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3.2. Sensory Modalities (Sensory Modalities on PhilPapers)

See also:

3.2a Distinguishing the Senses

19 / 20 entries displayed

Bermudez, Jose Luis (1999). Categorizing qualitative states: Some problems. Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2).   (Google)
Coady, C. A. J. (1974). The senses of Martians. Philosophical Review 83 (1):107-125.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Cooper, D. E. (1970). Materialism and perception. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (October):334-346.   (Google | More links)
Cox, J. W. Roxbee (1970). Distinguishing the senses. Mind 79 (October):530-550.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Feenstra, Louw & Borgstein, Johannes (2003). The senses in perspective. Ludus Vitalis 11 (20):135-157.   (Google)
Gray, Richard (2005). On the concept of a sense. Synthese 147 (3):461-475.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Keeley has recently argued that the philosophical issue of how to analyse the concept of a sense can usefully be addressed by considering how scientists, and more specifically neuroethologists, classify the senses. After briefly outlining his proposal, which is based on the application of an ordered set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for modality differentiation, I argue, by way of two complementary counterexamples, that it fails to account fully for the way the senses are in fact individuated in neuroethology and other relevant sciences. I suggest substantial modifications to Keeley
Grice, H. P. (1962). Some remarks about the senses. In R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, First Series. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 31 | Google)
Keeley, Brian L. (2002). Making sense of the senses: Individuating modalities in humans and other animals. Journal Of Philosophy 99 (1):5-28.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Leon, Mark . (1988). Characterising the senses. Mind and Language 3:243-70.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Nelkin, Norton (1990). Categorizing the senses. Mind and Language 5 (2):149-165.   (Google)
Nudds, Matthew (online). Is seeing just like feeling? Kinds of experiences and the five senses.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I am going to argue that two commonly held views about perceptual experience are incompatible and that one must be given up. The first is the view that the five senses are to be distinguished by appeal to the kind of experiences involved in perception; the second is the view
Nudds, Matthew (2000). Modes of perceiving and imagining. Acta Analytica 15 (24):139-150.   (Google)
Nudds, Matthew (online). The senses as psychological kinds.   (Google)
Abstract: The distinction we make between five different senses is a universal one.1 Rather than speaking of generically perceiving something, we talk of perceiving in one of five determinate ways: we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste things. In distinguishing determinate ways of perceiving things what are we distinguishing between? What, in other words, is a sense modality?2 An answer to this question must tell us what constitutes a sense modality and so needs to do more than simply describe differences in virtue of which we can distinguish the perceptions of different senses. There are many such differences
Nudds, Matthew (2004). The significance of the senses. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):31-51.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how and why we count ?ve senses (the counting question); none of the standard accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the signi?cance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an account of the senses and answering the counting question
O'Dea, John (forthcoming). A Proprioceptive Account of the Senses. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. OUP.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalist theories of sensory experience are often thought to be vulnerable to the existence of apparently non-representational differences between experiences in different sensory modalities. Seeing and hearing seem to differ in their qualia, quite apart from what they represent. The origin of this idea is perhaps Grice’s argument, in “Some Remarks on the Senses,” that the senses are distinguished by “introspectible character.” In this chapter I take the Representationalist side by putting forward an account of sense modalities which is consistent with that view and yet pays due regard to the intuition behind Grice’s argument. Employing J.J. Gibson’s distinction between exploratory and performatory behaviour, I point to a proprioceptive element in perceptual experience, and identify this as crucial in any account of what makes a particular way of perceiving a sense modality.
Ross, Peter W. (2008). Common sense about qualities and senses. Philosophical Studies 138 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about common-sense modalities which avoids appeal to qualitative properties altogether. I’ll argue contrary to Keeley that qualitative properties are necessary for distinguishing senses, and contrary to Block that our common-sense distinction doesn’t indicate that perceptual states have qualia. A non-qualitative characterization of perceptual states isn’t needed to avoid the potential limit on scientific understanding imposed by qualia
Ross, P. (2001). Qualia and the senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Scott, Michael (2007). Distinguishing the senses. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Seeing, hearing and touching are phenomenally different, even if we are detecting the same spatial properties with each sense. This presents a prima facie problem for intentionalism, the theory that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. The paper reviews some attempts to resolve this problem, and then looks in detail at Peter Carruthers' recent proposal that the senses can be individuated by the way in which they represent spatial properties and incorporate time. This proposal is shown to be ineffective in distinguishing auditory from either visual or tactual perception, and substantial classes of visual and tactual perceptions are found that the posited spatial and temporal features fail to individuate
Serres, Michel (2009). The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: Veils -- Boxes -- Tables -- Visit -- Joy.

