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3.10. The Perceptual Relation (The Perceptual Relation on PhilPapers)

Fish, William (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Leddington, Jason (2009). Perceptual presence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.   (Google)
Abstract: Plausibly, any adequate theory of perception must (a) solve what Alva Noë calls 'the problem of perceptual presence,' and (b) do justice to the direct realist idea that what is given in perception are garden-variety spatiotemporal particulars. This paper shows that, while Noë's sensorimotor view arguably satisfies the first of these conditions, it does not satisfy the second. Moreover, Noë is wrong to think that a naïve realist approach to perception cannot handle the problem of perceptual presence. Section three of this paper develops a version of naïve realism that meets both of the adequacy conditions above. This paper thus provides strong considerations in favor of naïve realism

3.10a The Causal Theory of Perception

Aldrich, Virgil C. (1932). Taking the causal theory of perception seriously. Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):69-78.   (Google | More links)
Aranyosi, Istv (2008). Review of Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):513-515.   (Google)
Aranyosi, István, The reappearing act.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In a recent article, Roy Sorensen proposed a very interesting puzzle involving shadows – The Disappearing Act puzzle (2006). It was left unsolved there. Nevertheless, in his latest book he has added a new thought in guise of a solution to it (2008: 73-75). In what follows I will argue that Sorensen’s solution has some shortcomings, and will offer an alternative to it
Bradie, Michael P. (1976). The causal theory of perception. Synthese 33 (2-4).   (Google)
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (1995). Perception and causation. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):323-329.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Scott (2002). Causal analyses of seeing. Erkenntnis 56 (2):169-180.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Child, William (1994). Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal understanding of the mental without having to see attitudes and experiences as internal, causally interacting entities and he defends this view against influential objections. The book offers detailed discussions of many of Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of mind, and also considers the work of Dennett, Anscombe, McDowell, and Rorty, among others. Issues discussed include: the nature of intentional phenomena; causal explanation; the character of visual experience; psychological explanation; and the causal relevance of mental properties
Child, William (1994). Vision and causation: Reply to Hyman. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):361-369.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Child, William (1992). Vision and experience: The causal theory and the disjunctive conception. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):297-316.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Coates, Paul (2000). Deviant causal chains and hallucinations: A problem for the anti-causalist. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):320-331.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical, or hallucinatory. Advocates of the Causal Theory of perception (whom I shall call
Coates, Paul (1998). Perception and metaphysical skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):1-28.   (Google)
Abstract: Much recent discussion about the nature of perception has focused on the dispute between the Causal Theory of Perception and the rival Disjunctive View. There are different versions of the Causal Theory (the abbreviation I shall use), but the point upon which they agree is that perception involves a conscious experience which is logically distinct from the particular physical object perceived. 1 On the opposed Disjunctive View, the perceptual experience is held to be inseparable from the object perceived; what is directly present to conscious experience is, literally, part of the physical environment. 2 One prima facie difficulty the Causal Theory appears to face is the problem of deviant causal chains, of providing sufficient conditions for perception; I shall not address this difficulty directly, though some of my concluding remarks will bear on it. My main aim in this paper is to show that, despite the deviant causal chains problem, the Causal Theory is to be preferred to the rival Disjunctive View
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1977). The causal theory of perception. Aristotelian Society 127:127-141.   (Google)
Davis, Steven (ed.) (1983). Causal Theories Of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, And Reference. Ny: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Davies, Martin (1983). Function in perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):409-426.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Dilworth, John B. (2005). A reflexive, dispositional approach to perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very same worldly perceived objects or properties that caused them--will be defended as one legitimate such naturalistic theory
Dilworth, John B. (2004). Naturalized perception without information. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 25 (4):349-368.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. However, such a reflexive, naturalistic causal theory must compete with well entrenched, supposedly equally naturalistic theories of perception that are based on some concept of information, so the paper also includes some basic logical, naturalistic and explanatory criticisms of such informational views
Dilworth, John B. (2005). Perceptual causality problems reflexively resolved. Acta Analytica 20 (3):11-31.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains. They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on. But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases. A critical discussion of David Lewis's perceptual descriptivist views is also provided, including a defense of the logical possibility of systematic misperception or perceptual error for a perceiver, in spite of its empirical improbability
Dilworth, John B. (2005). The reflexive theory of perception. Behavior and Philosophy 33:17-40.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dore, Clement (1964). Ayer on the causal theory of perception. Mind 73 (290):287-290.   (Google | More links)
