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3.1. The Nature of Perceptual Experience (The Nature of Perceptual Experience on PhilPapers)

See also:

3.1a Sense-Datum Theories

Aaron, R. I. (1958). The common sense view of sense-perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-14.   (Google)
Adams, E. M. (1958). The nature of the sense-datum theory. Mind 67 (April):216-226.   (Google | More links)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1934). Are there vague sense-data? Mind 43 (172):477-482.   (Google | More links)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1955). Is an after-image a sense-datum? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (3):369-376.   (Google | More links)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1979). Objective sense-data. Personalist 60 (January):36-42.   (Google)
Allinson, R. E. (1978). A non-dualistic reply to Moore's refutation of idealism. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 5 (July):661-668.   (Google)
Alston, William P. (1957). Is a sense-datum language necessary? Philosophy of Science 24 (1):41-45.   (Google | More links)
Andriopoulos, D. Z. (1979). Did Aristotle assume a sense-data theory? Philosophical Inquiry 1:125-128.   (Google)
Armstrong, David Malet (1979). Perception, sense-data, and causality. In Graham Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.~J. Ayer with His Replies. Macmillan.   (Google)
Austin, J. L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 247 | Google)
Austin, J. L. (1964). Sense And Sensibilia; Reconstructed From The Manuscript Notes By G J Warnock. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1967). Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory? Synthese 17 (June):117-140.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Ayer, A. J. (1970). Metaphysics and Common Sense. San Francisco,Freeman, Cooper.   (Google)
Abstract: On making philosophy intelligible.--What is communication?--Meaning and intentionality.--What must there be?--Metaphysics and common sense.--Philosophy and science.--Chance.--Knowledge, belief, and evidence.--Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory?--Professor Malcolm on dreams.--An appraisal of Bertrand Russell's philosophy.--G. E. Moore on propositions and facts.--Reflections on existentialism.--Man as a subject for science.--Philosophy and politics
Ayer, A. J. & Macdonald, Graham (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1940). The Foundations Of Empirical Knowledge. Macmillan.   (Cited by 72 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1945). The terminology of sense-data. Mind 54 (October):289-312.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Ba, (2004). On the ontological issue of sense data. Philosophia 33 (2):125-154.   (Google)
Barnes, Winston H. F. (1945). The myth of sense-data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:89-118.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Becroft, H. C. (1925). Professor Norman Kemp Smith's theory of the sensa. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):179 – 189.   (Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000). Naturalized sense data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):353-374.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bergmann, Gustav (1947). Sense data, linguistic conventions, and existence. Philosophy of Science 14 (2):152-163.   (Google | More links)
Bickham, Stephen H. (1975). What is at issue in the Ayer-Austin dispute about sense-data. Midwestern Journal of Philosophy 1:1-8.   (Google)
Biswas, Shokti Charan (1967). The Nature and Status of Sensa. [Allahabad]Dept. Of Philosophy, University of Allahabad.   (Google)
Blyth, John W. (1935). A discussion of mr. price's Perception. Mind 44 (173):58-67.   (Google | More links)
Brain, W. Russell (1960). Space and sense-data. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (November):177-191.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brain, Walter R. (1959). The Nature Of Experience. London,: Oxford University Press,.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Bretzevonl, Philip (1974). Cornman, sensa, and the argument from hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):443-445.   (Google)
Brown, Norman O. (1957). Sense-data and material objects. Mind 66 (April):173-194.   (Google | More links)
Bronaugh, Richard N. (1964). The argument from the elliptical penny. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):151-157.   (Google | More links)
Brokes, Audre Jean (2000). The argument from illusion reconsidered. Disputatio 9 (1).   (Google)
Campbell, Charles A. (1947). Sense data and judgment in sensory cognition. Mind 56 (October):289-316.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Caruso, Gregg (1999). A defence of the adverbial theory. Philosophical Writings 10:51-65.   (Google)
Carney, James D. (1962). Was Moore talking nonsense in 1918? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (June):521-527.   (Google | More links)
Casullo, Albert (1987). A defense of sense-data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):45-61.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cash, Peter T. (1979). The argument from the hand. Philosophical Investigations 2:47-70.   (Google)
Chandra, Suresh (1976). Sensible awareness of sense-objects. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April):355-366.   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick (1942). Discussions: The problem of the speckled hen. Mind 51 (204).   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1950). The theory of appearing. In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall.   (Google)
Chrucky, Andrew (online). The alleged fallacy of the sense-datum inference.   (Google)
Abstract: Sense-data, if they exist, could conceivably provide foundations for empirical knowledge. Those who are opposed to empirical foundationalism are therefore also prone to reject sense-data and arguments for their existence, e.g., Rorty, Bonjour; while foundationalists are prone to accept the existence of sense-data, e.g., Russell, Ayer, Broad, Price, Lewis. An exception to this is the position of Roderick Chisholm who accepts empirical foundationalism but rejects the existence of sense-data
Chubb, J. N. (1973). Are there sense-data, part I. Journal of the Philosophical Association 14 (January-December):135-158.   (Google)
Chuard, Philippe & Corry, Richard (ms). Looks non-transitive!   (Google)
Abstract: Suppose you are presented with three red objects. You are then asked to take a careful look at each possible pair of objects, and to decide whether or not their members look chromatically the same. You carry out the instructions thoroughly, and the following propositions sum up the results of your empirical investigation:
i. red object #1 looks the same in colour as red object #2.
ii. red object #2 looks the same in colour as red object #3
Coates, Paul (online). Sense-data. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Cooney, William (1985). Some comments on the sense-datum theory and the argument from illusion. Dialogue 28 (October):8-15.   (Google)
Cory, Daniel (1948). Are sense-data in the brain? Journal of Philosophy 45 (September):533-548.   (Google | More links)
Cornman, James W. (1970). Sellars, scientific realism, and sensa. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):417-51.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Cory, Daniel (1939). The private field of immediate experience. Journal of Philosophy 36 (16):421-427.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Coval, Sam C. & Todd, D. D. (1972). Adjusters and sense-data. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (January):107-112.   (Google)
Cowley, Fraser (1968). A Critique Of British Empiricism. Macmillan.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Cresswell, M. J. (1980). Jackson on perception. Theoria 46:123-147.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Crossley, David J. (1994). Moore's Refutation of Idealism: The debate about sensations. Idealistic Studies 24 (1):1-20.   (Google)
Culbertson, James T. (1963). The Minds Of Robots: Sense Data, Memory Images, And Behavior In Conscious Automata. Urbana: University Of Illinois Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Davie, G. E. (1954). Common sense and sense-data. Philosophical Quarterly 4 (July):229-246.   (Google | More links)
Dawes Hicks, G. (1912). The nature of sense-data. Mind 21 (83):399-409.   (Google | More links)
De Boer, C. (1931). Sceptical notes on the sense-datum. Journal of Philosophy 28 (19):505-519.   (Google | More links)
Ducasse, Curt J. (1936). Introspection, mental acts, and sensa. Mind 45 (178):181-192.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ducasse, C. J. (1942). Moore's refutation of idealism. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.   (Google)
Elder, Crawford L. (2007). Conventionalism and the world as bare sense-data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, merely project our conventions of individuation. Our confidence is warranted because apart from those conventions there are no phenomena of kind-sameness or of numerical sameness across time. There is just 'stuff' displaying properties. This paper argues that conventionalists can assign no properties to the 'stuff' beyond immediate phenomenal properties. Consequently they cannot explain how each of us comes to be able to wield 'our conventions'
Epstein, Joseph (1956). Professor Ayer on sense-data. Journal of Philosophy 53 (13):401-415.   (Google | More links)
Fantl, Jeremy & Howell, Robert J. (2003). Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Farnell, Derrick (ms). This is a simulation.   (Google)
Abstract: This article simply provides a very short introduction, aimed at non-philosophers, to the time-lag argument for the representational theory of perception.
Firth, Roderick (1949). Sense-data and the percept theory, part I. Mind 58 (October):434-465.   (Google)
Firth, Roderick (1950). Sense-data and the percept theory, part II. Mind 59 (January):35-56.   (Google)
Firth, Roderick (1949). Sense-data and the percept theory. Mind 58 (232):434-465.   (Google | More links)
Firth, Roderick (1950). Sense-data and the percept theory. Mind 59 (233):35-56.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, Eugen (2005). Austin on sense-data: Ordinary language analysis as 'therapy'. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):67-99.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The construction and analysis of arguments supposedly are a philosopher's main business, the demonstration of truth or refutation of falsehood his principal aim. In Sense and Sensibilia, J.L. Austin does something entirely different: He discusses the sense-datum doctrine of perception, with the aim not of refuting it but of 'dissolving' the 'philosophical worry' it induces in its champions. To this end, he 'exposes' their 'concealed motives', without addressing their stated reasons. The paper explains where and why this at first sight outrageous aim and approach are perfectly sensible, how exactly Austin proceeds, and how his approach can be taken further. This shows Austin to be a pioneer of the currently much discussed notion of philosophy as therapy, reveals a subtle and unfamiliar use of linguistic analysis that is not open to the standard objections to ordinary language philosophy, and yields a novel and forceful treatment of the sense-datum doctrine
Fish, Michael D. (1968). Are sense-data material things? Logique Et Analyse 11 (December):459-467.   (Google)
Forrest, Peter (2005). Universals as sense-data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):622-631.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper concerns the structure of appearances. I argue that to be appeared to in a certain way is to be aware of one or more universals. Universals therefore function like the sense-data, once highly favoured but now out of fashion. For instance, to be appeared to treely, in a visual way, is to be aware of the complex relation, being treeshaped and tree-coloured and being in front of, a relation of a kind which could be instantiated by a material object and a perceiver, which is thus instantiated in the veridical case but not in the non-veridical
Fries, Horace S. (1935). The spatial location of sensa. Philosophical Review 44 (4):345-353.   (Google | More links)
Gallois, Andr (1979). Basic properties and sense datum attributes. Personalist 60 (January):53-60.   (Google)
