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3.4. Perception and the Mind (Perception and the Mind on PhilPapers)

See also:
Jensen, Rasmus Thybo (2009). Motor intentionality and the case of Schneider. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein

3.4a Perception and Thought

Boas, George (1952). The perceptual element in cognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (June):486-494.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Casta, (1977). Perception, belief, and the structure of physical objects and consciousness. Synthese 35 (3).   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Creighton, J. E. (1906). Experience and thought. Philosophical Review 15 (5):482-493.   (Google | More links)
Crumley II, Jack S. (1991). Appearances can be deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):233-251.   (Google)
Daniels, Charles B. (1988). Perception, thought, and reality. Noûs 22 (September):455-464.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
de Haas, Frans A. J. & Mansfeld, Jaap (eds.) (2004). Aristotle on Generation and Corruption, Book 1: Symposium Aristotelicum. Clarendon.   (Google)
Abstract: Jaap Mansfeld and Frans de Haas bring together in this volume a distinguished international team of ancient philosophers, presenting a systematic, chapter-by-chapter study of one of the key texts in Aristotle's science and metaphysics: the first book of On Generation and Corruption. In GC I Aristotle provides a general outline of physical processes such as generation and corruption, alteration, and growth, and inquires into their differences. He also discusses physical notions such as contact, action and passion, and mixture. These notions are fundamental to Aristotle's physics and cosmology, and more specifically to his theory of the four elements and their transformations. Moreover, references to GC elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus show that in GC I Aristotle is doing heavy conceptual groundwork for more refined applications of these notions in, for example, the psychology of perception and thought, and the study of animal generation and corruption. Ultimately, biology is the goal of the series of enquiries in which GC I demands a position of its own immediately after the Physics. The contributors deal with questions of structure and text constitution and provide thought-provoking discussions of each chapter of GC I. New approaches to the issues of how to understand first matter, and how to evaluate Aristotle's notion of mixture are given ample space. Throughout, Aristotle's views of the theories of the Presocratics and Plato are shown to be crucial in understanding his argument
Dummett, Michael (1990). Thought and perception: The views of two philosophical innovators. In The Analytic Tradition: Philosophical Quarterly Monographs, Volume 1. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gl, (2004). On perceiving that. Theoria 70 (2-3):197-212.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Leighton, Joseph A. (1906). Cognitive thought and 'immediate' experience. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (7):174-180.   (Google | More links)
Locke, Don (1968). Perceiving and thinking, part I. Aristotelian Society 173:173-190.   (Google)
Lyons, Jack C. (2005). Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte- mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer- ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of looks. A standard view is that how things look, in this epistemically significant sense, is a matter of ones present perceptual phenomenology, of what nondoxastic experiential state one is in. On this standard view, these experiential states (a) determine which of my beliefs are perceptual beliefs and (b) are centrally involved in justifying these beliefs
Macpherson, Fiona (forthcoming). 'Cognitive penetration of colour experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one’s cognitive system, for example, one’s thoughts or beliefs? Ifone thinks that this can happen [at least in certain ways that are identWed in the paper] then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitivelv impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case ofcognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typicallv use to explain away alleged cases. The case is one in which it seems subjects’ beliefs about the typical colour of objects ajfects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitivelv penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generallv sympathetic to the idea ofcognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation ofthis plausible mechanism
McClure, M. T. (1916). Perception and thinking. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (13):345-354.   (Google | More links)
Nes, S. Anders (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford University. Dissertation, Oxford University   (Google)
Nicholas, John M. (1979). Leibniz: Apperception, perception, and thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1).   (Google)
Noe, Alva (1999). Thought and experience. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):257-65.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Pendlebury, Michael J. (1999). Sensibility and understanding in perceptual judgments. South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):356-369.   (Google)
Pryor, James (online). An epistemic theory of acquaintance.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: For example, suppose you believe squirrels can live an extremely long time, like parrots and tortoises. You think to yourself, The oldest mammal in this town is probably a squirrel. Contrast that case to:
(2b) believing some animal you seean animal that happens to be the oldest mammal in
townto be a squirrel
I said theres a philosophically important di?erence between the (a) examples and the (b) examples. In fact these examples illustrate more than one di?erence. Lets try to disentangle the di?erent di?erences
Quinton, Anthony M. (1968). Perceiving and thinking, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 191:191-208.   (Google)
Quillen, Keith (1989). Perceptual belief and psychological explanation. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (July):276-293.   (Google | More links)
Sabine, George H. (1907). The concreteness of thought. Philosophical Review 16 (2):154-169.   (Google | More links)
Schilder, Paul (1942). Mind: Perception And Thought In Their Constructive Aspects. Columbia University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Stokes, Dustin (ms). Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper considers an orectic perception hypothesis which says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic perception is an interesting possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The orectic perception hypothesis is thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively impenetrable. It is of importance to issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, epistemology, and general philosophy of science. The plausibility of orectic perception can be motivated by some hypothetical cases, some classic experimental studies, and some new experimental research inspired by those same studies. The general suggestion is that orectic perception thus defined, and evidenced by the relevant studies, cannot be deflected by the standard strategies of the cognitive impenetrability theorist.
Stroud, Barry G. (2002). Sense-experience and the grounding of thought. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Teschner, George (1981). The undifferentiated conjunction of sensation and judgment in perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):119-122.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Tolhurst, William E. (1998). Seemings. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):293-302.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wieman, Henry N. (1943). Perception and cognition. Journal of Philosophy 40 (February):73-77.   (Google | More links)

3.4b Perception and Action

Aizawa, Kenneth (2006). Understanding the embodiment of perception. APA Proceedings and Addresses 79 (3):5-25.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Nos (2004) theory of enactive perception provides one proposal. Where it is commonly thought that
Aizawa, Kenneth (2007). Understanding the embodiment of perception. Journal of Philosophy 104 (1):5-25.   (Google | More links)
Allott, Robin (2001). Language, perception and action: Philosophical issues. In [Book Chapter].   (Google)
Abstract: The earlier part of this book has been concerned with very specific questions arising in the field of linguistics (phonetics, semantics and syntax), with the results of research into visual perception (physiological and neurological) and with rather wider speculation about the organisation of bodily action and the relation between the bodily processes underlying action, vision and speech. The hypotheses, arguments, evidence and conclusions reached have not depended to any significant extent on philosophical doctrine or concepts and the question may be asked why should a book essentially concerned with linguistics conclude with a chapter devoted to philosophy. To this question there is a broad answer and a more specific one; the broad answer is that there has been prolonged and difficult discussion between philosophers over many centuries of the subjects dealt with earlier in this book, the origin and nature of language, the relation of language to reality, perception as based on sense-experience and providing the main basis for veridical knowledge, and voluntary human action (the notions of free will and determinism, of reasons and causes of action). The narrower answer, as an occasion and justification for having a philosophical chapter, is that in some respects totally new broad and specific hypotheses are presented about the functioning of language, perception and action, and particularly about their interrelation in human behaviour, and it is worth considering what implications these hypotheses, if true, may have for traditional or current philosophical views. It may be that they ought to involve some radical review of current theory but, in any case, it would be unsatisfactory simply to present a whole range of ideas bearing on language, perception and action without having regard to what relevant to these subjects has been said by philosophers (as in the same way it would be unsatisfactory not to have regard to work that has been done on these subjects by experts in the field of Artificial Intelligence)
Almer, Elizabeth Dreike; Gramling, Audrey A. & Kaplan, Steven E. (2008). Impact of post-restatement actions taken by a firm on non-professional investors' credibility perceptions. Journal of Business Ethics 80 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The frequency of earnings restatements has been increasing over the last decade. Restating previous earnings erodes perceived trustworthiness and competence of management, giving firms strong incentives to take actions to enhance perceived credibility of future financial reports [Farber, D. B.: 2005, The Accounting Review 80(2), 539–561.]. Using an experimental case, we examine the ability of post-restatement actions taken by a firm to positively influence non-professional investors’ perceptions of management’s financial reporting credibility. Our examination considers credibility judgments following two types of restatements – those resulting from fraud in which the character, ethics, and values of an organization may be called into question [cf. Copeland, Jr., J. E.: 2005, Accounting Horizons 19(1), 35–43.], and those resulting from non-fraud (i.e., aggressive accounting). Based on the information in the experimental case, non-professional investors take the role of potential equity investors and make a judgment about management’s financial reporting credibility after reviewing a set of post-restatement actions taken by a firm. The possible actions include changes in four corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., internal audit function, external audit firm, board of directors, CFO) and a buyback of company stock. Our results provide an important contribution to the literature by demonstrating that among non-professional investors, perceptions of management’s financial reporting credibility are affected both by the post-restatement action taken and the nature of the restatement. These results offer insight into the formation of a key credibility judgment made by non-professional investors following a trust-destroying event, an earnings restatement
Arnold, Donald F.; Bernardi, Richard A.; Neidermeyer, Presha E. & Schmee, Josef (2007). The effect of country and culture on perceptions of appropriate ethical actions prescribed by codes of conduct: A western european perspective among accountants. Journal of Business Ethics 70 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:   Recognizing the growing interdependence of the European Union and the importance of codes of conduct in companies’ operations, this research examines the effect of a country’s culture on the implementation of a code of conduct in a European context. We examine whether the perceptions of an activity’s ethicality relates to elements found in company codes of conduct vary by country or according to Hofstede’s (1980, Culture’s Consequences (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA)) cultural constructs of: Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity/Femininity, Individualism, and Power Distance. The 294 individuals, who participated in our study, were from 8 Western European countries. Their responses to our 13 scenarios indicate that differences in the perceptions of ethicality associate primarily with the participants’ country as opposed to their employer (i.e., accounting firm), employment level, or gender. The evidence also indicates that these country differences associate with Hofstede constructs of Individualism and Masculinity
Ballard, Dana (1996). On the function of visual representation. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Baldwin, Thomas (2003). Perception and agency. In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bartsch, Renate (2002). Consciousness Emerging: The Dynamics of Perception, Imagination, Action, Memory, Thought, and Language. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bayne, Tim (forthcoming). The phenomenology of agency. Philosophy Compass.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are developing models of how the phenomenology of agency is generated; and philosophers of mind are drawing connections between the phenomenology of agency and the nature of introspection, phenomenal character, and agency itself. My aim in this paper is not to provide an exhaustive survey of this recent literature, but to provide a..
