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3.10b. Direct and Indirect Perception (Direct and Indirect Perception on PhilPapers)

See also:
Banerjee, Kali K. (1955). Perception and direct awareness. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 28 (April):41-47.   (Google)
Buras, Todd (2008). Three grades of immediate perception: Thomas Reid's distinctions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):603–632.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 1. Introduction. Like other direct realists, Thomas Reid offered an alternative to indirect realist and idealist accounts of perception. Reids alternative aimed to preserve the indirect realists commitment to realism about the objects of perception, and the idealists commitment to the immediacy of the minds relation to the objects of perception. Reid holds that what you perceive is mind independent or external; and your relation to such objects in perception is direct or immediate. In his own words, something which is extended and solid, which may be measured and weighed, is the immediate object of my touch and sight. And this object I take to be matter, and not an idea (IP II xi, 154)
Carrier, Leonard S. (1969). Immediate and mediate perception. Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):391-403.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carrier, Leonard S. (1972). Time-gap myopia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (May):55-57.   (Google | More links)
Carrier, Leonard S. (1969). The time-gap argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (December):263-272.   (Google | More links)
Chemero, Tony (forthcoming). Information and direct perception: A new approach. In Priscila Farias & Jo (eds.), Advanced Issues in Cognitive Science and Semiotics.   (Google)
Abstract: Since the 1970s, Michael Turvey, Robert Shaw, and William Mace have worked on the formulation of a philosophically-sound and empirically-tractable version of James Gibson
Child, William (1994). Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal understanding of the mental without having to see attitudes and experiences as internal, causally interacting entities and he defends this view against influential objections. The book offers detailed discussions of many of Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of mind, and also considers the work of Dennett, Anscombe, McDowell, and Rorty, among others. Issues discussed include: the nature of intentional phenomena; causal explanation; the character of visual experience; psychological explanation; and the causal relevance of mental properties
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1950). The theory of appearing. In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall.   (Google)
Copenhaver, Rebecca (2004). A realism for Reid: Mediated but direct. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (1):61 – 74.   (Google | More links)
Copenhaver, Rebecca (ms). Thomas Reid's direct realism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Thomas Reid thought of himself as a critic of the representative theory of perception, of what he called the ‘theory of ideas’ or ‘the ideal theory’.2 He had no kind words for that theory: “The theory of ideas, like the Trojan horse, had a specious appearance both of innocence and beauty; but if those philosophers had known that it carried in its belly death and destruction to all science and common sense, they would not have broken down their walls to give it admittance.”3 Many have supposed that his opposition to the representative theory was grounded in his direct realism.4 A direct realist theory of perception holds that perception of external objects is not mediated by any mental entity whose intrinsic character licenses a move from the mental entity to the external object presented in perception. Reid himself, in an oration of 1759, delivered at graduation ceremonies over which he presided as regent and professor of philosophy at King’s College in Aberdeen, said that he did not “understand what need there is of an intermediate object for thought about something to be possible.”5 Hence, if Reid was not a direct realist, philosophers and historians would have to ask whether and to what degree Reid was what he thought himself to be
Cornman, James W. (1972). On direct perception. Review of Metaphysics 26 (September):38-56.   (Google)
Costall, Alan & Still, Arthur (1989). Gibson's theory of direct perception and the problem of cultural relativism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 19 (4):433–441.   (Google | More links)
De Jaegher, Hanne (2009). Social understanding through direct perception? Yes, by interacting. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):535-542.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I elaborate on the role of social interaction with a discussion of participatory sense-making to show that direct perception, rather than being a perception enriched by mainly individual capacities, can be best understood as an interactional phenomenon.
Dilworth, John B. (2005). The perception of representational content. British Journal Of Aesthetics 45 (4):388-411.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint? An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no physical existence. A solution is proposed that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of perception, plus a double content analysis of perceptual interpretation, which permits non-supervenient, culturally autonomous modes of reference to be generated and artistically exploited even in a purely physical world. In addition, a functionalist concept of broad or 'spread' reference replaces the traditional precise intentional concept of reference, which previously made reference to non-existent items theoretically intractable
Fish, William C. (2004). The direct/indirect distinction in contemporary philosophy of perception. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-13.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Givner, David A. (1982). Direct perception, misperception and perceptual systems: J. J. Gibson and the problem of illusion. Nature and System 4 (September):131-142.   (Google)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Hanna, Robert (1993). Direct reference, direct perception, and the cognitive theory of demonstratives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):96-117.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hudson, Robert G. (2000). Perceiving empirical objects directly. Erkenntnis 52 (3):357-371.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
James McDermid, Douglas (2001). What is direct perceptual knowledge? A fivefold confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16.   (Google)
Abstract: When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated ? but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior
Johnston, Mark (1996). Is the external world invisible? Philosophical Issues 7:185-198.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Jones, Raya (1999). Direct perception and symbol forming in positioning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (1):37–58.   (Google | More links)
Kalansuriya, A. D. P. (1980). Fred I. Dretske and the notion of direct perception. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 7 (July):513-517.   (Google)
Kaplan, Stephen (1987). Hermeneutics, Holography, and Indian Idealism: A Study of Projection and Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya Kārikā. Motilal Banarsidass.   (Google)
Kennedy, Matthew (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298-325.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness.