Ganapathy, T. N. (1984). Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Sense-Data. Dept. Of Philosophy, Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda College.   (Google)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (2001). Sense data: The sensible approach. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):17-63.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I present a version of a sense-data approach to perception, which differs to a certain extent from well-known versions like the one put forward by Jackson. I compare the sense-data view to the currently most popular alternative theories of perception, the so-called Theory of Appearing (a very specific form of disjunctivist approaches) on the one hand and reductive representationalist approaches on the other. I defend the sense-data approach on the basis that it improves substantially on those alternative theories
Gentry, George (1943). The logic of the sensum theory. Philosophy of Science 10 (April):81-89.   (Google | More links)
Gotlind, Erik (1952). Some comments on mistakes in statements concerning sense-data. Mind 61 (July):297-306.   (Google | More links)
Gupta, K. C. (1953). Sense-data and judgment in perceptual knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 25 (January):243-249.   (Google)
Hahn, Lewis Edwin (1939). Neutral, indubitable sense-data as the starting point for theories of perception. Journal of Philosophy 36 (22):589-600.   (Google | More links)
Hall, Richard J. (1964). The term sense-datum. Mind 73 (January):130-131.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hardin, C. L. (1985). Frank talk about the colors of sense-data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (December):485-93.   (Google)
Hare, Peter H. & Koehl, Richard A. (1968). Moore and Ducasse on the sense data issue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (March):313-331.   (Google | More links)
Harrison, Jonathan (1993). Science, souls and sense-data. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Abstract: I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric. The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be.
Johnstone Jr, Henry W. (1951). A postscript on sense-data. Journal of Philosophy 48 (26):809-814.   (Google | More links)
Hicks, G. Dawes (1912). The nature of sense-data. Mind 21 (83):399-409.   (Google | More links)
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Abstract: Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserl's pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschew's book was the concept of the given. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald concept. Carnap did the same when he wrote his Aufbau, the only difference being that he spoke not of sense-data but of Erlebnisse. This means, I argue, that both Moore's sense-data and Carnap'sErlebnisse have little to do with either British empiricists or the neo-Kantians. In Part II, I try to ascertain what made early analytic philosophy different from all those philosophical groups and movements that either exercised influence on it, or were closely related to it: phenomenologists, Greifswald objectivists, Brentanists. For this purpose, I identify the sine qua non practices of the early analytic philosophers: exactness; acceptance of the propositional turn; descriptivism; objectivism. If one of these practices was not explored by a given philosophical school or group, in all probability, it was not truly analytic
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Abstract: Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver. Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal principle. I suggest that although Direct Realism is in more than one respect implausible, it does not succumb to Robinson’s argument. The causal principle is true only if ‘proximate cause’ means ‘proximate sufficient cause’, and the Direct Realist need not concede that there is a sufficient cerebral cause for direct awareness of independent objects
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Abstract: Questions about perception remain some of the most difficult and insoluble in both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Perception provides a highly accessible introduction to the area, exploring the philosophical importance of those questions by re-examining the sense-datum theory, once the most popular theory of perception. Howard Robinson surveys the history of arguments for and against the sense-datum theory, from Descartes to Husserl. Robinson contends that the objections to the theory, particularly Wittgenstein's attack on privacy and those of the physicalists, have been unsuccessful. He argues for returning to the theory in order to understand perception. In doing so, he seeks to overturn a consensus that has dominated the philosophy of perception for nearly half a century
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Abstract: Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate one, and that, properly interpreted, the argument does not equivocate on proximate cause. Furthermore, I claim that his postulation of a modified mechanism for hallucinations is implausibly ad hoc
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Sambasiva Prasad, B. (1984). A Critique of the Philosophy of Sense-Data. Sri Venkateswara University.   (Google)
Sanford, David H. (1981). Illusions and sense-data. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6:371-385.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Sayward, Charles (2001). Austin and perception. Acta Analytica 16 (27):169-193.   (Google)
Self, Donnie J. (1974). Sense-data and the argument from illusion. Dialogue 16 (January-May):53-56.   (Google)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1982). Sensa or sensings: Reflections on the ontology of perception. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):83-114.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1971). Seeing, sense impressions, and sensa: A reply to Cornman. Review of Metaphysics 24 (March):391-447.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shearn, Martin (1950). Other people's sense-data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:15-26.   (Google)
Sinha, L. P. N. (1972). Bertrand Russell and the problem of perception. Indian Philosophy and Culture 17 (March):5-13.   (Google)
Smythies, J. R. (1956). Analysis Of Perception. London,: Routledge &Amp; K Paul,.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Smythies, J. R. (1962). On Space and Sense-Data: A reply to Lord brain. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (August):161-164.   (Google | More links)
Smythies, J. R. (1958). 'Philosophical' and 'scientific' sense-data. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (November):224.   (Google | More links)
Smythies, J. R. (1956). The stroboscope as providing empirical confirmation of the representative theory of perception. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (February):332-334.   (Google | More links)
Sosa, David (2007). Perceptual friction. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):245–261.   (Google | More links)
Spät, Patrick (2008). Questioning idealism. Reasoner 2 (4):5-6.   (Google)
Stainsby, H. V. (1970). Sight and sense-data. Mind 79 (April):170-187.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stieg, Chuck (ms). Mental representations: The new sense-data?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The notion of representation has become ubiquitous throughout cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and the cognitive sciences generally. This paper addresses the status of mental representations as entities that have been posited to explain cognition. I do so by examining similarities between mental representations and sense-data in both their characteristics and key arguments offered for each. I hope to show that more caution in the adoption and use of representations in explaining cognition is warranted. Moreover, by paying attention to problematic notions of representations, a less problematic sense of representation might emerge
Streiffer, Robert (ms). The argument from illusion: (1)in delusive cases, we perceive a sense-datum rather than a material object. (2)what we see in veridical cases has the same intrinsic nature as what we see in delusive..   (Google)
Abstract: • A coin appears to be elliptical when looked at from an angle, but it’s round. • A stick appears to be bent when it is partly immersed in water, but it’s straight. • An oasis appears to exist, but it doesn’t. • A bucket of water appears to be two different temperatures to two different hands, but it’s all..
Tibbetts, Paul E. (1972). Phenomenological and empirical inadequacies of Russell's theory of perception. Philosophical Studies 20:98-108.   (Google)
Tucker, John (1958). The television theory of perception. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (33).   (Google | More links)
Tully, R. E. (1978). Sense-data and common knowledge. Ratio 20 (December):123-141.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Turner, J. E. (1927). Dr. broad on perception and matter. Philosophical Review 36 (6):562-572.   (Google | More links)
Turner, J. E. (1914). Mr. Russell on sense-data and knowledge. Mind 23 (90):251-255.   (Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (2009). A new look at the speckled hen. Analysis 69 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: (forthcoming in Analysis) We owe the problem of the speckled hen to Gilbert Ryle. It was suggested to A.J. Ayer by Ryle in connection with Ayer’s account of seeing. Suppose that you are standing before a speckled hen with your eyes trained on it. You are in good light and nothing is obstructing your view. You see the hen in a single glance. The hen has 47 speckles on its facing side, let us say, and the hen ap­ pears speckled to you. On Ayer’s view, in seeing the hen, you directly see a speckled sense-datum or appearance. Ryle wondered how many speckles there are on the sense-datum. After all, intu­ itively, the hen does not appear to you to have 47 speckles. And if this is the case, then it does not present to you an appearance with 47 speckles. Equally, however, the hen does not appear to you not to have 47 speckles. So, it does not present an appearance that lacks 47 speckles either
Unknown, Unknown (online). Sense-data.   (Google)
Vinci, Thomas C. (1984). Theoretical models and the theory of sense-data. Metaphilosophy 15 (April):112-128.   (Google | More links)
Wadia, Pheroze S. (1972). Can 'the way things seem to us' ever guarantee 'the way they really are'? Philosophical Studies 20:90-97.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wadia, Pheroze S. (1979). Sense-data, 'common sensism' and the linguistic turn. Philosophical Studies 26:96-104.   (Google)
Wallraff, Charles F. (1958). Sense-datum theory and observational fact: Some contributions of psychology to epistemology. Journal of Philosophy 55 (January):20-31.   (Google | More links)
Ward, Andrew (1988). Representationalism and Hume's problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26:423-430.   (Google)
Whiteley, C. H. (1969). Sense-data. Philosophy 44 (September):187-192.   (Google)
Wild, John D. (1953). An examination of critical realism with special reference to mr C.d. Broad's theory of sensa. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (December):143-162.   (Google | More links)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1968). Notes for lectures on private experience and sense data. Philosophical Review 77 (July):275-320.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Wright, Edmond L. (1990). New representationalism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 20 (1):65-92.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Wright, Edmond L. (1983). Pre-phenomenal adjustments and Sanford's illusion objection against sense-data. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (July):266-272.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Wright, Edmond Leo (1993). The irony of perception. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.   (Google)
Wright, Edmond Leo (1987). The new representationalism: A reply to Pitson's the new representationalism. Philosophical Papers 16 (August):125-139.   (Google)
Yolton, John W. (1948). A defence of sense-data. Mind 57 (January):2-15.   (Google | More links)
Yolton, John W. (1960). Sense-data and cartesian doubt. Philosophical Studies 11 (1-2):25-29.   (Google | More links)
Yolton, John W. (1949). The ontological status of sense-data in Plato's theory of perception. Review of Metaphysics 3 (September):21-58.   (Google)
Yost, R. M. (1964). Price on appearing and appearances. Journal of Philosophy 61 (May):328-333.   (Google | More links)