Bayne, Tim, The sense of agency.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, and the telic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of agency. I conclude by defending the perceptual model against a number of objections to it, and by briefly exploring its implications for the question of how to approach the study of perception
Beauvais, Laura L.; Desplaces, David E.; Melchar, David E. & Bosco, Susan M. (2007). Business faculty perceptions and actions regarding ethics education. Journal of Academic Ethics 5 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper examines faculty perceptions regarding ethical behavior among colleagues and students, and faculty practices with regard to teaching ethics in three institutions over a 4-year period. Faculty reported an uneven pattern of unethical behavior among colleagues over the period. A majority of business courses included ethics, however as both a specific topic on the syllabus and within course discussions. The percentage of courses with ethics discussions increased in 2006, however, the time allocated to these discussions decreased. These results suggest that faculty are approaching ethics instruction less formally, raising concerns over the success of curriculum integration
Beauvillain, Cécile & Pouget, Pierre (2003). How can selection-for-perception be decoupled from selection-for-action? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):478-479.   (Google)
Abstract: Evidence is presented for the notion that selection-for-perception and selection-for-action progress in parallel to become tightly coupled at the saccade target before the execution of the movement. Such a conception might be incorporated in the E-Z Reader model of eye-movement control in reading
Bhalla, Madan M. & Proffitt, D. (2000). Geographical slant perception: Dissociation and coordination between explicit awareness and visually guided actions. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Biernoff, Suzannah (2002). Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages breaks new ground by bringing postmodern writings on vision and embodiment into dialogue with medieval texts and images: an interdisciplinary strategy that illuminates and complicates both cultures. This is an invaluable reference work for anyone interested in the history and theory of visuality, and it is essential reading or scholars of art, science, or spirituality in the medieval period
Binkofski, Ferdinand; Reetz, Kathrin & Blangero, Annabelle (2007). Tactile agnosia and tactile apraxia: Cross talk between the action and perception streams in the anterior intraparietal area. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):201-202.   (Google)
Block, Ned (2005). Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception. Journal of Philosophy 102:259-272.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aimsfor example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an inverse optics process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As No points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and the environment and involves contributions from sensory systems other than the eye. He is at pains to note that vision is not passive. His analogy with touch is to the point: touch involves skillful probing and movement, and so does vision, although less obviously and in my view less centrally so. This much is certainly widely accepted among vision scientistsalthough mainstream vision scientists (represented, for example, by Stephen Palmers excellent textbook<sup>2</sup>) view these points as best seen within a version of the inverse optics view that takes inputs as non-static and as including motor instructions (for example, involving eye movements and head movements).<sup>3</sup> The kind of point that No raises is viewed as important at the margins, but as not disturbing the main lines of the picture of vision that descendswith many changesfrom the pioneering work of David Marr in the 1980s (and before him, from Helmholtz). But No shows little interest in mainstream vision science, focusing on non-mainstream ideas in the science of perception, specifically ideas from the anti-representational psychologist J.J. Gibson, and also drawing on Wittgenstein and the phenomenology tradition. There is a sense throughout the book of revolution, of upsetting the applecart. This is a review from the point of view of the applecart
Briscoe, Robert (2009). Egocentric spatial representation in action and perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the “two visual systems” hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I carefully assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis and argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency
Briscoe, Robert (2008). Vision, action, and make-perceive. Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements – an act of what I call ‘make-perceive.’
Brozzoli, Claudio; Farnè, Alessandro & Rossetti, Yves (2007). Divide et impera? Towards integrated multisensory perception and action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):202-203.   (Google)
Cacioppe, Ron; Forster, Nick & Fox, Michael (2008). A survey of managers' perceptions of corporate ethics and social responsibility and actions that may affect companies' success. Journal of Business Ethics 82 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: This exploratory study examines how managers and professionals regard the ethical and social responsibility reputations of 60 well-known Australian and International companies, and how this in turn influences their attitudes and behaviour towards these organisations. More than 350 MBA, other postgraduate business students, and participants in Australian Institute of Management (Western Australia) management education programmes were surveyed to evaluate how ethical and socially responsible they believed the 60 organisations to be. The survey sought to determine what these participants considered ‘ethical’ and ‘socially responsible’ behaviour in organisations to be. The survey also examined how the participants’ beliefs influenced their attitudes and intended behaviours towards these organisations. The results of this survey indicate that many managers and professionals have clear views about the ethical and social responsibility reputations of companies. This affects their attitudes towards these organisations which in turn has an impact on their intended behaviour towards them. These findings support the view in other research studies that well-educated managers and professionals are, to some extent, taking into account the ethical and social responsibility reputations of companies when deciding whether to work for them, use their services or buy shares in their companies
Campbell, John (2008). Sensorimotor knowledge and naïve realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666-673.   (Google | More links)
Carey, D. P.; Dijkerman, H. Chris & Milner, A. David (1998). Perception and action in depth. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):438-453.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Little is known about distance processing in patients with posterior brain damage. Although many investigators have claimed that distance estimates are normal or abnormal in some of these patients, many of these observations were made informally and the examiners often asked for relative, and not absolute, distance estimates. The present investigation served two purposes. First, we wanted to contrast the use of distance information in peripersonal space for perceptual report as opposed to visuomotor control in our visual form agnosic patient, DF. Second, we wanted to see to what extent her abilities to process distance cues were dependent on binocular vision, in light of Milner et al.'s (1991) observations of preserved stereopsis in DF, and Dijkerman et al.'s (1996) and Marotta et al.'s (1997) observations that her visual guidance of grasping may be particularly dependent on binocular vision of the target. We hypothesized that DF's visuomotor responses would show normal sensitivity to target distance, while her perceptual estimates would not. In the first experiment, we required DF and two age- and sex-matched control subjects to reach out and grasp black cubes placed at varying distances, or to estimate the distance of the cubes from the hand starting position without making a reaching movement. In the second experiment, we required DF and two age-matched control subjects to point as rapidly and accurately as possible to small LED targets which differed in spatial location, under binocular and monocular conditions. The results showed that, relative to the control subjects, DF's grasping movements produced normal peak velocity-distance scaling-when she reached for blocks which varied in depth or pointed to LED targets which were presented at different distances in depth. In contrast, in the cube experiment, her verbal estimates of object distance were poorly scaled, although they improved slightly under the binocular conditions. The results are discussed in terms of current theories of processing streams in extrastriate visual cortex and the distinction between categorical and coordinate spatial processing
Chaminade, Thierry & Decety, Jean (2001). A common framework for perception and action: Neuroimaging evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):879-882.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years, neurophysiological evidence has accumulated in favor of a common coding between perception and execution of action. We review findings from recent neuroimaging experiments in the action domain with three complementary perspectives: perception of action, covert action triggered by perception, and reproduction of perceived action (imitation). All studies point to the parietal cortex as a key region for body movement representation, both observed and performed
Chemero, Tony & Turvey, Michael (online). Hypersets, complexity, and the ecological approach to perception-action.   (Google)
Chemero, Tony (2001). What we perceive when we perceive affordances: Commentary on Michaels (2000), Information, Perception and Action. Ecological Psychology 13 (2):111-116.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In her essay --?Information, Perception and Action--, Claire Michaels reaches two conclusions that run very much against the grain of ecological psychology. First, she claims that affordances are not perceived, but simply acted upon; second, because of this, perception and action ought to be conceived separately. These conclusions are based upon a misinterpretation of empirical evidence which is, in turn, based upon a conflation of two proper objects of perception: objectively with properties and affordances
Chown, Eric; Booker, Lashon B. & Kaplan, Stephen (2001). Perception, action planning, and cognitive maps. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):882-882.   (Google)
Abstract: Perceptual learning mechanisms derived from Hebb's theory of cell assemblies can generate prototypic representations capable of extending the representational power of TEC (Theory of Event Coding) event codes. The extended capability includes categorization that accommodates “family resemblances” and problem solving that uses cognitive maps
Clark, Andy & Toribio, Josefa (2001). Sensorimotor chauvinism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):979-980.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that follow will be taken in a spirit of constructive questioning. Overall, we have two main reservations
Clark, Andy (2006). Sensorimotor skills and perception: Cognitive complexity and the sensorimotor frontier. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (80):43-65.   (Google)
Clark, Andy (2006). That lonesome whistle: A puzzle for the sensorimotor model of perceptual experience. Analysis 66 (289):22-25.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (1999). Visual awareness and visuomotor action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (11-12):1-18.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (2006). Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensorimotor contingency theory. Psyche 12 (1).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In _Action in Perception _Alva No develops and presents a sensorimotor account of vision and of visual consciousness. According to such an account seeing (and indeed perceiving more generally) is analysed as a kind of skilful bodily activity. Such a view is consistent with the emerging emphasis, in both philosophy and cognitive science, on the critical role of embodiment in the construction of intelligent agency. I shall argue, however, that the full sensorimotor model faces three important challenges. The first is to negotiate a path between two prima facie unsatisfactory readings of the central claim that conscious perceptual experience is constituted by knowledge of patterns of sensorimotor dependence. The second is to convince us that the sensorimotor contribution, in such cases, is actually constitutive of perceptual experience rather than merely causally implicated in the origination of such experience.2 And the third is to respond to the important challenge raised by what I will dub 'sensorimotor summarizing' models of the relation between conscious experience and richly detailed sensorimotor routines. According to such models3 conscious perceptual experience only rather indirectly reflects the rich detail of our actual sensorimotor engagements, which are instead lightly sampled as a coarse guide, optimized for planning and reasoning, and geared and filtered according to current needs and purposes
Clark, Andy (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight? Philosophical Review 110 (4):495-519.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I shall call the Assumption of Experience-Based Control) is hostage to empirical fortune. It is a hostage, moreover, whose safety is in serious doubt. Thus Milner and Goodale (1995) argue for a deep and abiding dissociation between the contents of conscious seeing, on the one hand, and the resources used for the on-line guidance of visuo-motor action, on the other. This ‘dual visual systems’ hypothesis, which finds many echoes in various other bodies of cognitive scientific research, poses a prima facie challenge to the Assumption of Experience-Based Control. More importantly, it provides (I shall argue) fuel for an alternative and philosophically suggestive account of the functional role of conscious visual experience
Coates, Paul (2007). Experience, action and representations: Critical realism and the enactive theory of vision. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends a dynamic model of the way in which perception is integrated with action, a model I refer to as ‘the navigational account’. According to this account, employing vision and other forms of distance perception, a creature acquires information about its surroundings via the senses, information that enables it to select and navigate routes through its environment, so as to attain objects that satisfy its needs. This form of perceptually guided activity should be distinguished from other kinds of semi-automatic responses to visual stimuli that do not necessarily involve conscious experiences. It essentially involves inner states, which involve both the awareness of phenomenal qualities, and also a representational component. The navigational account is compared here with the enactive approach to perception, which opposes the view that perceptual experiences are inner states. This paper argues that a full account of perception raises a number of different questions. One central explanatory project concerns questions about the kinds of processes that currently enable a creature to identify and respond appropriately to distant objects: the answer, it is argued, lies in acknowledging the role of conscious inner representations in guiding navigational behaviour through complex environments. The fact that perception and action are interdependent does not conflict with the claim that inner representational states comprise an essential stage in visual processing
Coulter, Jeff (1990). The praxiology of perception: Visual orientations and practical action. Inquiry 251 (September):251-272.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Crowther, Thomas (2009). Perceptual activity and the will. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Crowther, Thomas (2009). Watching, sight, and the temporal shape of perceptual activity. Philosophical Review 118 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: There has been relatively little discussion, in contemporary philosophy of mind, of the active aspects of perceptual processes. This essay presents and offers some preliminary development of a view about what it is for an agent to watch a particular material object throughout a period of time. On this view, watching is a kind of perceptual activity distinguished by a distinctive epistemic role. The essay presents a puzzle about watching an object that arises through elementary reflection on the consequences of two apparent truths about watching an object throughout a period of time. It proposes that the puzzle can be resolved by a view according to which for an agent to watch an object throughout a period of time is for that agent to maintain visual awareness of that object with the aim of perceptually knowing what that object is doing. The essay goes on to make some further suggestions about how the apparatus developed in connection with the notion of watching may enable us to offer related explanations of other kinds of perceptual activity. It proposes that a useful distinction can be drawn between perceptual activities like watching which have as their aim knowledge of what an object is doing and activities like looking or visually scrutinizing which have as their aims knowledge of the states or conditions of the objects of perceptual awareness
Davis, Steven (ed.) (1983). Causal Theories Of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, And Reference. Ny: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
David, A. Rosenbaum; Jonathan Vaughan, Ruud; G. J. Meulenbroek Steven Jax, Rajal & G. Cohen, (2009). The activation, selection, and expression. Smart moves: The psychology of everyday perceptual-motor acts. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
de Gaynesford, Maximilian (2002). Corporeal objects and the interdependence of perception and action. Ratio 15 (4):335-353.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dewey, John (1912). Perception and organic action. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (24):645-668.   (Google | More links)
Dijkerman, H. Chris & de Haan, Edward H. F. (2007). Somatosensory processes subserving perception and action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):189-201.   (Google | More links)
Edelman, Shimon (2006). Mostly harmless: Review of action in perception by Alva noë. Artificial Life 12:183-186.   (Google)
Frankish, Keith (2006). Review of Consciousness in Action, by Susan Hurley. Mind 115:156-9.   (Google)
Abstract: Questions about the relation between mind and world have long occupied philosophers of mind. In _Consciousness in Action_ Susan Hurley invites us to adopt a ninety-degree shift and consider the relation between perception and action. The central theme of the book is an attack on what Hurley dubs the _Input-Output Picture_ of perception and actionthe picture of perceptions as sensory inputs to the cognitive system and intentions as motor outputs from it, with the mind occupying the buffer zone in between. Hurley argues that this picture confuses the personal level of normatively constrained mental contents and the subpersonal level of causal processes sustaining the mind. The notions of perception and action belong to the former, those of input and output to the latter. In place of the Input-Output picture, Hurley proposes a _Two-level _ _Interdependence View_. At the subpersonal level, she points out, there are not only one-way processes from input to output but also a host of feedback loops from output to inputsome internal to the central nervous system, some of wider orbit, involving proprioception, for example, or visual feedback on movement. The system as a whole can be seen as a _dynamical singularity_a tangle of sensorimotor feedback loops centred on the organism but extending out into the world beyond. The processes at this level are the vehicles of perceptions and actions, but, Hurley insists, the two levels cannot be mapped onto each other in a simple way. Changes on the output side may affect the content of perceptions, and changes on the input side may affect that of intentions. Perception and intention are in this way _interdependent_. The point here is not the uncontroversial one that perceptions and intentions can _cause_ changes in each other. That would be compatible with the Input-Output Picture. The dependency, in Hurleys view, is not instrumental, but _constitutive_: the contents of perceptions and intentions are each constituted by processes involving both inputs and outputs..
