MindPapers: 3.1a. Sense-Datum Theories

Adams, E. M. (1958). The nature of the sense-datum theory. Mind 67 (April):216-226. (Google | More links | Edit)

Aldrich, Virgil C. (1979). Objective sense-data. Personalist 60 (January):36-42. (Google | Edit)

Allinson, R. E. (1978). A non-dualistic reply to Moore's refutation of idealism. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 5 (July):661-668. (Google | Edit)

Andriopoulos, D. Z. (1979). Did Aristotle assume a sense-data theory? Philosophical Inquiry 1:125-128. (Google | Edit)

Austin, J. L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 247 | Google | Edit)

Austin, J. L. (1964). Sense And Sensibilia; Reconstructed From The Manuscript Notes By G J Warnock. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)

Ayer, A. J. (1967). Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory? Synthese 17 (June):117-140. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Ayer, A. J. (1940). The Foundations Of Empirical Knowledge. Macmillan. (Cited by 72 | Google | Edit)

Ayer, A. J. (1945). The terminology of sense-data. Mind 54 (October):289-312. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Barnes, Winston H. F. (1945). The myth of sense-data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:89-118. (Cited by 11 | Google | Edit)

Bañares Jr, Romulo T. (2004). On the ontological issue of sense data. Philosophia 33 (2):125-154. (Google | Edit)

Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000). Naturalized sense data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):353-374. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Bickham, Stephen H. (1975). What is at issue in the Ayer-Austin dispute about sense-data. Midwestern Journal of Philosophy 1:1-8. (Google | Edit)

Blyth, John W. (1935). A discussion of mr. price's Perception. Mind 44 (173):58-67. (Google | More links | Edit)

Brain, W. Russell (1960). Space and sense-data. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (November):177-191. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Brain, Walter R. (1959). The Nature Of Experience. London,: Oxford University Press,. (Cited by 15 | Google | Edit)

Brokes, Audre Jean (2000). The argument from illusion reconsidered. Disputatio 9 (1). (Google | More links | Edit)

Bronaugh, Richard N. (1964). The argument from the elliptical penny. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):151-157. (Google | More links | Edit)

Brown, Norman O. (1957). Sense-data and material objects. Mind 66 (April):173-194. (Google | More links | Edit)

Campbell, Charles A. (1947). Sense data and judgment in sensory cognition. Mind 56 (October):289-316. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Carney, James D. (1962). Was Moore talking nonsense in 1918? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (June):521-527. (Google | More links | Edit)

Cash, Peter T. (1979). The argument from the hand. Philosophical Investigations 2:47-70. (Google | Edit)

Casullo, Albert (1987). A defense of sense-data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):45-61. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Chandra, Suresh (1976). Sensible awareness of sense-objects. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April):355-366. (Google | Edit)

Chisholm, Roderick (1942). Discussions: The problem of the speckled hen. Mind 51 (204). (Google | Edit)

Chrucky, Andrew (online). The alleged fallacy of the sense-datum inference. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Sense-data, if they exist, could conceivably provide foundations for empirical knowledge. Those who are opposed to empirical foundationalism are therefore also prone to reject sense-data and arguments for their existence, e.g., Rorty, Bonjour; while foundationalists are prone to accept the existence of sense-data, e.g., Russell, Ayer, Broad, Price, Lewis. An exception to this is the position of Roderick Chisholm who accepts empirical foundationalism but rejects the existence of sense-data

Chubb, J. N. (1973). Are there sense-data, part I. Journal of the Philosophical Association 14 (January-December):135-158. (Google | Edit)

Coates, Paul (online). Sense-data. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Google | Edit)

Cooney, William (1985). Some comments on the sense-datum theory and the argument from illusion. Dialogue 28 (October):8-15. (Google | Edit)

Cory, Daniel (1948). Are sense-data in the brain? Journal of Philosophy 45 (September):533-548. (Google | More links | Edit)

Cory, Daniel (1939). The private field of immediate experience. Journal of Philosophy 36 (16):421-427. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Coval, Sam C. & Todd, D. D. (1972). Adjusters and sense-data. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (January):107-112. (Google | Edit)