3.1b Adverbialism and Qualia Theories

Berger, G. (1987). On the structure of visual sentience. Synthese 71 (June):355-70.   (Google | More links)
Bestor, Thomas W. (1979). Gilbert Ryle and the adverbial theory of mind. Personalist 60 (July):233-242.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brown, Harold I. (1987). Observation And Objectivity. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book develops an explanation for the roles of observation and theory in scientific endeavor that occupies the middle ground between empiricism and rationalism, and captures the strengths of both approaches. Brown argues that philosophical theories have the same epistemological status as scientific theories and constructs an epistemological theory that provides an account of the role that theory and instruments play in scientific observation. His theory of perception yields a new analysis of objectivity that combines the traditional view of observation as the foundation of scientific objectivity with the contemporary recognition that observation is theory-dependent
Butchvarov, Panayot K. (1980). Adverbial theories of consciousness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (3):261-80.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Caruso, Gregg (1999). A defence of the adverbial theory. Philosophical Writings 10:51-65.   (Google)
Casullo, Albert (1983). Adverbial theories of sensing and the many-property problem. Philosophical Studies 44 (September):143-160.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Romane L. (1987). Objects of consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 1:481-500.   (Google)
Clark, R. (1981). Sensing, perceiving, thinking. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:273-95.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Clark, Romane L. (1979). Sensing, perceiving, thinking. Grazer Philosophische Studien/ 8:273-295.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Conduct, M. D. (2008). Naïve realism, adverbialism and perceptual error. Acta Analytica 23 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (a) is independent of acceptance of (b). I then present a modified adverbialism that presents experience as relational in nature but whose character is nevertheless to be explained in terms of the way in which one senses an object. Finally, I will offer an explanation of how a naïve realist about experience can adopt this modified adverbialism and in so doing accommodate the possibility of perceptual error
Ducasse, C. J. (1942). Moore's refutation of idealism. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.   (Google)
Elugardo, Reinaldo (1982). Cornman, adverbial materialism, and phenomenal properties. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):33-50.   (Google | More links)
Fumerton, Richard A. (2000). Relational, non-relational, and mixed theories of experience. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.   (Google)
Goldstein, Laurence (1983). The adverbial theory of conceptual thought. The Monist 65 (July):379-392.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary C. (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited : color as a psychobiological property -- Sense data and the mind body problem -- The reality of qualia -- The sensory core and the medieval foundations of early modern perceptual theory -- Postscript (2008) on Ibn al-Haytham's (Alhacen's) theory of vision -- Attention in early scientific psychology -- Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science : reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology -- What can the mind tell us about the brain? : psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint -- Introspective evidence in psychology.
Honderich, Ted (1992). Seeing qualia and positing the world. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (1975). On the adverbial analysis of visual experience. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):127-135.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Kalat, James W. (2002). Identism without objective qualia: Commentary on Crooks. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):233-238.   (Google)
Lahav, Ran (1990). An alternative to the adverbial theory: Dis-phenomenalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):553-568.   (Google | More links)
Langsam, Harold (2000). Experiences, thoughts, and qualia. Philosophical Studies 99 (3):269-295.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Le Morvan, Pierre (2008). Sensory experience and intentionalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing
Loar, Brian (2003). Transparent experience and the availability of qualia. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Loui, Michael C. (1994). Against qualia: Our direct perception of physical reality. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Phenomenal objects: A backhanded defense. Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Maund, Barry (2003). Perception. Acumen.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Millar, Alan (1991). Reasons and Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Millar argues against the tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, he presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. A key theme in his general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the author develops a view of concepts and their mastery, explores the role of groundless beliefs drawing on suggestions of Wittgenstein, illuminates aspects of the thought of Locke, Hume, Quine, and Goldman, and finally offers a response to a sophisticated variety of scepticism
Park, Desiree (1992). Ayerian 'qualia' and the empiricist heritage. In The Philosophy of A Jayer. Peru: Open Court.   (Google)
Rapaport, William J. (1979). An adverbial meinongian theory. Analysis 39 (March):75-81.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1975). The adverbial theory of the objects of sensation. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):144-160.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Sorensen, Roy A. (2008). Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eclipse riddle -- Seeing surfaces -- The disappearing act -- Spinning shadows -- Berkeley's shadow -- Para-reflections -- Para-refractions : shadowgrams and the black drop -- Goethe's colored shadows -- Filtows -- Holes in the light -- Black and blue -- Seeing in black and white -- We see in the dark -- Hearing silence.
Thomas, Alan (2003). An adverbial theory of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper develops an adverbial theory of consciousness. Adverbialism is described and endorsed and defended from its near rival, an identity thesis in which conscious mental states are those that the mental subject self-knows immediately that he or she is "in". The paper develops an account of globally supported self-ascription to embed this neo-Brentanian view of experiencing consciously within a more general account of the relation between consciousness and self-knowledge. Following O'Shaughnessy, person level consciousness is explained as a feature of the bundle of mental capacities characteristic of persons: person level consciousness involves a capacity holism. Drawing on Kant, it is argued that if a person is in a mental state intentionally directed to an object then such a subject can "self token" such knowledge. The content of that self-knoweldge supervenes on the possession of a global set of capacities, and this capacity for self-ascription depends on the fact that our experience has a perspectival character with, as it were, nothing at the vanishing point of this perspective. The fact that one can attach the cogito to any one of one's representation shows a truth about the unity of the conscious life of a person that cannot be stated and this capacity is distinguished from self-conscious thinking about oneself. This approach is contrasted to Shoemaker's functionalist treatment of the self-tokening of conscious states and of "self-blindness". It is argued that to be fully consistent, Shoemaker has to abandon the claim that introspectionism is guilty of a self-scanning model or rational control as he seems committed to that model too
Tye, Michael (1984). The adverbial approach to visual experience. Philosophical Review 93 (April):195-226.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (1975). The adverbial theory: A defence of Sellars against Jackson. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):136-143.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
van Steenburgh, E. W. (1987). Adverbial sensing. Mind 76 (July):376-380.   (Google | More links)
Vinci, Thomas C. (1981). Sellars and the adverbial theory of sensation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (June):199-217.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wright, Edmond L. (1990). Two more proofs of present qualia. Theoria 56 (1-2):3-22.   (Cited by 25 | Google)

