 (1):1-24.   (Google)
Abstract: I review a widely accepted argument to the conclusion that the contents of our beliefs, desires and other mental states cannot be causally efficacious in a classical computational model of the mind. I reply that this argument rests essentially on an assumption about the nature of neural structure that we have no good scientific reason to accept. I conclude that computationalism is compatible with wide semantic causal efficacy, and suggest how the computational model might be modified to accommodate this possibility
Fodor, Jerry A. (1991). A modal argument for narrow content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 43 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (1994). The supervenience of mental content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Guichard, Lex (1995). The causal efficacy of propositional attitudes. In Cognitive Patterns in Science and Common Sense. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)
Heil, John & Mele, Alfred R. (1991). Mental causes. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (January):61-71.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (1992). Externalism and mental causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:203-19.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (1993). Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content. Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Klein, M. (1996). Externalism, content, and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:159-76.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lalor, Brendan J. (1997). It is what you think: Intentional potency and anti-individualism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):165-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue against the worried view that intentional properties might be epiphenomenal. In naturalizing intentionality we ought to reject both the idea that causal powers of intentional states must supervene on local microstructures, and the idea that local supervenience justifies worries about intentional epiphenomenality since our states could counterfactually lack their intentional properties and yet have the same effects. I contend that what's wrong with even the good guys (e.g. Dennett, Dretske, Allen) is that they implicitly grant that causal powers supervene locally. Finally, I argue that once we see the truth of an anti-individualism which sees cognition as a fundamentally embedded activity, it becomes clear both that granting local supervenience is granting too much, and that intentional properties do work that mere neurological properties could never do. I also suggest how a transcendental argument for intentional potency might go
Lin, Martin (online). Against wide causation.   (Google)
Abstract: It is commonly held that the content of an agents propositional attitudes play a causal role in generating her actions. It is also commonly held that the content of a mental state is at least partially determined by the relations that an agents internal states bear to her history and environment. But can these two claims peacefully coexist? It seems that they cannot, for relations to history and environment cannot be causally relevant. It makes no di?erence whether the coin dropped into the vending machine was pressed at the mint or in the counterfeiters workshop; its intrinsic features alone determine its e?ect on the vending machine. Causal powers are narrow, whereas content appears to be wide
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1993). Causal relevance and thought content. Philosophical Quarterly 43 (176):334-53.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
McGinn, Colin (1991). Conceptual causation. Mind 100:525-46.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Montgomery, Richard (1995). Non-cartesian explanations meet the problem of mental causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):221-41.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Newman, Anthony (2006). The burning barn fallacy in defenses of externalism about mental content. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:37-57.   (Google)
Noordhof, Paul (1999). Causation by content? Mind and Language 14 (3):291-320.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Owens, Joseph (1993). Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):242-61.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1993). Externalist explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:203-30.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
Robb, David & Heil, John (online). Mental Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Worries about mental causation are prominent in contemporary discussions of the mind and human agency. Originally, the problem of mental causation was that of understanding how a mental substance (thought to be immaterial) could interact with a material substance, a body. Most philosophers nowadays repudiate immaterial minds, but the problem of mental causation has not gone away. Instead, focus has shifted to mental properties. How could mental properties be causally relevant to bodily behavior? How could something mental qua mental cause what it does? After looking at the traditional Problem of Interaction, we survey various versions of the property-based problem and look at proposed solutions to them.
