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3.1a. Sense-Datum Theories (Sense-Datum Theories on PhilPapers)

See also:
Aaron, R. I. (1958). The common sense view of sense-perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-14.   (Google)
Adams, E. M. (1958). The nature of the sense-datum theory. Mind 67 (April):216-226.   (Google | More links)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1934). Are there vague sense-data? Mind 43 (172):477-482.   (Google | More links)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1955). Is an after-image a sense-datum? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (3):369-376.   (Google | More links)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1979). Objective sense-data. Personalist 60 (January):36-42.   (Google)
Allinson, R. E. (1978). A non-dualistic reply to Moore's refutation of idealism. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 5 (July):661-668.   (Google)
Alston, William P. (1957). Is a sense-datum language necessary? Philosophy of Science 24 (1):41-45.   (Google | More links)
Andriopoulos, D. Z. (1979). Did Aristotle assume a sense-data theory? Philosophical Inquiry 1:125-128.   (Google)
Armstrong, David Malet (1979). Perception, sense-data, and causality. In Graham Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.~J. Ayer with His Replies. Macmillan.   (Google)
Austin, J. L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 247 | Google)
Austin, J. L. (1964). Sense And Sensibilia; Reconstructed From The Manuscript Notes By G J Warnock. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1967). Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory? Synthese 17 (June):117-140.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Ayer, A. J. (1970). Metaphysics and Common Sense. San Francisco,Freeman, Cooper.   (Google)
Abstract: On making philosophy intelligible.--What is communication?--Meaning and intentionality.--What must there be?--Metaphysics and common sense.--Philosophy and science.--Chance.--Knowledge, belief, and evidence.--Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory?--Professor Malcolm on dreams.--An appraisal of Bertrand Russell's philosophy.--G. E. Moore on propositions and facts.--Reflections on existentialism.--Man as a subject for science.--Philosophy and politics
Ayer, A. J. & Macdonald, Graham (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1940). The Foundations Of Empirical Knowledge. Macmillan.   (Cited by 72 | Google)
Ayer, A. J. (1945). The terminology of sense-data. Mind 54 (October):289-312.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Ba, (2004). On the ontological issue of sense data. Philosophia 33 (2):125-154.   (Google)
Barnes, Winston H. F. (1945). The myth of sense-data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:89-118.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Becroft, H. C. (1925). Professor Norman Kemp Smith's theory of the sensa. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):179 – 189.   (Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000). Naturalized sense data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):353-374.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bergmann, Gustav (1947). Sense data, linguistic conventions, and existence. Philosophy of Science 14 (2):152-163.   (Google | More links)
Bickham, Stephen H. (1975). What is at issue in the Ayer-Austin dispute about sense-data. Midwestern Journal of Philosophy 1:1-8.   (Google)
Biswas, Shokti Charan (1967). The Nature and Status of Sensa. [Allahabad]Dept. Of Philosophy, University of Allahabad.   (Google)
Blyth, John W. (1935). A discussion of mr. price's Perception. Mind 44 (173):58-67.   (Google | More links)
Brain, W. Russell (1960). Space and sense-data. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (November):177-191.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brain, Walter R. (1959). The Nature Of Experience. London,: Oxford University Press,.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Bretzevonl, Philip (1974). Cornman, sensa, and the argument from hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):443-445.   (Google)
Brown, Norman O. (1957). Sense-data and material objects. Mind 66 (April):173-194.   (Google | More links)
Bronaugh, Richard N. (1964). The argument from the elliptical penny. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):151-157.   (Google | More links)
Brokes, Audre Jean (2000). The argument from illusion reconsidered. Disputatio 9 (1).   (Google)
Campbell, Charles A. (1947). Sense data and judgment in sensory cognition. Mind 56 (October):289-316.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Caruso, Gregg (1999). A defence of the adverbial theory. Philosophical Writings 10:51-65.   (Google)
Carney, James D. (1962). Was Moore talking nonsense in 1918? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (June):521-527.   (Google | More links)
