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3.5b. Epistemic and Non-epistemic Perception (Epistemic and Non-epistemic Perception on PhilPapers)

See also:
Close, Daryl (1980). More on non-epistemic seeing. Mind 89 (January):99-105.   (Google | More links)
Close, Daryl (1976). What is non-epistemic seeing? Mind 85 (April):161-170.   (Google | More links)
Goodman, Russell B. (1976). Two concepts of perceptual relativity. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7:45-52.   (Google)
Maund, J. Barry (1976). The non-sensuous epistemic account of perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):57-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
McNeill, William E. S. (forthcoming). On Seeing That Someone is Angry. European Journal of Philosophy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some propose that the question of how you know that James is angry can be adequately answered with the claim that you see that James is angry. Call this the Perceptual Hypothesis. Here, I examine that hypothesis.

I argue that there are two different ways in which the Perceptual Hypothesis could be made true. You might see that James is angry by seeing his bodily features. Alternatively, you might see that James is angry by seeing his anger. If you see that James is angry in the first way, your knowledge is inferential. If you see that James is angry in the second way, your knowledge is not inferential. These are different ways of knowing that James is angry. So the Perceptual Hypothesis alone does not adequately answer the question of how you know that fact. To ascertain how you know it, we need to decide whether or not you saw his anger.

This is an epistemological argument. But it has consequences for a theory of perception. It implies that there is a determinate fact about which features of an object you see. This fact is made true independently of what you come to know by seeing.

In the final section of the paper, I seek to undermine various ways in which the claim that you see James’ anger may be thought implausible.
Turri, John (2008). Practical and Epistemic Justification in Alston's Perceiving God. Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):290 - 299.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper clarifies and evaluates a premise of William Alston’s argument in Perceiving God. The premise in question: if it is practically rational to engage in a doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to suppose that said practice is reliable. I first provide the background needed to understand how this premise fits into Alston’s main argument. I then present Alston’s main argument, and proceed to clarify, criticize, modify, and ultimately reject Alston’s argument for the premise in question. Without this premise, Alston’s main argument fails.
Wilde, Tine (2008). Remodel[l]ing Reality. Wittgenstein's uebersichtliche Darstellung & the phenomenon of Installation in visual art. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam   (Google)
Abstract: Remodel[l]ing Reality is an inquiry into Wittgenstein's notion of uebersichtliche Darstellung and the phenomenon of installation in visual art. In a sense, both provide a perspicuous overview of a particular part of our complex world, but the nature of the overview differs. Although both generate knowledge, philosophy via the uebersichtliche Darstellung gives us a view of how things stand for us, while the installation shows an unexpected, exiting point of view. The obvious we tend to forget and the ambiguity of reality are related to each other in a dynamic way. It is in this reflexive dynamics that we constantly remodel our reality. Tools we use are our creative abilities and our powers of imagination. In our choices and solutions we show which aspects of reality we find important and how we communicate these values. The outcome of this investigation is a new perspective on the art of installation and a new insight in Wittgenstein's notion of uebersichtliche Darstellung. Because of this combination, the book is itself an artwork: an InstallationPackage.
The book is distributed by Ideabooks, Amsterdam. Isbn 978 90 804240 3 6
Wright, Edmond L. (1986). Ben-Zeev on the non-epistemic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (September):351-359.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Wright, Edmond L. (1977). Perception: A new theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (October):273-286.   (Cited by 45 | Google)
Wright, Edmond Leo (ms). Sensing as non-epistemic.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A sensory receptor, in any organism anywhere, is sensitive through time to some distribution - energy, motion, molecular shape - indeed, anything that can produce an effect. The sensitivity is rarely direct: for example, it may track changes in relative variation rather than the absolute change of state (as when the skin responds to colder and hotter instead of to cold and hot as such); it may track differing variations under different conditions (the eyes' dark-adaptation; adaptation to sound frequencies can lower the difference threshold; the kinesthetic sense will shut down if a limb is held in a stationary position too long - the limb 'going to sleep'); it may be subject to distortion of the input from overloading (dazzle producing strong-after-images); it may not be confined to one channel of sensitivity (the retina is sensitive to pressure; the hands can feel some strong sound-vibrations, the tympanum of the ear records touch). Strictly speaking there is no limit as to what intensities and what ranges receptors could be sensitive. Sharks are sensitive to electrostatic fields, homing pigeons to magnetic fields; snakes to infra-red rays; bacteria to acid concentrations; perhaps there has even been a mutant organism sensitive to the passage of cosmic rays, even though that would hardly have bestowed any conceivable survival value. What is irrefutable is that individual receptors differ markedly from organism to organism, between different members of the species (one dog being better at tracing smells than another; one person being able to sense light-waves of 375 nanometres, another not; children able to hear 20,000 Hz, older persons not), and between receptors of the same kind within one organism (one eye being sensitive to 765 nm and the other not; one ear deaf to 15,000 Hz and over, the other not). There are also just-noticeable-differences (JND's), in that one person can see two shades of a colour where another sees only one; similarly with sounds
Wright, Edmond L. (1981). Yet more on non-epistemic seeing. Mind 90 (October):586-591.   (Google | More links)