MindPapers: 3.3e. The Representation of High-Level Properties

Basile, Pierfrancesco (2007). Whitehead, Hume and the phenomenology of causation. In Subjectivity, Process, and Rationality (Process Thought, Volume 14). Heusenstamm Bei Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. (Google | Edit)

Beebee, Helen (2003). Seeing causing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):257-280. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Budd, Malcolm (1987). Wittgenstein on seeing aspects. Mind 96 (January):1-17. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Church, Jennifer (2000). 'Seeing as' and the double bind of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):99-112. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Ducasse, Curt J. (1965). Causation: Perceivable? Or only inferred? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (December):173-179. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)

Ducasse, Curt J. (1967). How literally causation is perceivable. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (December):271-273. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Ducasse, Curt J. (1926). On the nature and the observability of the causal relation. Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):57-68. (Cited by 27 | Google | More links | Edit)

Döring, Sabine A. (forthcoming). Seeing what to do: Affective perception and rational motivation. Dialectica. (Google | Edit)

Hooker, Cliff A. (1973). Empiricism, perception and conceptual change. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (September):59-74. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Hunter, J. F. M. (1981). Wittgenstein on seeing and seeing as. Philosophical Investigations 4:33-49. (Google | Edit)

Hyslop, Alec (1983). On 'seeing-as'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (June):533-540. (Google | More links | Edit)

Jonas, Hans (1950). Causality and perception. Journal of Philosophy 47 (May):319-323. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Luccio, Riccardo & Milloni, Donata (2004). Perception of causality: A dynamical analysis. In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Lyons, Jack C. (online). Clades, capgras, and perceptual kinds. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Perceptual states represent the world as being certain ways, as having certain properties. Which ways and properties are these? When I hold out my hand and look at it, it seems that I have a visual experience of a hand. One traditional view has held that my perceptual state is not of a hand but merely of an array of color patches, or the like, which disposes me to believe that thereâs a hand without itself actually representing anything as being a hand; the perceptual state, that is, is not actually of a hand. A very different sort of view might allow into the contents of perceptual states not just hands, but perhaps even psychological states, semantic properties, causal relations, such counterfactual properties as Gibsonian affordances, and maybe even highly specific properties like that of being a pileated woodpecker. Either view purports to express a deep fact about the nature of (human) perception, one that is not merely a matter of oneâs individual circumstances. Given my cognitive and perceptual apparatus, what ways can perception represent the world as being? What sorts of properties are represented in perception? What are the contents of perceptual states?

Malone, Michael E. (1978). Is scientific observation seeing as? Philosophical Investigations 1:23-38. (Google | Edit)

Mulhall, Stephen (1993). Consciousness, cognition and the Phenomenal--II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67 (67):75-89. (Google | Edit)

Phillips, Ian (online). Perception and context. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I develop a seeming antinomy in relation to the question, Do natural kind properties, strictly speaking, characterize the phenomenology of experience? Or, in Peacockean terms, Are natural kind concepts observational? On the one hand, naïve descriptions of experience are rich descriptions, often characterizing our experience in terms of the presence of natural kinds. Thus, negative answers to such questions falsify how our experience seems to us. On the other hand, attributing rich contents to experience forces us to treat certain matching experiences as illusions or, in Peacockean terms, purely perceptual errors. In both cases this is an implausible application of these notions, for, in such cases, all the properties seemingly being picked up on by the visual system are instantiated. The intractability of this apparent antinomy motivates a contextualist resolution: How rich a description it is appropriate to give of a stretch of someone’s experiential life depends on the context we are in

Prinz, Jesse J. (2006). Beyond appearances: The content of sensation and perception. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally ‘‘see’’ them in our dreams and hallucinations. To avoid triviality, I want to focus on things that we can actually encounter. We perceive poodles, perfumes, pinpricks, and pounding drums. These are concrete things; they are closely wedded to appearances. But we also encounter things that are abstract. We encounter uncles and instances of injustice. These things have no characteristic looks. Percepts, it is said, cannot represent abstract things. Call this claim the Imperceptability Thesis. I think the Imperceptibility Thesis is false. Perception is not restricted to the concrete. We can perceive abstract entities

Ranken, Nani L. (1967). A note on Ducasse's perceivable causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (December):269-270. (Google | More links | Edit)

Siegel, Susanna (ms). Misperception. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In discussions of perception and its provision of knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver would normally come to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content

Siegel, Susanna (online). The visual experience of causation. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: How is causation represented in the mind? We often believe that one event has caused another. But can we visually experience two things as causally related? If so, then experiences represent causation. A different question in the vicinity is whether we can ever see that something is causing (or has just caused) something else to happen. In the relevant sense of ‘seeing’ here, seeing is factive – you can see that p only if p. By contrast, experiential representation of properties or relations is not factive, so you can represent that p even if p is not true

Siegel, Susanna (2006). Which properties are represented in perception? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links | Edit)

Stadler, Ingrid H. (1958). On seeing as. Philosophical Review 67 (January):91-94. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1956). Seeing and seeing as. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56:109-124. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Wittgenstein, L. (1976). Cause and effect: Intuitive awareness. Philosophia 6 (3-4). (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)

Woodworth, R. S. (1907). Non-sensory components of sense perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (7):169-176. (Google | More links | Edit)

Wright, Edmond L. (2005). Perceiving socially and morally: A question of triangulation. Philosophy 80 (311):53-75. (Google | More links | Edit)

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