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3.2a. Distinguishing the Senses (Distinguishing the Senses on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bermudez, Jose Luis (1999). Categorizing qualitative states: Some problems. Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2).   (Google)
Coady, C. A. J. (1974). The senses of Martians. Philosophical Review 83 (1):107-125.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Cooper, D. E. (1970). Materialism and perception. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (October):334-346.   (Google | More links)
Cox, J. W. Roxbee (1970). Distinguishing the senses. Mind 79 (October):530-550.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Feenstra, Louw & Borgstein, Johannes (2003). The senses in perspective. Ludus Vitalis 11 (20):135-157.   (Google)
Gray, Richard (2005). On the concept of a sense. Synthese 147 (3):461-475.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Keeley has recently argued that the philosophical issue of how to analyse the concept of a sense can usefully be addressed by considering how scientists, and more specifically neuroethologists, classify the senses. After briefly outlining his proposal, which is based on the application of an ordered set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for modality differentiation, I argue, by way of two complementary counterexamples, that it fails to account fully for the way the senses are in fact individuated in neuroethology and other relevant sciences. I suggest substantial modifications to Keeley
Grice, H. P. (1962). Some remarks about the senses. In R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, First Series. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 31 | Google)
Keeley, Brian L. (2002). Making sense of the senses: Individuating modalities in humans and other animals. Journal Of Philosophy 99 (1):5-28.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Leon, Mark . (1988). Characterising the senses. Mind and Language 3:243-70.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Nelkin, Norton (1990). Categorizing the senses. Mind and Language 5 (2):149-165.   (Google)
Nudds, Matthew (online). Is seeing just like feeling? Kinds of experiences and the five senses.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I am going to argue that two commonly held views about perceptual experience are incompatible and that one must be given up. The first is the view that the five senses are to be distinguished by appeal to the kind of experiences involved in perception; the second is the view
Nudds, Matthew (2000). Modes of perceiving and imagining. Acta Analytica 15 (24):139-150.   (Google)
Nudds, Matthew (online). The senses as psychological kinds.   (Google)
Abstract: The distinction we make between five different senses is a universal one.1 Rather than speaking of generically perceiving something, we talk of perceiving in one of five determinate ways: we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste things. In distinguishing determinate ways of perceiving things what are we distinguishing between? What, in other words, is a sense modality?2 An answer to this question must tell us what constitutes a sense modality and so needs to do more than simply describe differences in virtue of which we can distinguish the perceptions of different senses. There are many such differences
Nudds, Matthew (2004). The significance of the senses. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):31-51.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how and why we count ?ve senses (the counting question); none of the standard accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the signi?cance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an account of the senses and answering the counting question
O'Dea, John (forthcoming). A Proprioceptive Account of the Senses. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. OUP.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalist theories of sensory experience are often thought to be vulnerable to the existence of apparently non-representational differences between experiences in different sensory modalities. Seeing and hearing seem to differ in their qualia, quite apart from what they represent. The origin of this idea is perhaps Grice’s argument, in “Some Remarks on the Senses,” that the senses are distinguished by “introspectible character.” In this chapter I take the Representationalist side by putting forward an account of sense modalities which is consistent with that view and yet pays due regard to the intuition behind Grice’s argument. Employing J.J. Gibson’s distinction between exploratory and performatory behaviour, I point to a proprioceptive element in perceptual experience, and identify this as crucial in any account of what makes a particular way of perceiving a sense modality.
Ross, Peter W. (2008). Common sense about qualities and senses. Philosophical Studies 138 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about common-sense modalities which avoids appeal to qualitative properties altogether. I’ll argue contrary to Keeley that qualitative properties are necessary for distinguishing senses, and contrary to Block that our common-sense distinction doesn’t indicate that perceptual states have qualia. A non-qualitative characterization of perceptual states isn’t needed to avoid the potential limit on scientific understanding imposed by qualia
Ross, P. (2001). Qualia and the senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Scott, Michael (2007). Distinguishing the senses. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Seeing, hearing and touching are phenomenally different, even if we are detecting the same spatial properties with each sense. This presents a prima facie problem for intentionalism, the theory that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. The paper reviews some attempts to resolve this problem, and then looks in detail at Peter Carruthers' recent proposal that the senses can be individuated by the way in which they represent spatial properties and incorporate time. This proposal is shown to be ineffective in distinguishing auditory from either visual or tactual perception, and substantial classes of visual and tactual perceptions are found that the posited spatial and temporal features fail to individuate
Serres, Michel (2009). The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: Veils -- Boxes -- Tables -- Visit -- Joy.