Cowley, Fraser (1968). A Critique Of British Empiricism. Macmillan. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Cresswell, M. J. (1980). Jackson on perception. Theoria 46:123-147. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Crossley, David J. (1994). Moore's Refutation of Idealism: The debate about sensations. Idealistic Studies 24 (1):1-20. (Google | Edit)

Davie, G. E. (1954). Common sense and sense-data. Philosophical Quarterly 4 (July):229-246. (Google | More links | Edit)

Dawes Hicks, G. (1912). The nature of sense-data. Mind 21 (83):399-409. (Google | Edit)

De Boer, C. (1931). Sceptical notes on the sense-datum. Journal of Philosophy 28 (19):505-519. (Google | More links | Edit)

Fantl, Jeremy & Howell, Robert J. (2003). Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Firth, Roderick (1949). Sense-data and the percept theory, part I. Mind 58 (October):434-465. (Google | Edit)

Firth, Roderick (1950). Sense-data and the percept theory, part II. Mind 59 (January):35-56. (Google | Edit)

Fischer, Eugen (2005). Austin on sense-data: Ordinary language analysis as 'therapy'. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):67-99. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The construction and analysis of arguments supposedly are a philosopher's main business, the demonstration of truth or refutation of falsehood his principal aim. In Sense and Sensibilia, J.L. Austin does something entirely different: He discusses the sense-datum doctrine of perception, with the aim not of refuting it but of 'dissolving' the 'philosophical worry' it induces in its champions. To this end, he 'exposes' their 'concealed motives', without addressing their stated reasons. The paper explains where and why this at first sight outrageous aim and approach are perfectly sensible, how exactly Austin proceeds, and how his approach can be taken further. This shows Austin to be a pioneer of the currently much discussed notion of philosophy as therapy, reveals a subtle and unfamiliar use of linguistic analysis that is not open to the standard objections to ordinary language philosophy, and yields a novel and forceful treatment of the sense-datum doctrine

Fish, Michael D. (1968). Are sense-data material things? Logique Et Analyse 11 (December):459-467. (Google | Edit)

Forrest, Peter (2005). Universals as sense-data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):622-631. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Fries, Horace S. (1935). The spatial location of sensa. Philosophical Review 44 (4):345-353. (Google | More links | Edit)

Gallois, André (1979). Basic properties and sense datum attributes. Personalist 60 (January):53-60. (Google | Edit)

García-Carpintero, Manuel (2001). Sense data: The sensible approach. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):17-63. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In this paper, I present a version of a sense-data approach to perception, which differs to a certain extent from well-known versions like the one put forward by Jackson. I compare the sense-data view to the currently most popular alternative theories of perception, the so-called Theory of Appearing (a very specific form of disjunctivist approaches) on the one hand and reductive representationalist approaches on the other. I defend the sense-data approach on the basis that it improves substantially on those alternative theories

Gentry, George (1943). The logic of the sensum theory. Philosophy of Science 10 (April):81-89. (Google | More links | Edit)

Hahn, Lewis Edwin (1939). Neutral, indubitable sense-data as the starting point for theories of perception. Journal of Philosophy 36 (22):589-600. (Google | More links | Edit)

Hall, Richard J. (1964). The term sense-datum. Mind 73 (January):130-131. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Hardin, C. L. (1985). Frank talk about the colors of sense-data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (December):485-93. (Google | Edit)

Hare, Peter H. & Koehl, Richard A. (1968). Moore and Ducasse on the sense data issue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (March):313-331. (Google | More links | Edit)

Harrison, Jonathan (1993). Science, souls and sense-data. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Hatfield, Gary (2002). Sense-data and the philosophy of mind: Russell, James, and Mach. Principia 6 (2):203-230. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Hellie, Benj (2007). That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore’s ‘The refutation of idealism’, material as widely cited for its discussion of ‘transparency’ and ‘diaphanousness’ as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, ‘that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact’ is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric. The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be

Howell, Robert J. & Fantl, Jeremy (2003). Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84:371-383. (Google | Edit)

Huemer, Michael (online). Sense-data. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Jackson, Frank (1978). Perception. Philosophical Books 19 (May):49-56. (Cited by 155 | Google | Edit)

Jackson, Frank (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 155 | Google | Edit)

Jackson, Frank (1976). The existence of mental objects. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):33-40. (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)

Johnson, David Martel (1971). Another perspective on the speckled hen. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (December):235-244. (Google | Edit)

Johnstone Jr, Henry W. (1951). A postscript on sense-data. Journal of Philosophy 48 (December):809-813. (Google | Edit)

Jones, J. R. (1951). Dr Moore's revised directions for picking out visual sense-data. Philosophical Quarterly 1 (October):433-438. (Google | More links | Edit)

Jones, J. R. (1954). Sense data: A suggested source of the fallacy. Mind 63 (April):180-202. (Google | More links | Edit)

Kalansuriya, A. D. P. (1981). Sense-data and J.l. Austin: A re-examination. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 8 (April):357-371. (Google | Edit)

Kent, John B. (1928). The status of the data of experience. Journal of Philosophy 25 (23):617-627. (Google | More links | Edit)

Klein, Peter D. (1969). The private language argument and the sense-datum theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (December):325-343. (Google | More links | Edit)

Knox Jr, John (1966). On mr Nelson's rejection of sense-data. Ratio 8 (June):90-95. (Google | Edit)

Knox Jr, John (1985). Subjective successions. Inquiry 28 (December):429-440. (Google | Edit)

Kriegel, Uriah (2004). Trope theory and the metaphysics of appearances. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):5-20. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The concept of appearance has had the historical misfortune of being associated with a Kantian or idealist program in metaphysics. Within this program, appearances are treated as "internal objects" that are immaterial and exert no causal powers over the physical world. However, there is a more mundane and innocuous notion of appearance, in which to say that x appears to y is just to say that y perceives x. In this more mundane sense of the term, an appearance is a perceived object qua perceived. In this paper, I try and develop an account of the metaphysic of appearances in this more mundane sense. The account is developed within the framework of Trope Theory. After defining the notion of a "phenomenal trope," I construe appearances as special bundles of phenomenal tropes. I then use this account to develop an approach to the thorny issue of appearance individuation

Kulkarni, N. G. (1973). Are there sense-data, part II. Journal of the Philosophical Association 14 (January-December):159-166. (Google | Edit)

Leighton, Joseph A. (1916). Percipients, sense data, and things. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (5):121-128. (Google | More links | Edit)

Lewis, David (1966). Percepts and color mosaics in visual experience. Philosophical Review 75 (July):357-368. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Lewy, C. (1946). The terminology of sense-data. Mind 55 (April):166-169. (Google | More links | Edit)

Lloyd, A. C. (1950). Empiricism, sense data and scientific languages. Mind 59 (January):57-70. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (1981). Indirect perception and sense data. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (October):330-342. (Cited by 47 | Google | More links | Edit)

Mackay, D. S. (1932). The displacement of the sense-datum. Journal of Philosophy 29 (10):253-259. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Martin, Michael G. F. (ms). Austin's Sense and Sensibilia revisited. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: When John Langshaw Austin died in  he had published only seven papers, together with a translation into English of Frege’s _Die _ _Grundlagen der Arithmetik_. But at his death he was pre-eminent among Oxford philosophers. Memoirs of him published at or near that time mention him in the same breath as Wittgenstein, as his equal in inﬂuence and philosophical importance. This conjunction is echoed in some popular presentations of the history of mid-cen tury philosophy, which lump Austin and Wittgenstein together as the leaders of the ‘linguistic philosophy’ or ‘ordinary language’ phi losophy that dominated England at that time

Martin, Michael W. (2000). Beyond dispute: Sense-data, intentionality, and the mind-body problem. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)

Maund, J. Barry (1975). The representative theory of perception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (September):41-55. (Cited by 70 | Google | Edit)

Mcrae, Robert (1985). Perceptions, objects and the nature of mind. Hume Studies (Suppl.) 85:150-167. (Google | Edit)

3.1a	Sense-Datum Theories [140]

3.1c	Intentionalism [36]

3.1d	Belief Theories [20]

3.1f	Disjunctivism [52]

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