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3.4d. Perception and Phenomenology (Perception and Phenomenology on PhilPapers)

See also:
Baldwin, Thomas (ed.) (2007). Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge.   (Google)
Barbaras, Renaud (2006). Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception. Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Desire and Distance constitutes an important new departure in contemporary phenomenological thought, a rethinking and critique of basic philosophical positions concerning the concept of perception presented by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, though it departs in significant and original ways from their work. Barbaras’s overall goal is to develop a philosophy of what “life” is—one that would do justice to the question of embodiment and its role in perception and the formation of the human subject. Barbaras posits that desire and distance inform the concept of “life.” Levinas identified a similar structure in Descartes’s notion of the infinite. For Barbaras, desire and distance are anchored not in meaning, but in a rethinking of the philosophy of biology and, in consequence, cosmology. Barbaras elaborates and extends the formal structure of desire and distance by drawing on motifs as yet unexplored in the French phenomenological tradition, especially the notions of “life” and the “life-world,” which are prominent in the later Husserl but also appear in non-phenomenological thinkers such as Bergson. Barbaras then filters these notions (especially “life”) through Merleau-Ponty
Beckermann, Ansgar (1995). Visual information processing and phenomenal consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: As far as an adequate understanding of phenomenal consciousness is concerned, representationalist theories of mind which are modelled on the information processing paradigm, are, as much as corresponding neurobiological or functionalist theories, confronted with a series of arguments based on inverted or absent qualia considerations. These considerations display the following pattern: assuming we had complete knowledge about the neural and functional states which subserve the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness, would it not still be conceivable that these neural states (or states with the same causal r
Boi, Luciano (2004). Questions regarding Husserlian geometry and phenomenology. A study of the concept of manifold and spatial perception. Husserl Studies 20 (3).   (Google)
Carlson, Elof A. (2002). Color perception: An ongoing convergence of reductionism and phenomenology. In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol LXXVII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google)
Carman, Taylor (2008). Review of Thomas Baldwin (ed.), Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6).   (Google)
Chudnoff, Elijah (forthcoming). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The upshot is that intuitions are importantly similar to perceptual experiences, and so should not be identified with doxastic attitudes or dispositions. I consider a popular argument from the introspective absence of sui generis intuition experiences in favor of doxasticism. I develop a conception of intuition experiences that helps to defuse this argument.
Coseru, Christian (forthcoming). “Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception,” Philosophy East and West 59:4 (October 2009): 409-439. Philosophy East and West.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist epistemologist, I claim, is operating on principles similar to those found in Husserl’s phenomenological tradition.
Coseru, Christian (2009). Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception. Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.   (Google)
Abstract: In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist epistemologist, I claim, is operating on principles similar to those found in Husserl’s phenomenological tradition.
Crooks, Mark (2008). The Churchlands' war on qualia. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case For Qualia. The MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The systematic phenomenology-denial within the works of Paul and Patricia Churchland is critiqued as to its coherence with the known elelmentary physics and physiology of perception. Paul Churchland misidentifies "qualia" with psychology's sensorimotor schemas, while Patricia Churchland illicitly propounds the intertheoretic identities of logical empiricism while rejecting the premises upon which those identities are based. Their analogies from such arguments to an identity of mind and brain thus have no inductive probability.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (2002). Samuel Todes's account of non-conceptual perceptual knowledge and its relation to thought. Ratio 15 (4):392-409.   (Google | More links)
Froese, Mr Tom & Spiers, Mr Adam, Toward a phenomenological pragmatics of enactive perception.   (Google)
Abstract: The enactive approach to perception is generating an extensive amount of interest and debate in the cognitive sciences. One particularly contentious issue has been how best to characterize the perceptual experiences reported by subjects who have mastered the skillful use of a perceptual supplementation (PS) device. This paper argues that this issue cannot be resolved with the use of third-person methodologies alone, but that it requires the development of a phenomenological pragmatics. In particular, it is necessary that the experimenters become skillful in the use of PS devices themselves. The "Enactive Torch" is proposed as an experimental platform which is cheap, non-intrusive and easy to replicate, so as to enable researchers to corroborate reported experiences with their own phenomenology more easily
