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3.3c. Construction and Inference in Perception (Construction and Inference in Perception on PhilPapers)

See also:
Allik, Jüri & Konstabel, Kenn (2005). G. F. Parrot and the theory of unconscious inferences. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 41 (4):317-330.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Anderson, Joseph & Anderson, Barbara (1993). The myth of persistence of vision revisited. Journal of Film and Video 45:3--12.   (Google)
Ben-Zeev, Aaron (1988). Can non-pure perception be direct? Philosophical Quarterly 38 (July):315-325.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bruce, Vicki & Green, Patrick (1985). Visual Perception: Physiology, Psychology, and Ecology. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Clark, Romane L. (1993). Seeing and inferring. Philosophical Papers 22 (2).   (Google)
Crawford, Dan D. (1982). Are there mental inferences in direct perceptions? American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):83-92.   (Google)
Cutting, James E. (2003). Reconceiving perceptual space. In Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.), Looking Into Pictures. The Mit Press.   (Google)
Gregory, Richard L. (1974). Perceptions as hypotheses. In Philosophy Of Psychology. London,: Macmillan.   (Cited by 67 | Google | More links)
Hatfield, Gary C. (2009). Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited : color as a psychobiological property -- Sense data and the mind body problem -- The reality of qualia -- The sensory core and the medieval foundations of early modern perceptual theory -- Postscript (2008) on Ibn al-Haytham's (Alhacen's) theory of vision -- Attention in early scientific psychology -- Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science : reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology -- What can the mind tell us about the brain? : psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint -- Introspective evidence in psychology.
Hatfield, Gary (2002). Perception As Unconscious Inference. In D. Heyer (ed.), Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception. John Wiley and Sons Ltd.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consider for a moment the spatial and chromatic dimensions of your visual expe- rience. Suppose that as you gaze about the room you see a table, some books, and papers. Ignore for now the fact that you immediately recognize these objects to be a table with books and papers on it. Concentrate on how the table looks to you: its top spreads out in front of you, stopping at edges beyond which lies un?lled space, leading to more or less distant chairs, shelves, or expanses of ?oor. The books and paper on the table top create shaped visual boundaries between areas of different color, within which there may be further variation of color or visual texture. Propelled by a slight breeze, a sheet of paper slides across the table, and you experience its smooth motion before it ?oats out of sight
Joske, W. D. (1963). Inferring and perceiving. Philosophical Review 72 (October):433-445.   (Google | More links)
Kline, A. David (1979). Constructivism and the objects of perception. Nature and System 1 (March):37-45.   (Google)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1996). Explaining why things look the way they do. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: How are we able to perceive the world veridically? If we ask this question as a part of the scientific investigation of perception, then we are not asking for a transcendental guarantee that our perceptions are by and large veridical; we presuppose that they are. Unless we assumed that we perceived the world for the most part veridically, we would not be in a position to investigate our perceptual abilities empirically. We are interested, then, not in how it is possible in general for us to perceive the world veridically, but instead in what the relation is between our environment and its properties, of which we have knowledge, on the one hand, and our perceptual mechanisms, on the other, that results in very many, even most of our perceptions being veridical in everyday life
Raftopoulos, Athanassios (2006). Defending realism on the proper ground. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 'Epistemological constructivism' holds that vision is mediated by background preconceptions and is theory-laden. Hence, two persons with differing theoretical commitments see the world differently and they could agree on what they see only if they both espoused the same conceptual framework. This, in its turn, undermines the possibility of theory testing and choice on a common theory-neutral empirical basis. In this paper, I claim that the cognitive sciences suggest that a part of vision may be only indirectly penetrated by cognition in a way that does not threaten retrieval of information from a visual scene in a bottom-up way. That blocks the constructivist epistemological thesis. However, since spatial attention, which can be cognitively driven, seems to permeate all stages of visual processes, one is led to conclude that there is no part of vision immune to direct cognitive interference. Against this, I elaborate on the role of spatial attention and argue that it does influence vision in a top-down manner, but it does so only in an indirect way. I then argue that the existence of visual processes that are only indirectly penetrated by cognition undermines the epistemological conclusions of constructivism
Spruit, Leen (1994). Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Brill.   (Google)
Abstract: v. 1. Classical roots and medieval discussions -- v. 2. Renaissance controversis, later scholasticism, and the elimination of the intelligible species in modern philosophy.
ten Hoor, Marten (1936). Awareness and inference: An approach to realism. Journal of Philosophy 33 (22):589-596.   (Google | More links)
Veer, Vander & Garrett, L. (1964). Austin on perception. Review of Metaphysics 17 (June):557-567.   (Google)
Vishwanath, Dhanraj (2005). The epistemological status of vision and its implications for design. Axiomathes 15 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Computational theories of vision typically rely on the analysis of two aspects of human visual function: (1) object and shape recognition (2) co-calibration of sensory measurements. Both these approaches are usually based on an inverse-optics model, where visual perception is viewed as a process of inference from a 2D retinal projection to a 3D percept within a Euclidean space schema. This paradigm has had great success in certain areas of vision science, but has been relatively less successful in understanding perceptual representation, namely, the nature of the perceptual encoding. One of the drawbacks of inverse-optics approaches has been the difficulty in defining the constraints needed to make the inference computationally tractable (e.g. regularity assumptions, Bayesian priors, etc.). These constraints, thought to be learned assumptions about the nature of the physical and optical structures of the external world, have to be incorporated into any workable computational model in the inverse-optics paradigm. But inference models that employ an inverse optics plus structural assumptions approach inevitably result in a na
Walton, Kendall (1963). The dispensability of perceptual inferences. Mind 72 (July):357-368.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Williamson, John (1966). Realization and unconscious inference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (September):11-26.   (Google | More links)