3.2b Vision

Anderson, Joseph & Anderson, Barbara (1993). The myth of persistence of vision revisited. Journal of Film and Video 45:3--12.   (Google)
Biernoff, Suzannah (2002). Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages breaks new ground by bringing postmodern writings on vision and embodiment into dialogue with medieval texts and images: an interdisciplinary strategy that illuminates and complicates both cultures. This is an invaluable reference work for anyone interested in the history and theory of visuality, and it is essential reading or scholars of art, science, or spirituality in the medieval period
Blinder, David (1986). A new look at vision. Topoi 5 (September):137-148.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bruce, Vicki & Green, Patrick (1985). Visual Perception: Physiology, Psychology, and Ecology. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1989). Marr's theory of vision. In Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1995). Machine stereopsis: A feedforward network for fast stereo vision with movable fusion plane. In Android Epistemology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Clark, Austen (1996). Three varieties of visual field. Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):477-95.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The goal of this paper is to challenge the rather insouciant attitude that many investigators seem to adopt when they go about describing the items and events in their "visual fields". There are at least three distinct categories of interpretation of what these reports might mean, and only under one of those categories do those reports have anything resembling an observational character. The others demand substantive revisions in one's beliefs about what one sees. The ur-concept of a "visual field" is that of the "sum of things seen", but one can interpret the latter in very different ways. The first is the "field of view", or the sum of physical things seen. The second is an array of visual impressions, whose spatial relations are distinct from those of physical phenomena in front of the eyes. The third is an intentional object: the world as it is represented visually. These three categories are described, and various locutions of vision science--such as "optic array", "retinocentric space", "visual geometry", "virtual object" and others--are analyzed and variously located within them. Finally, a recent argument purporting to necessitate the existence of a version two visual field is examined and shown wanting
Cutting, James E. (2003). Reconceiving perceptual space. In Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.), Looking Into Pictures. The Mit Press.   (Google)
Dilworth, John B. (2002). Varieties of visual representation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):183-206.   (Google)
Abstract: Pictorial representation is one species of visual representation--but not the only one, I argue. There are three additional varieties or species of visual representation--namely 'structural', 'aspect' and 'integrative' representation--which together comprise a category of 'delineative' rather than depictive visual representation. I arrive at this result via consideration of previously neglected orientational factors that serve to distinguish the two categories. I conclude by arguing that pictures (unlike 'delineations') are not physical objects, and that their multiplicity and modal narrowness motivates a view of them as instead being (one kind of) 'delineatively' represented content or subject matter, as represented by those objects that are (commonly but wrongly, in my view) assumed to be pictures
Farrell, B. A. (1977). On the psychological explanation of visual perception. Synthese 35 (3).   (Google | More links)
Glezer, Vadim D. (1989). Vision and mind. In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, VIII. New York: Elsevier Science.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Hamlyn, David W. (1957). The visual field and perception, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107:107-124.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary C. (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited : color as a psychobiological property -- Sense data and the mind body problem -- The reality of qualia -- The sensory core and the medieval foundations of early modern perceptual theory -- Postscript (2008) on Ibn al-Haytham's (Alhacen's) theory of vision -- Attention in early scientific psychology -- Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science : reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology -- What can the mind tell us about the brain? : psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint -- Introspective evidence in psychology.
Hill, Christopher S. (online). Visual awareness and visual qualia.   (Google)
Abstract: Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915
Hyman, John (1986). The cartesian theory of vision. Ratio 28 (December):149-167.   (Google)
Hyslop, James H. (1888). On wundt's theory of psychic synthesis in vision. Mind 13 (52):499-526.   (Google | More links)
Jütte, Robert (2005). A History of the Senses: From Antiquity to Cyberspace. Polity.   (Google)
Kapitan, Tomis (1998). Vision, vector, veracity. In Christian Strub (ed.), Blick Und Bild. Wilhelm Fink Verlag.   (Google)
Abstract: To experience is to undergo a process, to be in a state of receiving input which affords information about our environment. For highly developed beings like ourselves, the inputs determining states of conscious sensory perception are among the most important for our survival. At first glance, these states seem relational, each being a situation wherein a percipient X is passively conscious of something Y--its object, subject-matter, or content--without any apparent effort. Of course, the briefest reflection convinces us that despite a seemingly passive reception of data from without, a good deal of interpretation goes into the making of perceptual judgments, as evidenced by their wide variance in the face of like sensory stimulation. One person looking at the slope of a mountain notices a patch of whitish stones; another sees a flock of sheep grazing. They are distinguished by their different reactions to similar input, whether or not these are best construed as inferences, interpretations, or, simply, differing degrees of attentiveness
