Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
updated 2008-07-26
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
click here for help on how to search
 

Perception :: Perception and the Mind

3.6a Perception and Thought

See also: 1.5d. Conscious Thought, 2.1d. Beliefs, 2.1f. Thinking, 3.1d. Belief Theories, 3.3a. Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content, 3.5a. Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability, 3.6b. Perception and Knowledge, 3.6d. Perception and Reference.

Boas, George (1952). The perceptual element in cognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (June):486-494.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1977). Perception, belief, and the structure of physical objects and consciousness. Synthese 35 (3).   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links | Edit)
Creighton, J. E. (1906). Experience and thought. Philosophical Review 15 (5):482-493.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Crumley II, Jack S. (1991). Appearances can be deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):233-251.   (Google | Edit)
Daniels, Charles B. (1988). Perception, thought, and reality. Noûs 22 (September):455-464.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Dummett, Michael (1990). Thought and perception: The views of two philosophical innovators. In The Analytic Tradition: Philosophical Quarterly Monographs, Volume 1. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)
Glüer, Kathrin (2004). On perceiving that. Theoria 70 (2-3):197-212.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Leighton, Joseph A. (1906). Cognitive thought and 'immediate' experience. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (7):174-180.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Locke, Don (1968). Perceiving and thinking, part I. Aristotelian Society 173:173-190.   (Google | Edit)
Lyons, Jack C. (2005). Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte- mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer- ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of ‘looks’. A standard view is that ‘‘how things look’’, in this epistemically significant sense, is a matter of one’s present perceptual phenomenology, of what nondoxastic experiential state one is in. On this standard view, these experiential states (a) determine which of my beliefs are perceptual beliefs and (b) are centrally involved in justifying these beliefs
McClure, M. T. (1916). Perception and thinking. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (13):345-354.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Nes, S. Anders (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford University. Dissertation, Oxford University   (Google | Edit)
Noë, Alva (1999). Thought and experience. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):257-65.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Pendlebury, Michael J. (1999). Sensibility and understanding in perceptual judgments. South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):356-369.   (Google | Edit)
Pryor, James (online). An epistemic theory of acquaintance.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: For example, suppose you believe squirrels can live an extremely long time, like parrots and tortoises. You think to yourself, “The oldest mammal in this town is probably a squirrel.” Contrast that case to:
(2b) believing some animal you see—an animal that happens to be the oldest mammal in
town—to be a squirrel
I said there’s a philosophically important difference between the (a) examples and the (b) examples. In fact these examples illustrate more than one difference. Let’s try to disentangle the different differences
Quillen, Keith (1989). Perceptual belief and psychological explanation. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (July):276-293.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Quinton, Anthony M. (1968). Perceiving and thinking, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 191:191-208.   (Google | Edit)
Sabine, George H. (1907). The concreteness of thought. Philosophical Review 16 (2):154-169.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Stroud, Barry G. (2002). Sense-experience and the grounding of thought. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 15 | Google | Edit)
Teschner, George (1981). The undifferentiated conjunction of sensation and judgment in perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):119-122.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Tolhurst, William E. (1998). Seemings. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):293-302.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Wieman, Henry N. (1943). Perception and cognition. Journal of Philosophy 40 (February):73-77.   (Google | More links | Edit)

3.6b Perception and Knowledge

See also: 1.6d. Knowledge of Consciousness, 3.6a. Perception and Thought, 3.7c. Discriminability, 3.8c. The Given, 3.8e. Epistemic and Non-epistemic Perception.