Gallagher, Shaun (2010). Merleau-ponty's phenomenology of perception. Topoi 29 (2):183-185.   (Google)
Geraets, Theodore F. (1971). Vers Un Nouvelle Philosophie Transcendentale: La Genèse De La Philosophie De M. Merleau-Ponty Jusqu'à La Phénoménologie De La Perception. Martinus Nijhoff.   (Google)
Glotzbach, Philip A. & Heff, Harry (1982). Ecological and phenomenological contributions to the psychology of perception. Noûs 16 (March):108-121.   (Google | More links)
Gordon, Ḥayim (2004). Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Basis for Sharing the Earth. Praeger.   (Google)
Hohwy, Jakob, The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, and to psychopathology. These elusive notions of the self are shown to be the natural upshots of general cognitive mechanisms whose fundamental purpose is to enable agents to represent the world and act in it
Hudson, Richard & Pallard, Henri (1991). La question ontologique et la ``phénoménologie de la perception''. Man and World 24:373-393.   (Google)
Kates, Carol A. (1970). Perception and temporality in Husserl's phenomenology. Philosophy Today 14:89-100.   (Google)
Kelly, Sean Dorrance (2008). Content and constancy: Phenomenology, psychology, and the content of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):682–690.   (Google | More links)
Kelly, Sean D. (2005). Seeing things in Merleau-ponty. In C. Tarman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Abstract: The passage above comes from the opening pages of Merleau-Ponty’s essay on Edmund Husserl. It proposes a risky interpretive principle. The main feature of this principle is that the seminal aspects of a thinker’s work are so close to him that he is incapable of articulating them himself. Nevertheless, these aspects pervade the work, give it its style, its sense and its direction, and therefore belong to it essentially. As Martin Heidegger writes, in a passage quoted by Merleau-Ponty:
The greater the work of a thinker – which in no way coincides with the breadth
and number of writings – the richer is what is un-thought in this work, which
means, that which emerges in and through this work as having not yet been
thought.2
The goal of Merleau-Ponty’s essay, he says, is “to evoke this un-thought-of element in Husserl’s thought”.3
Kelly, Sean D. (2001). The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind. New York: Garland Publishing.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Through discussion of phenomenological and analytic traditions such as the philosophical problems of perceptual content, the content of demonstrative thoughts and the unity of proposition, Kelly explains that these concepts are not as alien to one another as most people believe
Lancaster, Brian (1997). On the stages of perception: Towards a synthesis of cognitive neuroscience and the buddhist abhidhamma tradition. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (2):122-142.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Levering, Bas (2006). Epistemological issues in phenomenological research: How authoritative are people's accounts of their own perceptions? Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (4):451–462.   (Google | More links)
Lohmar, Dieter (2005). On the function of weak phantasmata in perception: Phenomenological, psychological and neurological clues for the transcendental function of imagination in perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Weak phantasmata have a decisive and specifically transcendental function in our everyday perception. This paper provides several different arguments for this claim based on evidence from both empirical psychology and phenomenology
Lormand, Eric (2005). Phenomenal impressions. In T.S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oup.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Haddock, Adrian & Macpherson, Fiona (2008). Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
Mattens, Filip (2009). Perception, body, and the sense of touch: Phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Husserl Studies 25 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In recent philosophy of mind, a series of challenging ideas have appeared about the relation between the body and the sense of touch. In certain respects, these ideas have a striking affinity with Husserl’s theory of the constitution of the body. Nevertheless, these two approaches lead to very different understandings of the role of the body in perception. Either the body is characterized as a perceptual “organ,” or the body is said to function as a “template.” Despite its focus on the sense of touch, the latter conception, I will argue, nevertheless orients its understanding of tactual perception toward visual objects. This produces a distorted conception of touch. In this paper, I will formulate an alternative account, which is more faithful to what it is like to feel
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge.   (Google)
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1964). The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics. Northwestern University Press.   (Google)
Morris, David; Robinson, Andrew & Duchastel, Catherine (ms). Concordance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a concordance of page numbers in the following editions of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: English editions prior to the Routledge Classics 2002; Routledge Classics edition, with the new pagination; the French edition from Gallimard, prior to 2005; the 2e edition from Gallimard, 2005, with new pagination.