3.1c Intentionalist Theories of Perception

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1965). The intentionality of sensation: A grammatical feature. In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy. Blackwell.   (Cited by 47 | Google)
Armstrong, David M. (2004). In defence of the cognitivist theory of perception. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12:19-26.   (Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1991). Intentionality, perception, and causality. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1983). Toward a different approach to perception. International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (March):45-64.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1991). Vision and intentional content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Google)
Byrne, Alex (2001). Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.   (Cited by 75 | Google | More links)
Coburn, Robert C. (1977). Intentionality and perception. Mind 86 (January):1-18.   (Google | More links)
Crawford, Dan D. (1974). Bergmann on perceiving, sensing, and appearing. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (April):103-112.   (Google)
Crane, Tim (2009). Is perception a propositional attitude? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content
Dilworth, John B. (2007). Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve _indeterminate _perceptual content, but a _double content_ (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases
Dretske, Fred (2003). The intentionality of perception. In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Foster, John A. (2004). Reply to Armstrong. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12:27-28.   (Google)
Gluer, Kathrin (ms). Perception and justification.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction When it comes to perception, representationalism is all the rage. Representationalism is a claim about the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences: According to representationalism, phenomenal character is fully determined by the representational content of perceptual experiences (cf. Tye 2002, 45). In other words, phenomenal character, what it is like, for instance, to have an experience as of something red, is either supervenient upon or identical with that experience
Ha, Jong-Ho (1988). On the propositional theory of perception. Grazer Philosophische Studien 32:205-208.   (Google)
Hellie, Benj (ms). Visual form, attention, and binocularity.   (Google)
Abstract: This somewhat odd paper argues against a representational view of visual experience using an intricate "inversion" type thought experiment involving double vision: two subjects could represent external space in the same way while differing phenomenally due to different "spread" in their double images. The spatial structure of the visual field is explained not by representation of external space but functionally, in terms of the possible locations of an attentional spotlight. I'm fond of the ideas in this paper but doubt I'll be returning to it soon.
Hintikka, Jaakko (1969). The logic of perception. In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Models for Modalities. Reidel.   (Google)
Holman, Emmett L. (2003). Sense experience, intentionality, and modularity. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-57.   (Google)
Jacquette, Dale (1984). Sensation and intentionality. Philosophical Studies 47 (3):229-40.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Bengson, John; Grube, Enrico & Korman, Daniel Z. (forthcoming). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs.   (Google)
Abstract: Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative thought, phenomenal character, and the speckled hen objection to modest foundationalism.
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2004). Some arguments against intentionalism. Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Recently, many have argued that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content; i.e. that the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined (metaphysically, not causally) by the representational content of that experience. This paper it identifies many counter-examples to intentionalism. Further, this paper shows that, if intentionalism were correct, that would require that an untenable form of representational atomism also be correct. Our argument works both against the idea that phenomenal content supervenes on “conceptual” content and also against the idea that it supervenes on “non-conceptual” content. It is also shown that the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content has been wrongly conceived as distinction between different kinds of information: in fact, it is a distinction between ways of packaging information that is, in itself, neither conceptual or non-conceptual
Macpherson, Fiona (1999). Perfect pitch and the content of experience. Philosophy and Anthropology 3 (2).   (Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling   (Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1983). The intentionality of sense-perception. Philosophical Investigations 6 (July):175-183.   (Google)
Martin Jr, Edwin (1973). The intentionality of observation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (September):121-129.   (Google)
Matthen, Mohan P. (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. His work will be a stimulating resource for a wide range of scholars and students across philosophy and psychology
Matthen, Mohan (2008). Seeing, doing, and knowing: A précis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):392–399.   (Google | More links)
Maund, Barry (2003). Perception. Acumen.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Millar, Alan (1986). What's in a look? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86:83-98.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1977). On perceptual aboutness. Behaviorism 5:75-97.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Odegard, Douglas (1972). Anscombe, sensation and intentional objects. Dialogue 11 (March):69-77.   (Google)
Pacherie, (1999). Leibhaftigkeit and representational theories of perception. In Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Pautz, Adam (2010). An argument for the intentional view of visual experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pautz, Adam (2007). Intentionalism and perceptual presence. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
Pautz, Adam (2006). Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2):205-240.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Phillips, Ian (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford University   (Google)
Abstract: Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti -Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties
Reed, Edward S. (1983). Two theories of the intentionality of perceiving. Synthese 54 (January):85-94.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (2004). A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysics. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):519-540.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no reason for him to resist a properly deflated version of it that I sketch. Moreover, such intentionalism seems to me to stand a better chance than Clark's reliance on properties in explaining the peculiar ways in which experience appears to us that so concern the qualiaphile
Reynolds, Steven L. (2000). The argument from illusion. Noûs 34 (4):604-621.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard M. (1974). The irrelevance of intentionality to perception. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (October):300-315.   (Google | More links)
Ruegsegger, Ronald W. (1980). The propositional attitude in perception. Philosophy Research Archives 1408.   (Google)
Runzo, Joseph (1977). The propositional structure of perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (July):211-220.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Searle, John R. (1991). Response: Perception and the satisfactions of intentionality. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Simmons, Alison (1999). Are cartesian sensations representational? Noûs 33 (3):347-369.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Smith, A. D. (2008). Translucent experiences. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):197--212.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered
Sosa, Ernest (1986). Experience and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):67-83.   (Annotation | Google)
Speaks, Jeff (2009). Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond to these worries by arguing that Russellianism is consistent with intentionalism, that their conjunction is consistent with both internalism about phenomenology and externalism about perceptual content, and that the resulting view receives independent support from the relationship between hallucination and thought.
Swabey, William C. (1924). The phenomenology of experience and psychologism. Philosophical Review 33 (1):51-66.   (Google | More links)
Travis, Charles S. (2004). The silence of the senses. Mind 113 (449):57-94.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is a view abroad on which (a) perceptual experience has (a) representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On the view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so (except insofar as the perceiver represents things to himself as so). In that sense, the senses are silent, or, in Austin's term, dumb. Perceptual experience is not as such either veridical or delusive. It may mislead, but it does not take representation to accomplish that
Tye, Michael (1992). Visual qualia and visual content. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Tye, Michael (2007). Intentionalism and the argument from no common content. Philosophical Perspectives 21:589-613.   (Google)
Abstract: Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. I do not experience the table by experiencing some- thing else over and above the table and its facing surface. I see the facing surface of the table directly
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1966). Miss Anscombe on the intentionality of sensation. Analysis 26 (March):135-137.   (Google)
Zahavi, Dan (1994). Intentionality and the representative theory of perception. Man and World 27 (1):37-47.   (Cited by 1 | Google)

