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3.2d. Molyneux's Problem (Molyneux's Problem on PhilPapers)

See also:
Abbott, T. K. (1904). Fresh light on Molyneux' problem. Dr. Ramsay's case. Mind 13 (52):543-554.   (Google | More links)
Berchielli, Laura (2002). Color, space, and figure in Locke: An interpretation of the Molyneux problem. Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (1):47-65.   (Google | More links)
Block, Irving L. (1965). On the commonness of the common sensibles. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (August):189-195.   (Google | More links)
Bolton, Martha B. (1994). The real Molyneux question and the basis of Locke's answer. In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Campbell, John (2005). Information-processing, phenomenal consciousness and Molyneux's question. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of touch? I think this is the intuitive puzzle that underlies the question sent by the Dublin lawyer Molyneux to John Locke. This concerns a man born blind, who learns by the use of his touch to discriminate cubes from spheres. Suppose him now to gain the use of his sight. And suppose him to be presented with a cube and a sphere, of nighly the same bigness. Quaere, will he be able to tell, by the use of his vision alone, which is the sphere, and which the cube? (Locke 1975, II/ix/8.)
Campbell, John (1996). Molyneux's question. Philosophical Issues 7:301-318.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig
Campbell, John (2005). Molyneux's question and cognitive impenetrability. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science.   (Google)
Degenaar, Marjolein (online). Molyneux's problem. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Eilan, Naomi M. (1993). Molyneux's question and the idea of an external world. In Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Evans, Gareth (1985). Molyneux's question. In Gareth Evans (ed.), Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (forthcoming). The Molyneux problem. In How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Hight, Marc A. (2002). Why we do not see what we feel. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):148-162.   (Google | More links)
Hopkins, Robert (2005). Molyneux's question. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):441-464.   (Google)
Hopkins, Robert (2005). Thomas Reid on Molyneux's question. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):340-364.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jacomuzzi, Alessandra C.; Kobau, Pietro & Bruno, Nicola (2003). Molyneux's question redux. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):255-280.   (Google | More links)
John Murphy, Joseph (1876). Space through sight and touch. Mind 1 (2):284-285.   (Google | More links)
Levin, Janet (2008). Molyneux's question and the individuation of perceptual concepts. Philosophical Studies 139 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Molyneux's Question, that is, “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere... and the blind man made to see: Quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube”, was discussed by many theorists in the 17th and 18th centuries, and has recently been addressed by contemporary philosophers interested in the nature, and identity conditions, of perceptual concepts. My main concern in this paper is to argue – against Evans, Campbell, and a number of other contemporary philosophers – that a test of the sort Molyneux envisioned, at least if carefully designed and administered, can indeed be a crucial experiment for the claim that we deploy the same perceptual concepts when identifying shapes by sight and by touch. I will explore some implications of this argument for a theory of recognitional concepts. And I’ll try to trace out some unhappy consequences of various alternative views
Lievers, Menno (1992). The Molyneux problem. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (3).   (Google)
Loar, Brian (1996). Comments on John Campbell, Molyneux's Question. Philosophical Issues 7:319-324.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1996). Shape properties and perception. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Martin, Michael W. (1992). Sight and touch. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Meltzoff, Andrew N. (1993). Molyneux's babies: Cross-modal perception, imitation, and the mind of the preverbal infant. In Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Morgan, Michael J. (1977). Molyneux's Question: Vision, Touch, and the Philosophy of Perception. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Sassen, Brigitte (2004). Kant on Molyneux's problem. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (3):471 – 485.   (Google | More links)
Schumacher, Ralph (2003). What are the direct objects of sight? Locke on the Molyneux question. Locke Studies 3:41-62.   (Google)
Shute, Sara (1981). Molyneux's question: Vision, touch, and the philosophy of perception. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (2).   (Google)
Stratton, G. M. (1899). The spatial harmony of touch and sight. Mind 8 (32):492-505.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1974). Molyneux's problem. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):637-650.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Van Cleve, James (2007). Reid's answer to Molyneux's question. The Monist 90 (2):251-270.   (Google)