Frost, Thomas B. (1990). In defense of the causal representative theory of perception. Dialogue 32 (2-3):43-50.   (Google)
Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121:121-152.   (Google)
Grice, H. P. (1988). The causal theory of perception. In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hyman, John (1994). Reply to vision. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):369-376.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hyman, John (1992). The causal theory of perception. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):277-296.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Hyman, John (1993). Vision, causation and occlusion. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (171):210-214.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (1977). Perception and reference without causality. Journal of Philosophy 74 (October):606-620.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Le Catt, Bruce (1982). Censored vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (June):158-162.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1980). Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (September):239-249.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (1992). Experience and its objects. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Lowe, E. J. (1993). Perception: A causal representative theory. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.   (Google)
Maxwell, Grover (1972). Scientific methodology and the causal theory of perception. In Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars & Keith Lehrer (eds.), New Readings in Philosophical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1996). Lewis on what distinguishes perception from hallucination. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Mclaughlin, Brian P. (1984). Perception, causation, and supervenience. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:569-592.   (Google)
Newman, M. H. A. (1928). Mr. Russell's causal theory of perception. Mind 5 (146):26-43.   (Cited by 39 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Noe, Alva (2003). Causation and perception: The puzzle unravelled. Analysis 63 (2):93-100.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Oakes, Robert A. (1978). How to rescue the traditional causal theory of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):370-383.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Pappas, George S. (1990). Causation and perception in Reid. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):763-766.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Pears, David F. (1976). The causal conditions of perception. Synthese 33 (June):25-40.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Pendlebury, Michael J. (1994). Content and causation in perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):767-785.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Pickering, F. R. (1974). A refutation of an objection to the causal theory of perception. Analysis 34 (March):129-132.   (Google)
Price, Carolyn S. (1998). Function, perception and normal causal chains. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):31-51.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard M. (1990). The objects of perceptual experience--II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 151:151-166.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Rogers, G. A. J. (1975). The veil of perception. Mind 84 (April):210-224.   (Google | More links)
Shope, Robert K. (1991). Non-deviant causal chains. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:251-291.   (Google)
Smith, Peter K. (1991). On The Objects of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:191-196.   (Google)
Snowdon, Paul F. (1998). Strawson on the concept of perception. In The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson. Chicago: Open Court.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Strawson, Peter F. (1998). Reply to Paul Snowdon. In The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson. Chicago: Open Court.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Szubka, Tadeusz (2002). The causal theory of perception and direct realism. In Pragmatism and Realism. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Teichman, Jenny (1971). Perception and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71:29-41.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (1982). A causal analysis of seeing by Michael Tye. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):311-325.   (Google)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1971). Perception. Anchor Books.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Vision, Gerald (1993). Animadversions on the causal theory of perception. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):344-356.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Vision, Gerald (1997). Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this book Gerald Vision argues for a new causal theory, one that engages provocatively with direct realism and makes no use of a now discredited subjectivism
Watling, J. (1950). The causal theory of perception. Mind 59 (October):539-540.   (Google | More links)
White, Alan R. (1961). The causal theory of perception, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 153:153-168.   (Google)
Whiteley, C. H. (1940). The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 40:89-102.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Wilkie, Sean (1996). The causal theory of veridical hallucinations. Philosophy 71 (276):245-254.   (Google)

3.10b Direct and Indirect Perception

Banerjee, Kali K. (1955). Perception and direct awareness. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 28 (April):41-47.   (Google)
Buras, Todd (2008). Three grades of immediate perception: Thomas Reid's distinctions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):603–632.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 1. Introduction. Like other direct realists, Thomas Reid offered an alternative to indirect realist and idealist accounts of perception. Reids alternative aimed to preserve the indirect realists commitment to realism about the objects of perception, and the idealists commitment to the immediacy of the minds relation to the objects of perception. Reid holds that what you perceive is mind independent or external; and your relation to such objects in perception is direct or immediate. In his own words, something which is extended and solid, which may be measured and weighed, is the immediate object of my touch and sight. And this object I take to be matter, and not an idea (IP II xi, 154)