Alston, William P. (1997). Chisholm on the epistemology of perception. In The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Baergen, Ralph (1992). Perceptual consciousness and perceptual evidence. Philosophical Papers 21 (2):107-119.   (Google | Edit)
Boardman, William S. (1993). The relativity of perceptual knowledge. Synthese 94 (2):145-169.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   Since the most promising path to a solution to the problem of skepticism regarding perceptual knowledge seems to rest on a sharp distinction between perceiving and inferring, I begin by clarifying and defending that distinction. Next, I discuss the chief obstacle to success by this path, the difficulty in making the required distinction between merely logical possibilities that one is mistaken and the real (Austin) or relevant (Dretske) possibilities which would exclude knowledge. I argue that this distinction cannot be drawn in the ways Austin and Dretske suggest without begging the questions at issue. Finally, I sketch and defend a more radical way of identifying relevant possibilities that is inspired by Austin's controversial suggestion of a parallel between saying I know and saying I promise: a claim of knowledge of some particular matter is relative to a context in which questions about the matter have been raised
Brewer, Bill (1998). Experience and reason in perception. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Abstract: The question I am interested in is this. What exactly is the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of knowledge on the basis of perception? The problem here, as I see it, is to solve simultaneously for the nature of this experience, and its role in acquiring and sustaining the relevant beliefs, in such a away as to vindicate what I regard as an undeniable datum, that perception is a basic source of knowledge about the mind- independent world, in a sense of ‘basic’ which is also to be elucidated. I shall sketch the way in which I think that this should be done. In section I, I argue that perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs. In section II, I explain how they do so. My thesis is that a correct account of the sense in which perceptual experiences are experiences of mind-independent things is itself an account of the way in which they provide peculiarly basic reasons for beliefs about the world around the perceiver
Brewer, Bill (1997). Foundations of perceptual knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):41-55.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Brewer, Bill (1996). Internalism and perceptual knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):259-275.   (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)
Brewer, Bill (1995). Learning from experience: A commentary on baddeley and Weiskrantz (eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control. Mind and Language 10 (1-2):181-193.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Brewer, Bill (1999). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 96 | Google | More links | Edit)
Brewer, Bill (2001). Precis of Perception and Reason. Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 63 (2):405-416.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: What is the role of conscious perceptual experience in making thought about the mind- independent empirical world possible? What is the role of such experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge, about the way things are in that world? What is the relation between these two roles? My central argument is intended to establish that a proper account of the way in which perceptual experience is essential to our grasp of determinate thoughts about particular things in the world around us will at the same time yield a full explanation of the fundamental role which such experience plays in the acquisition of empirical knowledge, by providing us with reasons, which we recognize as such, to endorse the most basic thoughts about mind-independent things in belief
Brewer, Bill (2001). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):449-464.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Burge, Tyler (1997). Interlocution, perception, and memory. Philosophical Studies 86 (1):21-47.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links | Edit)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Perceptual entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-548.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links | Edit)
Bush, Wendell T. (1909). Knowledge and perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (15):393-398.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Butchvarov, Panayot K. (1998). Skepticism About the External World. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Byrne, Alex (1996). Spin control: Comment on McDowell's Mind and World. Philosophical Issues 7:261-73.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: We have justified beliefs about the “external” world, and some of these are formed directly on the basis of perception. I may justifiably believe that a certain dog is in certain manger, and I may have this belief because I can see that the dog is in the manger. So far, so good
Calabi, Clotilde (2005). Perceptual saliences. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Chen, Cheryl K. (2006). Empirical content and rational constraint. Inquiry 49 (3):242 – 264.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: It is often thought that epistemic relations between experience and belief make it possible for our beliefs to be about or "directed towards" the empirical world. I focus on an influential attempt by John McDowell to defend a view along these lines. According to McDowell, unless experiences are the sorts of things that can be our reasons for holding beliefs, our beliefs would not be "answerable" to the facts they purportedly represent, and so would lack all empirical content. I argue that there is no intelligible conception of what it is for beliefs to be answerable to the facts that supports McDowell's claim that our empirical beliefs must be justified by experience
Chuard, Philippe (ms). Perceptual reasons.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: According to Conceptualists like John McDowell and Bill Brewer, the representational content of perceptual experiences is wholly conceptual. One of the main!and only!arguments they advance for this claim has to do with the epistemological role of perceptual experiences. I focus on Bill Brewer’s "1999# version of the argument. I show why Brewer fails to satisfactorily motivate the premises of his argument, and suggest that opponents of Conceptualism could accept these premises without thereby endorsing the conclusion. Finally, I consider whether the conclusion really supports Conceptualism
Cory, Daniel (1935). The kinds of perception and knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 32 (12):309-322.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Cousin, D. R. (1940). Perceptual assurance, part II. Mind 49 (April):150-170.   (Google | Edit)
Craig, Edward (1976). Sensory experience and the foundations of knowledge. Synthese 33 (June):1-24.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)
Crawford, Dan D. (1991). On having reasons for perceptual beliefs: A Sellarsian perspective. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:107-123.   (Google | Edit)
