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3.1b. Adverbialism and Qualia Theories (Adverbialism and Qualia Theories on PhilPapers)

See also:
Berger, G. (1987). On the structure of visual sentience. Synthese 71 (June):355-70.   (Google | More links)
Bestor, Thomas W. (1979). Gilbert Ryle and the adverbial theory of mind. Personalist 60 (July):233-242.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brown, Harold I. (1987). Observation And Objectivity. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book develops an explanation for the roles of observation and theory in scientific endeavor that occupies the middle ground between empiricism and rationalism, and captures the strengths of both approaches. Brown argues that philosophical theories have the same epistemological status as scientific theories and constructs an epistemological theory that provides an account of the role that theory and instruments play in scientific observation. His theory of perception yields a new analysis of objectivity that combines the traditional view of observation as the foundation of scientific objectivity with the contemporary recognition that observation is theory-dependent
Butchvarov, Panayot K. (1980). Adverbial theories of consciousness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (3):261-80.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Caruso, Gregg (1999). A defence of the adverbial theory. Philosophical Writings 10:51-65.   (Google)
Casullo, Albert (1983). Adverbial theories of sensing and the many-property problem. Philosophical Studies 44 (September):143-160.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Romane L. (1987). Objects of consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 1:481-500.   (Google)
Clark, R. (1981). Sensing, perceiving, thinking. Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:273-95.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Clark, Romane L. (1979). Sensing, perceiving, thinking. Grazer Philosophische Studien/ 8:273-295.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Conduct, M. D. (2008). Naïve realism, adverbialism and perceptual error. Acta Analytica 23 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (a) is independent of acceptance of (b). I then present a modified adverbialism that presents experience as relational in nature but whose character is nevertheless to be explained in terms of the way in which one senses an object. Finally, I will offer an explanation of how a naïve realist about experience can adopt this modified adverbialism and in so doing accommodate the possibility of perceptual error
Ducasse, C. J. (1942). Moore's refutation of idealism. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.   (Google)
Elugardo, Reinaldo (1982). Cornman, adverbial materialism, and phenomenal properties. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):33-50.   (Google | More links)
Fumerton, Richard A. (2000). Relational, non-relational, and mixed theories of experience. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.   (Google)
Goldstein, Laurence (1983). The adverbial theory of conceptual thought. The Monist 65 (July):379-392.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary C. (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited : color as a psychobiological property -- Sense data and the mind body problem -- The reality of qualia -- The sensory core and the medieval foundations of early modern perceptual theory -- Postscript (2008) on Ibn al-Haytham's (Alhacen's) theory of vision -- Attention in early scientific psychology -- Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science : reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology -- What can the mind tell us about the brain? : psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint -- Introspective evidence in psychology.
Honderich, Ted (1992). Seeing qualia and positing the world. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (1975). On the adverbial analysis of visual experience. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):127-135.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Kalat, James W. (2002). Identism without objective qualia: Commentary on Crooks. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):233-238.   (Google)
Lahav, Ran (1990). An alternative to the adverbial theory: Dis-phenomenalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):553-568.   (Google | More links)
Langsam, Harold (2000). Experiences, thoughts, and qualia. Philosophical Studies 99 (3):269-295.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Le Morvan, Pierre (2008). Sensory experience and intentionalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing
Loar, Brian (2003). Transparent experience and the availability of qualia. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Loui, Michael C. (1994). Against qualia: Our direct perception of physical reality. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Phenomenal objects: A backhanded defense. Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Maund, Barry (2003). Perception. Acumen.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Millar, Alan (1991). Reasons and Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Millar argues against the tendency in current philosophical thought to treat sensory experiences as a peculiar species of propositional attitude. While allowing that experiences may in some sense bear propositional content, he presents a view of sensory experiences as a species of psychological state. A key theme in his general approach is that justified belief results from the competent exercise of conceptual capacities, some of which involve an ability to respond appropriately to current experience. In working out this approach the author develops a view of concepts and their mastery, explores the role of groundless beliefs drawing on suggestions of Wittgenstein, illuminates aspects of the thought of Locke, Hume, Quine, and Goldman, and finally offers a response to a sophisticated variety of scepticism
Park, Desiree (1992). Ayerian 'qualia' and the empiricist heritage. In The Philosophy of A Jayer. Peru: Open Court.   (Google)
Rapaport, William J. (1979). An adverbial meinongian theory. Analysis 39 (March):75-81.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1975). The adverbial theory of the objects of sensation. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):144-160.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Sorensen, Roy A. (2008). Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eclipse riddle -- Seeing surfaces -- The disappearing act -- Spinning shadows -- Berkeley's shadow -- Para-reflections -- Para-refractions : shadowgrams and the black drop -- Goethe's colored shadows -- Filtows -- Holes in the light -- Black and blue -- Seeing in black and white -- We see in the dark -- Hearing silence.
Thomas, Alan (2003). An adverbial theory of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper develops an adverbial theory of consciousness. Adverbialism is described and endorsed and defended from its near rival, an identity thesis in which conscious mental states are those that the mental subject self-knows immediately that he or she is "in". The paper develops an account of globally supported self-ascription to embed this neo-Brentanian view of experiencing consciously within a more general account of the relation between consciousness and self-knowledge. Following O'Shaughnessy, person level consciousness is explained as a feature of the bundle of mental capacities characteristic of persons: person level consciousness involves a capacity holism. Drawing on Kant, it is argued that if a person is in a mental state intentionally directed to an object then such a subject can "self token" such knowledge. The content of that self-knoweldge supervenes on the possession of a global set of capacities, and this capacity for self-ascription depends on the fact that our experience has a perspectival character with, as it were, nothing at the vanishing point of this perspective. The fact that one can attach the cogito to any one of one's representation shows a truth about the unity of the conscious life of a person that cannot be stated and this capacity is distinguished from self-conscious thinking about oneself. This approach is contrasted to Shoemaker's functionalist treatment of the self-tokening of conscious states and of "self-blindness". It is argued that to be fully consistent, Shoemaker has to abandon the claim that introspectionism is guilty of a self-scanning model or rational control as he seems committed to that model too
Tye, Michael (1984). The adverbial approach to visual experience. Philosophical Review 93 (April):195-226.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (1975). The adverbial theory: A defence of Sellars against Jackson. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):136-143.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
van Steenburgh, E. W. (1987). Adverbial sensing. Mind 76 (July):376-380.   (Google | More links)
Vinci, Thomas C. (1981). Sellars and the adverbial theory of sensation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (June):199-217.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wright, Edmond L. (1990). Two more proofs of present qualia. Theoria 56 (1-2):3-22.   (Cited by 25 | Google)