Myers, Charles M. (1958). Phenomenological idiom and perceptual mode. Philosophy of Science 25 (January):71-82.   (Google | More links)
Myin, Erik & O'Regan, J. Kevin (2002). Perceptual consciousness, access to modality and skill theories: A way to naturalize phenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1994). An introduction to reflective seeing: Part II. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (4):351-374.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1997). The presence of environmental objects to perceptual consciousness: An integrative, ecological and phenomenological approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (4):371-390.   (Google)
Noë, Alva (2008). Précis of action in perception: Philosophy and phenomenological research. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):660–665.   (Google | More links)
Pike, Alfred (1974). Foundational aspects of musical perception: A phenomenological analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (3):429-434.   (Google | More links)
Pike, Alfred (1966). The phenomenological approach to musical perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (2):247-254.   (Google | More links)
Pike, Alfred (1967). The theory of unconscious perception in music: A phenomenological criticism. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 25 (4):395-400.   (Google | More links)
Prakash, Ravi & Caponigro, Michele (online). Inner Light Perception as a Quantum Phenomenon-Addressing the Questions of Physical and Critical Realisms, Information and Reduction.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Subjectivity or the problem of ‘qualia’ tends to make the accessibility and comprehension of psychological events intangible especially for scientific exploration. The issue becomes even more complicated but interesting when one turns towards mystical experiences. Such experiences are different from other psychological phenomena in the sense that they don’t occur to every one, so are difficult to comprehend even for their qualifications of existence. We conducted a qualitative study on one such experience of inner-light perception. This is a common experience reported by meditators of all kinds. However, we chose to study this phenomenon in Vihangam Yoga practitioners because of frequent occurrence of this experience in them as well as their reports of having it for hours at a stretch. During this study, it was noted that it arose many questions there we need to answer not only to explain such phenomena but also for having a better understanding of philosophy of science. In the search for these answers, we proceeded towards another complicated branch of science, quantum mechanics. Our present work is about creating an interface between a unique subjective phenomenon and principles of philosophy as well as of quantum mechanics. We explore the constructs of physical and critical realisms and their coincidence, quantum information theory and the measurement problem of Copenhagen interpretation and their possible applications in such an experience. In this endeavour, we also address the possibility that inner-light perception as experienced by Vihangam Yogis is a quantum event in brain. For this purpose, we specifically analyse the Zeilingers information concept and try to apply it to this phenomena.
Rojcewicz, Richard (1984). Depth perception in Merleau-ponty: A motivated phenomenon. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 15 (1):33-44.   (Google)
Rosen, Steven M. (1974). A Case of Non-Euclidean Visualization. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 5:33-39.   (Google)
Rouse, Joseph T. (2005). Mind, body, and world: Todes and McDowell on bodies and language. Inquiry 48 (1):38-61.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dreyfus presents Todes's (2001) republished Body and World as an anticipatory response to McDowell (1994) which shows how preconceptual perception can ground conceptual thought. I argue that Dreyfus is mistaken on this point: Todes's claim that perceptual experience is preconceptual presupposes an untenable account of conceptual thought. I then show that Todes nevertheless makes two important contributions to McDowell's project. First, he develops an account of perception as bodily second nature, and as a practical-perceptual openness to the world, which constructively develops McDowell's view. Second, and more important, this account highlights the practical and perceptual dimension of linguistic competence. The result is that perception is conceptual "all the way down" only because discursive conceptualization is perceptual and practical "all the way up". This conjunction of McDowell and Todes on the bodily dimensions of discursive practice also vindicates Davidson's and Brandom's criticisms of McDowell's version of empiricism
Sallis, John C. (1971). Time, subjectivity, and the phenomenology of perception. Modern Schoolman 48 (May):343-358.   (Google)
Schellenberg, Susanna (forthcoming). Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experience are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain unsaturated. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend a minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) satisfies the Aristotelian principle according to which the existence of any type depends on its tokens and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.