Knuuttila, Simo & Kärkkäinen, Pekka (eds.) (2008). Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Springer.   (Google)
Lloyd, A. C. (1957). The visual field and perception, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 125:125-144.   (Google)
Matthen, Mohan (2007). Defining vision: What homology thinking contributes. Biology and Philosophy 22 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The specialization of visual function within biological function is reason for introducing “homology thinking” into explanations of the visual system. It is argued that such specialization arises when organisms evolve by differentiation from their predecessors. Thus, it is essentially historical, and visual function should be regarded as a lineage property. The colour vision of birds and mammals do not function the same way as one another, on this account, because each is an adaptation to special needs of the visual functions of predecessors—very different kinds of predecessors in each case. Thus, history underlies function. We also see how homology thinking figures in the hierarchical classification of visual systems, and how it supports the explanation of visual function by functional role analysis
Matthen, Mohan P. (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. His work will be a stimulating resource for a wide range of scholars and students across philosophy and psychology
Millar, Boyd (2006). The conflicted character of picture perception. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (4):471–477.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often assumed that there is a perceptual conflict in looking at a picture since one sees both a two-dimensional surface and a three-dimensional scene simultaneously. In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to think that looking at pictures requires the visual system to perform the special task of reconciling inconsistent impressions of space, or competing information from different depth cues. To the contrary, I suggest that there are good reasons to think that the perception of depth in pictures is achieved in much the same way as is the perception of depth in any ordinary case.
Montgomery, Richard (1989). Discrimination, reidentification and the indeterminacy of early vision. Noûs 23 (September):413-435.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1998). Field of view. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (4):415-436.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1989). The distinction between visual perceiving and visual perceptual experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:37-61.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
New, Christopher (1976). Look, no eyes. Analysis 36 (March):137-141.   (Google)
Pace, Michael (2007). Blurred vision and the transparency of experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):328–354.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper considers an objection to intentionalism (the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on intentional content) based on the phenomenology of blurred vision. Several intentionalists, including Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and Timothy Crane, have proposed intentionalist explanations of blurred vision phenomenology. I argue that their proposals fail and propose a solution of my own that, I contend, is the only promising explanation consistent with intentionalism. The solution, however, comes at a cost for intentionalists; it involves rejecting the "transparency of experience", a doctrine that has been the basis for the central argument in favor of intentionalism
Pastore, Nicholas (1971). Selective History Of Theories Of Visual Perception, 1650-1950. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 30 | Google)
Pickering, F. R. (1975). Is light the proper object of vision? Mind 84 (January):119-121.   (Google | More links)
Ryder, Dan (online). Explaining the "inhereness" of qualia representationally: Why we seem to have a visual field.   (Google)
Schwartz, Robert (1994). Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleian Themes. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (online). When our eyes are closed, what, if anything, do we visually experience?   (Google | More links)
Serres, Michel (2009). The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: Veils -- Boxes -- Tables -- Visit -- Joy.
Smith, Barry (1999). Truth and the visual field. In Jean Petitot (ed.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract The paper uses the tools of mereotopology (the theory of parts, wholes and boundaries) to work out the implications of certain analogies between the 'ecological psychology' of J. J Gibson and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. It presents an ontological theory of spatial boundaries and of spatially extended entities. By reference to examples from the geographical sphere it is shown that both boundaries and extended entities fall into two broad categories: those which exist independently of our cognitive acts (for example, the planet Earth, its exterior surface); and those which exist only in virtue of such acts (for example: the equator, the North Sea). The visual field, too, can be conceived as an example of an extended entity that is dependent in the sense at issue. The paper suggests extending this analogy by postulating entities which would stand to true judgments as the visual field stands to acts of visual perception. The judgment field is defined more precisely as that complex extended entity which comprehends all entities which are relevant to the truth of a given (true) judgment. The work of cognitive linguists such as Talmy and Langacker, when properly interpreted, can be shown to yield a detailed account of the structures of the judgment fields corresponding to sentences of different sorts. A new sort of correspondence-theoretic definition of truth for sentences of natural language can then be formulated on this basis
Wilson, Catherine (1993). Constancy, emergence, and illusions: Obstacles to a naturalistic theory of vision. In Causation in Early Modern Philosophy. University Park: Penn St University Press.   (Google)
Wilson, Hugh R. (1991). Shadows on the cave wall: Philosophy and visual science. Philosophical Psychology 4:65-78.   (Google)

