MindPapers: 3.2. The Perceptual Relation

Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (1995). Perception and causation. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):323-329. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Campbell, Scott (2002). Causal analyses of seeing. Erkenntnis 56 (2):169-180. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I critically analyse two causal analyses of seeing, by Frank Jackson and Michael Tye.I show that both are unacceptable. I argue that Jackson's analysis fails because it doesnot rule out cases of non-seeing. Tye's analysis seems to be superior to Jackson's in thisrespect, but I show that it too lets in cases of non-seeing. I also show that Tye's proposed solution to a problem for his theory – which involves a robot that mimics another (unseen) robot – fails. Finally I show that his `variability' requirement is not necessary, because there are cases where someone can see an object even though the variability that Tye requires doesnot exist

Child, William (1994). Vision and causation: Reply to Hyman. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):361-369. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Child, William (1992). Vision and experience: The causal theory and the disjunctive conception. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):297-316. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)

Coates, Paul (2000). Deviant causal chains and hallucinations: A problem for the anti-causalist. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):320-331. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical, or hallucinatory. Advocates of the Causal Theory of perception (whom I shall call ‘Causal Theorists’) account for the phenomena of hallucinations in terms of the causal ancestry of the subject’s experience. On this view, perceiving an object is a matter of having a logically distinct experience caused by that object, and moreover, caused by it in the appropriate way; if there is no object present to which the subject is causally related in the appropriate way, then the experience must be hallucinatory. One difficulty for the Causal Theorist consists in explicating the notion of: in the appropriate way. The need for the qualification of the bare claim about causal connectedness arises because of the well known problem of the Deviant Causal Chain (henceforth ‘DEV’). Opponents of the Causal Theory of Perception, who include Disjunctivists, Direct Realists, and Naive Realists (to whom I shall refer collectively as ‘Anti-causalists’) sometimes appeal to DEVs as a reason for rejecting the Causal Theory.[1]

Coates, Paul (1998). Perception and metaphysical skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):1-28. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Much recent discussion about the nature of perception has focused on the dispute between the Causal Theory of Perception and the rival Disjunctive View. There are different versions of the Causal Theory (the abbreviation I shall use), but the point upon which they agree is that perception involves a conscious experience which is logically distinct from the particular physical object perceived. 1 On the opposed Disjunctive View, the perceptual experience is held to be inseparable from the object perceived; what is directly present to conscious experience is, literally, part of the physical environment. 2 One prima facie difficulty the Causal Theory appears to face is the problem of deviant causal chains, of providing sufficient conditions for perception; I shall not address this difficulty directly, though some of my concluding remarks will bear on it. My main aim in this paper is to show that, despite the deviant causal chains problem, the Causal Theory is to be preferred to the rival Disjunctive View

Cohen, L. Jonathan (1977). The causal theory of perception. Aristotelian Society 127:127-141. (Google | Edit)

Davies, Martin (1983). Function in perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):409-426. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links | Edit)

Davis, Steven (ed.) (1983). Causal Theories Of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, And Reference. Ny: De Gruyter. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Dilworth, John B. (2005). A reflexive, dispositional approach to perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very same worldly perceived objects or properties that caused them--will be defended as one legitimate such naturalistic theory

Dilworth, John B. (2004). Naturalized perception without information. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 25 (4):349-368. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. However, such a reflexive, naturalistic causal theory must compete with well entrenched, supposedly equally naturalistic theories of perception that are based on some concept of information, so the paper also includes some basic logical, naturalistic and explanatory criticisms of such informational views

Dilworth, John B. (2005). Perceptual causality problems reflexively resolved. Acta Analytica 20 (3):11-31. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains. They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on. But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases. A critical discussion of David Lewis's perceptual descriptivist views is also provided, including a defense of the logical possibility of systematic misperception or perceptual error for a perceiver, in spite of its empirical improbability

Dilworth, John B. (2005). The reflexive theory of perception. Behavior and Philosophy 33:17-40. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Frost, Thomas B. (1990). In defense of the causal representative theory of perception. Dialogue 32 (2-3):43-50. (Google | Edit)

Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121:121-152. (Google | Edit)

Hyman, John (1994). Reply to vision. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):369-376. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Hyman, John (1992). The causal theory of perception. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):277-296. (Cited by 13 | Google | More links | Edit)

Hyman, John (1993). Vision, causation and occlusion. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (171):210-214. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Kim, Jaegwon (1977). Perception and reference without causality. Journal of Philosophy 74 (October):606-620. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Le Catt, Bruce (1982). Censored vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (June):158-162. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Lewis, David (1980). Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (September):239-249. (Cited by 38 | Google | More links | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (1992). Experience and its objects. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 7 | Google | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (1993). Perception: A causal representative theory. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury. (Google | Edit)

McLaughlin, Brian P. (1996). Lewis on what distinguishes perception from hallucination. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Mclaughlin, Brian P. (1984). Perception, causation, and supervenience. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:569-592. (Google | Edit)

Newman, M. H. A. (1928). 2.0.CO;2-H');return true;"href='http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(192804)2:37:146<137:MR"TOP>2.0.CO;2-H'>Mr. Russell's Causal Theory of Perception. Mind 37 (146):137-148. (Cited by 36 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Noë, Alva (2003). Causation and perception: The puzzle unravelled. Analysis 63 (2):93-100. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Oakes, Robert A. (1978). How to rescue the traditional causal theory of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):370-383. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Pappas, George S. (1990). Causation and perception in Reid. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):763-766. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Pears, David F. (1976). The causal conditions of perception. Synthese 33 (June):25-40. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Pendlebury, Michael J. (1994). Content and causation in perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):767-785. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)

