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3.2b. Vision (Vision on PhilPapers)

See also:
Anderson, Joseph & Anderson, Barbara (1993). The myth of persistence of vision revisited. Journal of Film and Video 45:3--12.   (Google)
Biernoff, Suzannah (2002). Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages breaks new ground by bringing postmodern writings on vision and embodiment into dialogue with medieval texts and images: an interdisciplinary strategy that illuminates and complicates both cultures. This is an invaluable reference work for anyone interested in the history and theory of visuality, and it is essential reading or scholars of art, science, or spirituality in the medieval period
Blinder, David (1986). A new look at vision. Topoi 5 (September):137-148.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bruce, Vicki & Green, Patrick (1985). Visual Perception: Physiology, Psychology, and Ecology. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1989). Marr's theory of vision. In Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1995). Machine stereopsis: A feedforward network for fast stereo vision with movable fusion plane. In Android Epistemology. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Clark, Austen (1996). Three varieties of visual field. Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):477-95.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The goal of this paper is to challenge the rather insouciant attitude that many investigators seem to adopt when they go about describing the items and events in their "visual fields". There are at least three distinct categories of interpretation of what these reports might mean, and only under one of those categories do those reports have anything resembling an observational character. The others demand substantive revisions in one's beliefs about what one sees. The ur-concept of a "visual field" is that of the "sum of things seen", but one can interpret the latter in very different ways. The first is the "field of view", or the sum of physical things seen. The second is an array of visual impressions, whose spatial relations are distinct from those of physical phenomena in front of the eyes. The third is an intentional object: the world as it is represented visually. These three categories are described, and various locutions of vision science--such as "optic array", "retinocentric space", "visual geometry", "virtual object" and others--are analyzed and variously located within them. Finally, a recent argument purporting to necessitate the existence of a version two visual field is examined and shown wanting
Cutting, James E. (2003). Reconceiving perceptual space. In Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.), Looking Into Pictures. The Mit Press.   (Google)
Dilworth, John B. (2002). Varieties of visual representation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):183-206.   (Google)
Abstract: Pictorial representation is one species of visual representation--but not the only one, I argue. There are three additional varieties or species of visual representation--namely 'structural', 'aspect' and 'integrative' representation--which together comprise a category of 'delineative' rather than depictive visual representation. I arrive at this result via consideration of previously neglected orientational factors that serve to distinguish the two categories. I conclude by arguing that pictures (unlike 'delineations') are not physical objects, and that their multiplicity and modal narrowness motivates a view of them as instead being (one kind of) 'delineatively' represented content or subject matter, as represented by those objects that are (commonly but wrongly, in my view) assumed to be pictures
Farrell, B. A. (1977). On the psychological explanation of visual perception. Synthese 35 (3).   (Google | More links)
Glezer, Vadim D. (1989). Vision and mind. In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, VIII. New York: Elsevier Science.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Hamlyn, David W. (1957). The visual field and perception, part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107:107-124.   (Google)
Hatfield, Gary C. (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited : color as a psychobiological property -- Sense data and the mind body problem -- The reality of qualia -- The sensory core and the medieval foundations of early modern perceptual theory -- Postscript (2008) on Ibn al-Haytham's (Alhacen's) theory of vision -- Attention in early scientific psychology -- Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science : reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology -- What can the mind tell us about the brain? : psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint -- Introspective evidence in psychology.
