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3.4c. Perception and Reference (Perception and Reference on PhilPapers)

See also:
Campbell, John (web). Consciousness and reference. In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that you are thinking and talking about. But this connection between consciousness of the objects and properties around you, and knowledge of the references of the basic terms you use, has proven difficult to articulate. The connection cannot be recognized so long as you think of consciousness as a kind of glow with which representations are accompanied or enlivened. It is, though, also possible to think of perceptual experience as fundamentally a relation between the subject and the things experienced; and given such a conception, we can make visible the link between consciousness and reference
Campbell, J. (1999). Immunity to error through misidentification and the meaning of a referring term. Philosophical Topics 26:89-104.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Campbell, John (2005). Precis of reference and consciousness. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):103-114.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, J. (2004). Reference as attention. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Campbell, John (1998). Sense and consciousness. In New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Atlanta: Rodopi.   (Google)
Campbell, John (1997). Sense, reference and selective attention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):55-98.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin
Clark, Austen (2006). Attention & inscrutability: A commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness for the Pacific APA meeting, pasadena, california, 2004. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of Reference and Consciousness. The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and I am confident that it will be the foundation, the launching-pad, for much future work on the subject. But in the end I will argue that Campbell’s picture makes the mechanisms of attention too smart: smarter than they are, smarter than they could be. If we come to a more realistic appraisal of the skills and capacities of our sub-personal minions, the “knowledge of reference” which they yield will have to be taken down a notch or two
Clark, Austen (online). Sensing and reference.   (Google)
Abstract: When I was revising _Sensory Qualities_ there was a period of about a year when I set the manuscript aside and did other things. When I returned to it I found that certain portions of the argument had collapsed of their own weight, like an old New England barn, and could be carted off the premises without compunction. Other parts were wobbling on their foundation, while some had weathered well and seemed nice and solid. My revision strategy was simple: I kept just the nice solid bits, thinking that I could go back and work on the wobbly portions later
Cussins, Adrian (1999). Subjectivity, objectivity, and theories of reference in Evans' theory of thought. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: This paper explores some problems with Gareth Evans’s theory of the fundamental and non-fundamental levels of thought [1]. I suggest a way to reconceive the levels of thought that overcomes these problems. But, first, why might anyone who was not already struck by Evans’s remarkable theory care about these issues? What’s at stake here?
Davis, Steven (ed.) (1983). Causal Theories Of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, And Reference. Ny: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hanna, Robert (1993). Direct reference, direct perception, and the cognitive theory of demonstratives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):96-117.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hawthorne, John & Scala, Mark (2000). Seeing and demonstration. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):199-206.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kelly, Sean D. (2004). Reference and attention: A difficult connection. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):277-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I am very much in sympathy with the overall approach of John Campbell’s paper, “Reference as Attention”. My sympathy extends to a variety of its features. I think he is right to suppose, for instance, that neuropsychological cases provide important clues about how we should treat some traditional philosophical problems concerning perception and reference. I also think he is right to suppose that there are subtle but important relations between the phenomena of perception, action, consciousness, attention, and reference. I even think that there is probably something importantly right about the main claim of the paper. I take this to be the claim that there is a tight connection – of some sort at any rate – between our capacity to refer demonstratively to perceptually presented objects and our capacity to attend to those objects in our conscious awareness of them. What precisely this connection consists in, however, remains a mystery to me. My goal in these comments is to clarify this result. I will begin, in section 2, with a fairly general statement of the problem I take Campbell to have set himself. Following this, in section 3, I will focus more particularly on what kind of relation Campbell takes to exist, or does exist, or perhaps could exist between attention and demonstrative reference. I examine four options, the first three of which seem to admit of clear counterexamples, and the fourth of which is too weak to be of any real interest
Kim, Jaegwon (1977). Perception and reference without causality. Journal of Philosophy 74 (October):606-620.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Matthen, Mohan P. (2006). On visual experience of objects: Comments on John Campbell's reference and consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also queried, as is his espousal of the so-called Referential View of Experience
McLaughlin, Brian P. (1989). Why perception is not singular reference. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Norwell: Kluwer.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Miller, Izchak (1984). Perceptual reference. Synthese 61 (October):35-60.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Mulligan, Kevin (1997). How perception fixes reference. In Language and Thought. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The answer I shall sketch is not mine. Nor, as far as I can tell, is it an answer to be found in the voluminous literature inspired by Kripke’s work. Many of the elements of the answer are to be found in the writings of Wittgenstein and his Austro-German predecessors, Martinak, Husserl, Marty, Landgrebe and Bühler. Within this Austro-German tradition we may distinguish between a strand which is Platonist and anti-naturalist and a strand which is nominalist and naturalist. Thus Husserl’s account of what he calls “directly referring” uses of singular terms invokes senses or individual concepts, albeit simple, not descriptive senses. But the account of reference fixing and reference given by Landgrebe, Bühler and Wittgenstein rejects senses.1 I confine further reference to these writers to footnotes since my aim here is to develop and unify some of their suggestions, in particular by comparing them with more recent work (cf. Mulligan 1997)
Prat Fernández, Olga (1999). Perceptual consciousness and the reflexive character of attention. In La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U.   (Google)
Smith, David Woodruff (1982). What's the meaning of 'this'? Noûs 16 (May):181-208.   (Google | More links)