Carrier, Leonard S. (1969). Immediate and mediate perception. Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):391-403.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carrier, Leonard S. (1972). Time-gap myopia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (May):55-57.   (Google | More links)
Carrier, Leonard S. (1969). The time-gap argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (December):263-272.   (Google | More links)
Chemero, Tony (forthcoming). Information and direct perception: A new approach. In Priscila Farias & Jo (eds.), Advanced Issues in Cognitive Science and Semiotics.   (Google)
Abstract: Since the 1970s, Michael Turvey, Robert Shaw, and William Mace have worked on the formulation of a philosophically-sound and empirically-tractable version of James Gibson
Child, William (1994). Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal understanding of the mental without having to see attitudes and experiences as internal, causally interacting entities and he defends this view against influential objections. The book offers detailed discussions of many of Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of mind, and also considers the work of Dennett, Anscombe, McDowell, and Rorty, among others. Issues discussed include: the nature of intentional phenomena; causal explanation; the character of visual experience; psychological explanation; and the causal relevance of mental properties
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1950). The theory of appearing. In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall.   (Google)
Copenhaver, Rebecca (2004). A realism for Reid: Mediated but direct. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (1):61 – 74.   (Google | More links)
Copenhaver, Rebecca (ms). Thomas Reid's direct realism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Thomas Reid thought of himself as a critic of the representative theory of perception, of what he called the ‘theory of ideas’ or ‘the ideal theory’.2 He had no kind words for that theory: “The theory of ideas, like the Trojan horse, had a specious appearance both of innocence and beauty; but if those philosophers had known that it carried in its belly death and destruction to all science and common sense, they would not have broken down their walls to give it admittance.”3 Many have supposed that his opposition to the representative theory was grounded in his direct realism.4 A direct realist theory of perception holds that perception of external objects is not mediated by any mental entity whose intrinsic character licenses a move from the mental entity to the external object presented in perception. Reid himself, in an oration of 1759, delivered at graduation ceremonies over which he presided as regent and professor of philosophy at King’s College in Aberdeen, said that he did not “understand what need there is of an intermediate object for thought about something to be possible.”5 Hence, if Reid was not a direct realist, philosophers and historians would have to ask whether and to what degree Reid was what he thought himself to be
Cornman, James W. (1972). On direct perception. Review of Metaphysics 26 (September):38-56.   (Google)
Costall, Alan & Still, Arthur (1989). Gibson's theory of direct perception and the problem of cultural relativism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 19 (4):433–441.   (Google | More links)
De Jaegher, Hanne (2009). Social understanding through direct perception? Yes, by interacting. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):535-542.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I elaborate on the role of social interaction with a discussion of participatory sense-making to show that direct perception, rather than being a perception enriched by mainly individual capacities, can be best understood as an interactional phenomenon.
Dilworth, John B. (2005). The perception of representational content. British Journal Of Aesthetics 45 (4):388-411.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint? An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no physical existence. A solution is proposed that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of perception, plus a double content analysis of perceptual interpretation, which permits non-supervenient, culturally autonomous modes of reference to be generated and artistically exploited even in a purely physical world. In addition, a functionalist concept of broad or 'spread' reference replaces the traditional precise intentional concept of reference, which previously made reference to non-existent items theoretically intractable
Fish, William C. (2004). The direct/indirect distinction in contemporary philosophy of perception. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-13.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Givner, David A. (1982). Direct perception, misperception and perceptual systems: J. J. Gibson and the problem of illusion. Nature and System 4 (September):131-142.   (Google)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Hanna, Robert (1993). Direct reference, direct perception, and the cognitive theory of demonstratives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):96-117.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hudson, Robert G. (2000). Perceiving empirical objects directly. Erkenntnis 52 (3):357-371.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
James McDermid, Douglas (2001). What is direct perceptual knowledge? A fivefold confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16.   (Google)
Abstract: When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated ? but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior
Johnston, Mark (1996). Is the external world invisible? Philosophical Issues 7:185-198.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Jones, Raya (1999). Direct perception and symbol forming in positioning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (1):37–58.   (Google | More links)
Kalansuriya, A. D. P. (1980). Fred I. Dretske and the notion of direct perception. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 7 (July):513-517.   (Google)
Kaplan, Stephen (1987). Hermeneutics, Holography, and Indian Idealism: A Study of Projection and Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya Kārikā. Motilal Banarsidass.   (Google)
Kennedy, Matthew (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298-325.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness.