3.2c Other Sensory Modalities

Almagor, Uri (1990). Odors and private language: Observations on the phenomenology of scent. Human Studies 13 (3):253-274.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Appelbaum, David (1988). The Interpenetrating Reality: Bringing The Body To Touch. Lang.   (Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1963). Vesey on sensations of heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (December):359-362.   (Google | More links)
Belardinelli, Marta Olivetti & Di Matteo, Rosalia (2002). Is mental imagery prominently visual? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):204-205.   (Google)
Abstract: Neuroimaging and psychophysiological techniques have proved to be useful in comprehending the extent to which the visual modality is pervasive in mental imagery, and in comprehending the specificity of images generated through other sensory modalities. Although further research is needed to understand the nature of mental images, data attained by means of these techniques suggest that mental imagery requires at least two distinct processing components
Biernoff, Suzannah (2002). Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages breaks new ground by bringing postmodern writings on vision and embodiment into dialogue with medieval texts and images: an interdisciplinary strategy that illuminates and complicates both cultures. This is an invaluable reference work for anyone interested in the history and theory of visuality, and it is essential reading or scholars of art, science, or spirituality in the medieval period
DeBellis, Mark (1991). The representational content of musical experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (June):303-24.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Humphrey, Nicholas (2001). Doing it my way: Sensation, perception – and feeling red. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):987-987.   (Google)
Abstract: The theory presented here is a near neighbour of Humphrey's theory of sensations as actions. O'Regan & Noë have opened up remarkable new possibilities. But they have missed a trick by not making more of the distinction between sensation and perception; and some of their particular proposals for how we use our eyes to represent visual properties are not only implausible but would, if true, isolate vision from other sensory modalities and do little to explain the phenomenology of conscious experience in general
Ihde, Don (1976). Listening And Voice: A Phenomenology Of Sound. Ohio University Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Ihde, Don (1982). On hearing shapes, surfaces and interiors. In Phenomenology Dialogues & Bridges. Suny.   (Google)
Ihde, Don (1966). Some auditory phenomena. Philosophy Today 10:227-235.   (Google)
Knuuttila, Simo & Kärkkäinen, Pekka (eds.) (2008). Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Springer.   (Google)
Macpherson, Fiona (1999). Perfect pitch and the content of experience. Philosophy and Anthropology 3 (2).   (Google | More links)
Matthen, Mohan (2010). On the diversity of auditory objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):63-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends two theses about sensory objects. The more general thesis is that directly sensed objects are those delivered by sub-personal processes. It is shown how this thesis runs counter to perceptual atomism, the view that wholes are always sensed indirectly, through their parts. The more specific thesis is that while the direct objects of audition are all composed of sounds, these direct objects are not all sounds—here, a composite auditory object is a temporal sequence of sounds (whereas a composite visual object is a spatial composite). Many composite objects are directly heard in the sense just mentioned. There is a great variety of such composite auditory objects—melodies, harmonies, sequences of phonemes, individual voices, meaning-carrying sounds, and so on. This diversity of auditory objects has an important application to aesthetics. Perceivers do not naturally or easily attend simultaneously to auditory objects that overlap in time. Yet, aesthetic appreciation depends on such an allocation of attention to overlapping objects
Mattens, Filip (2009). Perception, body, and the sense of touch: Phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Husserl Studies 25 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In recent philosophy of mind, a series of challenging ideas have appeared about the relation between the body and the sense of touch. In certain respects, these ideas have a striking affinity with Husserl’s theory of the constitution of the body. Nevertheless, these two approaches lead to very different understandings of the role of the body in perception. Either the body is characterized as a perceptual “organ,” or the body is said to function as a “template.” Despite its focus on the sense of touch, the latter conception, I will argue, nevertheless orients its understanding of tactual perception toward visual objects. This produces a distorted conception of touch. In this paper, I will formulate an alternative account, which is more faithful to what it is like to feel
Mole, Christopher (2009). The Motor Theory of Speech Perception. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Montgomery, Edmund (1885). Space and touch, I. Mind 10 (38):227-244.   (Google | More links)
Montgomery, Edmund (1885). Space and touch, II. Mind 10 (39):377-398.   (Google | More links)
Morton, Thomas H. (2000). Archiving odors. In Of Minds and Molecules: New Philosophical Perspectives on Chemistry. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Nudds, Matthew & O'Callaghan, Casey (eds.) (2010). Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