Casullo, Albert (1987). A defense of sense-data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):45-61.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cash, Peter T. (1979). The argument from the hand. Philosophical Investigations 2:47-70.   (Google)
Chandra, Suresh (1976). Sensible awareness of sense-objects. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April):355-366.   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick (1942). Discussions: The problem of the speckled hen. Mind 51 (204).   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1950). The theory of appearing. In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall.   (Google)
Chrucky, Andrew (online). The alleged fallacy of the sense-datum inference.   (Google)
Abstract: Sense-data, if they exist, could conceivably provide foundations for empirical knowledge. Those who are opposed to empirical foundationalism are therefore also prone to reject sense-data and arguments for their existence, e.g., Rorty, Bonjour; while foundationalists are prone to accept the existence of sense-data, e.g., Russell, Ayer, Broad, Price, Lewis. An exception to this is the position of Roderick Chisholm who accepts empirical foundationalism but rejects the existence of sense-data
Chubb, J. N. (1973). Are there sense-data, part I. Journal of the Philosophical Association 14 (January-December):135-158.   (Google)
Chuard, Philippe & Corry, Richard (ms). Looks non-transitive!   (Google)
Abstract: Suppose you are presented with three red objects. You are then asked to take a careful look at each possible pair of objects, and to decide whether or not their members look chromatically the same. You carry out the instructions thoroughly, and the following propositions sum up the results of your empirical investigation:
i. red object #1 looks the same in colour as red object #2.
ii. red object #2 looks the same in colour as red object #3
Coates, Paul (online). Sense-data. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Cooney, William (1985). Some comments on the sense-datum theory and the argument from illusion. Dialogue 28 (October):8-15.   (Google)
Cory, Daniel (1948). Are sense-data in the brain? Journal of Philosophy 45 (September):533-548.   (Google | More links)
Cornman, James W. (1970). Sellars, scientific realism, and sensa. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):417-51.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Cory, Daniel (1939). The private field of immediate experience. Journal of Philosophy 36 (16):421-427.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Coval, Sam C. & Todd, D. D. (1972). Adjusters and sense-data. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (January):107-112.   (Google)
Cowley, Fraser (1968). A Critique Of British Empiricism. Macmillan.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Cresswell, M. J. (1980). Jackson on perception. Theoria 46:123-147.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Crossley, David J. (1994). Moore's Refutation of Idealism: The debate about sensations. Idealistic Studies 24 (1):1-20.   (Google)
Culbertson, James T. (1963). The Minds Of Robots: Sense Data, Memory Images, And Behavior In Conscious Automata. Urbana: University Of Illinois Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Davie, G. E. (1954). Common sense and sense-data. Philosophical Quarterly 4 (July):229-246.   (Google | More links)
Dawes Hicks, G. (1912). The nature of sense-data. Mind 21 (83):399-409.   (Google | More links)
De Boer, C. (1931). Sceptical notes on the sense-datum. Journal of Philosophy 28 (19):505-519.   (Google | More links)
Ducasse, Curt J. (1936). Introspection, mental acts, and sensa. Mind 45 (178):181-192.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ducasse, C. J. (1942). Moore's refutation of idealism. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.   (Google)
Elder, Crawford L. (2007). Conventionalism and the world as bare sense-data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, merely project our conventions of individuation. Our confidence is warranted because apart from those conventions there are no phenomena of kind-sameness or of numerical sameness across time. There is just 'stuff' displaying properties. This paper argues that conventionalists can assign no properties to the 'stuff' beyond immediate phenomenal properties. Consequently they cannot explain how each of us comes to be able to wield 'our conventions'
Epstein, Joseph (1956). Professor Ayer on sense-data. Journal of Philosophy 53 (13):401-415.   (Google | More links)
Fantl, Jeremy & Howell, Robert J. (2003). Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Farnell, Derrick (ms). This is a simulation.   (Google)
Abstract: This article simply provides a very short introduction, aimed at non-philosophers, to the time-lag argument for the representational theory of perception.
