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3.1e. Naive and Direct Realism (Naive and Direct Realism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Armstrong, David M. (1959). Mr Arthadeva and naive realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.   (Google | More links)
Arthadeva, B. M. (1959). Naive realism and illusions: The elliptical penny. Philosophy 34 (October):323-330.   (Google)
Arthadeva, B. M. (1959). Naive realism and illusions of refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (August):118-137.   (Google | More links)
Arthadeva, B. M. (1961). Naive realism and the problem of color-seeing in dim light. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):467-478.   (Google | More links)
Ayer, A. J. & Macdonald, Graham (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Bayer, Benjamin (ms). In Search of Direct Realist Abstractionism.   (Google)
Abstract: Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Without slipping into naturalism, I apply insight about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, but only if it is supplemented by an abstractionist theory of concept-formation, the view that it is possible to abstract concepts directly from the empirically given. Critics of direct realist solutions like Laurence BonJour are correct that an account of direct perception by itself does not provide an adequate account of justification. However a direct realist account of perception can inform the needed theory of concept-formation, and leading critics of abstractionism like McDowell and Sellars, direct realists about perception themselves, fail to appreciate the ways in which their own views about perception help fill gaps in earlier accounts of abstractionism. Recognizing this undercuts both their objections to abstractionism and (therefore) their objections to foundationalism, as well.
BonJour, Laurence A. (2004). In search of direct realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):349-367.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Boulter, Stephen J. (2004). Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Brandom, Robert B. (2002). Non-inferential knowledge, perceptual experience, and secondary qualities: Placing McDowell's empiricism. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Brandom, Robert B. (1996). Perception and rational constraint: McDowell's mind and world. Philosophical Issues 7:241-259.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Bretzel, Philip (1974). Cornman, sensa, and the argument from hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6).   (Google | More links)
Brewer, Bill (2004). Realism and the nature of perceptual experience. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):61-77.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Realism concerning a given domain of things is the view that the things in that domain exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone
Brown, Harold I. (1992). Direct realism, indirect realism, and epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):341-363.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Campbell, Keith (1969). Direct realism and perceptual error. In The Business Of Reason. Routledge & K Paul.   (Google)
Carleton, Lawrence Richard (1978). Toward a defense of direct realism. Auslegung 5 (February):101-111.   (Google)
Conduct, M. D. (2008). Naïve realism, adverbialism and perceptual error. Acta Analytica 23 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (a) is independent of acceptance of (b). I then present a modified adverbialism that presents experience as relational in nature but whose character is nevertheless to be explained in terms of the way in which one senses an object. Finally, I will offer an explanation of how a naïve realist about experience can adopt this modified adverbialism and in so doing accommodate the possibility of perceptual error
Cornman, James W. (1975). Perception, Common Sense And Science. Yale University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Crooks, Mark (2002). Four rejoinders: A dialogue in continuation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):249-278.   (Google)
Dewey, John (1905). Immediate empiricism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (22):597-599.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dewey, John (1905). The postulate of immediate empiricism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (15):393-399.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Dokic, J (2000). Perception as openness to the facts. Facta Philosophica 2:95-112.   (Google | More links)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (2002). Samuel Todes's account of non-conceptual perceptual knowledge and its relation to thought. Ratio 15 (4):392-409.   (Google | More links)
Elugardo, Reinaldo (1982). Cornman, adverbial materialism, and phenomenal properties. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):33-50.   (Google | More links)
Fish, William (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Friedman, Michael (1996). Exorcising the philosophical tradition: Comments on John McDowell's Mind and World. Philosophical Review 105 (4):427-467.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Fumerton, Richard A. (2001). Brewer, direct realism, and acquaintance with acquaintance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):417-422.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Glendinning, Simon & De Gaynesford, Max (1998). John McDowell on experience: Open to the sceptic? Metaphilosophy 29 (1-2):20-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Kennedy, Matthew, Explanation in Good and Bad experiential cases.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Michael Martin aims to affirm a certain pattern of first-person thinking by advocating disjunctivism, a theory of perceptual experience which combines naive realism with the epistemic conception of hallucination. In this paper I argue that we can affirm the pattern of thinking in question without the epistemic conception of hallucination. The first part of my paper explains the link that Martin draws between the first-person thinking and the epistemic conception of hallucination. The second part of my paper explains how we can achieve Martin’s ambition without Martin’s theory. One resource that I enlist for this purpose is a naive-realist friendly conception of first-person access to experience. The metaphysical theory that I enlist is a form of naive realism that endorses an intentionalist or representationalist “common-factor” approach to veridical and hallucinatory experience. The third part of my paper briefly develops this theory
Gram, Moltke S. (1983). Direct Realism: A Study Of Perception. Boston: Nijhoff.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Hauser, Larry (2002). Don't go there: Reply to Crooks. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):223-232.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hellie, Benj (2006). Beyond phenomenal naivete. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (2):1-24.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The naive realist takes a veridical visual experience to be an immediate relation to external entities. Is this how such an experience is phenomenally, by its phenomenal character? Only if there can be phenomenal error, since a hallucinatory experience phenomenally matching such a veridical experience would then be phenomenally but not in fact such a relation. Fortunately, such phenomenal error can be avoided: the phenomenal character of a visual experience involves immediate awareness of a sort of picture of external entities, as on a representative theory of perception. The attraction of naive realism results from an erroneous projection of the immediacy of the subject's awareness of this picture onto the external entities pictured.
Hellie, Benj (2007). Factive phenomenal characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name.
Hellie, Benj (forthcoming). The multidisjunctive conception of hallucination. In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view embeds in my view as a "reference-fixer".