3.1d Belief Theories of Perception

Aquila, Richard E. (1975). Perceptions and perceptual judgments. Philosophical Studies 28 (July):17-31.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Armstrong, David M. (1963). Max Deutscher and perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):246-249.   (Google | More links)
Clark, R. (1973). Sensuous judgments. Noûs 7 (March):45-56.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Crumley, Jack S. (1991). Appearances can be deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64 (3).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Deutscher, Max (1963). David Armstrong and perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):80-88.   (Google | More links)
Glüer, Kathrin (2009). In defence of a doxastic account of experience. Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience
Gluer-Pagin, Kathrin (online). Perception and justification.   (Google)
Abstract: Any adequate account of perceptual experience has to provide answers to the following questions: What kind, and form of, content do experiences have? What kind of mental states are they? Many, if not most philosophers of perception today agree that experiences have representational contents of the form x is F, where x ranges over material objects and F over sensible properties. I argue that such a "naive semantics" for experiences has to give the wrong answer to the second question. Because of their justificatory role for, and inferential integration into, a subject's belief system, experiences themselves have to be construed as a kind of belief. I also sketch a semantics that allows experiences to be beliefs.
Goldman, Alan H. (1976). Appearing as irreducible in perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (December):147-164.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Goodman, Russell B. (1974). Is seeing believing? Proceedings of the New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society 40 (April):45.   (Google)
Heil, John (1982). Seeing is believing. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (July):229-240.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kelley, David (1980). The specificity of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (March):401-405.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Maund, J. Barry (1977). On the distinction between perceptual and ordinary beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (December):209-219.   (Google | More links)
Melchert, Norman P. (1973). A note on the belief theory of perception. Philosophical Studies 24 (November):427-429.   (Google | More links)
Moser, Paul K. (1986). Perception and belief: A regress problem. Philosophy of Science 53 (March):120-126.   (Google | More links)
Nelson, John O. (1964). An examination of D m Armstrong's theory of perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (April):154-160.   (Google)
Pappas, George S. (1977). Perception without belief. Ratio 19 (December):142-161.   (Google)
Pitcher, George (1971). A Theory Of Perception. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 54 | Google)
Pitson, Anthony (1990). Perception: Belief and experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):55-76.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Prado, C. G. (1968). Armstrong and perception. Theoria 34:256-258.   (Google)
Ruegsegger, Ronald W. (1982). Judging, taking, and believing: Three candidates for the propositional attitude in perception. Philosophy Research Archives 1460.   (Google)
Smith, A. D. (2001). Perception and belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.   (Google | More links)
Ziedins, R. (1966). Knowledge, belief and perceptual experiences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (May):70-88.   (Google | More links)