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2002). Elements of Virtualism: A Study in the Philosophy of Perception. Dartford: Traude Junghans Cuxhaven Verlag.   (Google)
Loui, Michael C. (1994). Against qualia: Our direct perception of physical reality. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
Lowe, E. J. (1981). Indirect perception and sense data. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (October):330-342.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (1986). What do we see directly? American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (July):277-286.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Luce, Arthur Aston (1954). Sense Without Matter or Direct Perception. [Edinburgh]Nelson.   (Google)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
Malcolm, Norman (1953). Direct perception. Philosophical Quarterly 3 (October):301-316.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Malmgren, Helge (1971). Moore's concept of indirect apprehension. Theoria 37:185-208.   (Google | More links)
Maund, J. Barry (1993). Representation, pictures and resemblance. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
McCabe, Viki (1982). The direct perception of universals: A theory of knowledge acquisition. Synthese 52 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   A theory is presented which proposes that knowledge acquisition involves direct perception of schematic information in the form of structural and transformational invariances. Individual components with salient verbal descriptions are considered conscious place-holders for non-conscious invariant schemes. It is speculated that theories positing mental construction have three related causes: The first is a lack of consciousness of the schema processing capacities of the right hemisphere; the second is the paucity of adequate words to express schematic relationships; and the last involves the dominance of verbal processes in consciousness. Philosophical theories are reviewed and schematic data relevant to biological survival is offered. Applications to education are suggested
McDermid, Douglas J. (2001). What is direct perceptual knowledge? A fivefold confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated ? but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior
Mergner, Thomas & Becker, Wolfgang (2001). A different way to combine direct perception with intersensory interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):228-230.   (Google)
Millar, Roderick (1982). A defence of direct surface realism. Philosophy 57 (July):339-355.   (Google)
Mulaik, Stanley A. (1995). The metaphoric origins of objectivity, subjectivity, and consciousness in the direct perception of reality. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):283-303.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Nathan, N. M. L. (2005). Direct realism: Proximate causation and the missing object. Acta Analytica 20 (36):3-6.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver. Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal principle. I suggest that although Direct Realism is in more than one respect implausible, it does not succumb to Robinson’s argument. The causal principle is true only if ‘proximate cause’ means ‘proximate sufficient cause’, and the Direct Realist need not concede that there is a sufficient cerebral cause for direct awareness of independent objects
No, (2002). Direct perception. In The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: experiences are qualitatively indistinguishable, experience by engaging in a constructive process then you are aware of one and the same thing of inference or conjecture. A perception, in the when you see a red tomato and hallucinate a red phrase of Helmholtz, is an `unconscious inference'. tomato. Hence, when you see a red tomato, you are Empirical research on perception focuses on under- aware not of a tomato but of a tomato-like sense standing the mechanisms, neural and psycho- datum. logical, that make up the brain's ability to perform 00170005 That perception is in this way indirect appears to
No, (2002). On what we see. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):57-80.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Oakes, Robert A. (1982). Seeing our own faces: A paradigm for indirect realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):442-448.   (Google | More links)
Peper, C. & Beek, Peter J. (2001). Direct perception of global invariants is not a fruitful notion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):235-235.   (Google)
Persson, Ingmar (1985). Phenomenal realism. Erkenntnis 23 (May):59-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Piatt, D. A. (1928). Immediate experience. Journal of Philosophy 25 (18):477-492.   (Google | More links)
Reynolds, Steven L. (2000). The argument from illusion. Noûs 34 (4):604-621.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Sapontzis, S. F. (1977). Direct perception, some further comments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (4):556-565.   (Google | More links)
Schwartz, Robert (1996). Directed perception. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):81-91.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Recently it has been argued that a model of directed perception provides an alternative to both indirect and direct accounts of the nature of vision. An examination of this proposal serves as a basis for challenging the meaningfulness and empirical import of the theoretical and ontological differences said to separate these models. Although focusing on James Cutting's work, the analysis is meant to speak more generally to the supposed significance of the distinctions among indirect, direct, and directed theories of perception
Schellenberg, Susanna (2008). The Situation-Dependency of Perception. The Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their shape, size, and color, and the situational features, such as the lighting conditions and the perceiver’s location in relation to the perceived object. Second, I argue that perceiving intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on representing situation-dependent properties. Recognizing situation-dependent properties yields four advantages. It makes it possible to embrace the motivations that lead to phenomenalism and indirect realism by recognizing that objects are presented a certain way, while holding on to the intuition that subjects directly perceive objects. Second, it acknowledges that perceptions are not just individuated by the objects they are of, but by the ways those objects are presented given the situational features. Third, it allows for a way to accommodate the fact that there is a wide range of viewing conditions or situational features that can count as normal. Finally, it makes it possible to distinguish perception and thought about the same object with regard to what is represented.