Gallagher, Shaun (online). Perceiving others in action / la perception d'autrui en action.   (Google)
Abstract: In a New York Times article last month, entitled Cells that read minds, the neuroscience reporter, Sandra Blakeslee (January 10, 2006) provided a list of all the things that mirror neurons can explain. As we know, mirror neurons, discovered by Rizzolattis group in Parma, are neurons that are activated when we engage in action, and when we perceive intentional movement in another person. According to Blakeslee and the scientists she interviewed, mirror neurons explain not only how we are capable of understanding another persons actions, but also language, empathy, how children learn, why people respond to certain types of sports, dance, music and art, why watching media violence may be harmful and why many men like pornography. Let me set aside the controversial questions about whether mirror neurons can explain all of these things, and accept that mirror neurons are clearly smart little cells. But let me ask whether Blakeslee and her scientists are expressing things in the right way
Gallese, Vittorio (2000). The inner sense of action: Agency and motor representations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):23-40.   (Cited by 79 | Google | More links)
Gangopadhyay, Nivedita & Kiverstein, Julian (2009). Enactivism and the unity of perception and action. Topoi 28 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme
Noë, Alva (2006). Experience without the head. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szab'o Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull. The mind reaches – or at least can reach --- beyond the limits of the body out into the world
Giacalone, Robert A. & Jurkiewicz, Carole L. (2003). Right from wrong: The influence of spirituality on perceptions of unethical business activities. Journal of Business Ethics 46 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: A network sample of 162 employees from across the U.S. was studied to assess the relationship between individual spirituality and perceptions of unethical business activities. Analyses indicate that degree of individual spirituality influences whether an individual perceives a questionable business practice as ethical or unethical. Ramifications of these findings regarding the role of spirituality in enhancing workplace ethicality, as well as directions for future research, are discussed
Goodale, Melvyn A. (2007). Duplex vision: Separate cortical pathways for conscious perception and the control of action. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Goodale, Mel (1997). Pointing the way to a unified theory of action and perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):749-750.   (Google)
Abstract: Deictic coding offers a useful model for understanding the interactions between the dorsal and ventral streams of visual processing in the cerebral cortex. By extending Ballard et al.'s ideas on teleassistance, I show how dedicated low-level visuomotor processes in the dorsal stream might be engaged for the services of high-level cognitive operations in the ventral stream
Goodale, Melvyn A. & Milner, A. David (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and action. Trends in Neurosciences 15:20-25.   (Cited by 1299 | Google | More links)
Greenwald, Anthony G.; Klinger, M. R. & Schuh, E. S. (1995). Activation by marginally perceptible ("subliminal") stimuli: Dissociation of unconscious from conscious cognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology 124:22-42.   (Cited by 96 | Google)
Grush, Rick (forthcoming). Skill theory v2.0: Dispositions, emulation, and spatial perception. Synthese.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: An attempt is made to defend a general approach to the spatial content of perception, an approach according to which perception is imbued with spatial content in virtue of certain kinds of connections between perceiving organism’s sensory input and its behavioral output. The most important aspect of the defense involves clearly distinguishing two kinds of perceptuo-behavioral skills—the formation of dispositions, and a capacity for emulation. The former, the formation of dispositions, is argued to by the central pivot of spatial content. I provide a neural information processing interpretation of what these dispositions amount to, and describe how dispositions, so understood, are an obvious implementation of Gareth Evans’ proposal on the topic. Furthermore, I describe what sorts of contribution are made by emulation mechanisms, and I also describe exactly how the emulation framework differs from similar but distinct notions with which it is often unhelpfully confused, such as sensorimotor contingencies and forward models
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (eds.) (2008). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2001). Visual perception is not visual awareness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):985-985.   (Google)
Abstract: O'Regan & Noë mistakenly identify visual processing with visual experience. I outline some reasons why this is a mistake, taking my data and arguments mainly from the literature on subliminal processing
Hickerson, Ryan, Knowing how to possibly act: Alva noë's action in perception.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Alva Noë is a modern-day empiricist. His book Action in Perception is chockablock with contemporary cognitive science; its preface and notes (not to mention general erudition) point to on-going collaboration with Evan Thompson, Kevin O’Regan, and Susan Hurley. Their research investigates the sensorimotor bases of consciousness, and Action in Perception is offered as its philosophical backdrop. As such, the book presents a series of ideas and interpretations that constitute what Noë calls the “enactive approach” to perception, many of which are explicitly phenomenological in orientation. So those on the lookout for imaginative philosophy of mind will find Noë's work particularly compelling. (Noë would prefer "already feeling about for imaginative philosophy of mind," because on his account paradigmatic perceptual activity is tactile rather than visual.) In this review I will not address the empirical details concerning Noë and his compatriots, but will instead focus on the way Noë’s enactive approach should be situated vis-à-vis traditional phenomenology. Action in Perception is part of the grand project of a robustly scientific knowledge of human perceptual experience, but it is clearly also a philosophical theory, so I will address it philosophically. I address it as I take it to be: one of the best works in the philosophy of perception to appear in a very long time
Hickerson, Ryan (2007). Perception as knowing how to act: Alva noë's action in perception. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):505 – 517.   (Google | More links)
Hochberg, Julian (2003). Backdrop, flat, and prop: The stage for active perceptual inquiry. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):414-415.   (Google)
Abstract: Lehar's revival of phenomenology and his all-encompassing Gestalt Bubble model are ambitious and stimulating. I offer an illustrated caution about phenomenology, a more fractured alternative to his Bubble model, and two lines of phenomena that may disqualify his isomorphism. I think a perceptual-inquiry model can contend
Hochberg, Julian (2001). In the mind's eye: Perceptual coupling and sensorimotor contingencies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):986-986.   (Google)
Abstract: The theoretical proposal that perceptual experience be thought of as expectancies about sensorimotor contingencies, rather than as expressions of mental representations, is endorsed; examples that effectively enforce that view are discussed; and one example (of perceptual coupling) that seems to demand a mental representation, with all of the diagnostic value such a tool would have, is raised for consideration
Hodges, Bert H. & Baron, Reuben M. (1992). Values as constraints on affordances: Perceiving and acting properly. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 22 (3):263–294.   (Google | More links)
Hommel, Bernhard; Müsseler, Jochen; Aschersleben, Gisa & Prinz, Wolfgang (2001). The theory of event coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):849-878.   (Google)
Abstract: Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task. We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference. Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes – cognitive structures we call event codes. We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data. Key Words: action planning; binding; common coding; event coding; feature integration; perception; perception-action interface
Hope, Vincent (2009). Object perception, perceptual recognition, and that-perception introduction. Philosophy 84 (4):515-528.   (Google)
Humphreys, Glyn W. & Riddoch, M. Jane (2007). How to define an object: Evidence from the effects of action on perception and attention. Mind and Language 22 (5):534–547.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We present work demonstrating that the nature of an object for our visual system depends on the actions we are programming and on the presence of action relations between stimuli. For example, patients who show visual extinction are more likely to become aware of two objects if the objects fall in appropriate visual locations for a common action. This effect of the action relations between objects is modulated both by the familiarity of the positioning of the objects for action, and by the mere possibility of action (the ‘affordance’) between the objects. In addition, the programming of an action to a part of an object alters the representation of that object, making the ‘part’ into the object selected by the visual system. These results point to object coding being a rather flexible process, affected not only by the perceptual properties of stimuli but also by the relations between these properties and action. We discuss the implications for theories of perception as well as considering why action information, in particular, may be important for perception
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Active perception and vehicle externalism. In Susan L. Hurley (ed.), Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether the contents of the mind are in principle independent of the outside world
Hurley, Susan L. (2006). Active perception and perceiving action: The shared circuits model. In Tamar Szab Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 46 | Google)
Abstract: Recently research on imitation and its role in social cognition has been flourishing across various disciplines. After briefly reviewing these developments under the headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation, I advance the _shared circuits_
Hurley, Susan L. (online). Consciousness in action: Clarifications.   (Cited by -78777 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophy of neuroscience may seem an odd thing to do. What can a philosopher add to what neuroscience itself has to say, other than at some very abstract level, far removed from empirical details and the interests of scientists? At some point you take a deep breath, acknowledge the methodological questions, and just go ahead, spurred on by the sheer philosophical interest and excitement abroad in the neurosciences today. So it is very gratifying to a philosopher of neuroscience for such a distinguished neuropsychologist as Marcel Kinsbourne to find added value in the result
Hurley, Susan L. (2001). Perception and action: Alternative views. Synthese 129 (1):3-40.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected.Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and action are seen as instrumentallyinterdependent. It is argued here that a betteralternative is to reject both assumptions, resultingin a two-level interdependence view in whichperception and action co-depend on dynamicallycircular subpersonal relations and as a result may bemore than merely instrumentally interdependent. Thisis illustrated by reference to motor theories ofperception and control theories of action
Hutto, Daniel D. (2005). Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):389-405.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O’Regan’s and No¨e’s landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. To remain properly enactivist it must be purged of such commitments and indeed all commitment to mediating knowledge: it must embrace a more radical enactivism
Ikegami, Takashi (2007). Simulating active perception and mental imagery with embodied chaotic itinerancy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):111-125.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We explore the understanding of conscious states in terms of spatio-temporal dynamics through modelling a mobile agent. Conscious states are associated with an agent's spontaneous and deterministic fluctuation between attachment to and detachment from the surroundings. It is because of this fluctuating nature, we argue, that an agent can perceive structure in the world. Perception requires a conscious state in physical devices. This is a central concern of this paper, and we examine it by simulating a mobile agent equipped with an interconnected Fitz-Hugh-Nagumo (FHN) neuron network with delayed signal transmissions. The agent can move around a space by sensing the environment pattern through the input neurons and computing the motor outputs via the FHN network. The agent shows a variety of motion styles and a spontaneous selection of motion styles responding to the surroundings. Such a phenomenon is named embodied chaotic itinerancy (ECI), as an extension of chaotic itinerant dynamics, which is known to be a typical dynamic with a high degree of freedom. We take this selective mode of response to be significant, particularly those interacting with spatial pattern, as an inevitable property of conscious states
Jacob, Pierre (2005). Grasping and perceiving objects. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Jackson, Stephen (2000). Perception, awareness and action: Insights from blindsight. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (2003). Perceiving objects and grasping them. In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google)
Jacob, Pierre (2006). Why visual experience is likely to resist being enacted. Psyche 12 (1).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and two trends in cognitive neuroscience: the two-visual systems model of human vision and the theory of internal forward models of action
J., S. (2003). Emergence of self and other in perception and action: An event-control approach. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):633-646.   (Google)
Abstract: The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept 'self.' This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) that is based on recently discovered regularities between perception and action. Specifically, these regularities indicate that perception and action planning utilize common neural resources. This leads to a coupling of perception, planning, and action in which the first two constitute aspects of a single system (i.e., the distal-event system) that is able to pre-specify and detect distal events. This distal-event system is then coupled with action (i.e., effector-control systems) in a constraining, as opposed to 'causal' manner. This model has implications for how we conceptualize the manner in which one infers the intentions of another, anticipates the intentions of another, and possibly even experiences another. In conclusion, it is argued that it may be possible to map the concept 'self' onto the regularities referred to in the event-control model, not in order to reify 'the self' as a causal mechanism, but to demonstrate its status as a useful concept that refers to regularities that are part of the natural order
Johanson, Thomas (online). Imprinted on the mind: Passive and active in Aristotle's theory of perception.   (Google)
Abstract: B.Saunders and J. van Brakel (eds.), Theories, Technologies, Instrumentalities of Colour, University Press of America 2002, 169-188
Jordan, J. Scott (2003). Emergence of self and other in perception and action: An event-control approach. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):633-646.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept 'self.' This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) that is based on recently discovered regularities between perception and action. Specifically, these regularities indicate that perception and action planning utilize common neural resources. This leads to a coupling of perception, planning, and action in which the first two constitute aspects of a single system (i.e., the distal-event system) that is able to pre-specify and detect distal events. This distal-event system is then coupled with action (i.e., effector-control systems) in a constraining, as opposed to 'causal' manner. This model has implications for how we conceptualize the manner in which one infers the intentions of another, anticipates the intentions of another, and possibly even experiences another. In conclusion, it is argued that it may be possible to map the concept 'self' onto the regularities referred to in the event-control model, not in order to reify 'the self' as a causal mechanism, but to demonstrate its status as a useful concept that refers to regularities that are part of the natural order
Kagan, Aaron (2007). Face to face with an enactive approach: A sensorimotor account of face detection and recognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The enactive approach to perception describes experience as a temporally extended activity of skillful engagement with the environment. This paper pursues this view and focuses on prosopagnosia both for the light that the theory can throw on the phenomenon, and for the critical light the phenomenon can throw on the theory. I argue that the enactive theory is insufficient to characterize the unique nature of experience specific to prosopagnosic subjects. There is a distinct difference in the overall process of detection (with respect to eye movement sequence) of familiar and unfamiliar faces in prosopagnosia; in contrast, normal subjects use the same scanning strategy when exploring both kinds of faces despite an obvious difference in qualitative character. In light of this limitation I outline a supplemental view basing sensorimotor contingencies upon the establishment and reaffirmation of regularities within the organism as it engages with the environment
Keijzer, Fred (2007). Evolution in action in perception. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):519 – 529.   (Google | More links)
Kelly, Sean D. (2002). Merleau-ponty on the body: The logic of motor intentional activity. Ratio-New Series 15 (4):376-391.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Klein, Colin & Love, Gabriel (2007). Kicking the Kohler habit. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):609 – 619.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Kohler's experiments with inverting goggles are often thought to support enactivism by showing that visual re-inversion occurs simultaneous with the return of sensorimotor skill. Closer examination reveals that Kohler's work does not show this. Recent work by Linden et al. shows that re-inversion, if it occurs at all, does not occur when the enactivist predicts. As such, the empirical evidence weighs against enactivism
Kleinschmidt, Harald (2005). Perception and Action in Medieval Europe. Boydell Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Perception and action : the genesis of their separation as concepts -- The transformation of perception in the early eleventh century : dance historical records from the village of Kölbigk in East Saxony -- Impacts from the environment : the perception of odour, touch and taste -- Impacts on the environment : the rationality of action -- Aesthetics and ethics : their separation as concepts.
Lacquaniti, Francesco & Zago, Mirka (2001). Internalization of physical laws as revealed by the study of action instead of perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):684-685.   (Google)
Abstract: We review studies on catching that reveal internalization of physics for action control. In catching free-falling balls, an internal model of gravity is used by the brain to time anticipatory muscle activation, modulation of reflex responses, and tuning of limb impedance. An internal model of the expected momentum of the ball at impact is used to scale the amplitude of anticipatory muscle activity. [Barlow; Hecht; Shepard]
Lane, Peter C. R.; Cheng, Peter C-H. & Gobet, Fernand (2001). The CHREST model of active perception and its role in problem solving. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):892-893.   (Google)
Abstract: We discuss the relation of the Theory of Event Coding (TEC) to a computational model of expert perception, CHREST, based on the chunking theory. TEC's status as a verbal theory leaves several questions unanswerable, such as the precise nature of internal representations used, or the degree of learning required to obtain a particular level of competence: CHREST may help answer such questions
Laureys, Steven (online). Baseline brain activity fluctuations predict somatosensory perception in humans.   (Google)
Leddington, Jason (2009). Perceptual presence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.   (Google)
Abstract: Plausibly, any adequate theory of perception must (a) solve what Alva Noë calls 'the problem of perceptual presence,' and (b) do justice to the direct realist idea that what is given in perception are garden-variety spatiotemporal particulars. This paper shows that, while Noë's sensorimotor view arguably satisfies the first of these conditions, it does not satisfy the second. Moreover, Noë is wrong to think that a naïve realist approach to perception cannot handle the problem of perceptual presence. Section three of this paper develops a version of naïve realism that meets both of the adequacy conditions above. This paper thus provides strong considerations in favor of naïve realism
Leisman, Gerry & Melillo, Robert (2007). A call to arms: Somatosensory perception and action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):214-215.   (Google)
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Logothetis, Nikos K. & Leopold, David A. (1998). Single-neuron activity and visual perception. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Lycan, William G. (2006). Enactive intentionality. Psyche 12 (3).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
Mandik, Pete (2005). Action-oriented representation. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Often, sensory input underdetermines perception. One such example is the perception of illusory contours. In illusory contour perception, the content of the percept includes the presence of a contour that is absent from the informational content of the sensation. (By “sensation” I mean merely information-bearing events at the transducer level. I intend no further commitment such as the identification of sensations with qualia.) I call instances of perception underdetermined by sensation “underdetermined perception.” The perception of illusory contours is just one kind of underdetermined perception. The focus of this chapter is another kind of underdetermined perception: what I shall call "active perception". Active perception occurs in cases in which the percept, while underdetermined by sensation, is determined by a combination of sensation and action. The phenomenon of active perception has been used by several to argue against the positing of representations in explanations of sensory experience, either by arguing that no representations need be posited or that far fewer than previously thought need be posited. Such views include, but are not limited to those of Gibson (1966, 1986), Churchland
Mandik, Pete (forthcoming). Control consciousness. Topics in Cognitive Science.   (Google)
Abstract: Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one’s actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. On such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing view, which I will be arguing for, is that sensory elements cannot be the whole story and must be supplemented by direct contributions of nonsensory, motor elements. More specifically, I will be arguing for the view that the neural basis of control consciousness is constituted by states of recurrent activation in relatively intermediate levels of the motor hierarchy.
