MindPapers: 3.4e. The Senses, Misc

Ackerman, Diana F. (1990). A Natural History of the Senses. Random House. (Cited by 130 | Google | Edit)

Aldrich, Virgil C. (1974). Sight and light. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (October):317-322. (Google | Edit)

Broad, C. D. (1952). Some elementary reflexions on sense-perception. Philosophy 27 (January):3-17. (Cited by 14 | Google | Edit)

Gold, Ian (2004). Phenomenal qualities and intermodal perception. In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. (Google | Edit)

O'Callaghan, Casey (2006). Cross-modal illusions and perceptual content: Lessons from cross-modal illusions. Electroneurobiología 14 (2):211-224. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: I argue that a class of recently-discovered cross-modal illusions gives reason to posit a dimension of content shared across perceptual modalities and to abandon the traditional view according to which perceptual content is exclusively constituted by discrete modality-specific contents

O'Callaghan, Casey (web). Seeing what you hear: Cross-modal illusions and perception. Philosophical Issues. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues. This version is a penultimate draft, so please check with me if there is some bit you’d like to quote or cite

Taliaferro, Charles (1991). The argument from transposed modalities. Metaphilosophy 93 (January-April):93-100. (Google | Edit)

Van Cleve, James (2006). Touch, sound, and things without the mind. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):162-182. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Abstract: Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind-independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so-called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind-independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds—and argue that only on the normative construal of them are they resolvable as intended by the a priori methods of the philosophers who pose them

3.4b	Vision [27]

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