MindPapers: 3.3f. The Contents of Perception, Misc

Bell, John L. (2000). Continuity and the logic of perception. Transcendent Philosophy 1 (2):1-7. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: If we imagine a chess-board with alternate blue and red squares, then this is something in which the individual red and blue areas allow themselves to be distinguished from each other in juxtaposition, and something similar holds also if we imagine each of the squares divided into four smaller squares also alternating between these two colours. If, however, we were to continue with such divisions until we had exceeded the boundary of noticeability for the individual small squares which result, then it would no longer be possible to apprehend the individual red and blue areas in their respective positions. But would we then see nothing at all? Not in the least; rather we would see the whole chessboard as violet, i.e. apprehend it as something that participates simultaneously in red and blue

Bilgrami, Akeel (1994). On McDowell on the content of perceptual experience. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):206-13. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Clark, Austen (2000). A Theory of Sentience. New York: Oxford University Press. (Cited by 107 | Google | More links | Edit)

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Clark, Austen (2004). Sensing, objects, and awareness: Reply to commentators. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):553-79. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Clark, Austen (1992). Sensory Qualities. Clarendon. (Cited by 177 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Clark, R. (1976). The sensuous content of perception. In Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.), Action, Knowledge, and Reality. Bobbs-Merrill. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Crane, Tim (ed.) (1992). The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 49 | Google | Edit)

Davies, W. M. (1996). Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory. Avebury. (Google | Edit)

Dilworth, John B. (2005). The double content of perception. Synthese 146 (3):225-243. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Clearly we can perceive both objects, and various aspects or appearances of those objects. But how should that complexity of perceptual content be explained or analyzed? I argue that perceptual representations normally have a double or two level nested structure of content, so as to adequately incorporate information both about contextual aspects Y(X) of an object X, and about the object X itself. On this double content (DC) view, perceptual processing starts with aspectual data Y′(X′) as a higher level of content, which data does not itself provide lower level X-related content, but only an aspectually encoded form of such data. Hence the relevant perceptual data Y′(X′) must be ’de-contextualized’ or decoded to arrive at the X-related content X′, resulting in a double content structure for perceptual data, that persists in higher-order conscious perceptual content. Some implications and applications of this DC view are also discussed

Dilworth, John B. (2005). The twofold orientational structure of perception. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):187-203. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I argue that perceptual content involves representations both of aspects of objects, and of objects themselves, whether at the level of conscious perception, or of low-level perceptual processing - a double content structure. I present an 'orientational' theory of the relations of the two kinds of perceptual content, which can accommodate both the general semantic possibility of perceptual misrepresentation, and also species of it involving characteristic perceptual confusions of aspectual and intrinsic content. The resulting theoretical structure is argued to be a broadly methodological or logical one, rather than a substantive theory that is open to empirical refutation

Dokic, Jérôme (1998). The ontology of perception: Bipolarity and content. Erkenntnis 48 (2):153-69. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar (capable of being correct and capable of being incorrect), whereas perception as a mental state is not (if it is veridical, it is essentially so). This has profound consequences for the epistemological view that perception is a source of knowledge. I sktech a two-level epistemology which is consistent with this view. I conclude that the analogy between perception and propositional attitudes, from which the notion of perceptual content is born, may be more misleading than it is usually thought

Ducasse, Curt J. (1941). Objectivity, objective reference, and perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2 (September):43-78. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gunther, York H. (1995). Perceptual content and the subpersonal. Conference 6 (1):31-45. (Google | Edit)

Leon, Mark . (1986). Interpreting experience. Philosophical Papers 15 (November):107-130. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Levine, Joseph M. (2004). Thoughts on sensory representation: A commentary on Austen Clark's a theory of sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):541-551. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Ludwig, Kirk A. (2006). Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations? In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. (Google | Edit)

Matthen, Mohan P. (2004). Features, places, and things: Reflections on Austen Clark's theory of sentience. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):497-518. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Matthen, Mohan P. (1989). Intensionality and perception: A reply to Rosenberg. Journal of Philosophy 86 (December):727-733. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

McDowell, John (1994). The content of perceptual experience. Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205. (Cited by 66 | Google | More links | Edit)

Millikan, Ruth G. (1991). Perceptual content and Fregean myth. Mind 100 (399):439-459. (Cited by 21 | Google | More links | Edit)

