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3.1d. Belief Theories of Perception (Belief Theories of Perception on PhilPapers)

See also:
Aquila, Richard E. (1975). Perceptions and perceptual judgments. Philosophical Studies 28 (July):17-31.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Armstrong, David M. (1963). Max Deutscher and perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):246-249.   (Google | More links)
Clark, R. (1973). Sensuous judgments. Noûs 7 (March):45-56.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Crumley, Jack S. (1991). Appearances can be deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64 (3).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Deutscher, Max (1963). David Armstrong and perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):80-88.   (Google | More links)
Glüer, Kathrin (2009). In defence of a doxastic account of experience. Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience
Gluer-Pagin, Kathrin (online). Perception and justification.   (Google)
Abstract: Any adequate account of perceptual experience has to provide answers to the following questions: What kind, and form of, content do experiences have? What kind of mental states are they? Many, if not most philosophers of perception today agree that experiences have representational contents of the form x is F, where x ranges over material objects and F over sensible properties. I argue that such a "naive semantics" for experiences has to give the wrong answer to the second question. Because of their justificatory role for, and inferential integration into, a subject's belief system, experiences themselves have to be construed as a kind of belief. I also sketch a semantics that allows experiences to be beliefs.
Goldman, Alan H. (1976). Appearing as irreducible in perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (December):147-164.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Goodman, Russell B. (1974). Is seeing believing? Proceedings of the New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society 40 (April):45.   (Google)
Heil, John (1982). Seeing is believing. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (July):229-240.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kelley, David (1980). The specificity of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (March):401-405.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Maund, J. Barry (1977). On the distinction between perceptual and ordinary beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (December):209-219.   (Google | More links)
Melchert, Norman P. (1973). A note on the belief theory of perception. Philosophical Studies 24 (November):427-429.   (Google | More links)
Moser, Paul K. (1986). Perception and belief: A regress problem. Philosophy of Science 53 (March):120-126.   (Google | More links)
Nelson, John O. (1964). An examination of D m Armstrong's theory of perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (April):154-160.   (Google)
Pappas, George S. (1977). Perception without belief. Ratio 19 (December):142-161.   (Google)
Pitcher, George (1971). A Theory Of Perception. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 54 | Google)
Pitson, Anthony (1990). Perception: Belief and experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):55-76.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Prado, C. G. (1968). Armstrong and perception. Theoria 34:256-258.   (Google)
Ruegsegger, Ronald W. (1982). Judging, taking, and believing: Three candidates for the propositional attitude in perception. Philosophy Research Archives 1460.   (Google)
Smith, A. D. (2001). Perception and belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.   (Google | More links)
Ziedins, R. (1966). Knowledge, belief and perceptual experiences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (May):70-88.   (Google | More links)