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3.11c. Spatial Experience (Spatial Experience on PhilPapers)

See also:
Albertazzi, Liliana (ed.) (2002). Unfolding Perceptual Continua. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The book analyses the differences between the mathematical interpretation and the phenomenological intuition of the continuum.
Battro, Antonio M. (1977). Visual riemannian space versus cognitive euclidean space. Synthese 35 (4).   (Google)
Brewer, Bill (1993). The integration of spatial vision and action. In Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Brewer, Bill (1992). Unilateral neglect and the objectivity of spatial representation. Mind and Language 7 (3):222-39.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Patients may show a more-or-less complete deviation of the head and eyes towards the right (ipsilesional) side [that is, to the same side of egocentric space as the brain lesion responsible for their disorder]. If addressed by the examiner from the left (contralesional) side [the opposite side to their lesion], patients with severe extrapersonal neglect may fail to respond or may look for the speaker in the right side of the room, turning head and eyes more and more to the right. Frequently these patients will not pick up food from the left half of the plate. Given a crossword puzzle, they may complete only the squares to the right. If walking is not prevented by hemiparesis, neglect patients may lose their bearings, since they do not make use of left sided cues
Briscoe, Robert (forthcoming). Perceiving the Present: Systematization of Illusions or Illusion of Systematization? Cognitive Science.   (Google)
Briscoe, Robert (2008). Vision, action, and make-perceive. Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements – an act of what I call ‘make-perceive.’
Browning, Lorin (1973). On seeing 'everything' upside down. Analysis 34 (December):48-49.   (Google)
Bryant, David J. (1997). Representing space in language and perception. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):239-264.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Campbell, John (1996). Shape properties, experience of shape and shape concepts. Philosophical Issues 7:351-363.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, John (2006). What is the role of location in the sense of a visual demonstrative? Reply to Matthen. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):239-254.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, John (2007). What's the role of spatial awareness in visual perception of objects? Mind and Language 22 (5):548–562.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. Zenon Pylyshyn has criticized both. I argue that nonetheless, the burden of the evidence supports both (a) and (b). Finally, I argue conscious visual perception of an object has a different causal role to both: (i) non-conscious perception of the object, and (ii) experience, e.g. hallucination, that may be subjectively indiscriminable from, but is not, perception of the object
Casullo, Albert (1989). Perceptual space is monadic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (September):131-134.   (Google | More links)
Cassam, Quassim (2005). Space and objective experience. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Casullo, Albert (1986). The spatial structure of perceptual space. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):665-671.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Clark, Austen (online). Location, location, location.   (Google)
Abstract: Forthcoming in Lana Trick & Don Dedrick (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Pylyshyn. MIT Press. Presented at the Zenon Pylyshyn Conference (ZenCon), University of Guelph, 1 May 2005
Cutting, James E. (2003). Reconceiving perceptual space. In Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.), Looking Into Pictures. The Mit Press.   (Google)
Drummond, John J. (1983). Objects' optimal appearances and the immediate awareness of space in vision. Man and World 16:177-206.   (Google)
Drummond, John J. (1979). On seeing a material thing in space: The role of kinaesthesis in visual perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (September):19-32.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Eilan, Naomi M. (ed.) (1993). Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Falkenstein, Lorne (1989). Is perceptual space monadic? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):709-713.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ford, E. (1893). The original datum of space-consciousness. Mind 2 (6):217-218.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
French, Robert E. (1987). The Geometry Of Vision And The Mind Body Problem. Lang.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
French, Robert (1987). The geometry of visual space. Noûs 21 (June):115-133.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Grush, Rick (1998). Skill and spatial content. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (6).   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Abstract: [1] It is well-known that Evans laid the groundwork for a truly radical and fruitful theory of _content_ -- a theory according to which content is a genus with at least conceptual and nonconceptual varieties as species, and in which nonconceptual content plays a very significant role. It is less well-recognized that Evans was also in the process of working out the details of a truly radical and groundbreaking theory of _representation_, a task he was unfortunately unable to bring to any satisfactory stage of fruition. I am here drawing the distinction between a theory of
Grush, Rick (2000). Self, world and space: The meaning and mechanisms of ego- and allocentric spatial representation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):59-92.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: b>: The problem of how physical systems, such as brains, come to represent themselves as subjects in an objective world is addressed. I develop an account of the requirements for this ability that draws on and refines work in a philosophical tradition that runs from Kant through Peter Strawson to Gareth Evans. The basic idea is that the ability to represent oneself as a subject in a world whose existence is independent of oneself involves the ability to represent space, and in particular, to represent oneself as one object among others in an objective spatial realm. In parallel, I provide an account of how this ability, and the mechanisms that support it, are realized neurobiologically. This aspect of the article draws on, and refines, work done in the neurobiology and psychology of egocentric and allocentric spatial representation
Harrison, Jonathan (1961). The third dimension. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:151-168.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary C. (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited : color as a psychobiological property -- Sense data and the mind body problem -- The reality of qualia -- The sensory core and the medieval foundations of early modern perceptual theory -- Postscript (2008) on Ibn al-Haytham's (Alhacen's) theory of vision -- Attention in early scientific psychology -- Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science : reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology -- What can the mind tell us about the brain? : psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint -- Introspective evidence in psychology.
