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3.3a. Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability (Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability on PhilPapers)

See also:
Brewer, William F. & Lambert, Bruce L. (2001). The theory-ladenness of observation and the theory-ladenness of the rest of the scientific process. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S176-S186.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bruner, Jerome S. (1957). On perceptual readiness. Psychological Review 64:123-52.   (Cited by 766 | Google | More links)
Cam, Philip (1990). Insularity and the persistence of perceptual illusion. Analysis 50 (October):231-5.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1988). Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.   (Cited by 86 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 312 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: The present essay is addressed simultaneously to two distinct audiences.
Cornwell, William (2004). Dr. In Marek, Johann Christian & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. niederosterreichkultur.   (Google)
DesAutels, P. (1995). Two types of theories: The impact of Churchland's perceptual plasticity. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):25-33.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue that because Churchland does not adequately address the distinction between high-level cognitive theories and low-level embodied theories, Churchland's claims for theory-laden perception lose their epistemological significance. I propose that Churchland and others debating the theory-ladenness of perception should distinguish carefully between two main ways in which perception is plastic: through modifying our high-level theories directly and through modifying our low-level theories using training experiences. This will require them to attend to two very different types of constraints on the modification of our perceptions
Estany, Anna (2001). The thesis of theory-Laden observation in the light of cognitive psychology. Philosophy of Science 68 (2):203-217.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1988). A reply to Churchland's `perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality'. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1984). Observation reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.   (Cited by 58 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gilman, Daniel J. (1991). The neurobiology of observation. Philosophy of Science (September) 496 (September):496-502.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Good, I. J. (1968). Creativity and duality in perception and recall. In Proceedings of the IEE/NPL Conference on Pattern Recognition No. 42. Inst Elec Eng NPL.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (1999). Simulation, theory-theory and cognitive penetration: No 'instance of the fingerpost'. Mind and Language 14 (1):32-56.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Grunewald, Alexander (1999). Neurophysiology indicates cognitive penetration of the visual system. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):379-380.   (Google)
Abstract: Short-term memory, nonattentional task effects and nonspatial extraretinal representations in the visual system are signs of cognitive penetration. All of these have been found physiologically, arguing against the cognitive impenetrability of vision as a whole. Instead, parallel subcircuits in the brain, each subserving a different competency including sensory and cognitive (and in some cases motor) aspects, may have cognitively impenetrable components
Heal, Jane (1996). Simulation and cognitive penetrability. Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Lockhart, Robert S. (2000). Modularity, cognitive penetrability and the Turing test. Psycoloquy.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The Turing Test blurs the distinction between a model and irrelevant) instantiation details. Modeling only functional modules is problematic if these are interconnected and cognitively penetrable
Macpherson, Fiona (forthcoming). 'Cognitive penetration of colour experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one’s cognitive system, for example, one’s thoughts or beliefs? Ifone thinks that this can happen [at least in certain ways that are identWed in the paper] then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitivelv impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case ofcognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typicallv use to explain away alleged cases. The case is one in which it seems subjects’ beliefs about the typical colour of objects ajfects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitivelv penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generallv sympathetic to the idea ofcognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation ofthis plausible mechanism
McCauley, Robert N. & Henrich, J. (2006). Susceptibility to the Muller-lyer illusion, theory-neutral observation, and the diachronic penetrability of the visual input system. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):79-101.   (Google)
Abstract: Jerry Fodor has consistently cited the persistence of illusions--especially the M
Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.   (Cited by 130 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and articulated and provides a representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues, including the use of signal detection theory and event-related potentials to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing. These include, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, memory-accessing, and inference stage which provide several different highly constrained ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments that have been presented in both computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of problem solving". It is suggested that these cases do not show cognitive penetration, but rather they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect
Raftopoulos, Athanassios (2001). Reentrant neural pathways and the theory-ladenness of perception. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S187-S199.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Rhodes, Gillian & Kalish, Michael L. (1999). Cognitive penetration: Would we know it if we saw it? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):390-391.   (Google)
Abstract: How can the impenetrability hypothesis be empirically tested? We comment on the role of signal detection measures, suggesting that context effects on discriminations for which post-perceptual cues are irrelevant, or on neural activity associated with early vision, would challenge impenetrability. We also note the great computational power of the proposed pre-perceptual attention processes and consider the implications for testability of the theory
Rock, Irvin (1983). The Logic Of Perception. Cambridge: Mit Press.   (Cited by 380 | Google | More links)
Rollins, Mark (1994). Deep plasticity: The encoding approach to perceptual change. Philosophy of Science 61 (1):39-54.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Schyns, Philippe G. (1999). The case for cognitive penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):394-395.   (Google)
Abstract: Pylyshyn acknowledges that cognition intervenes in determining the nature of perception when attention is allocated to locations or properties prior to the operation of early vision. I present evidence that scale perception (one function of early vision) is cognitively penetrable and argue that Pylyshyn's criterion covers not a few, but many situations of recognition. Cognitive penetrability could be their modus operandi
Siegel, Susanna, Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification.   (Google)
Abstract: It is sometimes said that in depression, everything looks grey. If this is true, then mood can influence the character of perceptual experience: depending only on whether a viewer is depressed or not, how a scene looks to that viewer can differ even if all other conditions stay the same. This would be an example of cognitive penetrability of visual experience by other mental states. Here the influential cognitive state is a mood. Other putative examples of cognitive penetrability involve beliefs: to the reader of Russian, the sheet of Cyrillic script looks different than it looked to her before she could read it. When you know that bananas are yellow, this knowledge affects what color you see bananas to be (an achromatic banana will [2] appear yellowish). To the vain performer, the faces in the audience range in their expression from neutral to pleased, but remarkably no one ever looks disapproving. To the underconfident performer, the faces in the audience range in their expression from neutral to displeased, but remarkably no one ever looks approving. And in cases of suggestibility, the mere salience of a hypothesis seems to have an effect on how a given stimulus is experienced. Potential cognitive penetrators thus include moods, beliefs, hypotheses, knowledge, desires, and traits. In some cases, cognitively penetration can be epistemically beneficial. If an x ray looks different to a radiologist from the way it looks to someone lacking radiological expertise, then the radiologist gets more information about the world from her experience (such as whether there’s a tumor) than the non expert does from looking at the same x ray. If Iris Murdoch and John McDowell are right that having the right sort of character lets you see more moral facts than someone lacking that character sees when faced with the same situation, then there too your perceptual experience becomes epistemically better thanks to its being penetrated by your [3] character. In other cases, however, cognitive penetration seems to make experience epistemically worse..
Smith, Barry (1995). Common sense. In The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. & Nichols, Shaun (1997). Cognitive penetrability, rationality, and restricted simulation. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):297-326.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Stillings, Neil (1987). Modularity and naturalism in theories of vision. In Modularity In Knowledge Representation. Cambridge: Mit Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Stokes, Dustin (ms). Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper considers an orectic perception hypothesis which says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic perception is an interesting possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The orectic perception hypothesis is thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively impenetrable. It is of importance to issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, epistemology, and general philosophy of science. The plausibility of orectic perception can be motivated by some hypothetical cases, some classic experimental studies, and some new experimental research inspired by those same studies. The general suggestion is that orectic perception thus defined, and evidenced by the relevant studies, cannot be deflected by the standard strategies of the cognitive impenetrability theorist.
Vaina, L. M. (1990). What and where in the human visual system: Two hierarchies of visual modules. Synthese 83 (1):49-91.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Wright, Richard D. & Dawson, Michael R. W. (1994). To what extent do beliefs affect apparent motion? Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):471-491.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: A number of studies in the apparent motion literature were examined using the cognitive penetrability criterion to determine the extent to which beliefs affect the perception of apparent motion. It was found that the interaction between the perceptual processes mediating apparent motion and higher order processes appears to be limited. In addition, perceptual and inferential beliefs appear to have different effects on perceived motion optimality and direction. Our findings suggest that the system underlying apparent motion perception has more than one stage and is informationally encapsulated from cognitive factors