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3.6c. Perceptual Qualities, Misc (Perceptual Qualities, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Blatti, Stephan (2006). No Impediment to Solidity as Impediment. Metaphysica 7 (1):35-41.   (Google)
Abstract: ABSTRACT: Quassim Cassam (1997) accepts the standard account of solidity, according to which, if S feels x as solid, then S feels x as an imediment to his movement. Recently, Martin Fricke and Paul Snowdon (2003) have presented a battery of counter-examples designed to show that S may feel x as solid and as exerting a pressure that supports or facilitates his movement. In this note, I defend the standard account against Fricke and Snowdon’s attack. Integral to this defense is a distinction between two (sometimes overlapping) ways in which S may feel x as an impediment to his movement: as an influence on a movement state of S, or as an obstacle to the achievement of a goal that requires movement. After demonstrating the primacy of the former sense, I argue that Fricke and Snowdon’s counter-examples only undermine a version of the standard account that glosses ‘impediment’ as an obstacle to the achievement of a goal that requires movement.
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1933). Perceptual and memory perspectives. Journal of Philosophy 30 (12):309-330.   (Google | More links)
Broughton, Lynne M. (1981). Quine's 'quality space'. Dialectica 35:291-302.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1976). How Quine perceives perceptual similarity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (June):251-255.   (Google)
Clement, W. C. (1956). Quality orders. Mind 65 (April):184-199.   (Google | More links)
Egan, Andy (2006). Appearance properties? Noûs 40 (3):495-521.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined by its representational content is very attractive. Unfortunately, it is in conflict with some quite robust intuitions about the possibility of phenomenal spectrum inversion without misrepresentation. Faced with such a problem, there are the usual three options: reject intentionalism, discount the intuitions and deny that spectrum inversion without misrepresentation is possible, or find a way to reconcile the two by dissolving the apparent conflict. Sydney Shoemaker's (1994) introduction of appearance properties is a particularly ingenious way of pursuing the third strategy, by maintaining that there is a representational difference between the phenomenally spectrum-inverted subjects.2 In introducing appearance properties, Shoemaker does two things: he identifies a theoretical role for some family of properties to play, and he suggests a family of properties as candidates to play that role. I'll argue that his proposed candidates do not play the role as well as we would like, suggest some new candidates, and argue that they do a better job
Goldman, Alan H. (1975). Criteriological arguments in perception. Mind 84 (January):102-105.   (Google | More links)
Hacker, P. M. S. (1991). Appearance and Reality: A Philosophical Investigation Into Perception and Perceptual Qualities. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (1973). Do material things have non-physical properties? Personalist 54:105-110.   (Google)
O'Callaghan, Casey (ms). Pitch.   (Google)
Abstract: Some sounds have pitch, some do not. A tuba’s notes are lower pitched than a flute’s, but the fuzz from an untuned radio has no discernible pitch. Pitch is an attribute in virtue of which sounds that possess it can be ordered from “low” to “high”. Given how audition works, physics has taught us that frequency determines what pitch a sound auditorily appears to have
O'Callaghan, Casey (ms). The argument from vacuums.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A commonly shared assumption is that there are no sounds in vacuums. If the standard science-based view that sounds are waves that exist in and travel through a medium such as air or water is correct, then vacuums hold no sounds and the shared assumption is true. Recently, however, several philosophers (Pasnau 1999, 2000; Casati and Dokic 1994) have argued against the received view. These authors have claimed, primarily on perceptual grounds, that sounds are properties of their sources (Pasnau 1999) or events located at their sources. According to Pasnau (1999), sounds are either identical with or supervene upon the the vibrations of objects ordinarily thought to make or produce sounds. For Casati and Dokic (1994), sounds are events constituted by such vibrations. These views share the consequence that sounds can exist in vacuums; sounds occur when an object vibrates alone in the absence of a surrounding medium. I do not wish here to directly engage the debate over whether sounds are properties or events in the medium or in the sources. Instead, I wish to indirectly address it by urging that the question of whether there could be sounds in vacuums should be decided neither by simply consulting common sense nor by reading off the consequences of one’s favorite metaphysical theory of sounds. I argue that even independent of explicit theoretical commitments concerning the nature of
Pluhar, Evelyn Begley (1987). The perceptual and physical worlds. Philosophical Studies 31:228-240.   (Google)