Schellenberg, Susanna (2008). The situation-dependency of perception. Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The fundamental philosophical interest in perception is to answer the question of how perception can give us knowledge of the world. One of the challenges in answering this question is that perception is necessarily tied to a particular time and place. One necessarily perceives from a particular location and at a particular time. As a consequence, what is immediately perceptually available is subject to situational features, such as one’s point of view and the lighting conditions. But although objects are always perceived subject to situational features, one can perceive the shape and color of objects.<sup>1</sup> One can perceive the shape of objects although only the facing surfaces are visible and one can perceive two objects to be the same size although one is nearer than the other. Similarly, one can perceive the uniform color of a surface although parts of it are illuminated more brightly than others<sup>2</sup> and one can recognize the sound of a cello regardless of whether it is played on a street or in a concert hall. More generally, one can perceive the properties objects have regardless of the situational features, although one always perceives them subject to situational features
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Sosa, David (1996). Getting acquainted with perception. Philosophical Issues 7:209-214.   (Google | More links)
Strong, Charles A. (1931). Is perception direct, or representative? Mind 40 (158):217-220.   (Google | More links)
Stroll, Avrum (1989). Wittgenstein's nose. In Brian McGuinness & Rudolf Haller (eds.), Wittgenstein in Focus--Im Brennpunkt: Wittgenstein. Rodopi.   (Google)
Todd, D. D. (1975). Direct perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (March):352-362.   (Google | More links)
Todd, D. D. (1977). Response to Sapontzis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):566-568.   (Google | More links)
Ullman, S. (1980). Against direct perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:333-81.   (Cited by 114 | Google)
Van Woudenberg, René (1994). Alston on direct perception and interpretation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (2).   (Google)
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Ward, Andrew (1976). Direct and indirect realism. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (October):287-294.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Warren, William H. (2005). Direct perception: The view from here. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):335-361.   (Google)
Warwick-Evans, Lawrence (2004). Multi-sensory processing facilitates perception but direct perception of global invariants remains unproven. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):891-892.   (Google)
Abstract: The existence of sensory convergence does not establish that the senses function as a single unified perceptual system. Reality is fully specified only by a one:many mapping onto the totality of energy arrays, and these provide alternative frames of reference for movement. It is therefore possible that higher order crossmodal relationships are detected by skilled perceivers, but this has not been confirmed empirically
Zeimbekis, John (2009). Phenomenal and objective size. Noûs 43 (2):346-362.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Definitions of phenomenal types (Nelson Goodman’s definition of qualia, Sydney Shoemaker’s phenomenal types, Austen Clark’s physicalist theory of qualia) imply that numerically distinct experiences can be type-identical in some sense. However, Goodman also argues that objects cannot be replicated in respect of continuous and densely ordered types. In that case, how can phenomenal types be defined for sizes, shapes and colours, which appear to be continuously ordered types? Concentrating on size, I will argue for the following points. (§2) We cannot deny the possibility of replication in respect of dense types, because this would imply that particulars have determinable sizes, shapes and colours. (§3) Phenomenal sizes and shapes are determinable types; objective, or super-determinate, sizes and shapes are unknowable. (§4) We can define and know, prior to verification, groupings of objective sizes for which indiscriminability is transitive. (§5) Phenomenal identity has to be defined on the basis of these transitive groupings, because finer-grained criteria (such as Goodman’s) lead to definition of objective identity. The quality space of phenomenal types consists of overlapping but not dense types, and this prevents a collapse of phenomenal types.

3.10c The Objects of Perception

Alspector-Kelly, Marc (2006). Pretending to see. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):713-728.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There are three distinct projects - ontological, phenomenological, and conceptual - to pursue in the philosophy of perception. They are, however, rarely distinguished. Failure to distinguish them has resulted in their being pursued as one. Their completion then requires that they admit of the same solution, while accommodating the existence of misperception and the scientific facts concerning the perceptual process. The lesson to learn from misperceptions and those facts is, however, that no such common solution is possible, and that the projects must, and can, be pursued separately. Pursuit of the phenomenological and conceptual projects then requires a context in which discourse concerning objects of perception is permitted without ontological commitment to such objects. This is supplied by treating certain uses of perceptual locutions as within a context of pretense
Alspector-Kelly, Marc (2004). Seeing the unobservable: Van Fraassen and the limits of experience. Synthese 140 (3):331-353.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I. Introduction “We can and do see the truth about many things: ourselves, others, trees and animals, clouds and rivers—in the immediacy of experience.”1 Absent from Bas van Fraassen’s list of those things we see are paramecia and mitochondria. We do not see such things, van Fraassen has long maintained, because they are unobservable, that is, they are undetectable by means of the unaided senses.2 But notice that these two notions—what we can see in the “immediacy” of experience and what is detectable by means of the unaided senses—are not the same. There is no incoherence in maintaining that the immediacy of experience is capable of disclosing to us truths concerning entities that are not detectable by the naked eye. And so, I claim, it does; science and technology provide us with the means to see things we have never seen before. Some of those things are van Fraassen’s unobservables. That suggestion is nothing new. Grover Maxwell long ago emphasized the continuity between seeing with and without instrumentation.3 Van Fraassen originally provided two responses to Maxwell’s arguments: some things that you can see with instruments you can also see without instruments (and those are the observables); and..