3.1e Naive and Direct Realism

Armstrong, David M. (1959). Mr Arthadeva and naive realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.   (Google | More links)
Arthadeva, B. M. (1959). Naive realism and illusions: The elliptical penny. Philosophy 34 (October):323-330.   (Google)
Arthadeva, B. M. (1959). Naive realism and illusions of refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (August):118-137.   (Google | More links)
Arthadeva, B. M. (1961). Naive realism and the problem of color-seeing in dim light. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):467-478.   (Google | More links)
Ayer, A. J. & Macdonald, Graham (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Bayer, Benjamin (ms). In Search of Direct Realist Abstractionism.   (Google)
Abstract: Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Without slipping into naturalism, I apply insight about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, but only if it is supplemented by an abstractionist theory of concept-formation, the view that it is possible to abstract concepts directly from the empirically given. Critics of direct realist solutions like Laurence BonJour are correct that an account of direct perception by itself does not provide an adequate account of justification. However a direct realist account of perception can inform the needed theory of concept-formation, and leading critics of abstractionism like McDowell and Sellars, direct realists about perception themselves, fail to appreciate the ways in which their own views about perception help fill gaps in earlier accounts of abstractionism. Recognizing this undercuts both their objections to abstractionism and (therefore) their objections to foundationalism, as well.
BonJour, Laurence A. (2004). In search of direct realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):349-367.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Boulter, Stephen J. (2004). Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Brandom, Robert B. (2002). Non-inferential knowledge, perceptual experience, and secondary qualities: Placing McDowell's empiricism. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Brandom, Robert B. (1996). Perception and rational constraint: McDowell's mind and world. Philosophical Issues 7:241-259.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Bretzel, Philip (1974). Cornman, sensa, and the argument from hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6).   (Google | More links)
Brewer, Bill (2004). Realism and the nature of perceptual experience. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):61-77.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Realism concerning a given domain of things is the view that the things in that domain exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone
Brown, Harold I. (1992). Direct realism, indirect realism, and epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):341-363.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Keith (1969). Direct realism and perceptual error. In The Business Of Reason. Routledge & K Paul.   (Google)
Carleton, Lawrence Richard (1978). Toward a defense of direct realism. Auslegung 5 (February):101-111.   (Google)
Conduct, M. D. (2008). Naïve realism, adverbialism and perceptual error. Acta Analytica 23 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (a) is independent of acceptance of (b). I then present a modified adverbialism that presents experience as relational in nature but whose character is nevertheless to be explained in terms of the way in which one senses an object. Finally, I will offer an explanation of how a naïve realist about experience can adopt this modified adverbialism and in so doing accommodate the possibility of perceptual error
Cornman, James W. (1975). Perception, Common Sense And Science. Yale University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Crooks, Mark (2002). Four rejoinders: A dialogue in continuation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):249-278.   (Google)
Dewey, John (1905). Immediate empiricism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (22):597-599.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dewey, John (1905). The postulate of immediate empiricism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (15):393-399.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Dokic, J (2000). Perception as openness to the facts. Facta Philosophica 2:95-112.   (Google | More links)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (2002). Samuel Todes's account of non-conceptual perceptual knowledge and its relation to thought. Ratio 15 (4):392-409.   (Google | More links)
Elugardo, Reinaldo (1982). Cornman, adverbial materialism, and phenomenal properties. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):33-50.   (Google | More links)
Fish, William (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Friedman, Michael (1996). Exorcising the philosophical tradition: Comments on John McDowell's Mind and World. Philosophical Review 105 (4):427-467.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Fumerton, Richard A. (2001). Brewer, direct realism, and acquaintance with acquaintance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):417-422.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Glendinning, Simon & De Gaynesford, Max (1998). John McDowell on experience: Open to the sceptic? Metaphilosophy 29 (1-2):20-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Kennedy, Matthew, Explanation in Good and Bad experiential cases.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Michael Martin aims to affirm a certain pattern of first-person thinking by advocating disjunctivism, a theory of perceptual experience which combines naive realism with the epistemic conception of hallucination. In this paper I argue that we can affirm the pattern of thinking in question without the epistemic conception of hallucination. The first part of my paper explains the link that Martin draws between the first-person thinking and the epistemic conception of hallucination. The second part of my paper explains how we can achieve Martin’s ambition without Martin’s theory. One resource that I enlist for this purpose is a naive-realist friendly conception of first-person access to experience. The metaphysical theory that I enlist is a form of naive realism that endorses an intentionalist or representationalist “common-factor” approach to veridical and hallucinatory experience. The third part of my paper briefly develops this theory
Gram, Moltke S. (1983). Direct Realism: A Study Of Perception. Boston: Nijhoff.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Hauser, Larry (2002). Don't go there: Reply to Crooks. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):223-232.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hellie, Benj (2006). Beyond phenomenal naivete. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (2):1-24.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The naive realist takes a veridical visual experience to be an immediate relation to external entities. Is this how such an experience is phenomenally, by its phenomenal character? Only if there can be phenomenal error, since a hallucinatory experience phenomenally matching such a veridical experience would then be phenomenally but not in fact such a relation. Fortunately, such phenomenal error can be avoided: the phenomenal character of a visual experience involves immediate awareness of a sort of picture of external entities, as on a representative theory of perception. The attraction of naive realism results from an erroneous projection of the immediacy of the subject's awareness of this picture onto the external entities pictured.
Hellie, Benj (2007). Factive phenomenal characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name.
Hellie, Benj (forthcoming). The multidisjunctive conception of hallucination. In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view embeds in my view as a "reference-fixer".
Hickerson, Ryan (2004). An indirect defense of direct realism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):1-6.   (Google)
Hoffman, Paul (2002). Direct realism, intentionality, and the objective being of ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):163-179.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: My aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the distinction between direct realism and representationalism by offering a critical analysis of Steven Nadler
Holman, Emmett L. (1977). Sensory experience, perceptual evidence and conceptual frameworks. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):99-108.   (Google)
Huemer, Michael (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external...
Kalderon, Mark Eli & Travis, Charles, Oxford realism.   (Google)
Abstract: A concern for realism motivates a fundamental strand of Oxford reflection on perception. Begin with the realist conception of knowledge. The question then will be: What must perception be like if we can know something about an object without the mind by seeing it? What must perception be if it can, on occasion, afford us with proof concerning a subject matter independent of the mind? The resulting conception of perception is not unlike the conception of perception shared by Cambridge realists such as Moore and Russell. Roughly speaking, perception is conceived to be a fundamental and irreducible sensory mode of awareness of mind-independent objects, a non-propositional mode of awareness that enables those with the appropriate recognitional capacities to have propositional knowledge concerning that subject matter. The difference between Oxford and Cambridge realism concerns the extent of this fundamental sensory mode of awareness. Whereas Oxford realists maintained that perception affords us this non-propositional mode of awareness, Cambridge realists maintained that this distinctive mode of awareness has a broader domain. Let experience be the genus of which perception is a species. Cambridge realists maintained that a experience, and not just perception, involves this non-propositional sensory mode of awareness. Cambridge realists are thus committed to a kind of experien- tial monism—the thesis that experience has a unitary nature. Specifically, all experience, perceptual and non-perceptual alike, involves, as part of its nature, a non-propositional sensory mode of awareness. Even subject to illusion or hallucination, there is something of which one is aware. And with that, they were an application of the argument from illusion, or hallucination, or conflicting appearances away from immaterial sense data and a representative realism that tended, over time, to devolve into a form of..
Kaplan, Stephen (1987). Hermeneutics, Holography, and Indian Idealism: A Study of Projection and Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya Kārikā. Motilal Banarsidass.   (Google)
Kelley, David (1986). The Evidence Of The Senses: A Realist Theory Of Perception. Baton Rouge: Louisiana St University Press.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Kennedy, Matthew (forthcoming). Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Michael Martin aims to affirm a certain pattern of first-person thinking by advocating disjunctivism, a theory of perceptual experience which combines naive realism with the epistemic conception of hallucination. In this paper I argue that we can affirm the pattern of thinking in question without the epistemic conception of hallucination. The first part of my paper explains the link that Martin draws between the first-person thinking and the epistemic conception of hallucination. The second part of my paper explains how we can achieve Martin’s ambition without Martin’s theory. One resource that I enlist for this purpose is a naive-realist friendly conception of first-person access to experience. The metaphysical theory that I enlist is a form of naive realism that endorses an intentionalist or representationalist “common-factor” approach to veridical and hallucinatory experience. The third part of my paper briefly develops this theory.
Kennedy, Matthew (2009). Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently representationalists have cited a phenomenon known as the transparency of experience in arguments against the qualia theory. Representationalists take transparency to support their theory and to work against the qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia and the representationalist theory of experience. I describe the transparency phenomenon, and I use my description to argue for naïve realism and against representationalism and the qualia theory. I also examine the relationship between phenomenological study and phenomenal character, and discuss the results in connection with the argument from hallucination
Kennedy, Matthew (2010). Naive realism and experiential evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):77-109.   (Google)
Abstract: I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs
Kennedy, Matthew (forthcoming). Naive Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one’s perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
Kennedy, Matthew (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298-325.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness.
Koons, Jeremy R. (2004). Disenchanting the world: McDowell, Sellars, and rational constraint by perception. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):125-152.   (Google)
Kultgen, John H. (1973). Intentionality and the publicity of perceptual world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (June):503-513.   (Google | More links)
Leddington, Jason (2009). Perceptual presence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.   (Google)
Abstract: Plausibly, any adequate theory of perception must (a) solve what Alva Noë calls 'the problem of perceptual presence,' and (b) do justice to the direct realist idea that what is given in perception are garden-variety spatiotemporal particulars. This paper shows that, while Noë's sensorimotor view arguably satisfies the first of these conditions, it does not satisfy the second. Moreover, Noë is wrong to think that a naïve realist approach to perception cannot handle the problem of perceptual presence. Section three of this paper develops a version of naïve realism that meets both of the adequacy conditions above. This paper thus provides strong considerations in favor of naïve realism
le Morvan, Pierre (2004). Arguments against direct realism and how to counter them. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):221-234.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Since the demise of the Sense-Datum independent objects or events to be objects Theory and Phenomenalism in the last cenof perception; however, unlike Direct Retury, Direct Realism in the philosophy of alists, Indirect Realists take this percepperception has enjoyed a resurgence of tion to be indirect by involving a prior popularity.1 Curiously, however, although awareness of some tertium quid between there have been attempts in the literature the mind and external objects or events.3 to refute some of the arguments against Idealists and Phenomenalists agree with Direct Realism, there has been, as of yet, the Indirect Realists
Levine, Steven M. (2007). Sellars' critical direct realism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):53 – 76.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate the structure of Sellars' critical direct realism in the philosophy of perception. This position is original because it attempts to balance two claims that many have thought to be incompatible: (1) that perceptual knowledge is direct, i.e., not inferential, and (2) that perceptual knowledge is irreducibly conceptual. Even though perceptual episodes are not the result of inferences, they must still stand within the space of reasons if they are to be counted not only as knowledge, but also as thoughts directed at the world. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how Sellars elaborates and defends this position
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
Macarthur, David (2003). McDowell, scepticism, and the 'veil of perception'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):175-190.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: McDowell has argued that external world scepticism is a pressing problem only in so far as we accept, on the basis of the argument from illusion, the claim that perceiving that p and hallucinating that p involve a highest common factor
Macarthur, David (2004). Putnam's natural realism and the question of a perceptual interface. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):167-181.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In his Dewey Lectures,1 Hilary Putnam argues that contemporary philosophy cannot solve nor see its way past the traditional problem of how language or thought hooks on to
Maloney, Christopher (1981). A theory of perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (January):63-70.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
McDowell, John (1996). Reply to Gibson, Byrne, and Brandom. Philosophical Issues 7:283-300.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
McDowell, John (1998). Having the world in view: Sellars, Kant, and intentionality. Journal of Philosophy 95 (9):431-492.   (Google)
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Abstract: Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti -Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties
Pietroski, Paul M. (1996). Experiencing the facts (critical notice of mcdowell). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:613-36.   (Google)
Abstract: Paul Pietroski, McGill University The general topic of_ Mind and World_, the written version of John McDowell's 1991 John Locke Lectures, is how `concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world'. And one of the main aims is `to suggest that Kant should still have a central place in our discussion of the way thought bears on reality' (1).1 In particular, McDowell urges us to adopt a thesis that he finds in Kant, or perhaps in Strawson's Kant: the content of experience is conceptualized; _what_ we experience is always the kind of thing that we could also believe. When an agent has a veridical experience, she `takes in, for instance sees, _that things are thus and so_' (9). McDowell's argument for this thesis is indirect, but potentially powerful. He discusses a tension concerning the roles of experience and conceptual capacities in thought, and he claims that the only adequate resolution involves granting that experiences have conceptualized content. The tension, elaborated below, can be expressed roughly as follows: judgments must be somehow constrained by features of the external environment, else judgments would be utterly divorced from the world they purport to be about; yet our judgments must be somehow free of external control, else we could give no sense to the idea that we are responsible for our judgments
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Smith, David Woodruff (1982). The realism in perception. Noûs 16 (March):42-55.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Smythies, J. R. & Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. (1997). An empirical refutation of the direct realist theory of perception. Inquiry 40 (4):437-438.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are currently two main philosophical theories of perception - Direct Realism and the Representative Theory. The former is supported by most contemporary philosophers, whereas the latter forms the groundwork for most scientific theories in this area. The paper describes a recent experiment involving retinal and cortical rivalry that provides strong empirical evidence that the Direct Realist theory is incorrect. There are of course a large number of related experiments on visual perception that would tend to lead us to the same conclusion, but the experiment described in this paper does so in a singularly direct and straightforward manner. Often the most telling experiments are the simplest
Smythies, J. R. (2002). Comment on Crooks's intertheoretic identification and mind-brain reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):245-248.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Sollberger, Michael (2008). Naïve realism and the problem of causation. Disputatio 3 (25):1-19.   (Google)
Abstract: In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of perceptions must be exhausted by the occurrence of inner sensory experiences that narrowly supervene on the perceiver. That is, empirical objects fail directly to determine the perceptual consciousness of the perceiver. The upshot is that not only naïve realism, but also certain further forms of direct realism have to be abandoned.
Sollberger, Michael (2007). The Causal Argument against Disjunctivism. Facta Philosophica 9:245-267.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I will ask whether naïve realists have the conceptual resources for meeting the challenge stemming from the causal argument. As I interpret it, naïve realism is committed to disjunctivism. Therefore, I first set out in detail how one has to formulate the causal argument against the background of disjunctivism. This discussion is above all supposed to work out the key assumptions at stake in the causal argument. I will then go on to sketch out several possible rejoinders on behalf of naïve realism. It will be shown that they all fail to provide a satisfying account of how causation and perceptual consciousness fit together. Accordingly, the upshot will be that the causal argument provides good reason to abandon disjunctivism and, instead, to promote a common factor view of perception.
Sosa, Ernest (1990). Perception and reality. In Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Weir, Alan (2004). An ultra-realist theory of perception. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (2):105-128.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I argue for a theory of perception distinct both from classical sense-datum theories and from intentionalist theories, that is theories according to which one perceives external objects by dint of a relation with a propositional content. The alternative I propose completely rejects any representational element in perception. When one sees that an object has a property, the situation or state of affairs of its having that property is one's perception, so that the object and property are literally part of one's mind. The most obvious objection to this view is that it embodies a rampant form of idealism. It is argued to the contrary, via consideration of the metaphysics of situations, that the theory is entirely consistent with a robustly realist view of the world
Zahavi, Dan (2004). Natural realism, anti-reductionism, and intentionality: The 'phenomenology' of Hilary Putnam. In Phenomenology of Hilary Putnam in Space, Time, and Culture. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zemach, Eddy M. (1991). Perceptual realism, naive and otherwise. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)

3.1f Disjunctivism

Aranyosi, István (forthcoming). Silencing the argument from hallucination. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. So what exactly is the problem? We can approach it via one of the central arguments against realism – the argument from hallucination. The argument is intended as a proof that in ordinary, veridical cases of perception, perceivers do not have an unmediated perceptual access to the world. There are many versions of it; I propose the following1: 1. Hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions are possible. 2. If two subjective states are indistinguishable, then they have a common nature. 3. The contents of hallucinations are mental images, not concrete external objects. 4. Therefore, the contents of veridical perceptions are mental images rather than concrete external objects. The key move is, I believe, from the fact that hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from cases of veridical perception are possible to an alleged common element, factor, or nature, in the form of a mental state, in the two cases – that is, premise 2. Disjunctivism, at its core, can be taken as simply denying this move, and arguing that all that follows from the premise stating the possibility of hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from cases veridical perception is that there is a broader category, that of “experience as of...”, which encompasses both cases..
Blatti, Stephan (2006). Disjunctivism. In A. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: A theory is disjunctive insofar as it distinguishes genuine from non-genuine cases of some phenomenon P on the grounds that no salient feature of cases of one type is common to cases of the other type. Genuine and non-genuine cases of P are, in this sense, fundamentally different. Those who advocate disjunctivist theories have (for the most part) been concerned with perception and perceptual knowledge. This entry outlines two such theories: the disjunctivist theory of experience (cf. Brewer, Hinton, Martin, Snowdon, Travis) and the disjunctivist theory of appearances (McDowell)
Brewer, Bill (2008). How to account for illusion. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its representational content. Second, retain the early modern idea that the core subjective character of experience is simply constituted by the identity of its direct objects, but admit that these must be mind-dependent entities, distinct from the mind-independent physical objects we all know and love. I argue here that the early modern empiricists had an indispensable insight. The idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience is more fundamental than any appeal to perceptual content, and can account for illusion, and indeed hallucination, without resorting to the problematic postulation of any such mind-dependent objects.
Brogaard, Berit, Disjunctivism by.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Naive realism is one of the oldest theories of perception. To a first approximation, naive realism is the view that perception is a direct relation between a subject and an object. Many historical philosophers (from Locke to Russell) argued that naive realism must be rejected on the grounds that hallucinations are perceptual experiences without an object. Contemporary philosophers have resurrected the theory by insisting that genuine cases of perception have a different structure or a different metaphysical status than non-genuine ones. This version of naive realism has come to be known as ‘disjunctivism’. Epistemological disjunctivism and disjunctivism about phenomenal belief, or what I shall call ‘Epistemological disjunctivism’, have also gained popularity in recent years. More recently disjunctivist accounts of bodily movements, abilities and reasons for action have entered the philosophical scene. This entry focuses on the contemporary debate about disjunctivism: its characterization, its motivation and its potential shortcomings
Brogaard, Berit, Primitive knowledge disjunctivism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that McDowell-style disjunctivism, as the position is often cashed out, goes wrong because it takes the good epistemic standing of veridical perception to be grounded in “manifest” facts which do not necessarily satisfy any epistemic constraints. A better form of disjunctivism explains the difference between good and bad cases in terms of epistemic constraints that the states satisfy. This view allows us to preserve McDowell’s thesis that good cases make facts manifest, as long as manifest facts must satisfy epistemic constraints
Burge, Tyler (2005). Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):1-78.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (2005). Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):1-78.   (Google)
Abstract: This essay is a long one. It is not meant to be read in a single sitting. Its structure is as follows. In section I, I explicate perceptual anti-individualism. Section II centers on the two aspects of the representational content of perceptual states. Sections III and IV concern the nature of the empirical psychology of vision, and its bearing on the individuation of perceptual states. Section V shows how what is known from empirical psychology undermines disjunctivism and hence certain further views that entail it, including naive realism. In Section VI, I raise a further point against disjunctivism. Section VII indicates how general reflection on perceptual perspective and epistemic ability supports the constraints from empirical psychology. It also explains how reflection on veridicality conditions, psychological explanation, and cognitive ability conspire to force recognition of the two kinds of representation mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In the Appendix, I criticize attempts to support disjunctivism.
Byrne, Alex & Logue, Heather (2009). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
Byrne, Alex & Logue, Heather (2008). Either/or. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours, metaphysical and epistemological.
Byrne, Alex & Logue, Heather (2009). Introduction. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
Child, William (1994). Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal understanding of the mental without having to see attitudes and experiences as internal, causally interacting entities and he defends this view against influential objections. The book offers detailed discussions of many of Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of mind, and also considers the work of Dennett, Anscombe, McDowell, and Rorty, among others. Issues discussed include: the nature of intentional phenomena; causal explanation; the character of visual experience; psychological explanation; and the causal relevance of mental properties
Child, William (1992). Vision and experience: The causal theory and the disjunctive conception. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):297-316.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Coates, Paul (1996). Idealism and theories of perception. In Current Issues in Idealism. Bristol: Thoemmes.   (Google)
Comesana, Juan (2005). Justified vs. warranted perceptual belief: Resisting disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that one reason for being a disjunctivist advanced by McDowell (having to do with the indefeasibility of perceptual knowledge) fails because it ignores the distinction between justification and warrant.
Comesaña, Juan (2005). Justified vs. warranted perceptual belief: Resisting disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where “warrant” is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield knowledge)
Conee, Earl (2007). Disjunctivism and anti-skepticism. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):16–36.   (Google | More links)
Dancy, Jonathan (1995). Arguments from illusion. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):421-438.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Smith, A. D. (2008). Husserl and externalism. Synthese 160 (3).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short, it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality
Dorsch, Fabian, Experience and introspection.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued by M. G. F. Martin and others that the hallucinatory experiences concerned cannot — and need not — be characterised in any more positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been advocated as the best choice for proponents of experiential (or ‘na¨ıve realist’) disjunctivism — the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their introspectible subjective characters. In this chapater, I aim to formulate and defend an intentional alternative to experiential disjunctivism called experiential intentionalism. This view does not only enjoy some advantages over its rival, but also can hold on to the epistemic conception of perception-like hallucinations. First of all, I try to spell out in a bit more detail in which sense hallucinations may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions, and why this leads us to erroneously judge them to be perceptions (cf. sections I–III and VIII). Then, I raise three challenges each for experiential disjunctivism and its orthodox intentionalist counterparts (cf. sections IV and V), notably in respect of the need to explicate why a perception-like hallucination still makes the same judgements reasonable from the subject’s perspective as the corresponding perceptions. And, finally, I propose my alternative both to experiential disjunctivism and to orthodox intentionalism. Experiential intentionalism takes perceptions and perception-like hallucinations to share a common character partly to be spelled out in intentional — and, hence, normative — terms (cf. sections VI and VII). The central thought is that the hallucinations concerned are intentionally — and erroneously — presented to us as perceptual relations to the world. I aim to show that the resulting view can meet all six challenges (cf. sections VI–VIII). I end..
Dorsch, Fabian, Transparency and imagining seeing.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences has been formulated by M. G. F. Martin in his paper The Transparency of Experience. The overall structure of this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims which are jointly inconsistent
Fish, William C. (2005). Disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism: Making sense of the debate. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):119-127.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Fish, William C. (2008). Disjunctivism, indistinguishability, and the nature of hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what the disjunctivist needs to provide is a plausible explanation of just how two mental states which have no common component might be indistinguishable for their subject and this in turn will require the telling of a positive story about hallucination. This is the goal of the present essay
Fish, William (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (2001). Sense data: The sensible approach. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):17-63.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I present a version of a sense-data approach to perception, which differs to a certain extent from well-known versions like the one put forward by Jackson. I compare the sense-data view to the currently most popular alternative theories of perception, the so-called Theory of Appearing (a very specific form of disjunctivist approaches) on the one hand and reductive representationalist approaches on the other. I defend the sense-data approach on the basis that it improves substantially on those alternative theories
Glendinning, S. (1998). Perception and hallucination: A new approach to the disjunctive conception of experience. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 29:314-19.   (Google)
Goldstick, D. (1980). The leninist theory of perception. Dialogue 19 (March):1-19.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gomes, Anil (online). Characterizing disjunctivism.   (Google)
Gomes, Anil (forthcoming). McDowell's Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry.   (Google)
Abstract: John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.
Gundersen, Lars Bo (2009). Disjunctivism, contextualism and the sceptical aporia. Synthese 171 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Hawthorne, John & Kovakovich, Karson (2006). Disjunctivism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):145-83.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Hellie, Benj (2010). An externalist's guide to inner experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!

Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems from shared "qualia". Qualia are compatible with direct realism: while they generate an explanatory gap (and colors do not), so does /seeing/; qualia are excluded from perceptual consciousness by its "transparency"; instead, qualia are aspects of thought about the perceived environment.

The asymmetry between my treatments of color and seeing is grounded in the asymmetry between ignorance and error: while inversion shows that normal subjects are ignorant of the natures of the colors, hallucination shows not that perceivers are ignorant of the nature of seeing but that hallucinators are prone to error about their condition. Past literature has treated inversion and hallucination as on a par: externalists see error in both cases, while internalists see mutual ignorance. My account is so complicated because plausible results require mixing it up.
Hellie, Benj (ms). Must the disjunctivist be so negative?   (Google)
Hellie, Benj (forthcoming). The multidisjunctive conception of hallucination. In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view embeds in my view as a "reference-fixer".
Hinton, J. M. (1973). Experiences: An Inquiry Into Some Ambiguities. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Hinckfuss, I. C. (1970). J.m. Hinton on visual experiences. Mind 79 (April):278-280.   (Google | More links)
Hinton, J. M. (1980). Phenomenological specimenism. Analysis 40 (January):37-41.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hinton, J. M. (2009). Selections from experiences. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
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Hinton, J. M. (1973). Visual experiences: A reply to I.C. Hinckfuss. Mind 82 (April):278-279.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (2008). Against disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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Martin, Michael G. F. (1997). The reality of appearances. In M. Sainsbury (ed.), Thought and Ontology. Franco Angeli.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Martin, Michael G. F. (manuscript). Uncovering Appearances.   (Google)
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McDowell, John (2009). Selections from criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
McDowell, John (2008). The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Abstract: There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by sorneone rnerely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perceptionenable us to be in cognitive contact with objects and facts. I develop this challenge to the traditional conception and then show that it is possible to accornrnodate an adequate account of cognitive contact in keeping with the traditional conception. One upshot of the discussion is that experiences do not bear the explanatory burden placed upon thern by disjunctivists
Millar, Alan (2007). What the disjunctivist is right about. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-199.   (Google)
Neta, Ram (2008). In defense of disjunctivism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Right now, I see a computer in front of me. Now, according to current philosophical orthodoxy, I could have the very same perceptual experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing a computer in front of me. Indeed, such orthodoxy tells us, I could have the very same experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing anything at all in front of me, but simply suffering from a hallucination. More generally, someone can have the very same perceptual experience no matter whether she is enjoying a veridical perception of some mindindependent object, or merely hallucinating. What differs across these two kinds of case is not the kind of experience that she has, but rather the connections between her experience and the rest of the world. So say most philosophers
Pritchard, Duncan (2007). How to be a neo-Moorean. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Much of the recent debate regarding scepticism has focussed on a certain template sceptical argument and a rather restricted set of proposals concerning how one might deal with that argument. Throughout this debate the ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism is often cited as a paradigm example of how one should not respond to the sceptical argument, so conceived. As I argue in this paper, however, there are ways of resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic. In particular, I consider the prospects for three such proposals in this regard: a classical epistemic internalist neo-Mooreanism, a classical epistemic externalist neo-Mooreanism, and a non-classical McDowellian epistemic internalist neo-Mooreanism, and maintain that the last two of these proposals (both of which make appeal to a disjunctivist account of perception, broadly conceived) merit further exploration. Indeed, I claim that a suitably qualified version of neo-Mooreanism would actually sit quite well with the general philosophical motivations behind other key anti-sceptical views and I argue that given this fact neo-Mooreanism is actually at a dialectical advantage relative to other views when it comes to dealing with the sceptical problem as it is typically conceived.
Pritchard, Duncan (2006). McDowellian neo-mooreanism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard (2005). Reply to Nathan: How to reconstruct the causal argument. Acta Analytica 20 (36):7-10.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate one, and that, properly interpreted, the argument does not equivocate on proximate cause. Furthermore, I claim that his postulation of a modified mechanism for hallucinations is implausibly ad hoc
Robinson, Howard (2009). Selections from perception. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
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Siegel, Susanna (online). The dog and the zombie.   (Google)
Siegel, Susanna (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of hallucinations are dim, and that this undermines the case for disjunctivism
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3.1g The Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc

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