Hatfield, Gary (2003). Representation and constraints: The inverse problem and the structure of visual space. Acta Psychologica 114:355-378.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Visual space can be distinguished from physical space. The ?rst is found in visual experi- ence, while the second is de?ned independently of perception. Theorists have wondered about the relation between the two. Some investigators have concluded that visual space is non- Euclidean, and that it does not have a single metric structure. Here it is argued (1) that visual space exhibits contraction in all three dimensions with increasing distance from the observer, (2) that experienced features of this contraction (including the apparent convergence of lines in visual experience that are produced from physically parallel stimuli in ordinary viewing con- ditions) are not the same as would be the experience of a perspective projection onto a fronto- parallel plane, and (3) that such contraction is consistent with size constancy. These properties of visual space are di?erent from those that would be predicted if spatial perception resulted from the successful solution of the inverse problem. They are consistent with the notion that optical constraints have been internalized. More generally, they are also consistent with the notion that visual spatial structures bear a resemblance relation to physical spatial structures. This notion supports a type of representational relation that is distinct from mere causal cor- respondence. The reticence of some philosophers and psychologists to discuss the structure of phenomenal space is diagnosed in terms of the simple materialism and the functionalism of the 1970s and 1980s.
Hatfield, Gary (1991). The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception From Kant to Helmholtz. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Gary Hatfield examines theories of spatial perception from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and provides a detailed analysis of the works of Kant and...
Haymond, William S. (1961). Is distance an original factor in vision? Modern Schoolman 39 (November):39-60.   (Google)
Heelan, Patrick A. (1983). Space-Perception And The Philosophy Of Science. University Of California Press.   (Cited by 91 | Google | More links)
Hellie, Benj (ms). Visual form, attention, and binocularity.   (Google)
Abstract: This somewhat odd paper argues against a representational view of visual experience using an intricate "inversion" type thought experiment involving double vision: two subjects could represent external space in the same way while differing phenomenally due to different "spread" in their double images. The spatial structure of the visual field is explained not by representation of external space but functionally, in terms of the possible locations of an attentional spotlight. I'm fond of the ideas in this paper but doubt I'll be returning to it soon.
Hunter, J. F. M. (1987). Seeing dimensionally. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (September):553-566.   (Google)
James, William (1893). The original datum of space-consciousness. Mind 2 (7):363-365.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
James, William (1887). The perception of space. (I.). Mind 12 (45):1-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
James, William (1887). The perception of space (III.). Mind 12 (47):321-353.   (Google | More links)
James, William (1887). The perception of space (II.). Mind 12 (46):183-211.   (Google | More links)
Jastrow, Joseph (1886). The perception of space by disparate senses. Mind 11 (44):539-554.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Kemp, G. Neville (1991). Metaphor and aspect-perception. Analysis (March) 84 (March):84-90.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kline, A. David (1980). Berkeley, Pitcher, and distance perception. International Studies in Philosophy 12:1-8.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lawrence, Nathaniel M. (1953). Single location, simple location and misplaced concreteness. Review of Metaphysics 7 (December):225-247.   (Google)
Lee, G. (2006). The experience of left and right. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Lewis, H. D. (1953). Private and public space. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53:79-94.   (Google)
Lowe, E. J. (1986). The topology of visual appearance. Erkenntnis 25 (November):271-274.   (Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2006). Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counter-example to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judge- ments to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position
Mandik, Pete (2005). Phenomenal consciousness and the allocentric-egocentric interface. Endophysics.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci
Mandik, Pete (1999). Qualia, space, and control. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space
Mattens, Filip (2009). Perception, body, and the sense of touch: Phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Husserl Studies 25 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In recent philosophy of mind, a series of challenging ideas have appeared about the relation between the body and the sense of touch. In certain respects, these ideas have a striking affinity with Husserl’s theory of the constitution of the body. Nevertheless, these two approaches lead to very different understandings of the role of the body in perception. Either the body is characterized as a perceptual “organ,” or the body is said to function as a “template.” Despite its focus on the sense of touch, the latter conception, I will argue, nevertheless orients its understanding of tactual perception toward visual objects. This produces a distorted conception of touch. In this paper, I will formulate an alternative account, which is more faithful to what it is like to feel