Aranyosi, Istv (2008). Review of Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):513-515.   (Google)
Averill, Edward W. (1958). Perception and definition. Journal of Philosophy 55 (July):690-698.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Barnett, Samuel (1916). In what sense two persons perceive the same thing. Philosophical Review 25 (6):837-842.   (Google | More links)
Barwise, Jon (1981). Scenes and other situations. Journal of Philosophy 78 (7):369-397.   (Google | More links)
Bode, Boyd H. (1912). Consciousness and its object. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (19):505-513.   (Google | More links)
Bogdan, Radu J. (1986). The Objects of Perception. In Radu J. Bogdan (ed.), Roderick Chisholm. Reidel: Dordrecht.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Our perceptions, beliefs, thoughts and memories have objects. They are about or of things and properties around us. I perceive her, have beliefs about her, think of her and have memories of her. How are we to construe this aboutness (or ofness) of our cognitive states?' There are four major choices on the philosophical market. There is an interaction approach which says that the object of cognition is fixed by and understood in terms of what cognizers physically and sensorily interact with - or, alternatively, in terms of what the information delivered by such interaction is about. There is the satisfactional approach which says that the object of a cognitive state is whatever satisfies the representation constitutive of that state. There is also a hybrid approach which requires both physical/sensory interaction and representational satisfaction in the fixation of the object of cognition. And there is, finally, the direct acquaintance approach which says that only an immediate cognitive contact with things and properties can establish them as objects of cognition. The latter, as far as I can tell, goes the way perception goes, so only the remaining three approaches look like serious contenders
Brewer, Bill (2007). Perception and its objects. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Physical objects are such things as stones, tables, trees, people and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in. (1) therefore expresses a commonsense commitment to physical realism: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone
Brown, Harold I. (1972). Perception and meaning. American Philosophical Quarterly 6:1-9.   (Google)
Campbell, Scott (2004). Seeing objects and surfaces, and the 'in virtue of' relation. Philosophy 79 (309):393-402.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carrier, Leonard S. (1981). Experience And The Objects Of Perception. Washington: University Press Of America.   (Google)
Dilworth, John B. (2006). A reflexive dispositional analysis of mechanistic perception. Minds and Machines 16 (4):479-493.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   The field of machine perception is based on standard informational and computational approaches to perception. But naturalistic informational theories are widely regarded as being inadequate, while purely syntactic computational approaches give no account of perceptual content. Thus there is a significant need for a novel, purely naturalistic perceptual theory not based on informational or computational concepts, which could provide a new paradigm for mechanistic perception. Now specifically evolutionary naturalistic approaches to perception have been—perhaps surprisingly—almost completely neglected for this purpose. Arguably perceptual mechanisms enhance evolutionary fitness by facilitating sensorily mediated causal interactions between an organism Z and items X in its environment. A ‘reflexive’ theory of perception of this kind is outlined, according to which an organism Z perceives an item X just in case X causes a sensory organ zi of Z to cause Z to acquire a disposition toward the very same item X that caused the perception. The rest of the paper shows how an intuitively plausible account of mechanistic perception can be developed and defended in terms of the reflexive theory. Also, a compatibilist option is provided for those who wish to preserve a distinct informational concept of perception
Drake, Durant (1915). Where do perceived objects exist? Mind 24 (93):29-36.   (Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1964). Observational terms. Philosophical Review 73 (January):25-42.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Goldman, Alvin (1977). Perceptual objects. Synthese 35 (3).   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Harrison, Ross (1970). Strawson on outer objects. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (July):213-221.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Hocutt, Max O. (1968). What we perceive. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (January):43-53.   (Google)
Kelly, Sean D. (1999). What do we see (when we do)? Philosophical Topics 27 (2):107-28.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kraut, R. (1982). Sensory states and sensory objects. Noûs 16 (May):277-93.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2005). The status of appearances revisited. Iyyun 54 (July):287-304.   (Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2011). The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 21.   (Google)
Abstract: Of all the problems attending the sense-datum theory, arguably the deepest is that it draws a veil of appearances over the external world. Today, the sense-datum theory is widely regarded as an overreaction to the problem of hallucination. Instead of accounting for hallucination in terms of intentional relations to sense data, it is often thought that we should account for it in terms of intentional relations to properties. In this paper, however, I argue that in the versions that might address the problem of hallucination, this newer account is guilty of a vice similar to sense-datum theory’s: it draws a veil of abtracta over the concrete world.
Liz, Manuel (2006). Camouflaged physical objects: The intentionality of perception. Theoria 21 (56):165-184.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is about perception and its objects. My aim is to suggest a new way to articulate some of the central ideas of direct realism. Sections 1 and 2 offer from different perspectives a panoramic view of the main problems and options in the philosophy of perception. Section 3 introduces the notion of
Mathrani, G. N. (1942). Do we perceive physical objects? Philosophical Quarterly (India) 18 (October):175-182.   (Google)
Matthen, Mohan P. (2004). Features, places, and things: Reflections on Austen Clark's theory of sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):497-518.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper argues that material objects are the primary referents of visual states -- not places, as Austen Clark would have it in his A Theory of Sentience.
