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3.5f. The Given (The Given on PhilPapers)

See also:
Ayer, A. J. & Macdonald, Graham (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
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Brandom, Robert B. (ms). The centrality of Sellars' two-ply account of observation to the arguments of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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deVries, Willem & Triplett, Timm (2000). Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Hackett.   (Google)
deVries, Willem A. & Triplett, Timm (2000). Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Hackett.   (Google)
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Fales, Evan (1996). A Defense of the Given. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
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Abstract: There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and externalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, in part because the literature on the distinction between internalism and externalism has become a mess, and I don’t want to clean up the mess here
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Milkov, Nikolay (2004). G. E. Moore and the greifswald objectivists on the given and the beginning of analytic philosophy. Axiomathes 14 (4):361-379.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserl's pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschew's book was the concept of the given. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald concept. Carnap did the same when he wrote his Aufbau, the only difference being that he spoke not of sense-data but of Erlebnisse. This means, I argue, that both Moore's sense-data and Carnap'sErlebnisse have little to do with either British empiricists or the neo-Kantians. In Part II, I try to ascertain what made early analytic philosophy different from all those philosophical groups and movements that either exercised influence on it, or were closely related to it: phenomenologists, Greifswald objectivists, Brentanists. For this purpose, I identify the sine qua non practices of the early analytic philosophers: exactness; acceptance of the propositional turn; descriptivism; objectivism. If one of these practices was not explored by a given philosophical school or group, in all probability, it was not truly analytic
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Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1979). More on givenness and explanatory coherence. In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Justification And Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
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