Martin, M. G. F. (2008). Commentary on action in perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):674–681.   (Google | More links)
Marin, Ludovic & Lagarde, Julien (2007). The perception-action interaction comes first. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2):215-216.   (Google)
McFarland, Dennis J. (2001). Where does perception end and when does action start? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):113-113.   (Google)
Abstract: Currently there is considerable interest in the notion that dorsal and ventral visual systems might differ in their specializations for thought and action. Behavior invariably involves multiple processes such as perception, judgment, and response execution. It is not clear that characteristics of the dorsal and ventral processing streams, as described by Norman, are entirely of a perceptual nature
McMichael, Kipp & Bingham, Geoffrey (2001). Functional separation of the senses is a requirement of perception/action research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):227-228.   (Google)
Mealey, Linda & Kinner, Stuart (2001). The perception-action model of empathy and psychopathic “cold-heartedness”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):42-43.   (Google)
Abstract: The Perception-Action Model of empathy (PAM) is both sufficiently broad and sufficiently detailed to be able to describe and accommodate a wide range of phenomena – including the apparent “cold-heartedness” or lack of empathy of psychopaths. We show how the physiological, cognitive, and emotional elements of the PAM map onto known and hypothesized attributes of the psychopathic personality
Mole, Christopher (2009). The Motor Theory of Speech Perception. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Myin, Erik (2001). Fragmentation, coherence, and the perception/action divide. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):231-231.   (Google)
Myin, Erik & O'Regan, J. Kevin (2002). Perceptual consciousness, access to modality and skill theories: A way to naturalize phenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.   (Google)
Nanay, Bence (forthcoming). Action-oriented perception. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Abstract: When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch-able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q-able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that in order to perform an action Q with respect to an object, we need to represent this object as Q-able and, second, I argue that we represent objects as having these properties perceptually
Newton, Natika (1985). Acting and perceiving in body and mind. Philosophy Research Archives 11:407-429.   (Google)
Nijhawan, Romi (2008). Predictive perceptions, predictive actions, and beyond. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):222-239.   (Google)
Noë, Alva (2000). Experience and experiment in art. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):123-135.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Noe, Alva (2006). Action in Experience. The MIT Press.   (Google)
Noë, Alva (2004). Action in perception. The Mit Press.   (Cited by 216 | Google | More links)
Noë, Alva (2001). Experience and the active mind. Synthese 129 (1):41-60.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper investigates a new species ofskeptical reasoning about visual experience that takesits start from developments in perceptual science(especially recent work on change blindness andinattentional blindness). According to thisskepticism, the impression of visual awareness of theenvironment in full detail and high resolution isillusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends onmisguided assumptions about the character ofperceptual experience, about whether perceptualexperiences are ''internal'' states, and about how bestto understand the relationship between a person''s oranimal''s perceptual capacities and the brain-level orneural processes on which they depend. I propose aconception of perceptual experience as a form ofskillful engagement with the environment on the partof the whole person or animal
Clark, Andy (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):181-202.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We seem, or so it seems to some theorists, to experience a rich stream of highly detailed information concerning an extensive part of our current visual surroundings. But this appearance, it has been suggested, is in some way illusory. Our brains do not command richly detailed internal models of the current scene. Our seeings, it seems, are not all that they seem. This, then, is the Grand Illusion. We think we see much more than we actually do. In this paper I shall (briefly) rehearse the empirical evidence for this rather startling claim, and then critically examine a variety of responses. One especially interesting response is a development of the so-called ‘skill theory’, according to which there is no illusion after all. Instead, so the theory goes, we establish the required visual contact with our world by an ongoing process of active exploration, in which the world acts as a kind of reliable, interrogable, external memory (Noe, Pessoa and
Noe, Alva (ms). Perception, action, and nonconceptual content.   (Google)
Abstract: profile deforms as we move about it. As perceivers we are masters of the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that shape our perceptual interaction with the world. We expect changes in such things as apparent size, shape and color to occur as we actively explore the environment. In encountering perspective-dependent changes of this sort, we learn how things are quite apart form our particular perspective. Our possession of these skills is constitutive of our ability to see (and generally to perceive). This is confirmed by the fact that we can disrupt a person
Noë, Alva & Hurley, Susan L. (2003). The deferential brain in action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (5):195-196.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: binding of colour and alphanumeric form in synaesthesia. Nature 410
Noë, Alva (2008). Précis of action in perception: Philosophy and phenomenological research. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):660–665.   (Google | More links)
Noë, Alva (2006). Précis of Action in Perception. Psyche 12 (1).   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: To be a perceiver is to understand, implicitly, the effects of movement on sensory stimulation. Examples are ready to hand. An object looms larger in the visual field as we approach it, and its profile deforms as we move about it. A sound grows louder as we move nearer to its source. Movements of the hand over the surface of an object give rise to shifting sensations. As perceivers we are masters of this sort of pattern of sensorimotor dependence. This mastery shows itself in the thoughtless automaticity with which we move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us. We spontaneously crane
PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/
our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses, or draw near to get a better look (or better to handle, sniff, lick or listen to what interests us). The central claim of what I call _the _ _enactive approach _is that our ability to perceive not only depends on, but is constituted by, our possession of this sort of sensorimotor knowledge.2
Noë, Alva (2007). Understanding action in perception: Replies to Hickerson and Keijzer. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):531 – 538.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this short essay I respond to the criticism of Action in Perception (2004) advanced by Ryan Hickerson and Fred Keijzer. In particular, I provide a brief precis of the main argument of Action in Perception. I seek to clarify the claims made in the book about the relation between perception and action, the importance of sensorimotor knowledge. I discuss the problem of "sensorimotor chauvinism," that of the "ping-pong playing robot," and the problem of perceptual presence
O'Regan, J. Kevin & Noë, Alva (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.   (Cited by 652 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The out- side world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the gov- erning laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Sev- eral lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception
O'Regan, J. Kevin; Myin, Erik & Noë, Alva (2006). Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
O'Regan, J. Kevin (2001). What it is like to see: A sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience. Synthese 129 (1):79-103.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also ableto approach the issues of visual awareness andconsciousness in a satisfactory way. Finally weconsider a number of testable empirical consequences,one of which is the striking prediction of thephenomenon of ''''change blindness''''
Ortells, Juan J.; Daza, María Teresa & Fox, Elaine (2003). Semantic activation in the absence of perceptual awareness. Perception and Psychophysics 65 (8):1307-1317.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1992). The diversity and unity of action and perception. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Panksepp, Jaak; Gordon, Nakia & Burgdorf, Jeff (2001). Empathy and the action-perception resonances of basic socio-emotional systems of the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):43-44.   (Google)
Abstract: Mammalian brains contain a variety of self-centered socio-emotional systems. An understanding of how they interact with more recent cognitive structures may be essential for understanding empathy. Preston & de Waal have neglected this vast territory of proximal brain issues in their analysis
Pani, John R. (2001). Perceptual theories that emphasize action are necessary but not sufficient. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):998-998.   (Google)
Abstract: Theories that make action central to perception are plausible, though largely untried, for space perception. However, explaining object recognition, and high-level perception generally, will require reference to representations of the world in some form. Nonetheless, action is central to cognition, and explaining high-level perception will be aided by integrating an understanding of action with other aspects of perception
Petit, Jean-Luc (2003). On the relation between recent neurobiological data on perception (and action) and the Husserlian theory of constitution. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4).   (Google)
Abstract:   The phenomenological theory of constitution promises a solution for the problem of consciousness insofar as it changes the traditional terms of this problem by systematically correlating subject and object in the unifying context of intentional acts. I argue that embodied constitution must depend upon the role of kinesthesia as a constitutive operator. In pursuing the path of intentionality in its descent from an idealistic level of pure constitution to this fully embodied kinesthetic constitution, we are able to gain access to different ontological regions such as physical thing, owned body and shared world. Neuroscience brings to light the somatological correlates of noemata. Bridging the gap between incarnation and naturalisation represents the best way of realizing the foundational program of transcendental phenomenology
Pisella, L.; Kritikos, A. & Rossetti, Y. (2001). Perception, action, and motor control: Interaction does not necessarily imply common structures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):898-899.   (Google)
Abstract: The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) provides a preliminary account of the interaction between perception and action, which is consistent with several recent findings in the area of motor control. Significant issues require integration and elaboration, however; particularly, distractor interference, automatic motor corrections, internal models of action, and neuroanatomical bases for the link between perception and action
Praetorius, Nini (2007). The problems of consciousness and content in theories of perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper aims to show, first, that O’Regan’s and Noë’s Sensorimotor Theory of Vision and Visual Experiences suffers from circularity, and that evidence from empirical research within perception psychology unequivocally invalidates their theory. Secondly, to show that the circularity in O’Regan’s and Noë’s theory of vision and in other general causal and functional theories of perception (i.e. Gibson’s and Marr’s theories of perception) is the inevitable consequence of mutually conflicting assumption of Cartesian dualism underlying these theories. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences of this conflict of assumptions for psychological theories of perception
Preston, Stephanie D. (2008). Putting the subjective back into intersubjective: The importance of person-specific, distributed, neural representations in perception-action mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):36-37.   (Google)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2006). Putting the brakes on enactive perception. Psyche 12 (1).   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, not constitutive. I then address three other contentious hypotheses in the book. Noë argues that visual states are not pictorial; he argues that all perception is conceptual; and he argues that the external world makes a constitutive contribution to experience. I am unpersuaded by these arguments, and I offer reasons to resist Noë’s conclusions
Proctor, Robert W. & Vu, Kim-Phuong L. (2001). TEC: Integrated view of perception and action or framework for response selection? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):899-900.   (Google)
Abstract: The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) presented in Hommel et al.'s target article provides a useful heuristic framework for stimulating research. Although the authors present TEC as providing a more integrated view of perception and action than classical information processing, TEC is restricted to the stage often called response selection and shares many features with existing theories
Rossetti, Yves (2001). Implicit perception in action: Short-lived motor representation of space. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Rossetti, Yves & Procyk, Emmanuel (1997). What memory is for action: The gap between percepts and concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):34-36.   (Google)
Abstract: The originality of Glenberg's theoretical account lies in the claim that memory works in the service of physical interaction with the three-dimensional world. Little consideration is given, however, to the role of memory in action. We present and discuss data on spatial memory for action. These empirical data constitute the first step of reasoning about the link between memory and action, and allow several aspects of Glenberg's theory to be tested
Rowlands, Mark (2006). Sensorimotor activity. Psyche 12 (1).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: This paper explores the concept of _sensorimotor activity_ that is central to the enactive model of visual perception developed in Alva Noë’s book, _Action in Perception_. The appeal to sensorimotor activity is, I shall argue, subject to a dilemma. On one interpretation, such activity presupposes representational states, and therefore is unable to aid us in the project of understanding how an organism is able to represent the world. On the other interpretation, sensorimotor activity fails to accommodate the essential normativity of representational states, and is therefore also unable to aid us in the project of understanding representation. The solution, I argue, lies in a new conception of sensorimotor activity, according to which such activity is normative, but where this normativity is not inherited from prior representational states
Rowlands, Mark (2007). Understanding the "active" in "enactive". Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This coupling is no accident. The appeal to action is seen either as a way of explaining representation or explaining it away. This paper argues that the appeal to action as a way of explaining, supplementing, or even supplanting, representation can lead to a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the concept of action to which we appeal cannot, on pain of circularity, be a representational concept. Such an appeal would presuppose representation and therefore can neither explain it nor explain it away. On the other hand, I shall argue, if the concept of action to which we appeal is not a representational one, there is every reason for supposing that it will not be the sort of thing that can explain, or supplement, let alone supplant, representation. The resulting dilemma, I shall argue, is not fatal. But avoiding it requires us to embrace a certain thesis about the nature of action, a thesis whose broad outline this paper delineates. Anyone who wishes to employ action as a way of explaining or explaining away representation should, I shall argue, take this conception of action very seriously indeed. I am going to discuss these issues with respect to a influential recent contribution to this debate: the sensorimotor or enactive model of perception developed by Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë
Ruben, David-Hillel (2008). Disjunctive theories of perception and action. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Sarter, Martin & Berntson, Gary G. (2004). Underconstrained thalamic activation + underconstrained top-down modulation of cortical input processing = underconstrained perceptions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):803-804.   (Google)
Abstract: Behrendt & Young's (B&Y's) theory offers a potentially important perspective on the neurobiology of schizophrenia, but it remains incomplete. In addition to bottom-up contributions, such as those associated with disturbances in sensory constraints on cognitive processes, a comprehensive model requires the integration of the consequences of abnormal top-down modulation of input processing for the evolution of “underconstrained” perceptions. Dysfunctional cholinergic modulation of input functions represents a necessary mechanism for the generation of false perceptions
Schellenberg, Susanna (2007). Action and self-location in perception. Mind 115 (463):603-632.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects
Schellenberg, Susanna (forthcoming). Perceptual Experience and the Capacity to Act. In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Setiya, Kieran (2009). Review of 'Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge'. Mind 118:834-840.   (Google)
Sewards, Terence V. & Sewards, Mark A. (2002). On the neural correlates of object recognition awareness: Relationship to computational activities and activities mediating perceptual awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):51-77.   (Google)
Abstract: Based on theoretical considerations of Aurell (1979) and Block (1995), we argue that object recognition awareness is distinct from purely sensory awareness and that the former is mediated by neuronal activities in areas that are separate and distinct from cortical sensory areas. We propose that two of the principal functions of neuronal activities in sensory cortex, which are to provide sensory awareness and to effect the computations that are necessary for object recognition, are dissociated. We provide examples of how this dissociation might be achieved and argue that the components of the neuronal activities which carry the computations do not directly enter the awareness of the subject. The results of these computations are sparse representations (i.e., vector or distributed codes) which are activated by the presentation of particular sensory objects and are essentially engrams for the recognition of objects. These final representations occur in the highest order areas of sensory cortex; in the visual analyzer, the areas include the anterior part of the inferior temporal cortex and the perirhinal cortex. We propose, based on lesion and connectional data, that the two areas in which activities provide recognition awareness are the temporopolar cortex and the medial orbitofrontal cortex. Activities in the temporopolar cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the remote past (consolidated object recognition), and those in the medial orbitofrontal cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the recent past. The activation of the sparse representation for a particular sensory object in turn activates neurons in one or both of these regions of cortex, and it is the activities of these neurons that provide the awareness of recognition of the object in question. The neural circuitry involved in the activation of these representations is discussed
Shaw, Robert E. & Wagman, Jeffrey B. (2001). Explanatory burdens and natural law: Invoking a field description of perception-action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):905-906.   (Google)
Abstract: Although we agree with Hommel et al. that perception and action refer to one another, we disagree that they do so via a code. Gibson (1966; 1979) attempted to frame perception-action as a field phenomenon rather than as a particle phenomenon. From such a perspective, perception and action are adjoint, mutually interacting through an information field, and codes are unnecessary
Siewert, Charles (2005). Attention and sensorimotor intentionality. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Siewert, Charles (2006). Is the appearance of shape protean? Psyche 12 (3):1-16.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary focuses on shape constancy in vision and its relation to sensorimotor knowledge. I contrast “Protean” and “Constancian” views about how to describe perspectival changes in the appearance of an object’s shape. For the Protean, these amount to changes in apparent shape; for Constance, things are not merely judged, but literally appear constant in shape. I give reasons in favor of the latter view, and argue that Noë’s attempt to combine aspects of both views in a “dual aspect” account does not manage to avoid an unacceptable attribution of contradictory content to visual appearance. I argue also that my position here actually fits better with Noë’s critique of a “snapshot” conception of visual appearance than his own interpretation of visual constancy, and better supports his claim that experiential content is constituted by the exercise of sensorimotor understanding
Spencer, Cara (2007). Unconscious vision and the platitudes of folk psychology. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):309 – 327.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Since we explain behavior by ascribing intentional states to the agent, many philosophers have assumed that some guiding principle of folk psychology like the following, which I call intentional states and actions (ISA), must be true: "If A and B are different actions, then the agents performing them must differ in their intentional states at the time they are performed." Recent results in the physiology of vision present a prima facie problem for this principle. These results show that some visual information that guides spatial manipulation and fine motor control is unavailable for verbal report. Plausibly, this information is not consciously available to the agent, and as such, not available to inform the content of intentional states. Thus, it is hard to see how every difference in action is subject to intentional explanation, as (ISA) requires. I articulate the prima facie problem and argue that the most plausible solution requires us to reject (ISA)
Stewart, John & Gapenne, Olivier (2004). Reciprocal modelling of active perception of 2-d forms in a simple tactile-vision substitution system. Minds and Machines 14 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   The strategies of action employed by a human subject in order to perceive simple 2-D forms on the basis of tactile sensory feedback have been modelled by an explicit computer algorithm. The modelling process has been constrained and informed by the capacity of human subjects both to consciously describe their own strategies, and to apply explicit strategies; thus, the strategies effectively employed by the human subject have been influenced by the modelling process itself. On this basis, good qualitative and semi-quantitative agreement has been achieved between the trajectories produced by a human subject, and the traces produced by a computer algorithm. The advantage of this reciprocal modelling option, besides facilitating agreement between the algorithm and the empirically observed trajectories, is that the theoretical model provides an explanation, and not just a description, of the active perception of the human subject
Storozhuk, Anna (2007). Perception: Mirror-image or action? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In the article two viewpoints on the mind’s influence on perception are considered. One of them was developed on the assumption that perception is a nonproblematic source of knowledge about the world, which is free from mind’s influence—perception as a mirror-image. Another viewpoint is perception as action, i.e. active search and gathering the relevant information, its processing and evaluation. First viewpoint has dominated in philosophy for a long time, the second one has been developing in psychology from the 80th of the 20th century. The aim of the paper is to examine some philosophically significant corollaries from both positions concerning objectiveness, epistemological status of an observation, truth, meaning of name. Analysis showed that perception as action is non-compatible with many traditional concepts, and it goes both against empiricism and against realism as it involves some critical arguments, e.g. theory ladenness of observations, underdetermination of theory by facts, the historical development of a scientific fact
Strong, Charles A. (1939). The sensori-motor theory of awareness. Journal of Philosophy 36 (15):393-405.   (Google | More links)
Thalberg, Irving (1977). Perception, Emotion, and Action: A Component Approach. Blackwell.   (Google)
Theodorou, Panos (2006). Perception and action: On the praxial structure of intentional consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Progressively Husserl started referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of praxis. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. What is the meaning of this move? A seemingly self-evident possibility is that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment; and all fulfilment is attained by means of bodily activities that enable our senses to acquire the relevant contents. I reject this approach as insufficient and misguided. I argue that perception and intentionality in general is praxial because consciousness, in all of its constituting syntheses, is or becomes organized as a practice-structure. Intentional consciousness organizes its contents according to rules so as to accomplish the evident or true givenness of its intended correlates
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (1999). Are theories of imagery theories of imagination? An active perception approach to conscious mental content. Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.   (Cited by 117 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi-pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the "traditional" symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent *situated cognition* and *active vision* approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non-discursiveness, creativity, and *seeing as*) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non-discursive and relates it closely to *seeing as*. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). New support for the perceptual activity theory of mental imagery.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Since the publication of my "Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An _Active Perception_ Approach to Conscious Mental Content," (Thomas, 1999 - henceforth abbreviated as ATOITOI on this page), a good deal of published material has appeared or has come to my attention that either provides additional support for the Perceptual Activity Theory PA theory) of mental imagery presented in ATOITOI, or that throws further doubt on the rival (picture and description) theories that are criticized there. Other relevant evidence was not mentioned in ATOITOI because I lacked the space for a proper explanation of its relevance. I hope eventually to write and publish a new account of
PA
theory, that will make use of much of this material. In the meantime this page provides citations (and, where possible, links) to the "new" support, and discussion sections that briefly explain the relevance of the cited material. Quite apart from presenting new lines of supporting evidence and argument, I hope this page will help to clarify many aspects of
Thompson, Evan (2005). Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective in- teraction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related (the body-body problem) via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments by O'Regan, No¨e, and Myin that seek to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness in terms of 'bodiliness' and 'grabbiness' are considered. It is suggested that their account does not pay sufficient attention to two other key aspects of perceptual phenomenality: the autonomous nature of the experiencing self or agent, and the pre-reflective nature of bodily self-consciousness
Tibbetts, Paul E. (1974). Mead's theory of the act and perception: Some empirical confirmations. Personalist 55:115-138.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Tibbetts, Paul (1975). Peirce and Mead on perceptual immediacy and human action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (2):222-232.   (Google | More links)
Torrance, Steve (2005). In search of the enactive: Introduction to special issue on enactive experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):357-368.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Siegel, Susanna (2005). The Phenomenology of Efficacy. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):265-84.   (Google)
Turvey, Michael T.; Shaw, R. E.; Reed, Edward S. & Mace, William M. (1981). Ecological laws of perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Cognition 9:237-304.   (Cited by 62 | Google)
Vaina, Lucia (1983). From shapes and movements to objects and actions. Synthese 54 (January):3-36.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Vallor, Shannon (2006). An enactive-phenomenological approach to veridical perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):39-60.   (Google)
Abstract: Most accounts of veridical perception draw upon conventional causal theories of perception for an explanatory framework. Recently developed enactive or sensorimotor theories of perception pose a challenge to such accounts, necessitating a redefinition of veridical perception. I propose and defend one such definition, drawing upon empirical studies of perception, the resources of the enactive approach and phenomenology. I argue that perceptual experience engages an organism in a network of sensorimotor dependencies with the perceived object, and that veridical perceptions involve experiential mastery of these dependencies. A thought example involving the phoneme restoration effect is used to compare this definition favourably with traditional accounts of veridical perception that involve the generation of matching content with appropriate causal history or patterns of counterfactual dependence. I also defend my account of veridical perception against several objections
Wagman, Jeffrey B. (2008). Perception-action as reciprocal, continuous, and prospective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):219-220.   (Google)
Westwood, David A. & Goodale, Melvyn A. (2001). Perception and action planning: Getting it together. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):907-908.   (Google)
Abstract: Hommel et al. propose that high-level perception and action planning share a common representational domain, which facilitates the control of intentional actions. On the surface, this point of view appears quite different from an alternative account that suggests that “action” and “perception” are functionally and neurologically dissociable processes. But it is difficult to reconcile these apparently different perspectives, because Hommel et al. do not clearly specify what they mean by “perception” and “action planning.” With respect to the visual control of action, a distinction must be made between conscious visual perception and unconscious visuomotor processing. Hommel et al. must also distinguish between the what and how aspects of action planning, that is, planning what to do versus planning how to do it
Wilkerson, William S. (1999). From bodily motions to bodily intentions: The perception of bodily activity. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):61-77.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that one's perception of another person's bodily activity is not the perception of the mere flexing and bending of that person's limbs, but rather of that person's intentions. It makes its case in three parts. First, it examines what conditions are necessary for children to begin to imitate and assimilate the behavior of other adults and argues that these conditions include the perception of intention. These conditions generalize to adult perception as well. Second, changing methodologies, the paper presents a first person phenomenology of watching another person act which demonstrates that one's own perception is of intentions. The phenomenological analysis of time consciousness is the keystone of this argument. Finally, the paper looks at some recently established facts about infant and child development, and shows that these facts are best explained by thinking that the child is already perceiving intention
Wilson, Thomas P. & Wilson, Margaret (2001). Perception-action links and the evolution of human speech exchange. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):47-48.   (Google)
Abstract: A perception-action system may underlie the mechanisms by which human speech exchange in social interaction is managed, as well as the evolutionary precursors of these mechanisms in closely related species. Some phenomena of interaction well-studied by sociologists are suggested as a point of departure for further research
Wright, Wayne (2006). Visual stuff and active vision. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):129-149.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines the status of unattended visual stimuli in the light of recent work on the role of attention in visual perception. Although the question of whether attention is required for visual experience seems very interesting, this paper argues that there currently is no good reason to take a stand on the issue. Moreover, it is argued that much of the allure of that question stems from a continued attachment to the defective ‘inner picture view’ of experience and a mistaken notion that the ultimate goal of vision is to produce visual experience. The paper considers a promising general account of the content and structure of vision and presents reasons for not taking that account to be committed to any substantive claims about the experiential status of unattended visual stimuli. Also addressed are the active nature of vision and the role of vision in enabling our ecological success. These considerations highlight that visual experience is not the whole of vision and that a much more important question about unattended visual stimuli than whether they are consciously experienced is what contribution they make to how we interact with the world
Wu, Wayne (2008). Visual attention, conceptual content, and doing it right. Mind 117 (468).   (Google)
Abstract: Reflection on the fine-grained information required for visual guidance of action has suggested that visual content is non-conceptual. I argue that in a common type of visually guided action, namely the use of manipulable artefacts, vision has conceptual content. Specifically, I show that these actions require visual attention and that concepts are involved in directing attention. In acting with artefacts, there is a way of doing it right as determined by the artefact’s conventional use. Attention must reflect our understanding of the function and appropriate ways to use these artefacts, understanding that requires possession of the relevant concept. As a result, we attend to the artefact’s relevant functional properties. In these cases, attention is structured by concepts. This discussion has a bearing on the dual visual stream hypothesis. While it is often held that the two visual streams are functionally independent, the argument of this essay is that the constraints on attention suggest a functional interaction between them.
Zimmer, Alf C. & Korndle, Hermann (1994). A gestalt theoretic account for the coordination of perception and action in motor learning. Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):249-265.   (Google)
Abstract: A review of the scanty Gestaltist literature on motor behaviour indicates that a genuine Gestalt theoretic approach to motor behaviour can be characterized by three research questions: (1) What are the natural units of motor behaviour? (2) What characterizes the self-organization in motor behaviour? (3) What are the conditions for invariance in motor behaviour? Tentative answers to these questions can be found by analysing the parallels between Gestalt theory and Bernstein's theory of motor actions and by showing that Gestalt theory can be regarded as a specific approach to non-linear dynamics as exemplified by synergetics (Haken, 1991). The congruence between the Gestalt theoretic approach and synergetics becomes apparent in the analysis of how a complex motor task is learned [1]

3.4c Perception and Reference

Campbell, John (web). Consciousness and reference. In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that you are thinking and talking about. But this connection between consciousness of the objects and properties around you, and knowledge of the references of the basic terms you use, has proven difficult to articulate. The connection cannot be recognized so long as you think of consciousness as a kind of glow with which representations are accompanied or enlivened. It is, though, also possible to think of perceptual experience as fundamentally a relation between the subject and the things experienced; and given such a conception, we can make visible the link between consciousness and reference
Campbell, J. (1999). Immunity to error through misidentification and the meaning of a referring term. Philosophical Topics 26:89-104.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Campbell, John (2005). Precis of reference and consciousness. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):103-114.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, J. (2004). Reference as attention. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Campbell, John (1998). Sense and consciousness. In New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Atlanta: Rodopi.   (Google)
Campbell, John (1997). Sense, reference and selective attention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):55-98.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin
Clark, Austen (2006). Attention & inscrutability: A commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness for the Pacific APA meeting, pasadena, california, 2004. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of Reference and Consciousness. The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am confident that it will be the foundation, the launching-pad, for much future work on the subject. But in the end I will argue that Campbell’s picture makes the mechanisms of attention too smart: smarter than they are, smarter than they could be. If we come to a more realistic appraisal of the skills and capacities of our sub-personal minions, the “knowledge of reference” which they yield will have to be taken down a notch or two
Clark, Austen (online). Sensing and reference.   (Google)
Abstract: When I was revising _Sensory Qualities_ there was a period of about a year when I set the manuscript aside and did other things. When I returned to it I found that certain portions of the argument had collapsed of their own weight, like an old New England barn, and could be carted off the premises without compunction. Other parts were wobbling on their foundation, while some had weathered well and seemed nice and solid. My revision strategy was simple: I kept just the nice solid bits, thinking that I could go back and work on the wobbly portions later
Cussins, Adrian (1999). Subjectivity, objectivity, and theories of reference in Evans' theory of thought. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: This paper explores some problems with Gareth Evans’s theory of the fundamental and non-fundamental levels of thought [1]. I suggest a way to reconceive the levels of thought that overcomes these problems. But, first, why might anyone who was not already struck by Evans’s remarkable theory care about these issues? What’s at stake here?
Davis, Steven (ed.) (1983). Causal Theories Of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, And Reference. Ny: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hanna, Robert (1993). Direct reference, direct perception, and the cognitive theory of demonstratives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):96-117.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hawthorne, John & Scala, Mark (2000). Seeing and demonstration. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):199-206.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kelly, Sean D. (2004). Reference and attention: A difficult connection. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):277-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I am very much in sympathy with the overall approach of John Campbell’s paper, “Reference as Attention”. My sympathy extends to a variety of its features. I think he is right to suppose, for instance, that neuropsychological cases provide important clues about how we should treat some traditional philosophical problems concerning perception and reference. I also think he is right to suppose that there are subtle but important relations between the phenomena of perception, action, consciousness, attention, and reference. I even think that there is probably something importantly right about the main claim of the paper. I take this to be the claim that there is a tight connection – of some sort at any rate – between our capacity to refer demonstratively to perceptually presented objects and our capacity to attend to those objects in our conscious awareness of them. What precisely this connection consists in, however, remains a mystery to me. My goal in these comments is to clarify this result. I will begin, in section 2, with a fairly general statement of the problem I take Campbell to have set himself. Following this, in section 3, I will focus more particularly on what kind of relation Campbell takes to exist, or does exist, or perhaps could exist between attention and demonstrative reference. I examine four options, the first three of which seem to admit of clear counterexamples, and the fourth of which is too weak to be of any real interest
Kim, Jaegwon (1977). Perception and reference without causality. Journal of Philosophy 74 (October):606-620.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Matthen, Mohan P. (2006). On visual experience of objects: Comments on John Campbell's reference and consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also queried, as is his espousal of the so-called Referential View of Experience
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1989). Why perception is not singular reference. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Norwell: Kluwer.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Miller, Izchak (1984). Perceptual reference. Synthese 61 (October):35-60.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Mulligan, Kevin (1997). How perception fixes reference. In Language and Thought. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The answer I shall sketch is not mine. Nor, as far as I can tell, is it an answer to be found in the voluminous literature inspired by Kripke’s work. Many of the elements of the answer are to be found in the writings of Wittgenstein and his Austro-German predecessors, Martinak, Husserl, Marty, Landgrebe and Bühler. Within this Austro-German tradition we may distinguish between a strand which is Platonist and anti-naturalist and a strand which is nominalist and naturalist. Thus Husserl’s account of what he calls “directly referring” uses of singular terms invokes senses or individual concepts, albeit simple, not descriptive senses. But the account of reference fixing and reference given by Landgrebe, Bühler and Wittgenstein rejects senses.1 I confine further reference to these writers to footnotes since my aim here is to develop and unify some of their suggestions, in particular by comparing them with more recent work (cf. Mulligan 1997)
Prat Fernández, Olga (1999). Perceptual consciousness and the reflexive character of attention. In La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U.   (Google)
Smith, David Woodruff (1982). What's the meaning of 'this'? Noûs 16 (May):181-208.   (Google | More links)

3.4d Perception and Phenomenology

Baldwin, Thomas (ed.) (2007). Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge.   (Google)
Barbaras, Renaud (2006). Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Desire and Distance constitutes an important new departure in contemporary phenomenological thought, a rethinking and critique of basic philosophical positions concerning the concept of perception presented by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, though it departs in significant and original ways from their work. Barbaras’s overall goal is to develop a philosophy of what “life” is—one that would do justice to the question of embodiment and its role in perception and the formation of the human subject. Barbaras posits that desire and distance inform the concept of “life.” Levinas identified a similar structure in Descartes’s notion of the infinite. For Barbaras, desire and distance are anchored not in meaning, but in a rethinking of the philosophy of biology and, in consequence, cosmology. Barbaras elaborates and extends the formal structure of desire and distance by drawing on motifs as yet unexplored in the French phenomenological tradition, especially the notions of “life” and the “life-world,” which are prominent in the later Husserl but also appear in non-phenomenological thinkers such as Bergson. Barbaras then filters these notions (especially “life”) through Merleau-Ponty
Beckermann, Ansgar (1995). Visual information processing and phenomenal consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: As far as an adequate understanding of phenomenal consciousness is concerned, representationalist theories of mind which are modelled on the information processing paradigm, are, as much as corresponding neurobiological or functionalist theories, confronted with a series of arguments based on inverted or absent qualia considerations. These considerations display the following pattern: assuming we had complete knowledge about the neural and functional states which subserve the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness, would it not still be conceivable that these neural states (or states with the same causal r
Boi, Luciano (2004). Questions regarding Husserlian geometry and phenomenology. A study of the concept of manifold and spatial perception. Husserl Studies 20 (3).   (Google)
Carlson, Elof A. (2002). Color perception: An ongoing convergence of reductionism and phenomenology. In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol LXXVII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google)
Carman, Taylor (2008). Review of Thomas Baldwin (ed.), Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6).   (Google)
Chudnoff, Elijah (forthcoming). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The upshot is that intuitions are importantly similar to perceptual experiences, and so should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions. I consider a popular argument from the introspective absence of sui generis intuition experiences in favor of doxasticism. I develop a conception of intuition experiences that helps to defuse this argument.
Coseru, Christian (forthcoming). “Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception,” Philosophy East and West 59:4 (October 2009): 409-439. Philosophy East and West.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist epistemologist, I claim, is operating on principles similar to those found in Husserl’s phenomenological tradition.
Coseru, Christian (2009). Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception. Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist epistemologist, I claim, is operating on principles similar to those found in Husserl’s phenomenological tradition.
Crooks, Mark (2008). The Churchlands' war on qualia. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case For Qualia. The MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The systematic phenomenology-denial within the works of Paul and Patricia Churchland is critiqued as to its coherence with the known elelmentary physics and physiology of perception. Paul Churchland misidentifies "qualia" with psychology's sensorimotor schemas, while Patricia Churchland illicitly propounds the intertheoretic identities of logical empiricism while rejecting the premises upon which those identities are based. Their analogies from such arguments to an identity of mind and brain thus have no inductive probability.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (2002). Samuel Todes's account of non-conceptual perceptual knowledge and its relation to thought. Ratio 15 (4):392-409.   (Google | More links)
Froese, Mr Tom & Spiers, Mr Adam, Toward a phenomenological pragmatics of enactive perception.   (Google)
Abstract: The enactive approach to perception is generating an extensive amount of interest and debate in the cognitive sciences. One particularly contentious issue has been how best to characterize the perceptual experiences reported by subjects who have mastered the skillful use of a perceptual supplementation (PS) device. This paper argues that this issue cannot be resolved with the use of third-person methodologies alone, but that it requires the development of a phenomenological pragmatics. In particular, it is necessary that the experimenters become skillful in the use of PS devices themselves. The "Enactive Torch" is proposed as an experimental platform which is cheap, non-intrusive and easy to replicate, so as to enable researchers to corroborate reported experiences with their own phenomenology more easily
Gallagher, Shaun (2010). Merleau-ponty's phenomenology of perception. Topoi 29 (2):183-185.   (Google)
Geraets, Theodore F. (1971). Vers Un Nouvelle Philosophie Transcendentale: La Genèse De La Philosophie De M. Merleau-Ponty Jusqu'à La Phénoménologie De La Perception. Martinus Nijhoff.   (Google)
Glotzbach, Philip A. & Heff, Harry (1982). Ecological and phenomenological contributions to the psychology of perception. Noûs 16 (March):108-121.   (Google | More links)
Gordon, Ḥayim (2004). Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Basis for Sharing the Earth. Praeger.   (Google)
Hohwy, Jakob, The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, and to psychopathology. These elusive notions of the self are shown to be the natural upshots of general cognitive mechanisms whose fundamental purpose is to enable agents to represent the world and act in it
Hudson, Richard & Pallard, Henri (1991). La question ontologique et la ``phénoménologie de la perception''. Man and World 24:373-393.   (Google)
Kates, Carol A. (1970). Perception and temporality in Husserl's phenomenology. Philosophy Today 14:89-100.   (Google)
Kelly, Sean Dorrance (2008). Content and constancy: Phenomenology, psychology, and the content of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):682–690.   (Google | More links)
Kelly, Sean D. (2005). Seeing things in Merleau-ponty. In C. Tarman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Abstract: The passage above comes from the opening pages of Merleau-Ponty’s essay on Edmund Husserl. It proposes a risky interpretive principle. The main feature of this principle is that the seminal aspects of a thinker’s work are so close to him that he is incapable of articulating them himself. Nevertheless, these aspects pervade the work, give it its style, its sense and its direction, and therefore belong to it essentially. As Martin Heidegger writes, in a passage quoted by Merleau-Ponty:
The greater the work of a thinker – which in no way coincides with the breadth
and number of writings – the richer is what is un-thought in this work, which
means, that which emerges in and through this work as having not yet been
thought.2
The goal of Merleau-Ponty’s essay, he says, is “to evoke this un-thought-of element in Husserl’s thought”.3
Kelly, Sean D. (2001). The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind. New York: Garland Publishing.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Through discussion of phenomenological and analytic traditions such as the philosophical problems of perceptual content, the content of demonstrative thoughts and the unity of proposition, Kelly explains that these concepts are not as alien to one another as most people believe
Lancaster, Brian (1997). On the stages of perception: Towards a synthesis of cognitive neuroscience and the buddhist abhidhamma tradition. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (2):122-142.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Levering, Bas (2006). Epistemological issues in phenomenological research: How authoritative are people's accounts of their own perceptions? Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (4):451–462.   (Google | More links)
Lohmar, Dieter (2005). On the function of weak phantasmata in perception: Phenomenological, psychological and neurological clues for the transcendental function of imagination in perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Weak phantasmata have a decisive and specifically transcendental function in our everyday perception. This paper provides several different arguments for this claim based on evidence from both empirical psychology and phenomenology
Lormand, Eric (2005). Phenomenal impressions. In T.S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oup.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
Mattens, Filip (2009). Perception, body, and the sense of touch: Phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Husserl Studies 25 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In recent philosophy of mind, a series of challenging ideas have appeared about the relation between the body and the sense of touch. In certain respects, these ideas have a striking affinity with Husserl’s theory of the constitution of the body. Nevertheless, these two approaches lead to very different understandings of the role of the body in perception. Either the body is characterized as a perceptual “organ,” or the body is said to function as a “template.” Despite its focus on the sense of touch, the latter conception, I will argue, nevertheless orients its understanding of tactual perception toward visual objects. This produces a distorted conception of touch. In this paper, I will formulate an alternative account, which is more faithful to what it is like to feel
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge.   (Google)
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1964). The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics. Northwestern University Press.   (Google)
Morris, David; Robinson, Andrew & Duchastel, Catherine (ms). Concordance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a concordance of page numbers in the following editions of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: English editions prior to the Routledge Classics 2002; Routledge Classics edition, with the new pagination; the French edition from Gallimard, prior to 2005; the 2e edition from Gallimard, 2005, with new pagination.
