Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
updated 2008-05-15
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
click here for help on how to search
 

Perception :: Perceptual Qualities

3.7a Color

See also: 1.3a. The Knowledge Argument, 1.7a. Qualia, General, 1.7d. The Inverted Spectrum, 3.3b. The Representation of Color, 3.7b. Sound, 3.7c. Discriminability, 3.7d. Primary and Secondary Qualities, 3.7e. Perceptual Qualities, Misc.

Akins, Kathleen & Hahn, Martin (2000). The peculiarity of color. In Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Albahari, Miri (1999). Objective colours and evolutionary value: A reply to Dedrick. Dialogue 38:99-108. (Google)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1952). Colors as universals. Philosophical Review 61 (July):377-381. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1954). The last word on being red and blue all over. Philosophical Studies 5:5-10. (Google)
Allen, Keith (online). Revelation and the nature of colour. (Google)
Allen, Keith (2007). The mind-independence of colour. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):137–158. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Arbini, Ronald (1963). Frederick Ferre on colour incompatibility. Mind 72 (October):586-590. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Armstrong, David M. (1969). Colour realism and the argument from microscopes. In R. Brown & C. D. Rollins (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. Humanities Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1993). Reply to Campbell. In John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Arstila, V. (2003). True colors, false theories. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):41-61. (Google | More links)
Austin, James W. (1980). Wittgenstein's solutions to the color exclusion problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (September-December):142-149. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Averill, Edward W. (1985). Color and the anthropocentric problem. Journal of Philosophy 82 (June):281-303. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Averill, Edward W. (2005). Toward a projectivist account of color. Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):217-34. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Averill, Edward W. (1992). The relational nature of color. Philosophical Review 101 (3):551-88. (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Averill, Edward W. (1980). Why are colour terms primarily used as adjectives? Philosophical Quarterly 30 (January):19-33. (Google | More links)
Batty, Clare (manuscript). Naive color. (Google)
Bigelow, John C. & J., Pargetter (1990). Colouring in the world. Mind 99 (394):279-88. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. & Velleman, J. David (1989). Color as a secondary quality. Mind 98 (January):81-103. (Cited by 148 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. & Velleman, J. David (1991). Physicalist theories of color. Philosophical Review 100 (January):67-106. (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (2002). Seeking the real. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):223-38. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bradley, Peter & Tye, Michael (2001). Of colors, kestrels, caterpillars, and leaves. Journal Of Philosophy 98 (9):469-487. (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Brenner, William H. (1987). Brownish-yellow' and 'reddish-green. Philosophical Investigations 10 (July):200-211. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brewer, Bill (2004). Stroud's Quest for reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):408-414. (Google | More links)
Broackes, Justin (2007). Colour, world and archimedean metaphysics: Stroud and the Quest for reality. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):27-71. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Broackes, Justin (1992). The autonomy of colour. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 73 | Google)
Broackes, Justin (1997). The Nature of Colour. Routledge. (Google)
Brown, D. H. (2006). On the dual referent approach to colour theory. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):96-113. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Buckner, D. K. (1986). Transparently false: Reply to Hardin. Analysis 46 (March):86-87. (Google)
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (1997). Colors and reflectances. In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press. (Cited by 65 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (2003). Color and similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):641-65. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (2006). Color and the mind-body problem. Dialectica 60 (2):223-44. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (2006). Comments on Cohen, mizrahi, Maund, and Levine. Dialectica 60:223-44. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (2006). Color primitivism. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (2003). Color realism and color science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21. (Cited by 71 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (2001). Do colors look like dispositions? Reply to Langsam and others. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238-245. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (2004). Hardin, Tye, and color physicalism. Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):37-43. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (forthcoming). Philosophical issues about colour vision. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan. (Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (1997). Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press. (Cited by 36 | Google)
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (1997). Readings on Color, Volume 2: The Science of Color. MIT Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (2007). Truest blue. Analysis 67 (1):87-92. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (2002). Yes, Virginia, Lemons are yellow. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):213-22. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Campbell, John (1993). A simple view of colour. In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. Oup. (Cited by 41 | Google)
Campbell, John (2006). Manipulating colour. In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oup. (Google | More links)
Campbell, John (2006). Manipulating colour: Pounding an Almond. In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oup. (Google | More links)
Campbell, K. (1969). Colours. In R. Brown & C. D. Rollins (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. Humanities Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Campbell, K. (1993). David Armstrong and realism about colour. In John Bacon, K. Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Campbell, K. (1982). The implications of land's theory of colour vision. In L. Jonathan Cohen (ed.), Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Elsevier. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Carlson, Elof A. (2002). Color perception: An ongoing convergence of reductionism and phenomenology. In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol LXXVII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub. (Google)
Casati, Roberto (1993). Colour predicates and vagueness. Acta Analytica 10 (10):129-134. (Google)
Clark, Austen (1996). True theories, false colors. Philosophy of Science (Supplement) 63 (3):143-50. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (online). A guided tour of color. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (2003). Barry Stroud, the Quest for reality: Subjectivism and the metaphysics of colour. Noûs 37 (3):537-554. (Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (forthcoming). Color. In John Symons & P. Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (2003). Color: A functionalist proposal. Philosophical Studies 113 (1):1-42. (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (2006). Color and perceptual variation revisited: Unknown facts, alien modalities, and perfect psychosemantics. Dialectica 60 (3):307-319. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (manuscript). Color constancy as counterfactual. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (forthcoming). Colors, functions, realizers, and roles. Philosophical Topics. (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (2004). Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalist manifesto. Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (2006). Color, variation, and the appeal to essences: Impasse and resolution. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):425-438. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (online). It's not easy being green: Hardin and color relationalism. (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (2003). On the structural properties of the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):78-95. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (2003). Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26:25-26. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (2001). Subjectivism, physicalism or none of the above? Comments on Ross's The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):94-104. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan; Hardin, C. L. & McLaughlin, Brian P. (2006). True colours. Analysis 66 (4):335-340. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (2001). Two recent anthologies on color. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):118-122. (Google)
Cummins, Robert E. (1978). The missing shade of blue. Philosophical Review 87 (October):548-565. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Davis, Steven (ed.) (2000). Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)
de Anna, G. (2002). The simple view of colour and the reference of perceptual terms. Philosophy 77 (299):87-108. (Google)
Dedrick, Don (1996). Can color be reduced to anything? Philosophy of Science Supplement 3 (3):134-42. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Dedrick, Don (1995). Objectivism and the evolutionary value of color vision. Dialogue 34 (1):35-44. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dwyer, Philip (2002). Stroud, colour, and metaphysical satisfaction. Dialogue 41 (3):569-587. (Google)
Edwards, J. (2003). A reply to de Anna on the simple view of colour. Philosophy 78 (303):99-114. (Google | More links)
Eilan, Naomi M. (manuscript). On the reality of color. (Google)
Ellis, Jonathan (2006). Color, error, and explanatory power. Dialectica 60 (2):171-179. (Google | More links)
Ellis, Jonathan (2005). Colour irrealism and the formation of colour concepts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):53-73. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Fogelin, Robert J. (2004). Stroud's Quest for reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):401-407. (Google | More links)
Foster, D. (2003). Does colour constancy exist? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7:439-443. (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Foti, Veronique M. (1990). The dimension of color. International Studies in Philosophy 22:13-28. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Franklin, C. L. (1894). Professor Ebbinghaus' theory of colour vision. Mind 3 (9):98-104. (Google | More links)