Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

3.1c. Intentionalist Theories of Perception (Intentionalist Theories of Perception on PhilPapers)

See also:
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1965). The intentionality of sensation: A grammatical feature. In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy. Blackwell.   (Cited by 47 | Google)
Armstrong, David M. (2004). In defence of the cognitivist theory of perception. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12:19-26.   (Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1991). Intentionality, perception, and causality. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1983). Toward a different approach to perception. International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (March):45-64.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1991). Vision and intentional content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Google)
Byrne, Alex (2001). Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.   (Cited by 75 | Google | More links)
Coburn, Robert C. (1977). Intentionality and perception. Mind 86 (January):1-18.   (Google | More links)
Crawford, Dan D. (1974). Bergmann on perceiving, sensing, and appearing. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (April):103-112.   (Google)
Crane, Tim (2009). Is perception a propositional attitude? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.   (Google)
Abstract: It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content
Dilworth, John B. (2007). Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve _indeterminate _perceptual content, but a _double content_ (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases
Dretske, Fred (2003). The intentionality of perception. In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Foster, John A. (2004). Reply to Armstrong. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12:27-28.   (Google)
Gluer, Kathrin (ms). Perception and justification.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction When it comes to perception, representationalism is all the rage. Representationalism is a claim about the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences: According to representationalism, phenomenal character is fully determined by the representational content of perceptual experiences (cf. Tye 2002, 45). In other words, phenomenal character, what it is like, for instance, to have an experience as of something red, is either supervenient upon or identical with that experience
Ha, Jong-Ho (1988). On the propositional theory of perception. Grazer Philosophische Studien 32:205-208.   (Google)
Hellie, Benj (ms). Visual form, attention, and binocularity.   (Google)
Abstract: This somewhat odd paper argues against a representational view of visual experience using an intricate "inversion" type thought experiment involving double vision: two subjects could represent external space in the same way while differing phenomenally due to different "spread" in their double images. The spatial structure of the visual field is explained not by representation of external space but functionally, in terms of the possible locations of an attentional spotlight. I'm fond of the ideas in this paper but doubt I'll be returning to it soon.
Hintikka, Jaakko (1969). The logic of perception. In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Models for Modalities. Reidel.   (Google)
Holman, Emmett L. (2003). Sense experience, intentionality, and modularity. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-57.   (Google)
Jacquette, Dale (1984). Sensation and intentionality. Philosophical Studies 47 (3):229-40.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Bengson, John; Grube, Enrico & Korman, Daniel Z. (forthcoming). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs.   (Google)
Abstract: Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative thought, phenomenal character, and the speckled hen objection to modest foundationalism.
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2004). Some arguments against intentionalism. Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Recently, many have argued that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content; i.e. that the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined (metaphysically, not causally) by the representational content of that experience. This paper it identifies many counter-examples to intentionalism. Further, this paper shows that, if intentionalism were correct, that would require that an untenable form of representational atomism also be correct. Our argument works both against the idea that phenomenal content supervenes on “conceptual” content and also against the idea that it supervenes on “non-conceptual” content. It is also shown that the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content has been wrongly conceived as distinction between different kinds of information: in fact, it is a distinction between ways of packaging information that is, in itself, neither conceptual or non-conceptual
Macpherson, Fiona (1999). Perfect pitch and the content of experience. Philosophy and Anthropology 3 (2).   (Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling   (Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1983). The intentionality of sense-perception. Philosophical Investigations 6 (July):175-183.   (Google)
Martin Jr, Edwin (1973). The intentionality of observation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (September):121-129.   (Google)
Matthen, Mohan P. (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. His work will be a stimulating resource for a wide range of scholars and students across philosophy and psychology
Matthen, Mohan (2008). Seeing, doing, and knowing: A précis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):392–399.   (Google | More links)
Maund, Barry (2003). Perception. Acumen.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Millar, Alan (1986). What's in a look? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86:83-98.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1977). On perceptual aboutness. Behaviorism 5:75-97.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Odegard, Douglas (1972). Anscombe, sensation and intentional objects. Dialogue 11 (March):69-77.   (Google)
Pacherie, (1999). Leibhaftigkeit and representational theories of perception. In Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Pautz, Adam (2010). An argument for the intentional view of visual experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pautz, Adam (2007). Intentionalism and perceptual presence. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
Pautz, Adam (2006). Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2):205-240.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Phillips, Ian (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford University   (Google)
Abstract: Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti -Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties
Reed, Edward S. (1983). Two theories of the intentionality of perceiving. Synthese 54 (January):85-94.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (2004). A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysics. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):519-540.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no reason for him to resist a properly deflated version of it that I sketch. Moreover, such intentionalism seems to me to stand a better chance than Clark's reliance on properties in explaining the peculiar ways in which experience appears to us that so concern the qualiaphile
Reynolds, Steven L. (2000). The argument from illusion. Noûs 34 (4):604-621.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard M. (1974). The irrelevance of intentionality to perception. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (October):300-315.   (Google | More links)
Ruegsegger, Ronald W. (1980). The propositional attitude in perception. Philosophy Research Archives 1408.   (Google)
Runzo, Joseph (1977). The propositional structure of perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (July):211-220.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Searle, John R. (1991). Response: Perception and the satisfactions of intentionality. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Simmons, Alison (1999). Are cartesian sensations representational? Noûs 33 (3):347-369.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Smith, A. D. (2008). Translucent experiences. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):197--212.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered
Sosa, Ernest (1986). Experience and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):67-83.   (Annotation | Google)
Speaks, Jeff (2009). Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond to these worries by arguing that Russellianism is consistent with intentionalism, that their conjunction is consistent with both internalism about phenomenology and externalism about perceptual content, and that the resulting view receives independent support from the relationship between hallucination and thought.
Swabey, William C. (1924). The phenomenology of experience and psychologism. Philosophical Review 33 (1):51-66.   (Google | More links)
Travis, Charles S. (2004). The silence of the senses. Mind 113 (449):57-94.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is a view abroad on which (a) perceptual experience has (a) representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On the view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so (except insofar as the perceiver represents things to himself as so). In that sense, the senses are silent, or, in Austin's term, dumb. Perceptual experience is not as such either veridical or delusive. It may mislead, but it does not take representation to accomplish that
Tye, Michael (1992). Visual qualia and visual content. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Tye, Michael (2007). Intentionalism and the argument from no common content. Philosophical Perspectives 21:589-613.   (Google)
Abstract: Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. I do not experience the table by experiencing some- thing else over and above the table and its facing surface. I see the facing surface of the table directly
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1966). Miss Anscombe on the intentionality of sensation. Analysis 26 (March):135-137.   (Google)
Zahavi, Dan (1994). Intentionality and the representative theory of perception. Man and World 27 (1):37-47.   (Cited by 1 | Google)