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2002). Elements of Virtualism: A Study in the Philosophy of Perception. Dartford: Traude Junghans Cuxhaven Verlag.   (Google)
Loui, Michael C. (1994). Against qualia: Our direct perception of physical reality. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
Lowe, E. J. (1981). Indirect perception and sense data. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (October):330-342.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (1986). What do we see directly? American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (July):277-286.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Luce, Arthur Aston (1954). Sense Without Matter or Direct Perception. [Edinburgh]Nelson.   (Google)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
Malcolm, Norman (1953). Direct perception. Philosophical Quarterly 3 (October):301-316.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Malmgren, Helge (1971). Moore's concept of indirect apprehension. Theoria 37:185-208.   (Google | More links)
Maund, J. Barry (1993). Representation, pictures and resemblance. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
McCabe, Viki (1982). The direct perception of universals: A theory of knowledge acquisition. Synthese 52 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   A theory is presented which proposes that knowledge acquisition involves direct perception of schematic information in the form of structural and transformational invariances. Individual components with salient verbal descriptions are considered conscious place-holders for non-conscious invariant schemes. It is speculated that theories positing mental construction have three related causes: The first is a lack of consciousness of the schema processing capacities of the right hemisphere; the second is the paucity of adequate words to express schematic relationships; and the last involves the dominance of verbal processes in consciousness. Philosophical theories are reviewed and schematic data relevant to biological survival is offered. Applications to education are suggested
McDermid, Douglas J. (2001). What is direct perceptual knowledge? A fivefold confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated ? but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior
Mergner, Thomas & Becker, Wolfgang (2001). A different way to combine direct perception with intersensory interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):228-230.   (Google)
Millar, Roderick (1982). A defence of direct surface realism. Philosophy 57 (July):339-355.   (Google)
Mulaik, Stanley A. (1995). The metaphoric origins of objectivity, subjectivity, and consciousness in the direct perception of reality. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):283-303.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Nathan, N. M. L. (2005). Direct realism: Proximate causation and the missing object. Acta Analytica 20 (36):3-6.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver. Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal principle. I suggest that although Direct Realism is in more than one respect implausible, it does not succumb to Robinson’s argument. The causal principle is true only if ‘proximate cause’ means ‘proximate sufficient cause’, and the Direct Realist need not concede that there is a sufficient cerebral cause for direct awareness of independent objects
No, (2002). Direct perception. In The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: experiences are qualitatively indistinguishable, experience by engaging in a constructive process then you are aware of one and the same thing of inference or conjecture. A perception, in the when you see a red tomato and hallucinate a red phrase of Helmholtz, is an `unconscious inference'. tomato. Hence, when you see a red tomato, you are Empirical research on perception focuses on under- aware not of a tomato but of a tomato-like sense standing the mechanisms, neural and psycho- datum. logical, that make up the brain's ability to perform 00170005 That perception is in this way indirect appears to
No, (2002). On what we see. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):57-80.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Oakes, Robert A. (1982). Seeing our own faces: A paradigm for indirect realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):442-448.   (Google | More links)
Peper, C. & Beek, Peter J. (2001). Direct perception of global invariants is not a fruitful notion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):235-235.   (Google)
Persson, Ingmar (1985). Phenomenal realism. Erkenntnis 23 (May):59-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Piatt, D. A. (1928). Immediate experience. Journal of Philosophy 25 (18):477-492.   (Google | More links)
Reynolds, Steven L. (2000). The argument from illusion. Noûs 34 (4):604-621.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Sapontzis, S. F. (1977). Direct perception, some further comments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (4):556-565.   (Google | More links)
Schwartz, Robert (1996). Directed perception. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):81-91.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Recently it has been argued that a model of directed perception provides an alternative to both indirect and direct accounts of the nature of vision. An examination of this proposal serves as a basis for challenging the meaningfulness and empirical import of the theoretical and ontological differences said to separate these models. Although focusing on James Cutting's work, the analysis is meant to speak more generally to the supposed significance of the distinctions among indirect, direct, and directed theories of perception
Schellenberg, Susanna (2008). The Situation-Dependency of Perception. The Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their shape, size, and color, and the situational features, such as the lighting conditions and the perceiver’s location in relation to the perceived object. Second, I argue that perceiving intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on representing situation-dependent properties. Recognizing situation-dependent properties yields four advantages. It makes it possible to embrace the motivations that lead to phenomenalism and indirect realism by recognizing that objects are presented a certain way, while holding on to the intuition that subjects directly perceive objects. Second, it acknowledges that perceptions are not just individuated by the objects they are of, but by the ways those objects are presented given the situational features. Third, it allows for a way to accommodate the fact that there is a wide range of viewing conditions or situational features that can count as normal. Finally, it makes it possible to distinguish perception and thought about the same object with regard to what is represented.