O'Callaghan, Casey (2009). Audition. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: Provides the theoretical and psychological framework to the philosophy of sounds and audition. I address auditory scene analysis, spatial hearing, the audible qualities, and cross-modal interactions.
O'Callaghan, Casey (2009). Introduction: The Philosophy of Sounds and Auditory Perception. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
O'Callaghan, Casey (ms). Pitch.   (Google)
Abstract: Some sounds have pitch, some do not. A tuba’s notes are lower pitched than a flute’s, but the fuzz from an untuned radio has no discernible pitch. Pitch is an attribute in virtue of which sounds that possess it can be ordered from “low” to “high”. Given how audition works, physics has taught us that frequency determines what pitch a sound auditorily appears to have
O'Callaghan, Casey (2009). Sounds. In Timothy J. Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oup.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
O'Callaghan, Casey (2007). Sounds: A Philosophical Theory. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ... ISBN0199215928 ... Abstract: Vision dominates philosophical thinking about perception, and theorizing about experience in cognitive science traditionally has focused on a visual model. This book presents a systematic treatment of sounds and auditory experience. It demonstrates how thinking about audition and appreciating the relationships among multiple sense modalities enriches our understanding of perception. It articulates the central questions that comprise the philosophy of sound, and proposes a novel theory of sounds and their perception. Against the widely accepted philosophical view that sounds are among the secondary or sensible qualities, and against the scientific view that sounds are waves that propagate through a medium such as air or water, the book argues that sounds are events in which objects or interacting bodies disturb a surrounding medium. This does not imply that sounds propagate through a medium, such as air or water. Rather, sounds are events that take place in one's environment at or near their sources. This account captures the way in which sounds essentially are creatures of time and situates sounds in the world. Sounds are not ethereal, mysterious entities. It also provides a powerful account of echoes, interference, reverberation, Doppler effects, and perceptual constancies that surpasses the explanatory richness of alternative theories. Investigating sounds and audition demonstrates that considering other sense modalities teaches what we could not otherwise learn from thinking exclusively about the visual. This book concludes by arguing that a surprising class of cross-modal perceptual illusions demonstrates that the perceptual modalities cannot be completely understood in isolation, and that a visuocentric model for theorizing about perception — according to which perceptual modalities are discrete modes of experience and autonomous domains of philosophical and scientific inquiry — ought to be abandoned.
O'Callaghan, Casey (2009). The world of sound. The Philosophers' Magazine.   (Google)
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1957). An impossible auditory experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:53-82.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Price, H. H. (1944). Touch and organic sensation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 44:I.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Rolston, Howard L. (1965). Kinaesthetic sensations revisited. Journal of Philosophy 62 (February):96-100.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Scott, M. (2001). Tactual perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):149-160.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Serres, Michel (2009). The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: Veils -- Boxes -- Tables -- Visit -- Joy.
Shiner, Roger A. (1979). Sense-experience, colours and tastes. Mind 88 (April):161-178.   (Google | More links)
Sorensen, Roy A. (2009). Hearing silence: The perception and introspection of absences. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays, ed. by Matthew Nudds and Casey O’Callaghan (Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2008)
Sorensen, Roy A. (2008). Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The eclipse riddle -- Seeing surfaces -- The disappearing act -- Spinning shadows -- Berkeley's shadow -- Para-reflections -- Para-refractions : shadowgrams and the black drop -- Goethe's colored shadows -- Filtows -- Holes in the light -- Black and blue -- Seeing in black and white -- We see in the dark -- Hearing silence.
Strang, C. (1961). The perception of heat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:239-252.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1963). Armstrong on sensations of heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):250-254.   (Google | More links)
Zamir, Tzachi (2004). The sense of smell: Morality and rhetoric in the bramhall-Hobbes controversy. Sophia 43 (2):49-61.   (Google)
Abstract: Olfactoric imagery is abundantly employed in the Bramhall-Hobbes controversy. I survey some examples and then turn to the possible significance of this. I argue that by forcing Hobbes into the figurative exchange Bramhall scores points in terms of moving the controversy into ground that is not covered by the limited view of rationality that Hobbes is committed to according to his rhetoric (at least as Bramhall perceives it). Bramhall clearly wants to move from cool argument to a more affluent rhetorical appeal. I argue that choosing such a richer epistemology coheres with Bramhall

