MindPapers: 3.6a. Perception and Thought

Boas, George (1952). The perceptual element in cognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (June):486-494. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1977). Perception, belief, and the structure of physical objects and consciousness. Synthese 35 (3). (Cited by 24 | Google | More links | Edit)

Creighton, J. E. (1906). Experience and thought. Philosophical Review 15 (5):482-493. (Google | More links | Edit)

Crumley II, Jack S. (1991). Appearances can be deceiving. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):233-251. (Google | Edit)

Daniels, Charles B. (1988). Perception, thought, and reality. Noûs 22 (September):455-464. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Dummett, Michael (1990). Thought and perception: The views of two philosophical innovators. In The Analytic Tradition: Philosophical Quarterly Monographs, Volume 1. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Glüer, Kathrin (2004). On perceiving that. Theoria 70 (2-3):197-212. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Leighton, Joseph A. (1906). Cognitive thought and 'immediate' experience. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (7):174-180. (Google | More links | Edit)

Locke, Don (1968). Perceiving and thinking, part I. Aristotelian Society 173:173-190. (Google | Edit)

Lyons, Jack C. (2005). Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte- mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer- ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of ‘looks’. A standard view is that ‘‘how things look’’, in this epistemically significant sense, is a matter of one’s present perceptual phenomenology, of what nondoxastic experiential state one is in. On this standard view, these experiential states (a) determine which of my beliefs are perceptual beliefs and (b) are centrally involved in justifying these beliefs

McClure, M. T. (1916). Perception and thinking. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (13):345-354. (Google | More links | Edit)

Nes, S. Anders (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford University. Dissertation, Oxford University (Google | Edit)

Noë, Alva (1999). Thought and experience. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):257-65. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Pendlebury, Michael J. (1999). Sensibility and understanding in perceptual judgments. South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):356-369. (Google | Edit)

Pryor, James (online). An epistemic theory of acquaintance. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: For example, suppose you believe squirrels can live an extremely long time, like parrots and tortoises. You think to yourself, “The oldest mammal in this town is probably a squirrel.” Contrast that case to:

(2b) believing some animal you see—an animal that happens to be the oldest mammal in
town—to be a squirrel

I said there’s a philosophically important diﬀerence between the (a) examples and the (b) examples. In fact these examples illustrate more than one diﬀerence. Let’s try to disentangle the diﬀerent diﬀerences

Quillen, Keith (1989). Perceptual belief and psychological explanation. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (July):276-293. (Google | More links | Edit)

Quinton, Anthony M. (1968). Perceiving and thinking, part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 191:191-208. (Google | Edit)

Sabine, George H. (1907). The concreteness of thought. Philosophical Review 16 (2):154-169. (Google | More links | Edit)

Stroud, Barry G. (2002). Sense-experience and the grounding of thought. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge. (Cited by 15 | Google | Edit)

Teschner, George (1981). The undifferentiated conjunction of sensation and judgment in perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):119-122. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Tolhurst, William E. (1998). Seemings. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):293-302. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Wieman, Henry N. (1943). Perception and cognition. Journal of Philosophy 40 (February):73-77. (Google | More links | Edit)

2.1d	Beliefs

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