Mohanty, Jitendra N. (1986). Perceptual meaning. Topoi 5 (September):131-136. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Pautz, Adam (online). Why believe that experiences have contents? (Google | Edit)

Abstract: I provide an argument from the best explanation for the claim that experiences have contents. In particular, I argue that a common factor account of experience in terms of content provides the best explanation of the fact that both veridical and non-veridical experience can ground the capacity for thought, of indeterminate and impossible experiences, and of other features of experience

Pautz, Adam (online). What does it mean to say that experiences have contents? (Google | Edit)

Abstract: I offer a formulation of the claim that experiences have contents.I also suggest a new method for determining what the contents of our experiences are, which can be applied to the issue of whether high-level properties such as being a tomato enter into the content of experience

Peacocke, Christopher (1986). Analogue content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:1-17. (Cited by 25 | Google | Edit)

Peacocke, Christopher (1989). Perceptual content. In J. Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 27 | Google | Edit)

Peacocke, Christopher (1983). Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 230 | Google | More links | Edit)

Pendlebury, Michael J. (1987). Perceptual representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:91-106. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Pendlebury, Michael J. (1990). Sense experiences and their contents: A defense of the propositional account. Inquiry 33 (2):215-30. (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | Edit)

Prosser, Simon (forthcoming). The two‐dimensional content of consciousness. Philosophical Studies. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker’s version of two‐dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher‐order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti‐ Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories

Schellenberg, Susanna (web). The situation-dependency of perception. Journal of Philosophy. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The fundamental philosophical interest in perception is to answer the question of how perception can give us knowledge of the world. One of the challenges in answering this question is that perception is necessarily tied to a particular time and place. One necessarily perceives from a particular location and at a particular time. As a consequence, what is immediately perceptually available is subject to situational features, such as one’s point of view and the lighting conditions. But although objects are always perceived subject to situational features, one can perceive the shape and color of objects.¹ One can perceive the shape of objects although only the facing surfaces are visible and one can perceive two objects to be the same size although one is nearer than the other. Similarly, one can perceive the uniform color of a surface although parts of it are illuminated more brightly than others² and one can recognize the sound of a cello regardless of whether it is played on a street or in a concert hall. More generally, one can perceive the properties objects have regardless of the situational features, although one always perceives them subject to situational features

Schroeder, Timothy & Caplan, Ben (2007). On the content of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590–611. (Google | Edit)

Shoemaker, Sydney (2002). Reply to Leeds. Noûs 36 (1):130-136. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Siegel, Susanna (2007). How can we discover the contents of experience? Southern Journal Of Philosophy. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I’ve uesd in several other papers - the method of phenomenal contrast

Siegel, Susanna (online). The contents of perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links | Edit)

Smith, David Woodruff (1984). Content and context of perception. Synthese 61 (October):61-88. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Smith, David Woodruff (1979). The case of the exploding perception. Synthese 41 (June):239-270. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Smith, David Woodruff (1986). The ins and outs of perception. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):187-211. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Sosa, Ernest (1988). Contents and objects of experience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 32:209-212. (Google | Edit)

Still, Arthur (1979). Perception and representation. In Philosophical Problems In Psychology. London: Methuen. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Talmont-Kaminski, Konrad & Collier, John D. (2004). Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically significant content of experience. In Johann Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society XII. Austrian L. Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: To account for a perceived distinction it is necessary to postulate a real distinction. Our process of experiencing the world is one of, mostly unconscious, interpretation of observed distinctions to provide us with a partial world-picture that is sufficient to guide action. The distinctions, themselves, are acorrigible (they do not have a truth value), directly perceived, structured, and capable of being interpreted. Interpreted experience is corrigible, representational and capable of guiding action. Since interpretation is carried out mostly unconsciously and in real time, the two aspects are present in experience together so that it is difficult to separate them out

Thompson, Brad J. (online). Senses for senses. (Google | Edit)

Tozser, Janos (2005). The content of perceptual experience. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY. (Google | Edit)

Viger, Christopher D. (2006). Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations? A case for the 'no' side. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. (Google | Edit)

Vlach, Frank (1983). On situation semantics for perception. Synthese 54 (January):129-152. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links | Edit)

Watt, H. J. (1920). The importance of the sensory attribute of order. Mind 29 (115):257-276. (Google | More links | Edit)

Yoon, B. (2000). Intentionality of perceptual experience. Erkenntnis 52 (3):339-355. (Google | More links | Edit)

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