3.2d Molyneux's Problem

Abbott, T. K. (1904). Fresh light on Molyneux' problem. Dr. Ramsay's case. Mind 13 (52):543-554.   (Google | More links)
Berchielli, Laura (2002). Color, space, and figure in Locke: An interpretation of the Molyneux problem. Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (1):47-65.   (Google | More links)
Block, Irving L. (1965). On the commonness of the common sensibles. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (August):189-195.   (Google | More links)
Bolton, Martha B. (1994). The real Molyneux question and the basis of Locke's answer. In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Campbell, John (2005). Information-processing, phenomenal consciousness and Molyneux's question. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of touch? I think this is the intuitive puzzle that underlies the question sent by the Dublin lawyer Molyneux to John Locke. This concerns a man born blind, who learns by the use of his touch to discriminate cubes from spheres. Suppose him now to gain the use of his sight. And suppose him to be presented with a cube and a sphere, of nighly the same bigness. Quaere, will he be able to tell, by the use of his vision alone, which is the sphere, and which the cube? (Locke 1975, II/ix/8.)
Campbell, John (1996). Molyneux's question. Philosophical Issues 7:301-318.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig
Campbell, John (2005). Molyneux's question and cognitive impenetrability. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science.   (Google)
Degenaar, Marjolein (online). Molyneux's problem. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Eilan, Naomi M. (1993). Molyneux's question and the idea of an external world. In Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Evans, Gareth (1985). Molyneux's question. In Gareth Evans (ed.), Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (forthcoming). The Molyneux problem. In How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Heil, John (1987). The Molyneux question. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 17 (3):227–241.   (Google | More links)
Hight, Marc A. (2002). Why we do not see what we feel. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):148-162.   (Google | More links)
Hopkins, Robert (2005). Molyneux's question. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):441-464.   (Google)
Hopkins, Robert (2005). Thomas Reid on Molyneux's question. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):340-364.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jacomuzzi, Alessandra C.; Kobau, Pietro & Bruno, Nicola (2003). Molyneux's question redux. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):255-280.   (Google | More links)
John Murphy, Joseph (1876). Space through sight and touch. Mind 1 (2):284-285.   (Google | More links)
Levin, Janet (2008). Molyneux's question and the individuation of perceptual concepts. Philosophical Studies 139 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Molyneux's Question, that is, “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere... and the blind man made to see: Quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube”, was discussed by many theorists in the 17th and 18th centuries, and has recently been addressed by contemporary philosophers interested in the nature, and identity conditions, of perceptual concepts. My main concern in this paper is to argue – against Evans, Campbell, and a number of other contemporary philosophers – that a test of the sort Molyneux envisioned, at least if carefully designed and administered, can indeed be a crucial experiment for the claim that we deploy the same perceptual concepts when identifying shapes by sight and by touch. I will explore some implications of this argument for a theory of recognitional concepts. And I’ll try to trace out some unhappy consequences of various alternative views
