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3.1f. Disjunctivism (Disjunctivism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Aranyosi, István (forthcoming). Silencing the argument from hallucination. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. So what exactly is the problem? We can approach it via one of the central arguments against realism – the argument from hallucination. The argument is intended as a proof that in ordinary, veridical cases of perception, perceivers do not have an unmediated perceptual access to the world. There are many versions of it; I propose the following1: 1. Hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions are possible. 2. If two subjective states are indistinguishable, then they have a common nature. 3. The contents of hallucinations are mental images, not concrete external objects. 4. Therefore, the contents of veridical perceptions are mental images rather than concrete external objects. The key move is, I believe, from the fact that hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from cases of veridical perception are possible to an alleged common element, factor, or nature, in the form of a mental state, in the two cases – that is, premise 2. Disjunctivism, at its core, can be taken as simply denying this move, and arguing that all that follows from the premise stating the possibility of hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishable from cases veridical perception is that there is a broader category, that of “experience as of...”, which encompasses both cases..
Blatti, Stephan (2006). Disjunctivism. In A. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: A theory is disjunctive insofar as it distinguishes genuine from non-genuine cases of some phenomenon P on the grounds that no salient feature of cases of one type is common to cases of the other type. Genuine and non-genuine cases of P are, in this sense, fundamentally different. Those who advocate disjunctivist theories have (for the most part) been concerned with perception and perceptual knowledge. This entry outlines two such theories: the disjunctivist theory of experience (cf. Brewer, Hinton, Martin, Snowdon, Travis) and the disjunctivist theory of appearances (McDowell)
Brewer, Bill (2008). How to account for illusion. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its representational content. Second, retain the early modern idea that the core subjective character of experience is simply constituted by the identity of its direct objects, but admit that these must be mind-dependent entities, distinct from the mind-independent physical objects we all know and love. I argue here that the early modern empiricists had an indispensable insight. The idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience is more fundamental than any appeal to perceptual content, and can account for illusion, and indeed hallucination, without resorting to the problematic postulation of any such mind-dependent objects.
Brogaard, Berit, Disjunctivism by.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Naive realism is one of the oldest theories of perception. To a first approximation, naive realism is the view that perception is a direct relation between a subject and an object. Many historical philosophers (from Locke to Russell) argued that naive realism must be rejected on the grounds that hallucinations are perceptual experiences without an object. Contemporary philosophers have resurrected the theory by insisting that genuine cases of perception have a different structure or a different metaphysical status than non-genuine ones. This version of naive realism has come to be known as ‘disjunctivism’. Epistemological disjunctivism and disjunctivism about phenomenal belief, or what I shall call ‘Epistemological disjunctivism’, have also gained popularity in recent years. More recently disjunctivist accounts of bodily movements, abilities and reasons for action have entered the philosophical scene. This entry focuses on the contemporary debate about disjunctivism: its characterization, its motivation and its potential shortcomings
Brogaard, Berit, Primitive knowledge disjunctivism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that McDowell-style disjunctivism, as the position is often cashed out, goes wrong because it takes the good epistemic standing of veridical perception to be grounded in “manifest” facts which do not necessarily satisfy any epistemic constraints. A better form of disjunctivism explains the difference between good and bad cases in terms of epistemic constraints that the states satisfy. This view allows us to preserve McDowell’s thesis that good cases make facts manifest, as long as manifest facts must satisfy epistemic constraints
Burge, Tyler (2005). Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):1-78.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (2005). Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):1-78.   (Google)
Abstract: This essay is a long one. It is not meant to be read in a single sitting. Its structure is as follows. In section I, I explicate perceptual anti-individualism. Section II centers on the two aspects of the representational content of perceptual states. Sections III and IV concern the nature of the empirical psychology of vision, and its bearing on the individuation of perceptual states. Section V shows how what is known from empirical psychology undermines disjunctivism and hence certain further views that entail it, including naive realism. In Section VI, I raise a further point against disjunctivism. Section VII indicates how general reflection on perceptual perspective and epistemic ability supports the constraints from empirical psychology. It also explains how reflection on veridicality conditions, psychological explanation, and cognitive ability conspire to force recognition of the two kinds of representation mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In the Appendix, I criticize attempts to support disjunctivism.
Byrne, Alex & Logue, Heather (2009). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
Byrne, Alex & Logue, Heather (2008). Either/or. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours, metaphysical and epistemological.
Byrne, Alex & Logue, Heather (2009). Introduction. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
Child, William (1994). Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal understanding of the mental without having to see attitudes and experiences as internal, causally interacting entities and he defends this view against influential objections. The book offers detailed discussions of many of Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of mind, and also considers the work of Dennett, Anscombe, McDowell, and Rorty, among others. Issues discussed include: the nature of intentional phenomena; causal explanation; the character of visual experience; psychological explanation; and the causal relevance of mental properties
Child, William (1992). Vision and experience: The causal theory and the disjunctive conception. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):297-316.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Coates, Paul (1996). Idealism and theories of perception. In Current Issues in Idealism. Bristol: Thoemmes.   (Google)
Comesana, Juan (2005). Justified vs. warranted perceptual belief: Resisting disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that one reason for being a disjunctivist advanced by McDowell (having to do with the indefeasibility of perceptual knowledge) fails because it ignores the distinction between justification and warrant.
Comesaña, Juan (2005). Justified vs. warranted perceptual belief: Resisting disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where “warrant” is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield knowledge)
Conee, Earl (2007). Disjunctivism and anti-skepticism. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):16–36.   (Google | More links)
Dancy, Jonathan (1995). Arguments from illusion. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):421-438.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Smith, A. D. (2008). Husserl and externalism. Synthese 160 (3).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short, it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality
Dorsch, Fabian, Experience and introspection.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued by M. G. F. Martin and others that the hallucinatory experiences concerned cannot — and need not — be characterised in any more positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been advocated as the best choice for proponents of experiential (or ‘na¨ıve realist’) disjunctivism — the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their introspectible subjective characters. In this chapater, I aim to formulate and defend an intentional alternative to experiential disjunctivism called experiential intentionalism. This view does not only enjoy some advantages over its rival, but also can hold on to the epistemic conception of perception-like hallucinations. First of all, I try to spell out in a bit more detail in which sense hallucinations may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions, and why this leads us to erroneously judge them to be perceptions (cf. sections I–III and VIII). Then, I raise three challenges each for experiential disjunctivism and its orthodox intentionalist counterparts (cf. sections IV and V), notably in respect of the need to explicate why a perception-like hallucination still makes the same judgements reasonable from the subject’s perspective as the corresponding perceptions. And, finally, I propose my alternative both to experiential disjunctivism and to orthodox intentionalism. Experiential intentionalism takes perceptions and perception-like hallucinations to share a common character partly to be spelled out in intentional — and, hence, normative — terms (cf. sections VI and VII). The central thought is that the hallucinations concerned are intentionally — and erroneously — presented to us as perceptual relations to the world. I aim to show that the resulting view can meet all six challenges (cf. sections VI–VIII). I end..
Dorsch, Fabian, Transparency and imagining seeing.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences has been formulated by M. G. F. Martin in his paper The Transparency of Experience. The overall structure of this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims which are jointly inconsistent
Fish, William C. (2005). Disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism: Making sense of the debate. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):119-127.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Fish, William C. (2008). Disjunctivism, indistinguishability, and the nature of hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what the disjunctivist needs to provide is a plausible explanation of just how two mental states which have no common component might be indistinguishable for their subject and this in turn will require the telling of a positive story about hallucination. This is the goal of the present essay
Fish, William (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (2001). Sense data: The sensible approach. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):17-63.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I present a version of a sense-data approach to perception, which differs to a certain extent from well-known versions like the one put forward by Jackson. I compare the sense-data view to the currently most popular alternative theories of perception, the so-called Theory of Appearing (a very specific form of disjunctivist approaches) on the one hand and reductive representationalist approaches on the other. I defend the sense-data approach on the basis that it improves substantially on those alternative theories
Glendinning, S. (1998). Perception and hallucination: A new approach to the disjunctive conception of experience. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 29:314-19.   (Google)
Goldstick, D. (1980). The leninist theory of perception. Dialogue 19 (March):1-19.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gomes, Anil (online). Characterizing disjunctivism.   (Google)
Gomes, Anil (forthcoming). McDowell's Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry.   (Google)
Abstract: John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.
Gundersen, Lars Bo (2009). Disjunctivism, contextualism and the sceptical aporia. Synthese 171 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Hawthorne, John & Kovakovich, Karson (2006). Disjunctivism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):145-83.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Hellie, Benj (2010). An externalist's guide to inner experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!

Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems from shared "qualia". Qualia are compatible with direct realism: while they generate an explanatory gap (and colors do not), so does /seeing/; qualia are excluded from perceptual consciousness by its "transparency"; instead, qualia are aspects of thought about the perceived environment.

The asymmetry between my treatments of color and seeing is grounded in the asymmetry between ignorance and error: while inversion shows that normal subjects are ignorant of the natures of the colors, hallucination shows not that perceivers are ignorant of the nature of seeing but that hallucinators are prone to error about their condition. Past literature has treated inversion and hallucination as on a par: externalists see error in both cases, while internalists see mutual ignorance. My account is so complicated because plausible results require mixing it up.
Hellie, Benj (ms). Must the disjunctivist be so negative?   (Google)
Hellie, Benj (forthcoming). The multidisjunctive conception of hallucination. In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view embeds in my view as a "reference-fixer".
Hinton, J. M. (1973). Experiences: An Inquiry Into Some Ambiguities. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Hinckfuss, I. C. (1970). J.m. Hinton on visual experiences. Mind 79 (April):278-280.   (Google | More links)
Hinton, J. M. (1980). Phenomenological specimenism. Analysis 40 (January):37-41.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hinton, J. M. (2009). Selections from experiences. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hinton, J. M. (1996). Sense-experience revisited. Philosophical Investigations 19 (3):211-236.   (Google)
Hinton, J. M. (1967). Visual experiences. Mind 76 (April):217-227.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Hinton, J. M. (1973). Visual experiences: A reply to I.C. Hinckfuss. Mind 82 (April):278-279.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (2008). Against disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
Martin, Michael G. F. (2006). On being alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Martin, Michael G. F. (2004). The limits of self-awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Martin, Michael G. F. (1997). The reality of appearances. In M. Sainsbury (ed.), Thought and Ontology. Franco Angeli.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Martin, Michael G. F. (manuscript). Uncovering Appearances.   (Google)
McDowell, John (1982). Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. Proceedings of the British Academy 68:455-79.   (Cited by 114 | Google)
McDowell, John (2009). Selections from criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
McDowell, John (2008). The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Millar, Alan (2008). Perceptual-recognitional abilities and perceptual knowledge. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Millar, Alan (1996). The idea of experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:75-90.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Millar, Alan (2007). What the disjunctivist is right about. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176�198.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by sorneone rnerely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perceptionenable us to be in cognitive contact with objects and facts. I develop this challenge to the traditional conception and then show that it is possible to accornrnodate an adequate account of cognitive contact in keeping with the traditional conception. One upshot of the discussion is that experiences do not bear the explanatory burden placed upon thern by disjunctivists
Millar, Alan (2007). What the disjunctivist is right about. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-199.   (Google)
Neta, Ram (2008). In defense of disjunctivism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Right now, I see a computer in front of me. Now, according to current philosophical orthodoxy, I could have the very same perceptual experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing a computer in front of me. Indeed, such orthodoxy tells us, I could have the very same experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing anything at all in front of me, but simply suffering from a hallucination. More generally, someone can have the very same perceptual experience no matter whether she is enjoying a veridical perception of some mindindependent object, or merely hallucinating. What differs across these two kinds of case is not the kind of experience that she has, but rather the connections between her experience and the rest of the world. So say most philosophers
Pritchard, Duncan (2007). How to be a neo-Moorean. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Much of the recent debate regarding scepticism has focussed on a certain template sceptical argument and a rather restricted set of proposals concerning how one might deal with that argument. Throughout this debate the ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism is often cited as a paradigm example of how one should not respond to the sceptical argument, so conceived. As I argue in this paper, however, there are ways of resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic. In particular, I consider the prospects for three such proposals in this regard: a classical epistemic internalist neo-Mooreanism, a classical epistemic externalist neo-Mooreanism, and a non-classical McDowellian epistemic internalist neo-Mooreanism, and maintain that the last two of these proposals (both of which make appeal to a disjunctivist account of perception, broadly conceived) merit further exploration. Indeed, I claim that a suitably qualified version of neo-Mooreanism would actually sit quite well with the general philosophical motivations behind other key anti-sceptical views and I argue that given this fact neo-Mooreanism is actually at a dialectical advantage relative to other views when it comes to dealing with the sceptical problem as it is typically conceived.
