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3.7b. Dispositionalist Theories of Color (Dispositionalist Theories of Color on PhilPapers)

Allen, Keith (2009). Being coloured and looking coloured. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 647-670.   (Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. & Velleman, J. David (1989). Color as a secondary quality. Mind 98 (January):81-103.   (Cited by 148 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (2001). Do colors look like dispositions? Reply to Langsam and others. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238-245.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Cohen, Jonathan (2003). Color: A functionalist proposal. Philosophical Studies 113 (1):1-42.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this paper I propose and defend an account of color that I call color functionalism. I argue that functionalism is a non-traditional species of primary quality theory, and that it accommodates our intuitions about color and the facts of color science better than more widely discussed alternatives
Gluer, Kathrin (forthcoming). Colors Without Circles? In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Theories of Color Perception. Kluwer.   (Google)
Abstract: The dispute between realists about color and anti-realists is actually a dispute about the
nature of color properties. The disputants do not disagree over what material objects are
like. Rather, they disagree over whether any of the uncontroversial facts about material
objects – their powers to cause visual experiences, their dispositions to reflect incident
light, their atomic makeup, and so on – amount to their having colors. The disagreement
is thus about which properties colors are and, in particular, whether colors are any of the
properties in a particular set that is acknowledged on both sides to exhaust the properties
of material objects (1991, 67)
Glüer, Kathrin (2007). Colors without circles? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):107--131.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts
Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin (2007). Colors without circles? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):107-131.   (Google)
Abstract: forthcoming in Theories of Color Perception, ed. R. Schumacher, special issue of Erkenntnis 2007
Gold, Ian (1999). Dispositions and the central problem of color. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):21-44.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Harvey, J. (2000). Colour-dispositionalism and its recent critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):137-156.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hardin, C. L. (1983). Colors, normal observers and standard conditions. Journal of Philosophy 80 (December):806-13.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Huettel, Scott (2003). In favor of an ecological account of color. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):33-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: B&H understate the difficulties facing their version of color realism. We doubt that they can fix reflectance types and magnitudes in a way that does not invoke relations to perceivers. B&HÂ’s account therefore resembles the dispositional or ecological accounts that they dismiss. This is a good thing, for a dispositional account is promising if understood in an ecological framework
Allen, Keith (2010). In defence of natural daylight. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):1-18.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Objects appear different as the illumination under which they are perceived varies. This fact is sometimes thought to pose a problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties: if a coloured object appears different under different illuminations, then under which illumination does the object appear the colour it really is? I argue that given the nature of natural daylight, and certain plausible assumptions about the nature of the colours it illuminates, there is a non-arbitrary reason to suppose that it is under natural daylight that we are able to perceive the real colours of objects
McGinn, Colin (1996). Another look at color. Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):537-53.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Miscevic, Nenad (2007). Is color-dispositionalism nasty and unecological? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article is a brief presentation and defense of response-dispositionalist intentionalism against a family of objections. The view claims that for a surface to have an objective stable color is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal-color experience. The objections, raised recently by M. Johnston, B. Stroud, and by Byrne and Hilbert, claim that any dispositionalist view is unfair to the naive perceiver-thinker, saddles her with massive error and represents her as maladaptated to her environment. The paper reconstructs the main line of thought in favor of response-intentionalism and argues that it is in fact rather charitable and fair to naïve cognizers, and also avoids a cluster of related objections
Peacocke, Christopher (1984). Colour concepts and colour experience. Synthese 58 (March):365-82.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Pitson, Tony (1997). The dispositional account of colour. Philosophia 25 (1-4):247-266.   (Google | More links)
Stroud, Barry G. (2007). Dispositional theories of the colours of things. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dispositional theories of the colours of objects identify an object’s having a certain colour with its being such that it would produce perceptions of certain kinds in perceivers of certain kinds under certain specified conditions. Without doubting that objects have dispositions to produce perceptions of certain kinds, this paper questions whether the relevant kinds of perceptions, perceivers, and conditions can be specified in a way that (i) does not rely on acceptance of any objects as being coloured in a non-dispositional sense and (ii) secures the necessity of the identity between an object’s having the disposition so specified and its having the colour in question. Accepting any theory that looked as if it succeeded on both these counts would require an explanation of why a parallel identity does not hold for an object’s disposition to produce, e.g., perceptions of shape
Stroud, Barry G. (2004). Unmasking and dispositionalism: Reply to mark Johnston. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):202-212.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Swartz, Robert J. (1967). Color concepts and dispositions. Synthese 17 (June):202-222.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Thompson, Evan; Palacios, A. & Varela, F. J. (1992). Ways of coloring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.   (Cited by 142 | Google)