Lievers, Menno (1992). The Molyneux problem. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (3).   (Google)
Loar, Brian (1996). Comments on John Campbell, Molyneux's Question. Philosophical Issues 7:319-324.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1996). Shape properties and perception. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Martin, Michael W. (1992). Sight and touch. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Meltzoff, Andrew N. (1993). Molyneux's babies: Cross-modal perception, imitation, and the mind of the preverbal infant. In Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Morgan, Michael J. (1977). Molyneux's Question: Vision, Touch, and the Philosophy of Perception. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Sassen, Brigitte (2004). Kant on Molyneux's problem. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (3):471 – 485.   (Google | More links)
Schumacher, Ralph (2003). What are the direct objects of sight? Locke on the Molyneux question. Locke Studies 3:41-62.   (Google)
Shute, Sara (1981). Molyneux's question: Vision, touch, and the philosophy of perception. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (2).   (Google)
Stratton, G. M. (1899). The spatial harmony of touch and sight. Mind 8 (32):492-505.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1974). Molyneux's problem. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):637-650.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Van Cleve, James (2007). Reid's answer to Molyneux's question. The Monist 90 (2):251-270.   (Google)

3.2e Sensory Modalities, Misc

7 / 8 entries displayed

Ackerman, Diana F. (1990). A Natural History of the Senses. Random House.   (Cited by 130 | Google)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1974). Sight and light. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (October):317-322.   (Google)
Broad, C. D. (1952). Some elementary reflexions on sense-perception. Philosophy 27 (January):3-17.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Gold, Ian (2004). Phenomenal qualities and intermodal perception. In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier.   (Google)
O'Callaghan, Casey (2008). Seeing what you hear: Cross-modal illusions and perception. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):316-338.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Cross-modal perceptual illusions occur when a stimulus to one modality impacts perceptual experience associated with another modality. Unlike synaesthesia, cross-modal illusions are intelligible as results of perceptual strategies for dealing with sensory stimulation to multiple modalities, rather than as mere quirks. I argue that understanding cross-modal illusions reveals an important flaw in a widespread conception of the senses, and of their role in perceptual experience, according to which understanding perception and perceptual experience is a matter of assembling independently viable stories about vision, audition, olfaction, and the rest.
Taliaferro, Charles (1991). The argument from transposed modalities. Metaphilosophy 93 (January-April):93-100.   (Google | More links)
Van Cleve, James (2006). Touch, sound, and things without the mind. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):162-182.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind-independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so-called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind-independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds