MindPapers: 3.7b. Sound

Coval, Sam C. (1963). Persons and sounds. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):26-32. (Google | More links | Edit)

Locke, Don (1961). Strawson's auditory universe. Philosophical Review 70 (October):518-532. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Muldoon, Mark S. (1996). Silence revisited: Taking the sight out of auditory qualities. Review of Metaphysics 50 (2):275-298. (Google | Edit)

Nudds, Matthew (online). Auditory perception and sounds. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: It is a commonly held view that auditory perception functions to tell us about sounds and their properties. In this paper I argue that this common view is mistaken and that auditory perception functions to tell us about the objects that are the sources of sounds. In doing so, I provide a general theory of auditory perception and use it to give an account of the content of auditory experience and of the nature of sounds

Nudds, Matthew (2001). Experiencing the production of sounds. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):210-229. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Whether or not we would be happy to do without sounds, the idea that our expe- rience of sounds is of things which are distinct from the world of material objects can seem compelling. All you have to do to confirm it is close your eyes and reflect on the character of your auditory experience

O'Callaghan, Casey (2007). Echoes. The Monist 90. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Suppose you are at a ﬁreworks display. You stand in an open ﬁeld with a single brick building behind you. A colorful bomb’s recognizable boom follows on the heels of its visual burst, but a moment later the boom’s echo sounds at the brick wall behind the ﬁeld. You have just heard a primary sound followed by its echo

O'Callaghan, Casey (ms). Pitch. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Some sounds have pitch, some do not. A tuba’s notes are lower pitched than a ﬂute’s, but the fuzz from an untuned radio has no discernible pitch. Pitch is an attribute in virtue of which sounds that possess it can be ordered from “low” to “high”. Given how audition works, physics has taught us that frequency determines what pitch a sound auditorily appears to have

O'Callaghan, Casey (forthcoming). Perceiving the locations of sounds. European Review of Philosophy ( 7. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Frequently, we learn of the locations of things and events in our environment by means of hearing. Hearing, I argue, is a locational mode of perceiving with a robustly spatial nature. I defend three proposals. First, audition furnishes information about the locations of things and events in one's environment because auditory experience itself is spatial. Audition represents space. Second, we hear the locations of things and events by or in hearing locational information about their sounds. Third, we auditorily experience sounds themselves as having relatively stable distal locations. I reject skepticism about spatial audition tracing to Strawson's Individuals, and suggest that spatial audition supports the view that audition and vision share a dimension of perceptual content

O'Callaghan, Casey (web). Sounds. In Timothy J. Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oup. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Chapter 3 The locations of sounds 3.1 Where are sounds? 3.2 Locational hearing 3.3 Located sounds 3.4 ‘Coming from’ 3.5 Sounds without locations? 3.6 Locatedness and the metaphysics of sounds 3.7 The durations of sounds

O'Callaghan, Casey (ms). Sounds and events. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: I argue that sounds are best conceived not as pressure waves that travel through a medium, nor as physical properties of the objects ordinarily thought to be the sources of sounds, but rather as events of a certain kind. Sounds are particular events in which a surrounding medium is disturbed or set into wavelike motion by the activities of a body or interacting bodies. This Event View of sounds provides for a uni- ﬁed perceptual account of several pervasive sound phenomena, including transmission through barriers, constructive and destructive interference, and echoes

O'Callaghan, Casey (ms). The argument from vacuums. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: A commonly shared assumption is that there are no sounds in vacuums. If the standard science-based view that sounds are waves that exist in and travel through a medium such as air or water is correct, then vacuums hold no sounds and the shared assumption is true. Recently, however, several philosophers (Pasnau 1999, 2000; Casati and Dokic 1994) have argued against the received view. These authors have claimed, primarily on perceptual grounds, that sounds are properties of their sources (Pasnau 1999) or events located at their sources. According to Pasnau (1999), sounds are either identical with or supervene upon the the vibrations of objects ordinarily thought to make or produce sounds. For Casati and Dokic (1994), sounds are events constituted by such vibrations. These views share the consequence that sounds can exist in vacuums; sounds occur when an object vibrates alone in the absence of a surrounding medium. I do not wish here to directly engage the debate over whether sounds are properties or events in the medium or in the sources. Instead, I wish to indirectly address it by urging that the question of whether there could be sounds in vacuums should be decided neither by simply consulting common sense nor by reading oﬀ the consequences of one’s favorite metaphysical theory of sounds. I argue that even independent of explicit theoretical commitments concerning the nature of

O'Callaghan, Casey (ms). The locations of sounds. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: When you hear the sound of a car drive by on the street outside your window, you learn not only whether the car has a hole in its muﬄer or has squealing brakes. You also learn something about the location of the car because hearing furnishes information about the locations of its objects. By listening, you learn not only about the character of the things and happenings around you, but also about where they are in the surrounding environment. The question I wish to address is this: Do we hear the locations of sounds themselves, or do we merely hear the locations of sound sources—the objects and events that produce sounds? I shall argue that frequently we do hear the locations of sounds themselves, and that this is required in order to hear and learn the locations of sound-producing sources. This feature of auditory experience has consequences for the metaphysics of sounds. If we veridically hear the locations of sounds, then the most prominent conception of sounds is mistaken and we must revise our ontology

O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1957). The location of sound. Mind 66 (October):471-490. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Pasnau, Robert (2000). Sensible qualities: The case of sound. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):27-40. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | Edit)

Pasnau, Robert (1999). What is sound? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):309-24. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Rosenberg, Jay F. (1978). On Strawson: Sounds, skepticism, and necessity. Philosophia 8 (November):405-419. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

3.7a	Color [275]

3.7b	Sound [16]

Search tips