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updated 2008-07-26
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Perception :: The Perceptual Relation :: The Perceptual Relation, Misc

Alston, William P. (1990). Externalist theories of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73:73-97.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)
Baker, M. J. (1955). Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (March):377-385.   (Google | Edit)
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1912). The relation of consciousness and object in sense-perception. Philosophical Review 21 (2):152-173.   (Google | Edit)
Crane, Tim (2006). Is there a perceptual relation? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)
Ebersole, Frank B. (1961). On seeing things. Philosophical Quarterly 11 (October):289-300.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Nelson, John O. (1985). Is object-seeing really propositional seeing? Philosophical Topics 13:231-238.   (Google | Edit)
Pacherie, Elisabeth (1995). Do we see with microscopes? The Monist 78 (2):171-188.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Pitson, A. E. (1984). Basic seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (September):121-130.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Platchias, Dimitris (2004). The veil of perception and contextual relativism. Sorites 15 (December):76-86.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Schwartz, Robert (2004). To Austin or not to Austin, that's the disjunction. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):255-263.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Siegel, Susanna (2006). How does phenomenology constrain object-seeing? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):429 – 441.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Perception provides a form of contact with the world and the other people in it. For example, we can learn that Franco is sitting in his chair by seeing Franco; we can learn that his hair is gray by seeing the colour of his hair. Such perception enables us to understand primitive forms of language, such as demonstrative expressions ‘this’ and ‘that’. These are expressions we can readily use to talk about the particular things we perceive
Siegel, Susanna (2002). The role of perception in demonstrative reference. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (1):1-21.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker
Sorensen, Roy A. (1999). Seeing intersecting eclipses. Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):25-49.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)
Sorensen, Roy A. (2004). We see in the dark. Noûs 38 (3):456-480.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Stroll, Avrum (1992). Reflections on surfaces. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):191-210.   (Google | Edit)
Stuart Fullerton, George (1907). In what sense two persons perceive the same thing. Philosophical Review 16 (5):506-518.   (Google | Edit)
Thilly, Frank (1912). The relation of consciousness and object in sense-perception. Philosophical Review 21 (4):415-432.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Warnock, G. J. (1955). Seeing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:201-218.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. (1912). Consciousness and object. Philosophical Review 21 (6):633-640.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Zemach, Eddy M. (1969). Seeing, seeing, and feeling. Review of Metaphysics 23 (September):3-24.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

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