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3.3e. Psychophysics (Psychophysics on PhilPapers)

See also:
Albertazzi, Liliana (2002). Phenomenologists and analytics: A question of psychophysics? Southern Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 40:27-48.   (Google)
Blomberg, Jaakko (1971). Psychophysics, sensation and information. Ajatus 33:106-137.   (Google)
Boring, Edwin G. (1935). The relation of the attributes of sensation to the dimensions of the stimulus. Philosophy of Science 2 (2):236-245.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Bradley, Francis H. (1895). What do we mean by the intensity of psychical states. Mind 4 (13):1-27.   (Google | More links)
Butterfield, Jeremy (1998). Quantum curiosities of psychophysics. In J. Cornwell (ed.), Consciousness and Human Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I survey some of the connections between the metaphysics of the relation between mind and matter, and quantum theory’s measurement problem. After discussing the metaphysics, especially the correct formulation of physicalism, I argue that two state-reduction approaches to quantum theory’s measurement problem hold some surprises for philosophers’ discussions of physicalism. Though both approaches are compatible with physicalism, they involve a very different conception of the physical, and of how the physical underpins the mental, from what most philosophers expect. And one approach exemplifies a a problem in the definition of physicalism which the metaphysical literature has discussed only in the abstract. A version of the paper has appeared in Consciousness and Human Identity, ed. John Cornwell, OUP 1998
Cattell, James McKeen & Fullerton, George Stuart (1892). The psychophysics of movement. Mind 1 (3):447-452.   (Google | More links)
di Lollo, V.; Enns, James T. & Rensink, R. (2000). Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes. Journal Of Experimental Psychology-General 129 (4):481-507.   (Google)
Eisler, H. (1975). Subjective duration and psychophysics. Psychological Review 82:429-50.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Enns, J. T.; Rensink, R. A. & Di Lollo, V. (2000). Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology 129 (4):481-507.   (Google)
Abstract: Advances in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology have called attention to reentrant signalling as the predominant form of communication between brain areas. We propose that explicit use be made of reentrant processing in theories of perception. To show that this can be done effectively in one domain, we report on a series of psychophysical experiments involving a new form of masking, which defies explanation by current feed-forward theories. This masking occurs when a brief display of target plus mask is continued with the mask alone. We report evidence of two masking processes: an early process affected by physical factors such as adapting luminance and contour proximity, and a later process affected by attentional factors such as set size, target pop-out, and spatial pre-cuing. We call this later process masking by
Findlay, J. N. (1950). Linguistic approach to psychophysics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:43-64.   (Google)
Francis, Gregory & Hermens, Frouke (2002). Comment on Competition for Consciousness Among Visual Events: The Psychophysics of Reentrant Visual Processes (di lollo, Enns & Rensink, 2000). Journal of Experimental Psychology 131 (4):590-593.   (Google)
Horst, Steven (2005). Phenomenology and psychophysics. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):1-21.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat
Kietzmann, Tim Christian, Philosophical accounts of causal explanation and the scientific practice of psychophysics.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical accounts of causality and causal explanation can provide important guidelines for the experimental sciences and valid experimental setups. In addition to the obvious requirement of logic validity, however, the approaches must account for the generally accepted experimental practice to be truly useful. To investigate this important interconnection, the current paper evaluates different philosophical accounts of causation and causal explanation in the light of typical psychophysical experiments. In particular, eye-tracking setups will be used to evaluate Granger Causality, Probabilistic Accounts and Woodwardʼs manipulationist approach. Upon coarse reading, the manipulationist perspective seems most suitable for a practical application, but there are manifold problems hidden in the details of the definitions. However, with some adjustments via standard tools of experimental design, these problems can be overcome and leave Woodwardʼs account as the method of choice
Klein, S. A. (1998). Double-judgment psychophysics for research on cosnciousness: Application to blindsight. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Nijhawan, Romi (2008). Visual prediction: Psychophysics and neurophysiology of compensation for time delays. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):179-198.   (Google)
Petrusic, William M. & Baranski, Joseph V. (2002). Mental imagery in memory psychophysics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):206-207.   (Google)
Abstract: Imagery has played an important, albeit controversial, role in the study of memory psychophysics. In this commentary we critically examine the available data bearing on whether pictorial based depictions of remembered perceptual events are activated and scanned in each of a number of different psychophysical tasks
Rosen, Steven M. (1976). Toward Relativization of Psychophysical "Relativity". Perceptual and Motor Skills 42:843-850.   (Google)
Abstract: A paradoxical feature of Weber's law is considered. The law presumably states a principle of psychophysical relativity, yet a pre-relativistic physical measurement model has been traditionally employed. Classical physics, Einsteinian relativity, and a newer interpretation of the relativity concept are discussed. Their relation to psychophysics is examined. The domain wherein Weber's law breaks down is noted as suggestively similar to that in which physicists report relativistic effects. A tentative hypothesis is offered to stimulate further thought about a more meaningful integration of psychophysics with modern physical science.