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1994). Content and context. Philosophical Perspectives 8:17-32.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Russow, L. M. (1993). Fodor, Adams, and causal properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.   (Google)
Saidel, Eric (1994). Content and causal powers. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):658-65.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Segal, Gabriel & Sober, Elliott (1991). The causal efficacy of content. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):1-30.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Seymour, Daniel (1993). Some of the difference in the world: Crane on intentional causation. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (170):83-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shea, Nicholas (2003). Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism
Sturgeon, Scott (1994). Good reasoning and cognitive architecture. Mind and Language 9 (1):88-101.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
van Gulick, Robert (1989). Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work. In Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation. Kluwer.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2006). Brain and consciousness: Exits from the labyrinth. Social Sciences 37 (2):51-66.   (Google)
Walsh, Denis M. (1999). Alternative individualism. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):628-648.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Warren, Dona (1999). Externalism and causality: Simulation and the prospects for a reconciliation. Mind and Language 14 (1):154-176.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wilson, Robert A. (1993). Against A Priori arguments for individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):60-79.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Wilson, Robert A. (1992). Individualism, causal powers, and explanation. Philosophical Studies 68 (2):103-39.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Yablo, Stephen (1997). Wide causation. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (11):251-281.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)

2.2e Externalism and the Theory of Vision

Burge, Tyler (1986). Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.   (Cited by 186 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Butler, Keith (1996). Content, computation, and individualism in vision theory. Analysis 56 (3):146-54.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Butler, Keith (1996). Individualism and Marr's computational theory of vision. Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Cain, M. J. (2000). Individualism, twin scenarios and visual content. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):441-463.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I address an important question concerning the nature of visual content: are the contents of human visual states and experiences exhaustively fixed or determined (in the non-causal sense) by our intrinsic physical properties? The individualist answers this question affirmatively. I will argue that such an answer is mistaken. A common anti-individualist or externalist tactic is to attempt to construct a twin scenario involving humanoid duplicates who are embedded in environments that diverge in such a way that it appears to be necessary to attribute divergent contents to their respective visual states. In the first half of the paper I discuss some of the twin scenarios that are prominent in the literature and argue that they fail to undermine individualism. Indeed I argue that due to important facts about our internal workings, a convincing externalist twin scenario involving humanoid protagonists cannot be constructed. However, I argue that such a result does not conclusively establish an individualist thesis and that in order to settle the question at issue it is necessary to construct an independently motivated theory of visual content. I attempt to do this in the second half of the paper by developing a theory at the core of which is the idea that the contents of our visual states and experiences are determined by the causal powers vis-
Davies, Martin (1991). Individualism and perceptual content. Mind 100 (399):461-84.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Egan, Frances (1996). Intentionality and the theory of vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Egan, Frances (1992). Individualism, computation, and perceptual content. Mind 101 (403):443-59.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Francescotti, Robert M. (1991). Externalism and Marr's theory of vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Kitcher, P. S. (1988). Marr's computational theory of vision. Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Kroustallis, Basileios (2006). Content individuation in Marr's theory of vision. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):57-71.   (Google)
Morton, P. (1993). Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Patterson, Sarah (1996). Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Segal, Gabriel (1991). Defence of a reasonable individualism. Mind 100 (399):485-94.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Segal, Gabriel (1989). Seeing what is not there. Philosophical Review 97 (April):189-214.   (Cited by 31 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1997). A clearer vision. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1993). Content, kinds, and individualism in Marr's theory of vision. Philosophical Review 102 (4):489-513.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1997). Junk representations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):345-361.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers and psychologists who approach the issue of representation from a computational or measurement theoretical perspective end up having to deny the possibility of junk representations?representations present in an organism's head but that enter into no psychological processes or produce no behaviour. However, I argue, a more functional perspective makes the possibility of junk representations intuitively quite plausible?so much so that we may wish to question those views of representation that preclude the possibility of junk representations. I explore some of the reasons we should care about the possibility of junk representations and conclude with some speculation about whether junk representations are in fact present in our heads
Silverberg, Arnold (2006). Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision. Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr
Wright, Wayne (online). Individualism, behavior, and Marr's theory of vision.   (Google)

2.2f Externalism and Computation

Andler, Daniel (1995). Can we knock off the shackles of syntax? Philosophical Issues 6:265-270.   (Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat (2000). Computation and intentional psychology. Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The relation between computational and intentional psychology has always been a vexing issue. The worry is that if mental processes are computational, then these processes, which are defined over symbols, are sensitive solely to the non-semantic properties of symbols. If so, perhaps psychology could dispense with adverting in its laws to intentional/semantic properties of symbols. Stich, as is well-known, has made a great deal out of this tension and argued for a purely "syntactic" psychology by driving a wedge between a semantic individuation of symbol tokens and their narrow functional individuation. If the latter can be carried out, he claimed, we do not need semantic typing. I argue that since a narrow functional individuation cannot type-identify symbol tokens across organisms, a semantic account of typing must be the only option given that interpersonal physical individuation of tokens is not to be taken seriously