Pickering, F. R. (1974). A refutation of an objection to the causal theory of perception. Analysis 34 (March):129-132. (Google | Edit)

Price, Carolyn S. (1998). Function, perception and normal causal chains. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):31-51. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Robinson, Howard M. (1990). The objects of perceptual experience--II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 151:151-166. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Rogers, G. A. J. (1975). The veil of perception. Mind 84 (April):210-224. (Google | More links | Edit)

Shope, Robert K. (1991). Non-deviant causal chains. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:251-291. (Google | Edit)

Smith, Peter K. (1991). On The Objects of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:191-196. (Google | Edit)

Snowdon, Paul F. (1998). Strawson on the concept of perception. In The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson. Chicago: Open Court. (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)

Strawson, Peter F. (1998). Reply to Paul Snowdon. In The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson. Chicago: Open Court. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Szubka, Tadeusz (2002). The causal theory of perception and direct realism. In Pragmatism and Realism. New York: Routledge. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Teichman, Jenny (1971). Perception and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71:29-41. (Google | Edit)

Tye, Michael (1982). A causal analysis of seeing by Michael Tye. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):311-325. (Google | Edit)

Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1971). Perception. Anchor Books. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Vision, Gerald (1993). Animadversions on the causal theory of perception. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):344-356. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Vision, Gerald (1997). Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)

Watling, J. (1950). The causal theory of perception. Mind 59 (October):539-540. (Google | More links | Edit)

White, Alan R. (1961). The causal theory of perception, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 153:153-168. (Google | Edit)

Whiteley, C. H. (1940). The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 40:89-102. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Wilkie, Sean (1996). The causal theory of veridical hallucinations. Philosophy 71 (276):245-254. (Google | Edit)

Banerjee, Kali K. (1955). Perception and direct awareness. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 28 (April):41-47. (Google | Edit)

Buras, Todd (2008). Three grades of immediate perception: Thomas Reid's distinctions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):603–632. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: §1. Introduction. Like other direct realists, Thomas Reid offered an alternative to indirect realist and idealist accounts of perception. Reid’s alternative aimed to preserve the indirect realist’s commitment to realism about the objects of perception, and the idealist’s commitment to the immediacy of the mind’s relation to the objects of perception. Reid holds that what you perceive is mind independent or external; and your relation to such objects in perception is direct or immediate. In his own words, “something which is extended and solid, which may be measured and weighed, is the immediate object of my touch and sight. And this object I take to be matter, and not an idea” (IP II xi, 154).1

Carrier, Leonard R. (1972). Time-gap myopia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (May):55-57. (Google | More links | Edit)

Carrier, Leonard S. (1969). Immediate and mediate perception. Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):391-403. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Carrier, Leonard S. (1969). The time-gap argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (December):263-272. (Google | Edit)

Cornman, James W. (1972). On direct perception. Review of Metaphysics 26 (September):38-56. (Google | Edit)

Dilworth, John B. (2005). The perception of representational content. British Journal Of Aesthetics 45 (4):388-411. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: How can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint? An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no physical existence. A solution is proposed that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of perception, plus a double content analysis of perceptual interpretation, which permits non-supervenient, culturally autonomous modes of reference to be generated and artistically exploited even in a purely physical world. In addition, a functionalist concept of broad or 'spread' reference replaces the traditional precise intentional concept of reference, which previously made reference to non-existent items theoretically intractable

Fish, William C. (2004). The direct/indirect distinction in contemporary philosophy of perception. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-13. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Hudson, Robert G. (2000). Perceiving empirical objects directly. Erkenntnis 52 (3):357-371. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to defend the claim that there is such a thing as direct perception, where by direct perception I mean perception unmediated by theorizing or concepts. The basis for my defense is a general philosophic perspective which I call empiricist philosophy. In brief, empiricist philosophy (as I have defined it) is untenable without the occurrence of direct perception. It is untenable without direct perception because, otherwise, one can't escape the hermeneutic circle, as this phrase is used in van Fraassen (1980). The bulk of the paper is devoted to defending my belief in direct perception against various objections that can be posed against it. I discuss various anticipations of my view found in the literature, eventually focusing on Ian Hacking's related conception of `entity realism' (Hacking 1983). Hacking has been criticized by a number of philosophers and my plan is to respond to these criticisms on behalf of entity realism (or more precisely on behalf of the claim that direct perception is a reality) and to then respond to other possible criticisms that can be launched against direct perception

James McDermid, Douglas (2001). What is direct perceptual knowledge? A fivefold confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior

Johnston, Mark (1996). Is the external world invisible? Philosophical Issues 7:185-198. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Kalansuriya, A. D. P. (1980). Fred I. Dretske and the notion of direct perception. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 7 (July):513-517. (Google | Edit)

Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2002). Elements of Virtualism: A Study in the Philosophy of Perception. Dartford: Traude Junghans Cuxhaven Verlag. (Google | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (1986). What do we see directly? American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (July):277-286. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Malcolm, Norman (1953). Direct perception. Philosophical Quarterly 3 (October):301-316. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Malmgren, Helge (1971). Moore's concept of indirect apprehension. Theoria 37:185-208. (Google | Edit)

Maund, J. Barry (1993). Representation, pictures and resemblance. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

McDermid, Douglas J. (2001). What is direct perceptual knowledge? A fivefold confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

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