MindPapers: 3.1f. Disjunctivism

Blatti, Stephan (2006). Disjunctivism. In A. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: A theory is disjunctive insofar as it distinguishes genuine from non-genuine cases of some phenomenon P on the grounds that no salient feature of cases of one type is common to cases of the other type. Genuine and non-genuine cases of P are, in this sense, fundamentally different. Those who advocate disjunctivist theories have (for the most part) been concerned with perception and perceptual knowledge. This entry outlines two such theories: the disjunctivist theory of experience (cf. Brewer, Hinton, Martin, Snowdon, Travis) and the disjunctivist theory of appearances (McDowell)

Brewer, Bill (forthcoming). How to account for illusion. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its representational content. Second, retain the early modern idea that the core subjective character of experience is simply constituted by the identity of its direct objects, but admit that these must be mind-dependent entities, distinct from the mind-independent physical objects we all know and love. I argue here that the early modern empiricists had an indispensable insight. The idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience is more fundamental than any appeal to perceptual content, and can account for illusion, and indeed hallucination, without resorting to the problematic postulation of any mind-dependent such objects

Burge, Tyler (2005). Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. Philosophical Topics 33:1-78. (Google | Edit)

Byrne, Alex & Logue, Heather (2008). Either/or. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main ﬂavours, metaphysical and epistemological. Metaphysical disjunctivism is the view usually associated with the disjunctivist label, and whenever ‘disjunctivism’ occurs here unpreﬁxed, it refers to this view. After some initial discussion of (metaphysical) disjunctivism (sections 1–3), we explain epistemological disjunctivism in section 4. The rest of the essay is solely concerned with explaining and assessing metaphysical disjunctivism, a theory of the nature of perceptual experience. Our main (and provisional) conclusion is that although there is considerable insight in the vicinity, metaphysical disjunctivism is false

Byrne, Alex & Logue, Heather (online). Introduction to Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. (Google | More links | Edit)

Child, William (1992). Vision and experience: The causal theory and the disjunctive conception. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):297-316. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)

Coates, Paul (1996). Idealism and theories of perception. In Current Issues in Idealism. Bristol: Thoemmes. (Google | Edit)

Comesana, Juan (2005). Justified vs. warranted perceptual belief: Resisting disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXI (2005), 367-383. I argue that one reason for being a disjunctivist advanced by McDowell (having to do with the indefeasibility of perceptual knowledge) fails because it ignores the distinction between justification and warrant

Crawford, Dan D. (1974). Bergmann on perceiving, sensing, and appearing. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (April):103-112. (Google | Edit)

Fish, William C. (2005). Disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism: Making sense of the debate. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):119-127. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Fish, William C. (forthcoming). Disjunctivism, indistinguishability and the nature of hallucination. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Glendinning, S. (1998). Perception and hallucination: A new approach to the disjunctive conception of experience. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 29:314-19. (Google | Edit)

Goldstick, D. (1980). The leninist theory of perception. Dialogue 19 (March):1-19. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Gomes, Anil (online). Characterizing disjunctivism. (Google | Edit)

Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson (forthcoming). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson (forthcoming). Varieties of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Hawthorne, John & Kovakovich, Karson (2006). Disjunctivism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:145-83. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Hinckfuss, I. C. (1970). J.m. Hinton on visual experiences. Mind 79 (April):278-280. (Google | More links | Edit)

Hinton, J. Michael (1973). Experiences: An Inquiry Into Some Ambiguities. Oxford,: Clarendon Press. (Cited by 33 | Google | Edit)

Hinton, J. Michael (1980). Phenomenological specimenism. Analysis 40 (January):37-41. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Hinton, J. Michael (1996). Sense-experience revisited. Philosophical Investigations 19 (3):211-236. (Google | Edit)

Hinton, J. Michael (1967). Visual experiences. Mind 76 (April):217-227. (Cited by 16 | Google | More links | Edit)

Hinton, J. Michael (1973). Visual experiences: A reply to I.C. Hinckfuss. Mind 82 (April):278-279. (Cited by 16 | Google | More links | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (2008). Against disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Martin, Michael G. F. (2006). On being alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hal- lucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking ex- periences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case of veridical perception like this very kind of experience that you now have, the experiential episode you enjoy is of a kind which could not be occurring were you having an hallucination. The common strategy of arguments from hallucination set out to show that certain things are true of hallucinations, and hence must be true of perceptions. For example, it is argued that hallucinations must have non-physical objects of awareness, or that such states are not relations to anything at all, but are at best seeming relations to objects. In insisting that veridical perceptual experience is of a distinct kind from hallucination, the disjunctivist denies that any of these conceptions of hallucination challenges our conception of veridical perceptions as relations to mind-independent objects

