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3.2e. Sensory Modalities, Misc (Sensory Modalities, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Ackerman, Diana F. (1990). A Natural History of the Senses. Random House.   (Cited by 130 | Google)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1974). Sight and light. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (October):317-322.   (Google)
Broad, C. D. (1952). Some elementary reflexions on sense-perception. Philosophy 27 (January):3-17.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Gold, Ian (2004). Phenomenal qualities and intermodal perception. In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier.   (Google)
O'Callaghan, Casey (2008). Seeing what you hear: Cross-modal illusions and perception. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):316-338.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Cross-modal perceptual illusions occur when a stimulus to one modality impacts perceptual experience associated with another modality. Unlike synaesthesia, cross-modal illusions are intelligible as results of perceptual strategies for dealing with sensory stimulation to multiple modalities, rather than as mere quirks. I argue that understanding cross-modal illusions reveals an important flaw in a widespread conception of the senses, and of their role in perceptual experience, according to which understanding perception and perceptual experience is a matter of assembling independently viable stories about vision, audition, olfaction, and the rest.
Taliaferro, Charles (1991). The argument from transposed modalities. Metaphilosophy 93 (January-April):93-100.   (Google | More links)
Van Cleve, James (2006). Touch, sound, and things without the mind. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):162-182.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind-independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so-called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind-independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds