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3.11d. The Experience of Objects (The Experience of Objects on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bach, Kent (online). Searle against the world: How can experiences find their objects?   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Here's an old question in the philosophy of perception: here I am, looking at this pen [I hold up a pen in my hand]. Presumably I really am seeing this pen. Even so, I could be having an experience just like the one I am having without anything being there. So how can the experience I am having really involve direct awareness of the pen? It seems as though the presence of the pen is inessential to the way the experience is
Battro, Antonio M. (1977). Visual riemannian space versus cognitive euclidean space. Synthese 35 (4).   (Google)
Bernal, Sara (2005). Object lessons: Spelke principles and psychological explanation. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):289-312.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is general agreement that from the first few months of life, our apprehension of physical objects accords, in some sense, with certain principles. In one philosopher's locution, we are 'perceptually sensitive' to physical principles describing the behavior of objects. But in what does this accordance or sensitivity consist? Are these principles explicitly represented or merely 'implemented'? And what sort of explanation do we accomplish in claiming that our object perception accords with these principles? My main goal here is to suggest answers to these questions. I argue that the object principles are not explicitly represented, first addressing some confusion in the debate about what that means. On the positive side, I conclude that the principles supply a competence account, at Marr's computational level, and that they function like natural constraints in vision. These are among their considerable explanatory benefits - benefits endowed by rules and principles in other cognitive domains as well. Characterizing the explanatory role of the object principles is my main project here, but in pursuing certain sub-goals I am led to other conclusions of interest in their own right. I address an argument that the object principles are explicitly represented which assumes that object perception is substantially thought-like. This provokes a jaunt off the main path which leads to interesting territory: the boundary between thought and perception. I argue that object apprehension is much closer to perception than to thought on the spectrum between the two
Brewer, Bill (1994). Thoughts about objects, places and times. In Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Campbell, John (2006). Does visual reference depend on sortal classification? Reply to Clark. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):221-237.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Austen (2004). Feature-placing and proto-objects. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):443-469.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper contrasts three different schemes of reference relevant to understanding systems of perceptual representation: a location-based system dubbed "feature-placing", a system of "visual indices" referring to things called "proto-objects", and the full sortal-based individuation allowed by a natural language. The first three sections summarize some of the key arguments (in Clark, 2000) to the effect that the early, parallel, and pre-attentive registration of sensory features itself constitutes a simple system of nonconceptual mental representation. In particular, feature integration--perceiving something as being both F and G, where F and G are sensible properties registered in distinct parallel streams--requires a referential apparatus. Section V. reviews some grounds for thinking that at these earliest levels this apparatus is location-based: that it has a direct and nonconceptual means of picking out places. Feature-placing is contrasted with a somewhat more sophisticated system that can identify and track four or five "perceptual objects" or "proto-objects", independently of their location, for as long as they remain perceptible. Such a system is found in Zenon Pylyshyn's fascinating work on "visual indices", in Dana Ballard's notion of deictic codes, and in Kahneman, Treisman, and Wolfe's accounts of systems of evanescent representations they call "object files". Perceptual representation is a layered affair, and I argue that it probably includes both feature-placing and proto-objects. Finally, both nonconceptual systems are contrasted with the full-blooded individuation allowed in a natural language
Cohen, Jonathan (2004). Objects, places, and perception. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):471-495.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Clark (2000), Austen Clark argues convincingly that a widespread view of perception as a complicated kind of feature-extraction is incomplete. He argues that perception has another crucial representational ingredient: it must also involve the representation of "sensory individuals" that exemplify sensorily extracted features. Moreover, he contends, the best way of understanding sensory individuals takes them to be places in space surrounding the perceiver. In this paper, I'll agree with Clark's case for sensory individuals (
Duncker, Karl (2003). Phenomenology and epistemology of consciousness of objects. International Gestalt Journal 26 (1):79-128.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Evans, Gareth (1980). Things without the mind. In Philosophical Subjects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Fern, (2006). Particularity and reflexivity in the intentional content of perception. Theoria 21 (56):133-145.   (Google)
Fern, (1999). Perceptual consciousness and the reflexive character of attention. In Jos Falguera (ed.), La Filosof. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U..   (Google)