Schellenberg, Susanna (2008). The situation-dependency of perception. Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The fundamental philosophical interest in perception is to answer the question of how perception can give us knowledge of the world. One of the challenges in answering this question is that perception is necessarily tied to a particular time and place. One necessarily perceives from a particular location and at a particular time. As a consequence, what is immediately perceptually available is subject to situational features, such as one’s point of view and the lighting conditions. But although objects are always perceived subject to situational features, one can perceive the shape and color of objects.<sup>1</sup> One can perceive the shape of objects although only the facing surfaces are visible and one can perceive two objects to be the same size although one is nearer than the other. Similarly, one can perceive the uniform color of a surface although parts of it are illuminated more brightly than others<sup>2</sup> and one can recognize the sound of a cello regardless of whether it is played on a street or in a concert hall. More generally, one can perceive the properties objects have regardless of the situational features, although one always perceives them subject to situational features
Sedgwick, H. A. (2003). Relating direct and indirect perception of spatial layout. In Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.), Looking Into Pictures. The Mit Press.   (Google)
Shuger, Scott (1986). Hintikka and the analysis of direct perception. Philosophia 16 (December):365-376.   (Google | More links)
Snowdon, Paul F. (1992). How to interpret direct perception. In The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Sosa, David (1996). Getting acquainted with perception. Philosophical Issues 7:209-214.   (Google | More links)
Strong, Charles A. (1931). Is perception direct, or representative? Mind 40 (158):217-220.   (Google | More links)
Stroll, Avrum (1989). Wittgenstein's nose. In Brian McGuinness & Rudolf Haller (eds.), Wittgenstein in Focus--Im Brennpunkt: Wittgenstein. Rodopi.   (Google)
Todd, D. D. (1975). Direct perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (March):352-362.   (Google | More links)
Todd, D. D. (1977). Response to Sapontzis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):566-568.   (Google | More links)
Ullman, S. (1980). Against direct perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:333-81.   (Cited by 114 | Google)
Van Woudenberg, René (1994). Alston on direct perception and interpretation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (2).   (Google)
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Ward, Andrew (1976). Direct and indirect realism. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (October):287-294.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Warren, William H. (2005). Direct perception: The view from here. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):335-361.   (Google)
Warwick-Evans, Lawrence (2004). Multi-sensory processing facilitates perception but direct perception of global invariants remains unproven. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):891-892.   (Google)
Abstract: The existence of sensory convergence does not establish that the senses function as a single unified perceptual system. Reality is fully specified only by a one:many mapping onto the totality of energy arrays, and these provide alternative frames of reference for movement. It is therefore possible that higher order crossmodal relationships are detected by skilled perceivers, but this has not been confirmed empirically
Zeimbekis, John (2009). Phenomenal and objective size. Noûs 43 (2):346-362.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Definitions of phenomenal types (Nelson Goodman’s definition of qualia, Sydney Shoemaker’s phenomenal types, Austen Clark’s physicalist theory of qualia) imply that numerically distinct experiences can be type-identical in some sense. However, Goodman also argues that objects cannot be replicated in respect of continuous and densely ordered types. In that case, how can phenomenal types be defined for sizes, shapes and colours, which appear to be continuously ordered types? Concentrating on size, I will argue for the following points. (§2) We cannot deny the possibility of replication in respect of dense types, because this would imply that particulars have determinable sizes, shapes and colours. (§3) Phenomenal sizes and shapes are determinable types; objective, or super-determinate, sizes and shapes are unknowable. (§4) We can define and know, prior to verification, groupings of objective sizes for which indiscriminability is transitive. (§5) Phenomenal identity has to be defined on the basis of these transitive groupings, because finer-grained criteria (such as Goodman’s) lead to definition of objective identity. The quality space of phenomenal types consists of overlapping but not dense types, and this prevents a collapse of phenomenal types.