MindPapers: 3.2b. Direct and Indirect Perception

Banerjee, Kali K. (1955). Perception and direct awareness. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 28 (April):41-47. (Google | Edit)

Buras, Todd (2008). Three grades of immediate perception: Thomas Reid's distinctions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):603–632. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: ï¿½1. Introduction. Like other direct realists, Thomas Reid offered an alternative to indirect realist and idealist accounts of perception. Reidï¿½s alternative aimed to preserve the indirect realistï¿½s commitment to realism about the objects of perception, and the idealistï¿½s commitment to the immediacy of the mindï¿½s relation to the objects of perception. Reid holds that what you perceive is mind independent or external; and your relation to such objects in perception is direct or immediate. In his own words, ï¿½something which is extended and solid, which may be measured and weighed, is the immediate object of my touch and sight. And this object I take to be matter, and not an ideaï¿½ (IP II xi, 154)

Carrier, Leonard S. (1969). Immediate and mediate perception. Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):391-403. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Carrier, Leonard R. (1972). Time-gap myopia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (May):55-57. (Google | More links | Edit)

Carrier, Leonard S. (1969). The time-gap argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (December):263-272. (Google | Edit)

Cornman, James W. (1972). On direct perception. Review of Metaphysics 26 (September):38-56. (Google | Edit)

Dilworth, John B. (2005). The perception of representational content. British Journal Of Aesthetics 45 (4):388-411. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: How can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint? An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no physical existence. A solution is proposed that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of perception, plus a double content analysis of perceptual interpretation, which permits non-supervenient, culturally autonomous modes of reference to be generated and artistically exploited even in a purely physical world. In addition, a functionalist concept of broad or 'spread' reference replaces the traditional precise intentional concept of reference, which previously made reference to non-existent items theoretically intractable

Fish, William C. (2004). The direct/indirect distinction in contemporary philosophy of perception. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-13. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Hudson, Robert G. (2000). Perceiving empirical objects directly. Erkenntnis 52 (3):357-371. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

James McDermid, Douglas (2001). What is direct perceptual knowledge? A fivefold confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated ? but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior

Johnston, Mark (1996). Is the external world invisible? Philosophical Issues 7:185-198. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Kalansuriya, A. D. P. (1980). Fred I. Dretske and the notion of direct perception. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 7 (July):513-517. (Google | Edit)

Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2002). Elements of Virtualism: A Study in the Philosophy of Perception. Dartford: Traude Junghans Cuxhaven Verlag. (Google | Edit)

Lowe, E. J. (1986). What do we see directly? American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (July):277-286. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Malcolm, Norman (1953). Direct perception. Philosophical Quarterly 3 (October):301-316. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Malmgren, Helge (1971). Moore's concept of indirect apprehension. Theoria 37:185-208. (Google | Edit)

Maund, J. Barry (1993). Representation, pictures and resemblance. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

McDermid, Douglas J. (2001). What is direct perceptual knowledge? A fivefold confusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):1-16. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated ? but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior

Millar, Roderick (1982). A defence of direct surface realism. Philosophy 57 (July):339-355. (Google | Edit)

Mulaik, Stanley A. (1995). The metaphoric origins of objectivity, subjectivity, and consciousness in the direct perception of reality. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):283-303. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Nathan, N. M. L. (2005). Direct realism: Proximate causation and the missing object. Acta Analytica 20 (36):3-6. (Google | More links | Edit)

No, (2002). Direct perception. In The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: experiences are qualitatively indistinguishable, experience by engaging in a constructive process then you are aware of one and the same thing of inference or conjecture. A perception, in the when you see a red tomato and hallucinate a red phrase of Helmholtz, is an `unconscious inference'. tomato. Hence, when you see a red tomato, you are Empirical research on perception focuses on under- aware not of a tomato but of a tomato-like sense standing the mechanisms, neural and psycho- datum. logical, that make up the brain's ability to perform 00170005 That perception is in this way indirect appears to

No, (2002). On what we see. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):57-80. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links | Edit)

Oakes, Robert A. (1982). Seeing our own faces: A paradigm for indirect realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):442-448. (Google | More links | Edit)

Persson, Ingmar (1985). Phenomenal realism. Erkenntnis 23 (May):59-78. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Piatt, D. A. (1928). Immediate experience. Journal of Philosophy 25 (18):477-492. (Google | More links | Edit)

Schwartz, Robert (1996). Directed perception. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):81-91. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Shuger, Scott (1986). Hintikka and the analysis of direct perception. Philosophia 16 (December):365-376. (Google | More links | Edit)

Snowdon, Paul F. (1992). How to interpret direct perception. In The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 19 | Google | Edit)

Sosa, David (1996). Getting acquainted with perception. Philosophical Issues 7:209-214. (Google | More links | Edit)

Strong, Charles A. (1931). Is perception direct, or representative? Mind 40 (158):217-220. (Google | More links | Edit)

Stroll, Avrum (1989). Wittgenstein's nose. In Wittgenstein in Focus--Im Brennpunkt: Wittgenstein. Amsterdam: Rodopi. (Google | Edit)

Todd, D. D. (1975). Direct perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (March):352-362. (Google | More links | Edit)

Todd, D. D. (1977). Response to Sapontzis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):566-568. (Google | More links | Edit)

Villanueva, Enrique (1996). Would more acquaintance with the external world relieve epistemic anxiety? Philosophical Issues 7:215-218. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Ward, Andrew (1976). Direct and indirect realism. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (October):287-294. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Search tips