MindPapers: 3.5d. Perception and Neuroscience

Alroy, Daniel (1995). Inner light. Synthese 104 (1):147-160. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Brain, W. Russell (1946). The neurological approach to the problem of perception. Philosophy 21 (July):133-146. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Foss, Jeffrey E. (1988). The percept and vector function theories of the brain. Philosophy of Science 55 (December):511-537. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gillett, Grant R. (1989). Perception and neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (March) 83 (March):83-103. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Perception is often analysed as a process in which causal events from the environment act on a subject to produce states in the mind or brain. The role of the subject is an increasing feature of neuroscientific and cognitive literature. This feature is linked to the need for an account of the normative aspects of perceptual competence. A holographic model is offered in which objects are presented to the subject classified according to rules governing concepts and encoded in brain function in that form. This implies that the analysis of perception must consider not only the fact that there is an interaction between the perceiving subject and the perceived object but also that the interaction is shaped by a system of concepts which the subject uses in thought and action

Hall, Everett W. (1959). The adequacy of a neurological theory of perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (September):75-84. (Google | More links | Edit)

Hatfield, Gary (1999). Mental functions as constraints on neurophysiology: Biology and psychology of vision. In V. Harcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Hintikka, Jaakko & Symons, John (2003). Systems of visual identification in neuroscience: Lessons from epistemic logic. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):89-104. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: The following analysis shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the "where" and "what" systems) is not coincidental, and that it can play a clarificatory role at the most fundamental levels of neuroscientific theory

McKee, P. L. (1971). Perception and physiology. Mind 80 (October):594-596. (Google | More links | Edit)

Mogi, Ken (1997). Response selectivity, neuron doctrine, and Mach's principle in perception. Austrian Soc. For Cognitive Science Tech Report. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: manner. The construction of the space-time structure that describes the dynamics of the neural network in a causal manner is a non-trivial problem. I critically review the idea of response selectivity as is applied to

Reiser, Oliver L. (1928). Light, wave-mechanics, and consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 25 (12):309-317. (Google | More links | Edit)

Smythies, J. R. (1993). The impact of contemporary neuroscience and introspection psychology on the philosophy of perception. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury. (Google | Edit)

Trehub, Arnold (1991). The Cognitive Brain. MIT Press. (Google | Edit)

3.5e	Psychophysics [8]

3.5f	Gestalt Theory [26]

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