French, Robert (1987). The geometry of visual space. Noûs 21 (June):115-133.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hampshire, Stuart N. (1961). Perception and identification, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:81-96.   (Google)
Hinton, J. Michael (1967). Perception and identification. Philosophical Review 76 (October):421-435.   (Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (1994). Seeing things. Synthese 98 (1):51-71.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Knuuttila, Simo & Kärkkäinen, Pekka (eds.) (2008). Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Springer.   (Google)
Kulvicki, John (2007). What is what it's like? Introducing perceptual modes of presentation. Synthese 156 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The central claim of this paper is that what it is like to see green or any other perceptible property is just the perceptual mode of presentation of that property. Perceptual modes of presentation are important because they help resolve a tension in current work on consciousness. Philosophers are pulled by three mutually inconsistent theses: representational externalism, representationalism, and phenomenal internalism. I throw my hat in with defenders of the first two: the externalist representationalists. We are faced with the problem of explaining away intuitions that favor phenomenal internalism. Perceptual modes of presentation account for what it is like to see properties in a way that accommodates those intuitions without vindicating phenomenal internalism itself. Perceptual MoPs therefore provide a new way of being an externalist representationalist
Kung, Guido (1984). The intentional and the real object. Dialectica 38:143-156.   (Google)
Martin, Michael G. F. (2002). Particular thoughts and singular thought. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Matthen, Mohan (2010). On the diversity of auditory objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):63-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends two theses about sensory objects. The more general thesis is that directly sensed objects are those delivered by sub-personal processes. It is shown how this thesis runs counter to perceptual atomism, the view that wholes are always sensed indirectly, through their parts. The more specific thesis is that while the direct objects of audition are all composed of sounds, these direct objects are not all sounds—here, a composite auditory object is a temporal sequence of sounds (whereas a composite visual object is a spatial composite). Many composite objects are directly heard in the sense just mentioned. There is a great variety of such composite auditory objects—melodies, harmonies, sequences of phonemes, individual voices, meaning-carrying sounds, and so on. This diversity of auditory objects has an important application to aesthetics. Perceivers do not naturally or easily attend simultaneously to auditory objects that overlap in time. Yet, aesthetic appreciation depends on such an allocation of attention to overlapping objects
Matthen, Mohan P. (2006). On visual experience of objects: Comments on John Campbell's reference and consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also queried, as is his espousal of the so-called Referential View of Experience
Mcculloch, Gregory (1984). Cause in perception: A note on Searle's intentionality. Analysis 44 (October):203-205.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
McDowell, John (1986). Singular thought and the extent of ``inner space''. In John McDowell & Philip Pettit (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Millar, Alan (1985). Veridicality: More on Searle. Analysis 45 (March):120-124.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1984). On the causal self-referentiality of perceptual experiences and the problem of concrete perceptual reference. Behaviorism 12:61-80.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1994). On the distinction between the object and the content of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):239-64.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2002). The experiential presence of objects to perceptual consciousness: Wilfrid Sellars, sense impressions, and perceptual takings. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):293-316.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1997). The presence of environmental objects to perceptual consciousness: An integrative, ecological and phenomenological approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (4):371-390.   (Google)
Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (2001). Connecting vision with the world: Tracking the missing link. In Joao Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: You might reasonably surmise from the title of this paper that I will be discussing a theory of vision. After all, what is a theory of vision but a theory of how the world is connected to our visual representations? Theories of visual perception universally attempt to give an account of how a proximal stimulus (presumably a pattern impinging on the retina) can lead to a rich representation of a three dimensional world and thence to either the recognition of known objects or to the coordination of actions with visual information. Such theories typically provide an effective (i.e., computable) mapping from a 2D pattern to a representation of a 3D scene, usually in the form of a symbol structure. But such a mapping, though undoubtedly the essential purpose of a theory of vision, leaves at least one serious problem that I intend to discuss here. It is this problem, rather than a theory of vision itself, that is the subject of this talk
Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (2001). Visual indexes, preconceptual objects, and situated vision. Cognition.   (Cited by 130 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that a theory of situated vision, suited for the dual purposes of object recognition and the control of action, will have to provide something more than a system that constructs a conceptual representation from visual stimuli: it will also need to provide a special kind of direct (preconceptual, unmediated) connection between elements of a visual representation and certain elements in the world. Like natural language demonstratives (such as `this' or `that') this direct connection allows entities to be referred to without being categorized or conceptualized. Several reasons are given for why we need such a preconcep- tual mechanism which individuates and keeps track of several individual objects in the world. One is that early vision must pick out and compute the relation among several individual objects while ignoring their properties. Another is that incrementally computing and updating representations of a dynamic scene requires keeping track of token individuals despite changes in their properties or locations. It is then noted that a mechanism meeting these requirements has already been proposed in order to account for a number of disparate empiri- cal phenomena, including subitizing, search-subset selection and multiple object tracking (Pylyshyn et al., Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 48(2) (1994) 260). This mechanism, called a visual index or FINST, is brie
Raftopoulos, Athanassios & Müller, Vincent C. (2006). The phenomenal content of experience. Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties
Richardson, Robert C. (1988). Objects and fields. In Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google)
Rorty, Richard (1970). Strawson's objectivity argument. Review of Metaphysics 24 (December):207-244.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Schellenberg, Susanna (2007). Action and self-location in perception. Mind 115 (463):603-632.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects
Schellenberg, Susanna (forthcoming). Perceptual content defended. Noûs.   (Google)
Abstract: Recently the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids the objections of austere relationalists. The main thesis of the paper is that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. I argue that most austere relationalist objections to the thesis that experience has content are objections only against accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational
Siegel, Susanna (ms). Particularity and presence in visual perception.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What is the difference between perception and mere sensation? Take a typical perceptual experience, such as an experience of seeing a fish or a table, and a merely sensory experience, such as the experience of
Siegel, Susanna (2002). Review of A Theory of Sentience, by Austen Clark. Philosophical Review 111 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: First, what it is for a sentient being to sense is for it to employ two distinct capacities: one for representing places-at-times; the other for representing "features" (60, cf. 70). Exercised together, the result is akin to feature-placing, which brings us to the second thesis: what sensory systems represent is that features are instantiated at place-times. Accordingly, sensory systems do not, for instance, attribute properties to objects, such as trees, tables, bodies, or persons (163)
Siegel, Susanna (2005). Subject and object in the contents of visual experience. Philosophical Review 115 (3):355--88.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is the difference between perception and mere sensation? Take a typical perceptual experience, such as an experience of seeing a fish or a table, and a merely sensory experience, such as the experience of ‘seeing stars’ or of enjoying a red phosphene (a phosphene is a kind of afterimage). One difference between these experiences is that in the first case, there is an external object that one sees. But this difference is not the only difference. On the face of it, typical perceptual experiences and mere sensations also differ in their phenomenal character. How can this difference be understood?
Soteriou, Matthew (2000). The particularity of visual perception. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):173-189.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Thomas, Alan (online). Perceptual knowledge, representation and imagination.   (Google)
Abstract: The focus of this paper will be on the problem of perceptual presence and on a solution to this problem pioneered by Kant [1781; 1783] and refined by Sellars [Sellars, 1978] and Strawson [Strawson, 1971]. The problem of perceptual presence is that of explaining how our perceptual experience of the world gives us a robust sense of the presence of objects in perception over and above those sensory aspects of the object given in perception. Objects possess other properties which are, one might say, phenomenologically present even though they are admittedly sensorily absent. The general form of the solution to this problem that Kant developed seems to me to be a neglected resource in contemporary work on perceptual consciousness. Kant solves the problem of perceptual presence by appealing to that which he called the productive use of the imagination. This faculty of mind supplies schematic representations of the object of perception that explains a phenomenological sense of perceptual presence even of those features that are not, in a sense to be further clarified,
Tye, Michael (2007). Intentionalism and the argument from no common content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589–613.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (2009). The admissible contents of visual experience. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character of visual experience
Welker, David D. (1988). On the necessity of bodies. Erkenntnis 28 (May):363-385.   (Google | More links)