Schipper, Gerrit (1966). Perception phenomenologically considered. Southern Journal of Philosophy 4:237-241.   (Google)
Schellenberg, Susanna (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.
Schroer, Robert (2008). The woman in the painting and the image in the penny: An investigation of phenomenological doubleness, seeing-in, and “reversed seeing-in”. Philosophical Studies 139 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The experience of looking at a tilted penny involves a “phenomenological doubleness” in that it simultaneously seems to be of something circular and of something elliptical. In this paper, I investigate the phenomenological doubleness of this experience by comparing it to another case of phenomenological doubleness––the phenomenological doubleness of seeing an object in a painting. I begin by pointing out some striking similarities between the phenomenological characters of these two experiences. I then argue that these phenomenological characters have a common explanation. More specifically, I argue that the psychological mechanism that explains the phenomenological doubleness of the experience of seeing an object in a painting can be extended to also explain the phenomenological doubleness of the experience of seeing a tilted penny
Seebohm, Thomas M. (2002). The phenomenological movement: A tradition without method? Merleau-ponty and Husserl. In Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Husserl. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google)
Serres, Michel (2009). The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Continuum.   (Google)
Abstract: Veils -- Boxes -- Tables -- Visit -- Joy.
Shim, Michael K. (2005). The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl's phenomenology of perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F
Smith, A. D. (2002). The Problem of Perception. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Soldati, Gianfranco & Dorsch, Fabian, The rational dimension of perceptual phenomenology.   (Google)
Abstract: One influential focus of the recent debates about non-sensory aspects of the phenomenal character of our mental episodes has been on their intellectual elements. More specifically, it has been on what it is like to think or judge something in opposition to seeing or imagining it, as well as on the extent to which how we subjectively experience our thoughts and judgements depends on how they present the world as being.1 Other non-sensory aspects of character, by contrast, have been largely neglected, despite two significant facts about them. The first is that they pertain, not only to judgements and similar thoughts, but also to perceptions and other sensory episodes — thus not raising the general issue of whether the episodes concerned possess a phenomenal character in the first place. And second, they are, in several respects, more interesting and perhaps also more basic than the sensory and the intellectual aspects usually discussed. In particular, they reflect or manifest the general nature of the type of episode concerned, rather than the specific differences among its instances. And, as part of this, they render especially the rational dimension of our mental episodes first-personally salient. Our aim in this essay is to describe the non-sensory and non-intellectual phenomenal aspects of perceptions and to highlight their link to the rational role of the latter. This will also involve an attempt at characterising the three kinds of phenomenal aspects at issue. More specifically, it is part of our proposal that the difference between the sensory and the intellectual aspects can be spelled out in terms of the non-neutrality and the reason-insensitivity of the presentational elements concerned. The phenomenal aspects of the third type — which may be called the rational aspects — may then be distinguished from the other two by reference to the fact that only the former concern the type of non-neutrality involved in the respective episodes, rather than what these episodes are non-neutral about..
Talero, Maria Lucia (2002). The Temporal Context of Freedom in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Dissertation,   (Google)
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Tibbetts, Paul E. (1972). Phenomenological and empirical inadequacies of Russell's theory of perception. Philosophical Studies 20:98-108.   (Google)
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Abstract: Most accounts of veridical perception draw upon conventional causal theories of perception for an explanatory framework. Recently developed enactive or sensorimotor theories of perception pose a challenge to such accounts, necessitating a redefinition of veridical perception. I propose and defend one such definition, drawing upon empirical studies of perception, the resources of the enactive approach and phenomenology. I argue that perceptual experience engages an organism in a network of sensorimotor dependencies with the perceived object, and that veridical perceptions involve experiential mastery of these dependencies. A thought example involving the phoneme restoration effect is used to compare this definition favourably with traditional accounts of veridical perception that involve the generation of matching content with appropriate causal history or patterns of counterfactual dependence. I also defend my account of veridical perception against several objections
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