Bontly, Thomas D. (1998). Individualism and the nature of syntactic states. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):557-574.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely assumed that the explanatory states of scientific psychology are type-individuated by their semantic or intentional properties. First, I argue that this assumption is implausible for theories like David Marr's [1982] that seek to provide computational or syntactic explanations of psychological processes. Second, I examine the implications of this conclusion for the debate over psychological individualism. While most philosophers suppose that syntactic states supervene on the intrinsic physical states of information-processing systems, I contend they may not. Syntatic descriptions must be adequately constrained, and the most plausible such constraints appeal to a system's teleological function or design and hence to its history. As a result, physical twins may not realize the same syntactic states
Butler, Keith (1998). Content, computation, and individuation. Synthese 114 (2):277-92.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The role of content in computational accounts of cognition is a matter of some controversy. An early prominent view held that the explanatory relevance of content consists in its supervenience on the the formal properties of computational states (see, e.g., Fodor 1980). For reasons that derive from the familiar Twin Earth thought experiments, it is usually thought that if content is to supervene on formal properties, it must be narrow; that is, it must not be the sort of content that determines reference and truth-conditions. An interesting alternative to this view has recently been proposed by Egan (1995). According to Egan, the explanatory role of content is such that contents must in general be broad to be explanatorily relevant. But Egan’s view involves a non-realist interpretation of content assignments. I will argue here that this non-realism about contents is undermotivated. A realist variation on her view of the explanatory role of content, however, would survive this criticism. This realist variation, I suggest, shares with the views of other commentators on Marr’s theory (e.g., Burge 1986; Shapiro 1993; forthcoming) certain commitments concerning the supervenience base of visual contents and processes. I will argue, however, that these commitments beg important questions regarding the individuation of cognitive states and processes. I conclude, contrary to Burge and Shapiro, that Marr’s theory does not favor anti-individualism.
Egan, Frances (1995). Computation and content. Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Egan, Frances (1999). In defence of narrow mindedness. Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Horowitz, Amir (2007). Computation, external factors, and cognitive explanations. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I present a conception of computation in cognitive science that takes Shagrir's conception as its starting point, but further develops it in various directions and strengthens it. I argue that the explanatory role of computational properties emerges from the idea that syntactical properties and the relevant external factors presented by cognitive systems compose wide computational properties. I also elaborate upon the notion of content that is in play, and argue that it is contents of the kind that are ascribed by transparent interpretations of content ascriptions that impact computation. This fact enables the thesis that external factors impact computation to rebuff the challenge which concerns the claim that psychology must be individualistic
Jacobson-Horowitz, Hilla (2004). Syntax, semantics, and intentional aspects. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.   (Google | More links)
Kazez, J. R. (1994). Computationalism and the causal role of content. Philosophical Studies 75 (3):231-60.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Kobes, Bernard W. (1990). Individualism and artificial intelligence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:429-56.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Miscevic, Nenad (1996). Computation, content, and cause. Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-63.   (Google)
Miščević, Nenad (1996). Computation, content and cause. Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-263.   (Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1999). Computation as involving content: A response to Egan. Mind and Language 14 (2):195-202.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1995). Content, computation, and externalism. Philosophical Issues 6:227-264.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Schneider, Susan (2005). Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases. Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that Frege Cases are a major problem, if not the major problem, that this sort of theory faces. In this essay, I hope to show that the theory can surmount the Frege Cases
Seager, William E. (1992). Thought and syntax. Philosophy of Science Association 1992:481-491.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shagrir, Oron (2001). Content, computation and externalism. Mind 110 (438):369-400.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper presents an extended argument for the claim that mental content impacts the computational individuation of a cognitive system (section 2). The argument starts with the observation that a cognitive system may simultaneously implement a variety of different syntactic structures, but that the computational identity of a cognitive system is given by only one of these implemented syntactic structures. It is then asked what are the features that determine which of implemented syntactic structures is the computational structure of the system, and it is contended that these features are certain aspects of mental content. The argument helps (section 3) to reassess the thesis known as computational externalism, namely, the thesis that computational theories of cognition make essential reference to features in the individual's environment. It is suggested that the familiar arguments for computational externalism?which rest on thought experiments and on exegesis of Marr's theories of vision?are unconvincing, but that they can be improved. A reconstruction of the visex/audex thought experiment is offered in section 3.1. An outline of a novel interpretation of Marr's theories of vision is presented in section 3.2. The corrected arguments support the claim that computational theories of cognition are intentional. Computational externalism is still pending, however, upon the thesis that psychological content is extrinsic

2.2g Externalism and Self-Knowledge

Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). Social externalism and first-person authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”
Bar-On, Dorit (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression. Noûs 38 (3):430-55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There
Beebee, Helen (2002). Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Beebee, Helen (2001). Transfer of warrant, begging the question and semantic externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-374.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (1996). Davidson on first-person authority and externalism. Inquiry 39 (1):121-39.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (1996). Externalism and the attitudinal component of self-knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Berg, Jonathan (1998). First-person authority, externalism, and wh-knowledge. Dialectica 52 (1):41-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (2000). Knowing the world by knowing one's mind. Synthese 123 (1):1-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (2004). Memory and externalism. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.   (Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (1997). On knowing one's own mind. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Bernecker, Sven (2006). Prospects for epistemic compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels
Bernecker, Sven (1998). Self-knowledge and closure. In Peter Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (2003). A trilemma for redeployment. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):22-30.   (Google | More links)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1992). Can externalism be reconciled with self-knowledge? Philosophical Topics 20 (1):233-68.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1991). Thought and its objects. Philosophical Issues 1:215-232.   (Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1989). Content and self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 70 | Annotation | Google)
Boghossian, Paul (1989). Content and self-knowledge. In Christopher S. Hill (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. University of Arkansas Press.   (Google)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1992). Externalism and inference. Philosophical Issues 2:11-28.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1998). Replies to commentators. Philosophical Issues 9:253-260.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1994). The transparency of mental content. Philosophical Perspectives 8:33-50.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
Boghossian, Paul A. (1997). What the externalist can know A Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):161-75.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and not merely at that of reference: what concepts we think in terms of -- and not just what they happen to pick out -- is said by the externalist to depend upon environmental facts. By a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, I mean the view that we are able to know, without the benefit of empirical investigation, what our thoughts are in our own case. Suppose I entertain a thought that I would express with the sentence `Water is wet'. According to the traditional doctrine, I can know without empirical investigation (a) that I am entertaining a thought; (b) that it has a particular conceptual content, and (c) that its content is that water is wet
Brewer, Bill (2000). Externalism and A Priori knowledge of empirical facts. In Christopher Peacocke & Paul A. Boghossian (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxfordo.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
Brewer, Bill (2004). Self-knowledge and externalism. In J.M. Larrazabal & L.A. PC)rez Miranda (eds.), Language, Knowledge and Representation. Kluwer.   (Google)
Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
Brown, J. (2001). Anti-individualism and agnosticism. Analysis 61 (3):213-24.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brown, Jessica (1999). Boghossian on externalism and privileged access. Analysis 59 (1):52-59.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Brown, J. (2000). Critical reasoning, understanding and self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):659-676.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Brown, J. (2000). Reliabilism, knowledge, and mental content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-35.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brown, J. (1995). The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 55 (3):149-56.   (Cited by 46 | Google)
Brown, J. (2003). The reductio argument and transmission of warrant. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2002). Anti-individualism and analyticity. Analysis 62 (1):87-91.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2000). Ambiguity and knowledge of content. Analysis 60 (3):257-60.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). A Priori knowledge of the world not easily available. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):109-114.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2004). Brewer on the McKinsey problem. Analysis 64 (1):41-43.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1998). Content externalism and a priori knowledge. Protosociology 11:149-159.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1997). Externalism and memory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):1-12.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2007). Externalism and privileged access are consistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2000). Externalism and the a prioricity of self-knowledge. Analysis 60 (1):132-136.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1997). Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1994). Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world. Philosophical Review 103 (2):327-343.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2004). McKinsey redux? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2005). Noordhof on McKinsey-brown. Analysis 65 (285):86-88.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). Problems for a recent account of introspective knowledge. Facta Philosophica.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1993). Skepticism and externalism. Philosophia 22 (1-2):169-71.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1990). Scepticism about knowledge of content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1992). Semantic answers to skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):200-19.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1999). Transcendental arguments from content externalism. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1999). Two recent approaches to self-knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 13:251-71.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1995). Trying to get outside your own skin. Philosophical Topics 23:79-111.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1992). What an anti-individualist knows A Priori. Analysis 52 (2):111-18.   (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1988). Individualism and self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.   (Cited by 152 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Mental agency in authoritative self-knowledge: Reply to Kobes. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1998). Memory and self-knowledge. In Peter Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Some reflections on scepticism: Reply to Stroud. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Butler, Keith (1998). Externalism and skepticism. Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.   (Google)
Butler, Keith (1997). Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Butler, Keith (2000). Problems for semantic externalism and A Priori refutations of skeptical arguments. Dialectica 54 (1):29-49.   (Google | More links)
Chase, James (2001). Is externalism about content inconsistent with internalism about justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):227-46.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Child, William (2006). Wittgenstein's externalism: Context, self-knowledge & the past. In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
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Cullison, Andrew (2007). Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
Davies, Martin (2000). Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome prospect of transferring a ‘non-empirical’ warrant from premises about our own mental states and about philosophical theory to a conclusion about external environment or internal architecture seems to depend upon little more than the possibility of knowledge by inference. (The use of the scare-quoted term ‘non-empirical’ is explained a couple of paragraphs further on.)