Martin, Michael G. F. (2004). The limits of self-awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89. (Cited by 25 | Google | More links | Edit)

Martin, Michael G. F. (1997). The reality of appearances. In M. Sainsbury (ed.), Thought and Ontology. Franco Angeli. (Cited by 19 | Google | Edit)

Martin, Michael G. F. (manuscript). Uncovering Appearances. (Google | Edit)

McDowell, John (1982). Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. Proceedings of the British Academy 68:455-79. (Cited by 114 | Google | Edit)

McDowell, John (2008). The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Millar, Alan (2008). Perceptual-recognitional abilities and perceptual knowledge. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Millar, Alan (1996). The idea of experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:75-90. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Millar, Alan (2007). What the disjunctivist is right about. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176–198. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Neta, Ram (2008). In defense of disjunctivism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Right now, I see a computer in front of me. Now, according to current philosophical orthodoxy, I could have the very same perceptual experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing a computer in front of me. Indeed, such orthodoxy tells us, I could have the very same experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing anything at all in front of me, but simply suffering from a hallucination. More generally, someone can have the very same perceptual experience no matter whether she is enjoying a veridical perception of some mind- independent object, or merely hallucinating. What differs across these two kinds of case is not the kind of experience that she has, but rather the connections between her experience and the rest of the world. So say most philosophers

Pritchard, Duncan (2006). McDowellian neo-mooreanism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: It is claimed that McDowell’s treatment of scepticism offers a potential way of resurrecting the much derided ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism in a fashion that avoids the problems facing classical internalist and externalist construals of neo-Mooreanism. I here evaluate the prospects for a McDowellian neo-Mooreanism and, in doing so, offer further support for the view

Schantz, R. (2005). Direct realism, disjunctivism, and the common sensory content. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 34:321. (Google | Edit)

Siegel, Susanna (2004). Indiscriminability and the phenomenal. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Siegel, Susanna (online). The dog and the zombie. (Google | Edit)

Siegel, Susanna (web). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of hallucinations are dim, and that this undermines the case for disjunctivism

Smith, A. D. (forthcoming). Husserl and externalism. Synthese. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short, it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality

Snowdon, Paul F. (1980). Perception, vision, and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:175-92. (Cited by 33 | Google | Edit)

Snowdon, Paul F. (2005). The formulation of disjunctivism: A response to fish. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105:129-141. (Google | Edit)

Soteriou, Matthew (2005). The subjective view of experience and its objective commitments. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):177-190. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Sturgeon, Scott (forthcoming). Disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Sturgeon, Scott (2006). Reflective disjunctivism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:185-216. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Sturgeon, Scott (1998). Visual experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (2):179-200. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links | Edit)

Thau, Michael (2004). What is disjunctivism? Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):193-253. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Travis, Charles S. (2005). Frege, father of disjunctivism. Philosophical Topics. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The concept of the ‘inner picture’ is misleading, for this concept uses the ‘outer picture’ as a model; and yet the uses of the words for these concepts are no more like one another than those of ‘numeral’ and ‘number’. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, IIxi (p. 196))

Van Cleve, James (2004). Externalism and disjunctivism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. (Google | Edit)

Vega Encabo, Jesús (2006). Appearances and disjunctions: Empirical authority in McDowell's space of reasons. Teorema 25 (1):63-81. (Google | Edit)

Webber, Jonathan (2000). Seeing-in-the-world. Philosophical Writings 14:3-14. (Google | Edit)

Wright, Crispin (web). Comment on John McDowell's "the disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument". In A. Haddock & F. Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Descartes was surely right that while normal waking experience, dreams and hallucinations are characteristically distinguished at a purely phenomenological level, — by contrasts of spatial perspective, coherence, clarity of image, etc., — it is not essential that they be so.[1] What is it like for someone who dreams that he is sitting, clothed in his dressing gown, in front of his fire can in principle be subjectively indistinguishable from what it is like to perceive that one is doing so, fully conscious and awake. The same holds for multi-sense hallucination and, it is assumed, would hold of the experience of an envatted brain in the usual postulated scenario

3.1c	Intentionalism [36]

3.1d	Belief Theories [20]

3.1f	Disjunctivism [52]

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