Pritchard, Duncan (2006). McDowellian neo-mooreanism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard (2005). Reply to Nathan: How to reconstruct the causal argument. Acta Analytica 20 (36):7-10.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate one, and that, properly interpreted, the argument does not equivocate on proximate cause. Furthermore, I claim that his postulation of a modified mechanism for hallucinations is implausibly ad hoc
Robinson, Howard (2009). Selections from perception. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
Ruben, David-Hillel (2008). Disjunctive theories of perception and action. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Schantz, R. (2005). Direct realism, disjunctivism, and the common sensory content. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 34:321.   (Google)
Sedivy, Sonia (2008). Starting afresh disjunctively : Perceptual engagement with the world. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Setiya, Kieran (2009). Review of 'Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge'. Mind 118:834-840.   (Google)
Siegel, Susanna (2004). Indiscriminability and the phenomenal. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Siegel, Susanna (online). The dog and the zombie.   (Google)
Siegel, Susanna (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of hallucinations are dim, and that this undermines the case for disjunctivism
Smith, A. D. (2008). Disjunctivism and discriminability. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Smith, A. D. (2010). Disjunctivism and illusion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):384-410.   (Google)
Smith, A. D. (2009). Selections from the problem of perception. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
Snowdon, Paul (2008). Hinton and the origins of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Snowdon, Paul (2005). Some reflections on an argument from hallucination. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):285.   (Google)
Snowdon, Paul F. (2005). The formulation of disjunctivism: A response to fish. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105:129-141.   (Google | More links)
Sollberger, Michael (2008). Naïve realism and the problem of causation. Disputatio 3 (25):1-19.   (Google)
Abstract: In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of perceptions must be exhausted by the occurrence of inner sensory experiences that narrowly supervene on the perceiver. That is, empirical objects fail directly to determine the perceptual consciousness of the perceiver. The upshot is that not only naïve realism, but also certain further forms of direct realism have to be abandoned.
Sollberger, Michael (2007). The Causal Argument against Disjunctivism. Facta Philosophica 9:245-267.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I will ask whether naïve realists have the conceptual resources for meeting the challenge stemming from the causal argument. As I interpret it, naïve realism is committed to disjunctivism. Therefore, I first set out in detail how one has to formulate the causal argument against the background of disjunctivism. This discussion is above all supposed to work out the key assumptions at stake in the causal argument. I will then go on to sketch out several possible rejoinders on behalf of naïve realism. It will be shown that they all fail to provide a satisfying account of how causation and perceptual consciousness fit together. Accordingly, the upshot will be that the causal argument provides good reason to abandon disjunctivism and, instead, to promote a common factor view of perception.
Soteriou, Matthew (online). The Disjunctive Theory of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition).   (Google)
Soteriou, Matthew (2005). The subjective view of experience and its objective commitments. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):177-190.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sturgeon, Scott (2008). Disjunctivism about visual experience. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Sturgeon, Scott (2006). Reflective disjunctivism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):185–216.   (Google | More links)
Sturgeon, Scott (1998). Visual experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (2):179-200.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Sytsma, Justin, Searching for evidence of phenomenal consciousness in ncc research.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent scientific work aiming to give a neurobiological explanation of phenomenal consciousness has largely focused on finding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). The hope is that by locating neural correlates of phenomenally conscious mental states, some light will be cast on how the brain is able to give rise to such states. In this paper I argue that NCC research is unable to produce evidence of such neural correlates. I do this by considering two alternative interpretations of NCC research—an eliminativist and a disjunctivist interpretation. I show that each of these interpretations is compatible with the scientific data and yet is more parsimonious than accounts involving the supposed phenomenon of phenomenal consciousness
Tanesini, Alessandra (2010). The Non-Conjunctive Nature of Disjunctivism. Teorema 29 (1):95-103.   (Google)
Thau, Michael (2004). What is disjunctivism? Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):193-253.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Travis, Charles S. (2005). Frege, father of disjunctivism. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):307-334.   (Google | More links)
Travis, Charles (2005). Frege, father of disjunctivism. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):307-334.   (Google)
Travis, Charles (ms). Gazing inward.   (Google)
Van Cleve, James (2004). Externalism and disjunctivism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Vega Encabo, Jes (2006). Appearances and disjunctions: Empirical authority in McDowell's space of reasons. Teorema 25 (1):63-81.   (Google)
Vega-Encabo, Jesús (2010). Hallucinations for disjunctivists. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I examine the so-called disjunctive views on hallucinations. I argue that neither of the options open to the disjunctivist is capable of accommodating basic phenomenological facts about hallucinatory experiences and the explanatory demands behind the classical argument from hallucination. A positive characterization of the hallucinatory case is not attractive to a disjunctivist once she is disposed to accept certain commonalities with veridical experiences. Negative disjunctivism glosses the hallucinatory disjunct in terms of indiscriminability. I will argue that this move either renounces to characterize phenomenally the hallucinatory experience or does not take seriously questions about why indiscriminability is possible in the phenomenal realm
Webber, Jonathan (2000). Seeing-in-the-world. Philosophical Writings 14:3-14.   (Google)
Wright, Crispin (2008). Comment on John McDowell's "The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument". In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)