Hill, Christopher S. (online). Visual awareness and visual qualia.   (Google)
Abstract: Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915
Hyman, John (1986). The cartesian theory of vision. Ratio 28 (December):149-167.   (Google)
Hyslop, James H. (1888). On wundt's theory of psychic synthesis in vision. Mind 13 (52):499-526.   (Google | More links)
Jütte, Robert (2005). A History of the Senses: From Antiquity to Cyberspace. Polity.   (Google)
Kapitan, Tomis (1998). Vision, vector, veracity. In Christian Strub (ed.), Blick Und Bild. Wilhelm Fink Verlag.   (Google)
Abstract: To experience is to undergo a process, to be in a state of receiving input which affords information about our environment. For highly developed beings like ourselves, the inputs determining states of conscious sensory perception are among the most important for our survival. At first glance, these states seem relational, each being a situation wherein a percipient X is passively conscious of something Y--its object, subject-matter, or content--without any apparent effort. Of course, the briefest reflection convinces us that despite a seemingly passive reception of data from without, a good deal of interpretation goes into the making of perceptual judgments, as evidenced by their wide variance in the face of like sensory stimulation. One person looking at the slope of a mountain notices a patch of whitish stones; another sees a flock of sheep grazing. They are distinguished by their different reactions to similar input, whether or not these are best construed as inferences, interpretations, or, simply, differing degrees of attentiveness
Knuuttila, Simo & Kärkkäinen, Pekka (eds.) (2008). Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Springer.   (Google)
Lloyd, A. C. (1957). The visual field and perception, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 125:125-144.   (Google)
Matthen, Mohan (2007). Defining vision: What homology thinking contributes. Biology and Philosophy 22 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The specialization of visual function within biological function is reason for introducing “homology thinking” into explanations of the visual system. It is argued that such specialization arises when organisms evolve by differentiation from their predecessors. Thus, it is essentially historical, and visual function should be regarded as a lineage property. The colour vision of birds and mammals do not function the same way as one another, on this account, because each is an adaptation to special needs of the visual functions of predecessors—very different kinds of predecessors in each case. Thus, history underlies function. We also see how homology thinking figures in the hierarchical classification of visual systems, and how it supports the explanation of visual function by functional role analysis
Matthen, Mohan P. (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. His work will be a stimulating resource for a wide range of scholars and students across philosophy and psychology
Millar, Boyd (2006). The conflicted character of picture perception. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (4):471–477.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often assumed that there is a perceptual conflict in looking at a picture since one sees both a two-dimensional surface and a three-dimensional scene simultaneously. In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to think that looking at pictures requires the visual system to perform the special task of reconciling inconsistent impressions of space, or competing information from different depth cues. To the contrary, I suggest that there are good reasons to think that the perception of depth in pictures is achieved in much the same way as is the perception of depth in any ordinary case.
Montgomery, Richard (1989). Discrimination, reidentification and the indeterminacy of early vision. Noûs 23 (September):413-435.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1998). Field of view. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (4):415-436.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1989). The distinction between visual perceiving and visual perceptual experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:37-61.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
New, Christopher (1976). Look, no eyes. Analysis 36 (March):137-141.   (Google)
Pace, Michael (2007). Blurred vision and the transparency of experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):328–354.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper considers an objection to intentionalism (the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on intentional content) based on the phenomenology of blurred vision. Several intentionalists, including Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and Timothy Crane, have proposed intentionalist explanations of blurred vision phenomenology. I argue that their proposals fail and propose a solution of my own that, I contend, is the only promising explanation consistent with intentionalism. The solution, however, comes at a cost for intentionalists; it involves rejecting the "transparency of experience", a doctrine that has been the basis for the central argument in favor of intentionalism
Pastore, Nicholas (1971). Selective History Of Theories Of Visual Perception, 1650-1950. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 30 | Google)
Pickering, F. R. (1975). Is light the proper object of vision? Mind 84 (January):119-121.   (Google | More links)
Ryder, Dan (online). Explaining the "inhereness" of qualia representationally: Why we seem to have a visual field.   (Google)
Schwartz, Robert (1994). Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleian Themes. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (online). When our eyes are closed, what, if anything, do we visually experience?   (Google | More links)
Serres, Michel (2009). The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: Veils -- Boxes -- Tables -- Visit -- Joy.
Smith, Barry (1999). Truth and the visual field. In Jean Petitot (ed.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract The paper uses the tools of mereotopology (the theory of parts, wholes and boundaries) to work out the implications of certain analogies between the 'ecological psychology' of J. J Gibson and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. It presents an ontological theory of spatial boundaries and of spatially extended entities. By reference to examples from the geographical sphere it is shown that both boundaries and extended entities fall into two broad categories: those which exist independently of our cognitive acts (for example, the planet Earth, its exterior surface); and those which exist only in virtue of such acts (for example: the equator, the North Sea). The visual field, too, can be conceived as an example of an extended entity that is dependent in the sense at issue. The paper suggests extending this analogy by postulating entities which would stand to true judgments as the visual field stands to acts of visual perception. The judgment field is defined more precisely as that complex extended entity which comprehends all entities which are relevant to the truth of a given (true) judgment. The work of cognitive linguists such as Talmy and Langacker, when properly interpreted, can be shown to yield a detailed account of the structures of the judgment fields corresponding to sentences of different sorts. A new sort of correspondence-theoretic definition of truth for sentences of natural language can then be formulated on this basis
Wilson, Catherine (1993). Constancy, emergence, and illusions: Obstacles to a naturalistic theory of vision. In Causation in Early Modern Philosophy. University Park: Penn St University Press.   (Google)
Wilson, Hugh R. (1991). Shadows on the cave wall: Philosophy and visual science. Philosophical Psychology 4:65-78.   (Google)