Firth, Roderick (1949). Sense-data and the percept theory, part I. Mind 58 (October):434-465.   (Google)
Firth, Roderick (1950). Sense-data and the percept theory, part II. Mind 59 (January):35-56.   (Google)
Firth, Roderick (1949). Sense-data and the percept theory. Mind 58 (232):434-465.   (Google | More links)
Firth, Roderick (1950). Sense-data and the percept theory. Mind 59 (233):35-56.   (Google | More links)
Fischer, Eugen (2005). Austin on sense-data: Ordinary language analysis as 'therapy'. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):67-99.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The construction and analysis of arguments supposedly are a philosopher's main business, the demonstration of truth or refutation of falsehood his principal aim. In Sense and Sensibilia, J.L. Austin does something entirely different: He discusses the sense-datum doctrine of perception, with the aim not of refuting it but of 'dissolving' the 'philosophical worry' it induces in its champions. To this end, he 'exposes' their 'concealed motives', without addressing their stated reasons. The paper explains where and why this at first sight outrageous aim and approach are perfectly sensible, how exactly Austin proceeds, and how his approach can be taken further. This shows Austin to be a pioneer of the currently much discussed notion of philosophy as therapy, reveals a subtle and unfamiliar use of linguistic analysis that is not open to the standard objections to ordinary language philosophy, and yields a novel and forceful treatment of the sense-datum doctrine
Fish, Michael D. (1968). Are sense-data material things? Logique Et Analyse 11 (December):459-467.   (Google)
Forrest, Peter (2005). Universals as sense-data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):622-631.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper concerns the structure of appearances. I argue that to be appeared to in a certain way is to be aware of one or more universals. Universals therefore function like the sense-data, once highly favoured but now out of fashion. For instance, to be appeared to treely, in a visual way, is to be aware of the complex relation, being treeshaped and tree-coloured and being in front of, a relation of a kind which could be instantiated by a material object and a perceiver, which is thus instantiated in the veridical case but not in the non-veridical
Fries, Horace S. (1935). The spatial location of sensa. Philosophical Review 44 (4):345-353.   (Google | More links)
Gallois, Andr (1979). Basic properties and sense datum attributes. Personalist 60 (January):53-60.   (Google)
Ganapathy, T. N. (1984). Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Sense-Data. Dept. Of Philosophy, Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda College.   (Google)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (2001). Sense data: The sensible approach. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):17-63.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I present a version of a sense-data approach to perception, which differs to a certain extent from well-known versions like the one put forward by Jackson. I compare the sense-data view to the currently most popular alternative theories of perception, the so-called Theory of Appearing (a very specific form of disjunctivist approaches) on the one hand and reductive representationalist approaches on the other. I defend the sense-data approach on the basis that it improves substantially on those alternative theories
Gentry, George (1943). The logic of the sensum theory. Philosophy of Science 10 (April):81-89.   (Google | More links)
Gotlind, Erik (1952). Some comments on mistakes in statements concerning sense-data. Mind 61 (July):297-306.   (Google | More links)
Gupta, K. C. (1953). Sense-data and judgment in perceptual knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 25 (January):243-249.   (Google)
Hahn, Lewis Edwin (1939). Neutral, indubitable sense-data as the starting point for theories of perception. Journal of Philosophy 36 (22):589-600.   (Google | More links)
Hall, Richard J. (1964). The term sense-datum. Mind 73 (January):130-131.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hardin, C. L. (1985). Frank talk about the colors of sense-data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (December):485-93.   (Google)
Hare, Peter H. & Koehl, Richard A. (1968). Moore and Ducasse on the sense data issue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (March):313-331.   (Google | More links)
Harrison, Jonathan (1993). Science, souls and sense-data. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hatfield, Gary (2002). Sense-data and the philosophy of mind: Russell, James, and Mach. Principia 6 (2):203-230.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Abstract: I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric. The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be.
