MindPapers: 3.10d. The Perceptual Relation, Misc

Baker, M. J. (1955). Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (March):377-385. (Google | More links)

Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1912). The relation of consciousness and object in sense-perception. Philosophical Review 21 (2):152-173. (Google | More links)

Campbell, John (2007). What's the role of spatial awareness in visual perception of objects? Mind and Language 22 (5):548–562. (Google | More links)

Abstract: I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. Zenon Pylyshyn has criticized both. I argue that nonetheless, the burden of the evidence supports both (a) and (b). Finally, I argue conscious visual perception of an object has a different causal role to both: (i) non-conscious perception of the object, and (ii) experience, e.g. hallucination, that may be subjectively indiscriminable from, but is not, perception of the object

Crane, Tim (2006). Is there a perceptual relation? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)

Abstract: P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in groups on the vivid green grass…’ (1979: 97). In other words, in describing experience, we tend to describe the objects of experience – the things which we experience – and the ways they are when we are experiencing them. Some go further. According to Heidegger

Ebersole, Frank B. (1961). On seeing things. Philosophical Quarterly 11 (October):289-300. (Google | More links)

Kalderon, Mark Eli (forthcoming). Color Illusion. Nous. (Google)

Abstract: As standardly conceived,an illusion is an experience of an object o appearing F where o is not in fact F. Paradigm examples of color illusion, however, do not ﬁt this pattern. A diagnosis of this uncovers diﬀerent sense of appearance talk that is the basis of a dilemma for the standard conception. The dilemma is only a challenge. But if the challenge cannot be met, then any conception of experience, such as representationalism, that is committed to the standard conception is false. Perhaps surprisingly, naïve realism provides a better account of color illusion.

Pacherie, Elisabeth (1995). Do we see with microscopes? The Monist 78 (2):171-188. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Pitson, A. E. (1984). Basic seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (September):121-130. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Platchias, Dimitris (2004). The veil of perception and contextual relativism. Sorites 15 (December):76-86. (Google | More links)

Schwartz, Robert (2004). To Austin or not to Austin, that's the disjunction. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):255-263. (Google | More links)

Siegel, Susanna (2006). How does phenomenology constrain object-seeing? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):429 – 441. (Google | More links)

Abstract: Perception provides a form of contact with the world and the other people in it. For example, we can learn that Franco is sitting in his chair by seeing Franco; we can learn that his hair is gray by seeing the colour of his hair. Such perception enables us to understand primitive forms of language, such as demonstrative expressions

Siegel, Susanna (2002). The role of perception in demonstrative reference. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (1):1-21. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Abstract: Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker

Sorensen, Roy A. (1999). Seeing intersecting eclipses. Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):25-49. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Sorensen, Roy A. (2004). We see in the dark. Noûs 38 (3):456-480. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

Stroll, Avrum (1992). Reflections on surfaces. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):191-210. (Google)

Stuart Fullerton, George (1907). In what sense two persons perceive the same thing. Philosophical Review 16 (5):506-518. (Google | More links)

Thilly, Frank (1912). The relation of consciousness and object in sense-perception. Philosophical Review 21 (4):415-432. (Google | More links)

Warnock, G. J. (1955). Seeing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:201-218. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. (1912). Consciousness and object. Philosophical Review 21 (6):633-640. (Google | More links)

Zemach, Eddy M. (1969). Seeing, seeing, and feeling. Review of Metaphysics 23 (September):3-24. (Cited by 3 | Google)

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