Myers, Charles M. (1958). Phenomenological idiom and perceptual mode. Philosophy of Science 25 (January):71-82.   (Google | More links)
Myin, Erik & O'Regan, J. Kevin (2002). Perceptual consciousness, access to modality and skill theories: A way to naturalize phenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1994). An introduction to reflective seeing: Part II. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (4):351-374.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1997). The presence of environmental objects to perceptual consciousness: An integrative, ecological and phenomenological approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (4):371-390.   (Google)
Noë, Alva (2008). Précis of action in perception: Philosophy and phenomenological research. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):660–665.   (Google | More links)
Pike, Alfred (1974). Foundational aspects of musical perception: A phenomenological analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (3):429-434.   (Google | More links)
Pike, Alfred (1966). The phenomenological approach to musical perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (2):247-254.   (Google | More links)
Pike, Alfred (1967). The theory of unconscious perception in music: A phenomenological criticism. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 25 (4):395-400.   (Google | More links)
Prakash, Ravi & Caponigro, Michele (online). Inner Light Perception as a Quantum Phenomenon-Addressing the Questions of Physical and Critical Realisms, Information and Reduction.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Subjectivity or the problem of ‘qualia’ tends to make the accessibility and comprehension of psychological events intangible especially for scientific exploration. The issue becomes even more complicated but interesting when one turns towards mystical experiences. Such experiences are different from other psychological phenomena in the sense that they don’t occur to every one, so are difficult to comprehend even for their qualifications of existence. We conducted a qualitative study on one such experience of inner-light perception. This is a common experience reported by meditators of all kinds. However, we chose to study this phenomenon in Vihangam Yoga practitioners because of frequent occurrence of this experience in them as well as their reports of having it for hours at a stretch. During this study, it was noted that it arose many questions there we need to answer not only to explain such phenomena but also for having a better understanding of philosophy of science. In the search for these answers, we proceeded towards another complicated branch of science, quantum mechanics. Our present work is about creating an interface between a unique subjective phenomenon and principles of philosophy as well as of quantum mechanics. We explore the constructs of physical and critical realisms and their coincidence, quantum information theory and the measurement problem of Copenhagen interpretation and their possible applications in such an experience. In this endeavour, we also address the possibility that inner-light perception as experienced by Vihangam Yogis is a quantum event in brain. For this purpose, we specifically analyse the Zeilingers information concept and try to apply it to this phenomena.
Rojcewicz, Richard (1984). Depth perception in Merleau-ponty: A motivated phenomenon. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 15 (1):33-44.   (Google)
Rosen, Steven M. (1974). A Case of Non-Euclidean Visualization. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 5:33-39.   (Google)
Rouse, Joseph T. (2005). Mind, body, and world: Todes and McDowell on bodies and language. Inquiry 48 (1):38-61.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dreyfus presents Todes's (2001) republished Body and World as an anticipatory response to McDowell (1994) which shows how preconceptual perception can ground conceptual thought. I argue that Dreyfus is mistaken on this point: Todes's claim that perceptual experience is preconceptual presupposes an untenable account of conceptual thought. I then show that Todes nevertheless makes two important contributions to McDowell's project. First, he develops an account of perception as bodily second nature, and as a practical-perceptual openness to the world, which constructively develops McDowell's view. Second, and more important, this account highlights the practical and perceptual dimension of linguistic competence. The result is that perception is conceptual "all the way down" only because discursive conceptualization is perceptual and practical "all the way up". This conjunction of McDowell and Todes on the bodily dimensions of discursive practice also vindicates Davidson's and Brandom's criticisms of McDowell's version of empiricism
Sallis, John C. (1971). Time, subjectivity, and the phenomenology of perception. Modern Schoolman 48 (May):343-358.   (Google)
Schellenberg, Susanna (forthcoming). Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experience are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain unsaturated. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend a minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) satisfies the Aristotelian principle according to which the existence of any type depends on its tokens and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.
Schipper, Gerrit (1966). Perception phenomenologically considered. Southern Journal of Philosophy 4:237-241.   (Google)
Schellenberg, Susanna (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.
Schroer, Robert (2008). The woman in the painting and the image in the penny: An investigation of phenomenological doubleness, seeing-in, and “reversed seeing-in”. Philosophical Studies 139 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The experience of looking at a tilted penny involves a “phenomenological doubleness” in that it simultaneously seems to be of something circular and of something elliptical. In this paper, I investigate the phenomenological doubleness of this experience by comparing it to another case of phenomenological doubleness––the phenomenological doubleness of seeing an object in a painting. I begin by pointing out some striking similarities between the phenomenological characters of these two experiences. I then argue that these phenomenological characters have a common explanation. More specifically, I argue that the psychological mechanism that explains the phenomenological doubleness of the experience of seeing an object in a painting can be extended to also explain the phenomenological doubleness of the experience of seeing a tilted penny
Seebohm, Thomas M. (2002). The phenomenological movement: A tradition without method? Merleau-ponty and Husserl. In Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Husserl. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google)
Serres, Michel (2009). The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: Veils -- Boxes -- Tables -- Visit -- Joy.
Shim, Michael K. (2005). The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl's phenomenology of perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F
Smith, A. D. (2002). The Problem of Perception. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Soldati, Gianfranco & Dorsch, Fabian, The rational dimension of perceptual phenomenology.   (Google)
Abstract: One influential focus of the recent debates about non-sensory aspects of the phenomenal character of our mental episodes has been on their intellectual elements. More specifically, it has been on what it is like to think or judge something in opposition to seeing or imagining it, as well as on the extent to which how we subjectively experience our thoughts and judgements depends on how they present the world as being.1 Other non-sensory aspects of character, by contrast, have been largely neglected, despite two significant facts about them. The first is that they pertain, not only to judgements and similar thoughts, but also to perceptions and other sensory episodes — thus not raising the general issue of whether the episodes concerned possess a phenomenal character in the first place. And second, they are, in several respects, more interesting and perhaps also more basic than the sensory and the intellectual aspects usually discussed. In particular, they reflect or manifest the general nature of the type of episode concerned, rather than the specific differences among its instances. And, as part of this, they render especially the rational dimension of our mental episodes first-personally salient. Our aim in this essay is to describe the non-sensory and non-intellectual phenomenal aspects of perceptions and to highlight their link to the rational role of the latter. This will also involve an attempt at characterising the three kinds of phenomenal aspects at issue. More specifically, it is part of our proposal that the difference between the sensory and the intellectual aspects can be spelled out in terms of the non-neutrality and the reason-insensitivity of the presentational elements concerned. The phenomenal aspects of the third type — which may be called the rational aspects — may then be distinguished from the other two by reference to the fact that only the former concern the type of non-neutrality involved in the respective episodes, rather than what these episodes are non-neutral about..
Talero, Maria Lucia (2002). The Temporal Context of Freedom in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Dissertation,   (Google)
Thompson, Evan; Noë, Alva & Pessoa, Luiz (1999). Perceptual completion: A case study in phenomenology and cognitive science. In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 66 | Google)
Tibbetts, Paul E. (1972). Phenomenological and empirical inadequacies of Russell's theory of perception. Philosophical Studies 20:98-108.   (Google)
Tibbetts, Paul (1969). Perception; Selected Readings in Science and Phenomenology. Chicago, Quadrangle Books.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction to sensory psychology, by C. Mueller.--Some reflections on brain and mind, by R. Brain.--In search of the engram, by K. Lashly.--Cerebral organization and behavior, by R. W. Sperry.--Relations between the central nervous system and the peripheral organs, by E. von Holst.--Effects of the Gestalt revolution, by J. E. Hochberg.--Seeing in depth, by R. L. Gregory.--The stimulus variables for visual depth perception, by J. J. Gibson.--The elaboration of the universe, by J. Piaget.--Visual perception approached by the method of stabilized images, by R. M. Pritchard, W. Heron, and D. O. Hebb.--Philosophy as rigorous science, by E. Husserl.--The "sensation" as a unit of experience, by M. Merleau-Ponty.--The phenomenology of perception: perceptual implications, by A. Gurwitsch.--The expression of thinking, by E. W. Straus.--The concept of group and the theory of perception, by E. Cassirer.--Norm and pathology of I-world relations, by E. W. Straus.--The metaphysical in man, by M. Merleau-Ponty.--Cultural differences in the perception of geometric illusions, by M. H. Segall, D. T. Campbell, and M. J. Herskovits.--The interpretive cortex, by W. Penfield.--Recovery from early blindness: a case study, by R. L. Gregory and J. G. Wallace.--Visual disturbances after perceptual isolation, by W. Heron, B. K. Doane, and T. H. Scott.
Vallor, Shannon (2006). An enactive-phenomenological approach to veridical perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):39-60.   (Google)
Abstract: Most accounts of veridical perception draw upon conventional causal theories of perception for an explanatory framework. Recently developed enactive or sensorimotor theories of perception pose a challenge to such accounts, necessitating a redefinition of veridical perception. I propose and defend one such definition, drawing upon empirical studies of perception, the resources of the enactive approach and phenomenology. I argue that perceptual experience engages an organism in a network of sensorimotor dependencies with the perceived object, and that veridical perceptions involve experiential mastery of these dependencies. A thought example involving the phoneme restoration effect is used to compare this definition favourably with traditional accounts of veridical perception that involve the generation of matching content with appropriate causal history or patterns of counterfactual dependence. I also defend my account of veridical perception against several objections
Weber, Michel (2006). Whitehead's onto-epistemology of perception and its significance for consciousness studies. New Ideas in Psychology 24 (2):117-132.   (Google)
Welton, Donn (1982). Husserl's genetic phenomenology of perception. Research in Phenomenology 12 (1):59-83.   (Google)

3.4e Perception and the Mind, Misc

Smith, A. D. (2006). In defence of direct realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):411-424.   (Google | More links)