Davies, Martin (2000). Externalism and armchair knowledge. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can
Davies, Martin (2003). Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person (or other physical being) has M depends, not only on conditions inside the person
Davidson, Donald (1987). Knowing one's own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.   (Cited by 190 | Google)
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Ebbs, Gary (2005). Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining. Analysis 65 (287):237-244.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Edwards, J. (1998). The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the transparency of sense experience. The simple theory of colour (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
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Abstract: A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject
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Falvey, Kevin (2003). Memory and knowledge of content. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Google)
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Abstract: Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended here is not dualism--which is not adopted--but internalism. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted externalist thesis, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on certain features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view, which holds that the mind is autonomous, and though it is obviously affected by the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. Defenders of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; Katalin Farkas offers a defence of an uncompromising internalist Cartesian conception
Farkas, Katalin (2003). What is externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
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Abstract: Much debate has surrounded "switching" scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation ( Burge 1988 ; Boghossian 1992, 1994 ). Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are "epistemically prevalent" and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives ( Ludlow 1995a ). Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them 'equivocational switching cases'. Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with regards to anti-individualism (or content externalism) and self-knowledge. However, the issue has wide-reaching consequences for many areas of epistemology. Arguably, the claim that equivocational switching cases are epistemically relevant may bear on the epistemology of inference, testimony, memory, group rationality and belief revision. Ludlow's argument proceeds from a now well-known "down to Earth" switching-case of a subject, Biff, who travels between the US and the UK. I argue that Ludlow's case-based argument fails to support the general claim that conceptual equivocational switching cases are prevalent and epistemically relevant. Thus, the discussion addresses the basis of some poorly understood issues regarding the epistemological consequences of anti-individualism. Simultaneously, the discussion is broadened from the narrow focus on self-knowledge. Finally, the critical discussion serves as the basis for some general reflections on epistemic relevance and the epistemic risks associated with conceptual equivocation. Specifically, I suggest that philosophy is an area where the risk of conceptual equivocation is extraordinarily high
Gertler, Brie (2004). We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does? Analysis 64 (1):44-47.   (Google | More links)
Gibbons, John (1996). Externalism and knowledge of content. Philsophical Review 105 (3):287-310.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Gibbons, John (2001). Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28.   (Google | More links)
Glock, H. J. & Preston, John M. (1995). Externalism and first-person authority. The Monist 78 (4):515-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
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Abstract: Given anti-individualism, a subjectmight have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking thatp, have complete and exhaustiveexplicational knowledge of all of the conceptscomposing the content that p, and yetstill need empirical information (e.g.regarding her embedding conditions and history)prior to being in a position to apply herexhaustive conceptual knowledge in aknowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed byanti-individualists: it squares with everythingthat compatibilist-minded anti-individualistshave said regarding e.g. the compatibility ofanti-individualism and basic self-knowledge;and more importantly it contains the crux of aresponse to McKinsey-style arguments againstanti-individualism
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2007). Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification. Nos 41 (2):178�203.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification
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Abstract: In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2006). Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301�314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2002). Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception? Noûs 36 (4):597-621.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2000). Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy. Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that forming a justi?ed true self-ascriptive judgement about one
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Goldberg, Sanford C. (2003). On our alleged A Priori knowledge that water exists. Analysis 63 (1):38-41.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2004). Review of Maria Frapolli (ed.), Esther Romero (ed.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (1).   (Google)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1997). Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument. Analysis 57 (3):211-19.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2005). The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):135-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory Argument.’
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Goldberg, Sanford C. (1999). The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):136-56.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2003). What do you know when you know your own thoughts? In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Goldberg, Sanford C. (2000). Word-ambiguity, world-switching, and semantic intentions. Analysis 60 (267):260-264.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Greco, John (2004). Externalism and skepticism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Haukioja, Jussi (2006). Semantic externalism and A Priori self-knowledge. Ratio 19 (2):149-159.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The argument known as the 'McKinsey Recipe' tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and _a priori _self- knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know _a priori _that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of 'natural kind concept': (i) a concept which _in fact _denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which _aims_ to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a _Dry Earth _scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two-dimensional semantics, using the notion of 'considering a possible world as actual', I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian's question: which concept would 'water' express on Dry Earth?
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Hohwy, Jakob (2002). Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):235-52.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Hymers, Michael (1997). Realism and self-knowledge: A problem for Burge. Philosophical Studies 86 (3):303-325.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (2000). Deference and self-knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
Jacob, Pierre (2004). Do we know how we know our own minds yet? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (web). Incompatibility arguments and semantic self-knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been much discussion recently of what has been labeled the
Jacob, Pierre (ms). Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism?   (Google | More links)
Kennedy, Matthew (forthcoming). Naive Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one’s perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
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Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
Korman, Daniel Z. (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth. The Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word ‘water’ in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concering the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism.
Kraay, Klaas J. (2002). Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):297-317.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value
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Larkin, William S. (ms). Burge on our privileged access to the external world.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (ms). Concepts and introspection: An externalist defense of inner sense.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (online). Comments on Pryor's “externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning”.   (Google)
Abstract: I. Pryor on McKinsey:
A. Pryor’s Version of McKinsey-style Reasoning
1. Given authoritative self-knowledge, I can usually tell the contents of my own thoughts just by introspection.
So
I can know the following claim on the basis of reflection alone:
McK-1: I am thinking a thought with the content _water puts out fires_
Larkin, William S. (2000). Content skepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):33-43.   (Google)
Abstract: Skeptical theses in general claim that we cannot know what we think we know. Content skepticism in particular claims that we cannot know the contents of our own occurrent thoughtsat least not in the way we think we can. I argue that an externalist account of content does engender a mild form of content skepticism but that the condition is no real cause for concern. Content externalism forces us to reevaluate some of our assumptions about introspective knowledge, but it is compatible with privileged access and the distinctive epistemic character of introspective judgments
Larkin, William S. (online). Content skepticism and reliable self-knowledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Sub-Thesis 1: We should be contingent reliabilists to avoid the threat of an unacceptably strong content skeptical thesis posed by content externalism and the possibility of twin thoughts. The predominant strategy for resisting this threat has been to rely on the claim that introspective self-attributions are immune to brute error; but this claim is problematic from a naturalistic standpoint
Larkin, William S. (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and knowing the width of Water.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and brains in vats.   (Google)
Larkin, Willian (ms). The non-apriority of concept width.   (Google)
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Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism and memory: A problem? Acta Analytica 10 (14):69-76.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory. Analysis 55 (3):157-59.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Macdonald, C. (1998). Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. In C. Wright, Peter K. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.1 In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the issue of the individuation dependence of subjects' intentional states on factors beyond their bodies. His reason is that whereas externalism—the view that certain intentional states of persons are individuation-dependent on objects and/or phenomena external to their bodies—is a metaphysical thesis, authoritative self-knowledge is an epistemological matter. This being so, there is no reason to suppose that the two need conflict with one another
Macdonald, C. (1995). Externalism and first-person authority. Synthese 104 (1):99-122.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
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Malatesti, Luca (ms). Externalism and the knowledge of mental states.   (Google)
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