Hickerson, Ryan (2004). An indirect defense of direct realism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):1-6.   (Google)
Hoffman, Paul (2002). Direct realism, intentionality, and the objective being of ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):163-179.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: My aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the distinction between direct realism and representationalism by offering a critical analysis of Steven Nadler
Holman, Emmett L. (1977). Sensory experience, perceptual evidence and conceptual frameworks. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):99-108.   (Google)
Huemer, Michael (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external...
Kalderon, Mark Eli & Travis, Charles, Oxford realism.   (Google)
Abstract: A concern for realism motivates a fundamental strand of Oxford reflection on perception. Begin with the realist conception of knowledge. The question then will be: What must perception be like if we can know something about an object without the mind by seeing it? What must perception be if it can, on occasion, afford us with proof concerning a subject matter independent of the mind? The resulting conception of perception is not unlike the conception of perception shared by Cambridge realists such as Moore and Russell. Roughly speaking, perception is conceived to be a fundamental and irreducible sensory mode of awareness of mind-independent objects, a non-propositional mode of awareness that enables those with the appropriate recognitional capacities to have propositional knowledge concerning that subject matter. The difference between Oxford and Cambridge realism concerns the extent of this fundamental sensory mode of awareness. Whereas Oxford realists maintained that perception affords us this non-propositional mode of awareness, Cambridge realists maintained that this distinctive mode of awareness has a broader domain. Let experience be the genus of which perception is a species. Cambridge realists maintained that a experience, and not just perception, involves this non-propositional sensory mode of awareness. Cambridge realists are thus committed to a kind of experien- tial monism—the thesis that experience has a unitary nature. Specifically, all experience, perceptual and non-perceptual alike, involves, as part of its nature, a non-propositional sensory mode of awareness. Even subject to illusion or hallucination, there is something of which one is aware. And with that, they were an application of the argument from illusion, or hallucination, or conflicting appearances away from immaterial sense data and a representative realism that tended, over time, to devolve into a form of..
Kaplan, Stephen (1987). Hermeneutics, Holography, and Indian Idealism: A Study of Projection and Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya Kārikā. Motilal Banarsidass.   (Google)
Kelley, David (1986). The Evidence Of The Senses: A Realist Theory Of Perception. Baton Rouge: Louisiana St University Press.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Kennedy, Matthew (forthcoming). Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Michael Martin aims to affirm a certain pattern of first-person thinking by advocating disjunctivism, a theory of perceptual experience which combines naive realism with the epistemic conception of hallucination. In this paper I argue that we can affirm the pattern of thinking in question without the epistemic conception of hallucination. The first part of my paper explains the link that Martin draws between the first-person thinking and the epistemic conception of hallucination. The second part of my paper explains how we can achieve Martin’s ambition without Martin’s theory. One resource that I enlist for this purpose is a naive-realist friendly conception of first-person access to experience. The metaphysical theory that I enlist is a form of naive realism that endorses an intentionalist or representationalist “common-factor” approach to veridical and hallucinatory experience. The third part of my paper briefly develops this theory.
Kennedy, Matthew (2009). Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently representationalists have cited a phenomenon known as the transparency of experience in arguments against the qualia theory. Representationalists take transparency to support their theory and to work against the qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia and the representationalist theory of experience. I describe the transparency phenomenon, and I use my description to argue for naïve realism and against representationalism and the qualia theory. I also examine the relationship between phenomenological study and phenomenal character, and discuss the results in connection with the argument from hallucination
Kennedy, Matthew (2010). Naive realism and experiential evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):77-109.   (Google)
Abstract: I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs
Kennedy, Matthew (forthcoming). Naive Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one’s perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
Kennedy, Matthew (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298-325.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness.
Koons, Jeremy R. (2004). Disenchanting the world: McDowell, Sellars, and rational constraint by perception. Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (February):125-152.   (Google)
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Abstract: Plausibly, any adequate theory of perception must (a) solve what Alva Noë calls 'the problem of perceptual presence,' and (b) do justice to the direct realist idea that what is given in perception are garden-variety spatiotemporal particulars. This paper shows that, while Noë's sensorimotor view arguably satisfies the first of these conditions, it does not satisfy the second. Moreover, Noë is wrong to think that a naïve realist approach to perception cannot handle the problem of perceptual presence. Section three of this paper develops a version of naïve realism that meets both of the adequacy conditions above. This paper thus provides strong considerations in favor of naïve realism
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Abstract: Since the demise of the Sense-Datum independent objects or events to be objects Theory and Phenomenalism in the last cenof perception; however, unlike Direct Retury, Direct Realism in the philosophy of alists, Indirect Realists take this percepperception has enjoyed a resurgence of tion to be indirect by involving a prior popularity.1 Curiously, however, although awareness of some tertium quid between there have been attempts in the literature the mind and external objects or events.3 to refute some of the arguments against Idealists and Phenomenalists agree with Direct Realism, there has been, as of yet, the Indirect Realists
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Abstract: In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate the structure of Sellars' critical direct realism in the philosophy of perception. This position is original because it attempts to balance two claims that many have thought to be incompatible: (1) that perceptual knowledge is direct, i.e., not inferential, and (2) that perceptual knowledge is irreducibly conceptual. Even though perceptual episodes are not the result of inferences, they must still stand within the space of reasons if they are to be counted not only as knowledge, but also as thoughts directed at the world. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how Sellars elaborates and defends this position
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Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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Abstract: McDowell has argued that external world scepticism is a pressing problem only in so far as we accept, on the basis of the argument from illusion, the claim that perceiving that p and hallucinating that p involve a highest common factor
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