Johnstone Jr, Henry W. (1951). A postscript on sense-data. Journal of Philosophy 48 (26):809-814.   (Google | More links)
Hicks, G. Dawes (1912). The nature of sense-data. Mind 21 (83):399-409.   (Google | More links)
Hilbert, David R. (2004). Hallucination, sense-data and direct realism. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):185-191.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Howell, Robert J. & Fantl, Jeremy (2003). Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84:371-383.   (Google)
Huemer, Michael (online). Sense-data. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (1978). Perception. Philosophical Books 19 (May):49-56.   (Cited by 155 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 155 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (1976). The existence of mental objects. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):33-40.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
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Jones, J. R. (1954). Sense data: A suggested source of the fallacy. Mind 63 (April):180-202.   (Google | More links)
Kalansuriya, A. D. P. (1981). Sense-data and J.l. Austin: A re-examination. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 8 (April):357-371.   (Google)
Kent, John B. (1928). The status of the data of experience. Journal of Philosophy 25 (23):617-627.   (Google | More links)
Klein, Peter D. (1969). The private language argument and the sense-datum theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.   (Google | More links)
Knox Jr, John (1966). On mr Nelson's rejection of sense-data. Ratio 8 (June):90-95.   (Google)
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Martin, Michael G. F. (ms). Austin's Sense and Sensibilia revisited.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When John Langshaw Austin died in ???? he had published only seven papers, together with a translation into English of Frege
Martin, Michael G. F. (2000). Beyond dispute: Sense-data, intentionality, and the mind-body problem. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
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Abstract: Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserl's pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschew's book was the concept of the given. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald concept. Carnap did the same when he wrote his Aufbau, the only difference being that he spoke not of sense-data but of Erlebnisse. This means, I argue, that both Moore's sense-data and Carnap'sErlebnisse have little to do with either British empiricists or the neo-Kantians. In Part II, I try to ascertain what made early analytic philosophy different from all those philosophical groups and movements that either exercised influence on it, or were closely related to it: phenomenologists, Greifswald objectivists, Brentanists. For this purpose, I identify the sine qua non practices of the early analytic philosophers: exactness; acceptance of the propositional turn; descriptivism; objectivism. If one of these practices was not explored by a given philosophical school or group, in all probability, it was not truly analytic
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Abstract: Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver. Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal principle. I suggest that although Direct Realism is in more than one respect implausible, it does not succumb to Robinson’s argument. The causal principle is true only if ‘proximate cause’ means ‘proximate sufficient cause’, and the Direct Realist need not concede that there is a sufficient cerebral cause for direct awareness of independent objects
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Abstract: Questions about perception remain some of the most difficult and insoluble in both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Perception provides a highly accessible introduction to the area, exploring the philosophical importance of those questions by re-examining the sense-datum theory, once the most popular theory of perception. Howard Robinson surveys the history of arguments for and against the sense-datum theory, from Descartes to Husserl. Robinson contends that the objections to the theory, particularly Wittgenstein's attack on privacy and those of the physicalists, have been unsuccessful. He argues for returning to the theory in order to understand perception. In doing so, he seeks to overturn a consensus that has dominated the philosophy of perception for nearly half a century
Robinson, Howard (2005). Reply to Nathan: How to reconstruct the causal argument. Acta Analytica 20 (36):7-10.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate one, and that, properly interpreted, the argument does not equivocate on proximate cause. Furthermore, I claim that his postulation of a modified mechanism for hallucinations is implausibly ad hoc
Robinson, Howard M. (2005). Sense-Data, Intentionality, and Common Sense. In G. Forrai (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future. Rodopi NY.   (Google)
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Russell, Bertrand (1914). The relation of sense-data to physics. Scientia 16:1--27.   (Google)
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Abstract: The notion of representation has become ubiquitous throughout cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and the cognitive sciences generally. This paper addresses the status of mental representations as entities that have been posited to explain cognition. I do so by examining similarities between mental representations and sense-data in both their characteristics and key arguments offered for each. I hope to show that more caution in the adoption and use of representations in explaining cognition is warranted. Moreover, by paying attention to problematic notions of representations, a less problematic sense of representation might emerge
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Abstract: • A coin appears to be elliptical when looked at from an angle, but it’s round. • A stick appears to be bent when it is partly immersed in water, but it’s straight. • An oasis appears to exist, but it doesn’t. • A bucket of water appears to be two different temperatures to two different hands, but it’s all..
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