Morris, David (2004). The Sense of Space. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The Sense of Space brings together space and body to show that space is a plastic environment, charged with meaning, that reflects the distinctive character of human embodiment in the full range of its moving, perceptual, emotional, expressive, developmental, and social capacities. Drawing on the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Bergson, as well as contemporary psychology to develop a renewed account of the moving, perceiving body, the book suggests that our sense of space ultimately reflects our ethical relations to other people and to the places we inhabit
Munsterberg, Hugo (1904). Perception of distance. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (23):617-623.   (Google | More links)
O'Callaghan, Casey (2010). Perceiving the locations of sounds. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Frequently, we learn of the locations of things and events in our environment by means of hearing. Hearing, I argue, is a locational mode of perceiving with a robustly spatial nature. I defend three proposals. First, audition furnishes information about the locations of things and events in one's environment because auditory experience itself is spatial. Audition represents space. Second, we hear the locations of things and events by or in hearing locational information about their sounds. Third, we auditorily experience sounds themselves as having relatively stable distal locations. I reject skepticism about spatial audition tracing to Strawson's Individuals, and suggest that spatial audition supports the view that audition and vision share a dimension of perceptual content
O'Callaghan, Casey (ms). The locations of sounds.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When you hear the sound of a car drive by on the street outside your window, you learn not only whether the car has a hole in its muffler or has squealing brakes. You also learn something about the location of the car because hearing furnishes information about the locations of its objects. By listening, you learn not only about the character of the things and happenings around you, but also about where they are in the surrounding environment. The question I wish to address is this: Do we hear the locations of sounds themselves, or do we merely hear the locations of sound sources—the objects and events that produce sounds? I shall argue that frequently we do hear the locations of sounds themselves, and that this is required in order to hear and learn the locations of sound-producing sources. This feature of auditory experience has consequences for the metaphysics of sounds. If we veridically hear the locations of sounds, then the most prominent conception of sounds is mistaken and we must revise our ontology
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Schellenberg, Susanna (2007). Action and self-location in perception. Mind 115 (463):603-632.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects
Schellenberg, Susanna (forthcoming). Perceptual Experience and the Capacity to Act. In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Smith, A. D. (2000). Space and sight. Mind 109 (435):481-518.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper, which has both a historical and a polemical aspect, investigates the view, dominant throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that the sense of sight is, originally, not phenomenally three-dimensional in character, and that we must come to interpret its properly two-dimensional data by reference to the sense of 'touch'. The principal argument for this claim, due to Berkeley, is examined and found wanting. The supposedly confirming findings concerning 'Molyneux subjects' are also investigated and are shown to be either irrelevant or disconfirming. Recent investigations on infant and neonatal perception are discussed and are also found to be disconfirming. An innatist version of the theory is then considered and is shown to be undermined by the largely 'Gibsonian' character of early space-perception. Finally three recent arguments in favour of the theory - two from psychologists, one from a philosopher - are considered and answered
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Abstract: In this chapter I attempt to explain the lasting effectiveness and critical success of Robert Wise’s The Haunting (1963) by roughly sketching the role that spectator belief might play in a revised version of the so-called “Thought Theory” of emotional response to fiction. I argue that The Haunting engages viewers in a process of “disbelief mitigation”—the sheltering of nontrivial, tenuously held beliefs required for optimal viewer response—that helps make the film work as horror, and prevents it from sliding into comedy. Haunted house films do not have to extend much effort to keep us from walking away, since most viewers come to the theater ready to entertain the idea that haunted houses exist. Using the experiential philosophy of John Dewey, I propose that this willingness has to do with a fundamental aspect of our relationship with space. It is common to speak of places as “charged” or “tense,” to get feelings of dread or nostalgia from certain spots. Some haunted house films leverage this experiential characteristic to fuel the horror, and without it, the subgenre would probably not exist
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Vosgerau, Gottfried (2007). Conceptuality in spatial representations. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):349 – 365.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The notion of conceptuality is still unclear and vague. I will present a definition of conceptual and nonconceptual representations that is grounded in different aspects of the representations' structures. This definition is then used to interpret empirical results from human and animal navigation. It will be shown, that the distinction between egocentric and allocentric spatial representations can be matched onto the conceptual vs. nonconceptual distinction. The phenomena discussed in spatial navigation are thereby put into a wider context of cognitive abilities, which allows for new explanations of certain features of spatial representations and how they are linked to other capacities, like perception and reasoning
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