Sarris, Viktor (2010). Relational psychophysics: Messages from Ebbinghaus' and Wertheimer's work. Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):207 – 216.   (Google)
Abstract: In past and modern psychophysics there are several unresolved methodological and philosophical problems of human and animal perception, including the outstanding question of the relational basis of whole psychophysics. Here the main issue is discussed: if, and to what extent, there are viable bridges between the traditional “gestalt” oriented approaches and the modern perceptual-cognitive perspectives in psychophysics. Thereby the key concept of psychological “frame of reference” is presented by pointing to Hermann Ebbinghaus' geometric-optical illusions, on the one hand, and Max Wertheimer's treatment of the traditional transposition phenomenon, on the other hand. A much-needed theoretical reorientation of future research may help to overcome the philosophical narrowness of present-day human and comparative psychophysics
Strother, Lars; Van Valkenburg, David & Kubovy, Michael (2003). Toward a psychophysics of perceptual organization using multistable stimuli and phenomenal reports. Axiomathes 13 (3-4).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We explore experimental methods used to study the phenomena of perceptual organization, first studied by the Gestalt psychologists. We describe an application of traditional psychophysics to perceptual organization and offer alternative methods. Among these, we distinguish two approaches that use multistable stimuli: (1) phenomenological psychophysics, in which the observer's response is assumed to accurately and directly reflect perceptual experience; and (2) the interference paradigm, in which an observer's response is evaluated as correct or incorrect because it pertains to a corrigible task, but does not directly reflect the observer's experience. We show that phenomenological psychophysics can yield valuable information about perceptual organization and lends itself to the development of quantitative theory. We discuss some criticisms of the method and argue that the two approaches that use multistable stimuli are complementary. We also compare each of the approaches with traditional psychophysics. We conclude that the several methods are convergent
Titchener, E. B. (1920). Prize in psychophysics. Mind 29 (114):256.   (Google | More links)
Wackermann, J. (2008). Measure of time: A meeting point of psychophysics and fundamental physics. Mind and Matter 6 (1):9-50.   (Google)
Abstract: In the present paper the relation between objective and subjective time is studied from a neutral non-dualist perspective Adoption of the relational concept of time leads to fundamental problems of time measurement of the uniformity of time measures, and of a native measure of duration in subjective experience. Experimental data on discrimination and reproduction of time intervals are reviewed and relevant models of internal time representations are discussed. Special attention is given to the 'dual klepsydra model' (DKM)and to the outstanding properties of the reproduction func- tion yielded by the DKM Time scales generated by a DKM-based reproduction mechanisms are studied It is shown that such 'klepsydraic clocks' generate time measures which are non-uniform with respect to objective time yet internally consistent within an ensemble of such clocks and in this sense 'quasi-uniform' . Competing concepts of subjective time and modeling principles of internal time representation are briefly discussed Some interesting parallels be- tween our psychophysical approach and E.A. Milne's treatment of the problem of uniform time are drawn in the Appendix
Wackermann, Jiří (2010). Psychophysics as a science of primary experience. Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):189 – 206.   (Google)
Abstract: In Fechner's psychophysics, the 'mental' and the 'physical' were conceived as two phenomenal domains, connected by functional relations, not as two ontologically different realms. We follow the path from Fechner's foundational ideas and Mach's radical programme of a unitary science to later approaches to primary, psychophysically neutral experience (phenomenology, protophysics). We propose an 'integral psychophysics' as a mathematical study of law-like, invariant structures of primary experience. This approach is illustrated by a reinterpretation of psychophysical experiments in terms of perceptual situations involving a constructed apparatus and an instructed subject. The problematic notion of 'measurement of sensation' is thus eliminated: 'sensations' are merely indices for classes of perceptually equivalent configurations (states of the apparatus) specified by the instruction. The locus of the measured is in the inter-subjectively shared, communicable world—not inside the subject's mind. Finally we discuss the role of integral psychophysics as a scientia prima , logically and methodically preceding physics and psychology
Ward, James (1876). An attempt to interpret fechner's law. Mind 1 (4):452-466.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Wertheimer, Max (1923). Laws of organization in perceptual forms. Psycologische Forschung 4:301-350.   (Cited by 355 | Google)