Minissale, Gregory (2010). Beyond Internalism and Externalism: Husserl and Sartre's Image Consciousness in Hitchcock and. Buñuel. Film-Philosophy 14 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Husserl and Sartre’s analyses of mental imagery and some of the latest cognitive research on vision provide a framework for understanding a number of films by Hitchcock (Psycho and Rear Window) and Buñuel (Un Chien Andalou), films which similarly probe the subtleties and uses of mental imagery. One of the many ways to enjoy these films is to see them as explorations of visual phenomenology; they allow us to enact, as well as reflect upon, mental images as part of the film experience.





Myers, Charles M. (1957). On actually seeing. Philosophical Studies 8 (1-2):28-32.   (Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1983). What are the objects of perceptual consciousness? American Journal of Psychology 96:435-67.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Neta, Ram (2007). Contextualism and a puzzle about seeing. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):53-63.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Contextualist solutions to skeptical puzzles have recently been subjected to various criticisms. In this paper, I will defend contextualism against an objection prominently pressed by Stanley 2000. According to Stanley, contextualism in epistemology advances an empirically implausible hypothesis about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions in natural language. It is empirically implausible because it attributes to knowledge ascriptions a kind of semantic context-sensitivity that is wholly unlike any well- established type of semantic context-sensitivity in natural language
O'Callaghan, Casey (2007). Echoes. The Monist 90 (3):403-414.   (Google)
Abstract: Echo experiences are illusory experiences of ordinary primary sounds. Just as there is no new object that we see at the surface of a mirror, there is no new sound that we hear at a reflecting surface. The sound that we hear as an echo just is the original primary sound, though its perception involves illusions of place, time, and qualities. The case of echoes need not force us to adopt a conception according to which sounds are persisting object-like particulars that travel through space.
O’Callaghan, Casey (2008). Object perception: Vision and audition. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):803-829.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Vision has been the primary focus of naturalistic philosophical research concerning perception and perceptual experience. Guided by visual experience and vision science, many philosophers have focused upon theoretical issues dealing with the perception of objects. Recently, however, hearing researchers have discussed auditory objects. I present the case for object perception in vision, and argue that an analog of object perception occurs in auditory perception. I propose a notion of an auditory object that is stronger than just that of an intentional object of audition, but that does not identify auditory objects with the ordinary material objects we see
O'Callaghan, Casey (2007). Sounds: A Philosophical Theory. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ... ISBN0199215928 ... Abstract: Vision dominates philosophical thinking about perception, and theorizing about experience in cognitive science traditionally has focused on a visual model. This book presents a systematic treatment of sounds and auditory experience. It demonstrates how thinking about audition and appreciating the relationships among multiple sense modalities enriches our understanding of perception. It articulates the central questions that comprise the philosophy of sound, and proposes a novel theory of sounds and their perception. Against the widely accepted philosophical view that sounds are among the secondary or sensible qualities, and against the scientific view that sounds are waves that propagate through a medium such as air or water, the book argues that sounds are events in which objects or interacting bodies disturb a surrounding medium. This does not imply that sounds propagate through a medium, such as air or water. Rather, sounds are events that take place in one's environment at or near their sources. This account captures the way in which sounds essentially are creatures of time and situates sounds in the world. Sounds are not ethereal, mysterious entities. It also provides a powerful account of echoes, interference, reverberation, Doppler effects, and perceptual constancies that surpasses the explanatory richness of alternative theories. Investigating sounds and audition demonstrates that considering other sense modalities teaches what we could not otherwise learn from thinking exclusively about the visual. This book concludes by arguing that a surprising class of cross-modal perceptual illusions demonstrates that the perceptual modalities cannot be completely understood in isolation, and that a visuocentric model for theorizing about perception — according to which perceptual modalities are discrete modes of experience and autonomous domains of philosophical and scientific inquiry — ought to be abandoned.
Odegard, Douglas (1978). Perception. Dialogue 17:72-91.   (Google)
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1965). Material objects and perceptual standpoint. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:77-98.   (Google)
Persson, Ingmar (1985). The Primacy of Perception: Towards a Neutral Monism. C.W.K. Gleerup.   (Google)
Ramsperger, Albert G. (1940). Objects perceived and objects known. Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):291-297.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Richman, Robert J. (1958). The whereabouts of percepts. Journal of Philosophy 55 (April):344-347.   (Google | More links)
Rosenkrantz, Gary S. (1984). Acquaintance. Philosophia 14 (August):1-24.   (Google | More links)
Sanford, David H. (1976). The primary objects of perception. Mind 85 (April):189-208.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Schellenberg, Susanna (forthcoming). Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experience are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain unsaturated. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend a minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) satisfies the Aristotelian principle according to which the existence of any type depends on its tokens and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.
Schellenberg, Susanna (2008). The situation-dependency of perception. Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The fundamental philosophical interest in perception is to answer the question of how perception can give us knowledge of the world. One of the challenges in answering this question is that perception is necessarily tied to a particular time and place. One necessarily perceives from a particular location and at a particular time. As a consequence, what is immediately perceptually available is subject to situational features, such as one’s point of view and the lighting conditions. But although objects are always perceived subject to situational features, one can perceive the shape and color of objects.<sup>1</sup> One can perceive the shape of objects although only the facing surfaces are visible and one can perceive two objects to be the same size although one is nearer than the other. Similarly, one can perceive the uniform color of a surface although parts of it are illuminated more brightly than others<sup>2</sup> and one can recognize the sound of a cello regardless of whether it is played on a street or in a concert hall. More generally, one can perceive the properties objects have regardless of the situational features, although one always perceives them subject to situational features
Shwayder, D. S. (1961). The varieties and the objects of visual phenomena. Mind 70 (July):307-330.   (Google | More links)
Snowdon, Paul F. (1990). The objects of perceptual experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:121-50.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Sorensen, Roy A. (2008). Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eclipse riddle -- Seeing surfaces -- The disappearing act -- Spinning shadows -- Berkeley's shadow -- Para-reflections -- Para-refractions : shadowgrams and the black drop -- Goethe's colored shadows -- Filtows -- Holes in the light -- Black and blue -- Seeing in black and white -- We see in the dark -- Hearing silence.
Sorenson, Roy (2006). The disappearing act. Analysis 66 (4):319-325.   (Google | More links)
Spruit, Leen (1994). Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Brill.   (Google)
Abstract: v. 1. Classical roots and medieval discussions -- v. 2. Renaissance controversis, later scholasticism, and the elimination of the intelligible species in modern philosophy.
Strawson, Peter F. (1961). Perception and identification, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97:97-120.   (Google)
Stuart Fullerton, George (1913). Percept and object in common sense and in philosophy. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (3):57-64.   (Google | More links)
Stuart Fullerton, George (1913). Percept and object in common sense and in philosophy. II. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (6):149-158.   (Google | More links)
Suchting, W. A. (1969). Perception and the time-gap argument. Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):46-56.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Susan Stebbing, L. (1926). Professor Whitehead's "perceptual object". Journal of Philosophy 23 (8):197-213.   (Google | More links)
Willard, Dallas (1970). Perceptual realism. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1:75-84.   (Google)
Wright, Henry W. (1916). The object of perception versus the object of thought. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (16):437-441.   (Google | More links)

3.10d The Perceptual Relation, Misc

Baker, M. J. (1955). Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (March):377-385.   (Google | More links)
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1912). The relation of consciousness and object in sense-perception. Philosophical Review 21 (2):152-173.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, John (2007). What's the role of spatial awareness in visual perception of objects? Mind and Language 22 (5):548–562.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. Zenon Pylyshyn has criticized both. I argue that nonetheless, the burden of the evidence supports both (a) and (b). Finally, I argue conscious visual perception of an object has a different causal role to both: (i) non-conscious perception of the object, and (ii) experience, e.g. hallucination, that may be subjectively indiscriminable from, but is not, perception of the object
Crane, Tim (2006). Is there a perceptual relation? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in groups on the vivid green grass…’ (1979: 97). In other words, in describing experience, we tend to describe the objects of experience – the things which we experience – and the ways they are when we are experiencing them. Some go further. According to Heidegger
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Kalderon, Mark Eli (forthcoming). Color Illusion. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: As standardly conceived,an illusion is an experience of an object o appearing F where o is not in fact F. Paradigm examples of color illusion, however, do not fit this pattern. A diagnosis of this uncovers different sense of appearance talk that is the basis of a dilemma for the standard conception. The dilemma is only a challenge. But if the challenge cannot be met, then any conception of experience, such as representationalism, that is committed to the standard conception is false. Perhaps surprisingly, naïve realism provides a better account of color illusion.
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Abstract: Perception provides a form of contact with the world and the other people in it. For example, we can learn that Franco is sitting in his chair by seeing Franco; we can learn that his hair is gray by seeing the colour of his hair. Such perception enables us to understand primitive forms of language, such as demonstrative expressions
Siegel, Susanna (2002). The role of perception in demonstrative reference. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (1):1-21.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker
Sorensen, Roy A. (1999). Seeing intersecting eclipses. Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):25-49.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Sorensen, Roy A. (2004). We see in the dark. Noûs 38 (3):456-480.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
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Zemach, Eddy M. (1969). Seeing, seeing, and feeling. Review of Metaphysics 23 (September):3-24.   (Cited by 3 | Google)