Dicker, Georges (1978). Is there a problem about perception and knowledge? American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (July):165-176.   (Cited by 5 | Google | Edit)
Dicker, Georges (1980). Perceptual Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)
Doppelt, Gerald (1973). Dretske's conception of perception and knowledge. Philosophy of Science 40 (September):433-446.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Dretske, Fred (1979). Chisholm on perceptual knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 8:253-269.   (Google | Edit)
Dretske, Fred (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 144 | Google | Edit)
Dretske, Fred (2003). Skepticism: What perception teaches. In The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.   (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)
Ewing, Alfred C. (1930). Direct knowledge and perception. Mind 39 (154):137-153.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Fireman, Peter (1954). Perceptualistic Theory Of Knowledge. Philosophical Library.   (Google | Edit)
Fumerton, Richard A. (1998). Externalism and epistemological direct realism. The Monist 81 (3):393-406.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
George, F. H. (1957). Epistemology and the problem of perception. Mind 66 (October):491-506.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Glüer, Kathrin (online). Perception and justification.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Abstract: Any adequate account of perceptual experience has to provide answers to the following questions: What kind, and form of, content do experiences have? What kind of mental states are they? Many, if not most philosophers of perception today agree that experiences have representational contents of the form x is F, where x ranges over material objects and F over sensible properties. I argue that such a ‘naive semantics’ for experiences has to give the wrong answer to the second question. Because of their justificatory role for, and inferential integration into, a subject’s belief system, experiences themselves have to be construed as a kind of belief. I also sketch a semantics that allows experiences to be beliefs. Pdf
Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin (online). Perception and justification.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: Any adequate account of perceptual experience has to provide answers to the following questions: What kind, and form of, content do experiences have? What kind of mental states are they? Many, if not most philosophers of perception today agree that experiences have representational contents of the form x is F, where x ranges over material objects and F over sensible properties. I argue that such a ‘naive semantics’ for experiences has to give the wrong answer to the second question. Because of their justificatory role for, and inferential integration into, a subject’s belief system, experiences themselves have to be construed as a kind of belief. I also sketch a semantics that allows experiences to be beliefs. Pdf
Goldman, Alan H. (1981). Epistemology and the psychology of perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (January):43-51.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Goldman, Alan H. (2004). Epistemological foundations: Can experiences justify beliefs? American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):273-285.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Goldman, Alvin (1976). Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.   (Cited by 155 | Google | More links | Edit)
Green, Mitchell S. (2005). "You perceive with your mind": Knowledge and perception. In D. Darby and T. Shelby (ed.), Hip Hop and Philosophy. Open Court.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: A major theme in rap lyrics is that the only way to survive is to use your head, be aware, know what’s going on around you. That simple idea packs a lot of background. The most obvious ideas about knowledge turn out if you look at them close up to be pretty questionable. For example: How do we get knowledge about the world? A natural and ancient answer to this question is that much if not all of our knowledge comes from our senses. So for example the nose gives us knowledge of what things smell like, and if all goes well, also indicates whether the thing we’re smelling is healthy, tasty, or noxious. Likewise, the eyes tell us the color and shape of things, and thereby give us information about whether those things are useful, dangerous, and so on. Like everybody else, rappers know all this. Or do they? Maybe some rappers know that this isn’t really so
Gupta, A. (2006). Empiricism and Experience. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)
Gupta, A. (2006). Experience and knowledge. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)
Gupta, K. C. (1953). Sense-data and judgment in perceptual knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 25 (January):243-249.   (Google | Edit)
Hall, Everett W. (1943). Perception as fact and as knowledge. Philosophical Review 52 (September):468-489.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)
Hall, Richard J. (1978). Criticism and revision of Chisholm's epistemic principle for perception. Philosophia 7 (July):477-488.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Haller, Rudolf (1974). Perception and inferences. Ajatus 36:166-177.   (Google | Edit)
Hocutt, Max O. (1968). The difference between the psychology and the epistemology of perception. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 17:61-81.   (Google | Edit)
Holman, Emmett L. (1975). Sensory experience, epistemic evaluation and perceptual knowledge. Philosophical Studies 28 (September):173-187.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Hurley, Susan L. (2001). Overintellectualizing the mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):423-431.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Hutten, Ernest H. (1947). Perception and knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 44 (February):85-96.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Hyman, John (2003). The evidence of our senses. In Strawson and Kant. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google | Edit)
Jacob, Pierre (online). Seeing, perceiving, and knowing.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Johnson, David Martel (1971). A formulation model of perceptual knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (January):54-62.   (Google | Edit)
Langsam, Harold (2006). Why I believe in an external world. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):652-672.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Laurier, Daniel (2004). Reasons, contents, and experiences. Disputatio 1 (17).   (Google | More links | Edit)
Lee, Harold N. (1964). Perception and epistemology. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 13:27-43.   (Google | Edit)
Locke, Don (1967). Perception And Our Knowledge Of The External World. Ny: Humanities Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)
Lyons, Jack C. (online). Experience, evidence, and externalism.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: Can anything other than a belief confer epistemic justification on a belief? In particular, can nondoxastic experiential