MindPapers: 3.5b. Ecological Approaches

Bermúdez, José Luis (1998). Ecological perception and the notion of a nonconceptual point of view. In The Body and the Self. Cambridge: MIT Press. (Cited by 21 | Google | Edit)

Bickhard, Mark H. & Richie, D. Michael (1983). On The Nature Of Representation: A Case Study Of James Gibson's Theory Of Perception. Ny: Praeger. (Cited by 66 | Google | Edit)

Boynton, David M. (1993). Relativism in Gibson's theory of picture perception. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (1):51-69. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Chemero, Anthony (2003). An outline of a theory of affordances. Ecological Psychology 15 (2):181-195. (Cited by 44 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The primary difference between direct and inferential theories of perception concerns the location of perceptual content, the meaning of our perceptions. In inferential theories of perception, these meanings arise inside animals, based upon their interactions with the physical environment. Light, for example, bumps into receptors causing a sensation. The animal (or its brain) performs inferences on the sensation, yielding a meaningful perception. In direct theories of perception, on the other hand, meaning is in the environment, and perception does not depend upon meaning- conferring inferences. Instead the animal simply gathers information from a meaning- laden environment. But if the environment contains meanings, then it cannot be merely physical. This places a heavy theoretical burden on direct theories of perception, a burden so severe that it may outweigh all the advantages to conceiving perception as

Chemero, Tony (forthcoming). Information and direct perception: A new approach. In Priscila Farias & João Queiroz (eds.), Advanced Issues in Cognitive Science and Semiotics. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Since the 1970s, Michael Turvey, Robert Shaw, and William Mace have worked on the formulation of a philosophically-sound and empirically-tractable version of James Gibson’s ecological psychology. It is surely no exaggeration to say that without their theoretical work ecological psychology would have died on the vine because of the high-profile attacks from establishment cognitive scientists (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, Ullman 1981). But thanks to Turvey, Shaw and Mace’s work as theorists and, perhaps more importantly, as teachers, ecological psychology is currently flourishing. A generation of students, having been trained by Turvey, Shaw and Mace at Trinity College and/or the University of Connecticut, ecological psychology, are now distinguished experimental psychologists who train their own students in Turvey-Shaw-Mace ecological psychology. Despite the undeniable and lasting importance of Turvey, Shaw and Mace’s theoretical contributions for psychology and the other cognitive science, their work has not received much attention from philosophers. It will get some of that that attention in this paper. I will point to shortcomings in the Turvey-Shaw-Mace approach to ecological psychology, and will offer what I take to be improved versions of two important aspects of it. In particular, I will describe theories of information and of direct perception that differ from the Turvey-Shaw-Mace account

Chemero, Tony (2003). Review of ecological psychology in context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the legacy of William James' radical empiricism. Contemporary Psychology. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: James J. Gibson’s ecological theory of perception (1966, 1979) is striking in many ways. It is not merely a theory of perception, but also a theory of what the world is made up of, a metaphysics, and how we can know it, an epistemology. Furthermore, the metaphysics and epistemology Gibson describes are very unusual by present standards. Indeed, Gibson very clearly intended that his theory of perception seem old-fashioned, even pre-Modern. Witness, for example, the first chapter of Gibson’s posthumous An Ecological

Chemero, Tony (2001). What we perceive when we perceive affordances: Commentary on Michaels (2000), Information, Perception and Action. Ecological Psychology 13 (2):111-116. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In her essay Ã¢ÂÂInformation, Perception and ActionÃ¢ÂÂ, Claire Michaels reaches two conclusions that run very much against the grain of ecological psychology. First, she claims that affordances are not perceived, but simply acted upon; second, because of this, perception and action ought to be conceived separately. These conclusions are based upon a misinterpretation of empirical evidence which is, in turn, based upon a conflation of two proper objects of perception: objectively with properties and affordances

Fodor, Jerry A. & Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1981). How direct is visual perception? Some reflections on Gibson's 'ecological approach'. Cognition 9:139-96. (Cited by 197 | Google | Edit)

Gibson, James J. (1976). The myth of passive perception: A reply to Richards. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (December):234-238. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gibson, James J. (1950). The Perception Of The Visual World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. (Cited by 10 | Google | Edit)

Gibson, James J. (1968). The Senses Considered As Perceptual Systems. Allen & Unwin. (Cited by 7 | Google | Edit)

Givner, David A. (1982). Concepts, percepts and perceptal systems: The relevance of psychology to epistemology. Metaphilosophy 13 (July-October):209-216. (Google | Edit)

Givner, David A. (1982). Direct perception, misperception and perceptual systems: J. J. Gibson and the problem of illusion. Nature and System 4 (September):131-142. (Google | Edit)

Glotzbach, Philip A. (1992). Determining the primary problem of visual perception: A Gibsonian response to the correlation' objection. Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):69-94. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Glotzbach, Philip A. & Heff, Harry (1982). Ecological and phenomenological contributions to the psychology of perception. Noûs 16 (March):108-121. (Google | More links | Edit)

Manfredi, Pat A. (1986). Processing or pickup: Conflicting approaches to perception. Mind and Language 1:181-200. (Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (2004). To see things is to perceive what they afford: James J. Gibson's concept of affordance. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (4):323-347. (Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (1999). Virtual objects. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):357-377. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Natsoulas, Thomas (1991). Why do things look as they do? Some Gibsonian answers to koffka's question. Philosophical Psychology 183:183-202. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Reed, Edward S. (1988). James J. Gibson And The Psychology Of Perception. New Haven: Yale University Press. (Cited by 78 | Google | Edit)

Richards, Robert J. (1976). James Gibson's passive theory of perception: A rejection of the doctrine of specific nerve energies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (December):218-233. (Google | More links | Edit)

Scarantino, Andrea (2003). Affordances explained. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):949-961. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: I examine the central theoretical construct of ecological psychology, the concept of an affordance. In the first part of the paper, I illustrate the role affordances play in Gibson's theory of perception. In the second part, I argue that affordances are to be understood as dispositional properties, and explain what I take to be their characteristic background circumstances, triggering circumstances and manifestations. The main purpose of my analysis is to give affordances a theoretical identity enriched by Gibson's visionary insight, but independent of the most controversial claims of the Gibsonian movement

Stroll, Avrum (1986). The role of surfaces in an ecological theory of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (March):437-453. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Turvey, Michael T.; Shaw, R. E.; Reed, Edward S. & Mace, William M. (1981). Ecological laws of perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Cognition 9:237-304. (Cited by 62 | Google | Edit)

Ullman, S. (1980). Against direct perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:333-81. (Cited by 114 | Google | Edit)

van Leeuwen, Cees & Stins, John (1994). Perceivable information or: The happy marriage between ecological psychology and gestalt. Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):267-285. (Google | Edit)

Young, Garry (2005). Ecological perception affords an explanation of object permanence. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):189-208. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: In this paper I aim to present an explanation of object permanence that is derived from an ecological account of perceptually based action. In understanding why children below a certain age do not search for occluded objects, one must first understand the process by which these children perform certain intentional actions on non-occluded items; and to do this one must understand the role affordances play in eliciting retrieval behaviour. My affordance-based explanation is contrasted with Shinskey and Munakata's graded representation account; and although I do not reject totally the role representations play in initiating intentional action I nevertheless maintain that only by incorporating direct perception into an account of object permanence can a fuller understanding of this phenomenon be achieved

3.5b	Ecological Approaches [27]

3.5e	Psychophysics [8]

3.5f	Gestalt Theory [26]

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