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3.7d. Theories of Color, Misc (Theories of Color, Misc on PhilPapers)

Allen, Keith (2007). The mind-independence of colour. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):137–158.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Averill, Edward W. (1992). The relational nature of color. Philosophical Review 101 (3):551-88.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Brogaard, Berit, Color by.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The nature of the colors—what they are like, whether they are instantiated by objects or are projected by our minds, whether their nature is revealed to us in color perception, and whether there could be alien colors (e.g. reddish-green)—has been one of the central topics in philosophy for centuries. This entry focuses on the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of the colors
Brown, D. H. (2006). On the dual referent approach to colour theory. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):96-113.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brogaard, Berit, Perspectival truth and color perception.   (Google)
Abstract: Perspectivalism is a semantic theory according to which the contents of utterances and mental states (perhaps of a particular kind) have a truth-value only relative to a particular perspective (or standard) determined by the context of the speaker or bearer of the mental state. I have defended this view for epistemic terms, moral terms and predicates of personal taste elsewhere (Brogaard 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming). The main aim of this paper is to defend perspectivalism about color perception and color discourse. The content of color perception and color discourse, I will argue, has a truth-value only relative to a centered world containing an appropriate viewing condition and the perceiver, or a perceiver that is deferred to. Some may object to the underlying assumption that perceptual experiences have truth-evaluable contents. Representationalists typically treat perceptual experiences as propositional attitudes with full-blown or non-deflationary propositional contents (Russellian, Fregean or possible-worlds contents). But the assumption that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes has been explicitly denied by numerous others. For example, direct realists hold that good perceptual experiences are relations to objects. Accordingly, good perceptual experiences do not have full-blown truth-evaluable contents. Sense-data theorists hold that perceptual experiences are relations to sense-data. Consequently, no perceptual experience has full-blown truth-evaluable content. Adverbialists deny that experiences are relations to objects or properties. Perceiving R is engaging in the activity of perceiving R- wise. For example, one has an experience as of R being red just in case one is engaged in the activity of perceiving red-ly and R-wise. So, adverbialists too deny that perceptual experiences have full-blown truth-evaluable contents. Raw feel theorists equate perceptual..
Broackes, Justin (2010). What do the colour-blind see? In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press.   (Google)
Byrne, Alex (2006). Comments on Cohen, mizrahi, Maund, and Levine. Dialectica 60:223-44.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Byrne, Alex (ms). Colour vision, philosophical issues about.   (Google)
Abstract: The primary issues concern whether objects have colours, and what sorts of properties the colours are. Some philosophers hold that nothing is coloured, others that colour are powers to affect perceivers, and others that colours are physical properties
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (forthcoming). Philosophical issues about colour vision. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The primary issues concern whether objects have colours, and what sorts of properties the colours are. Some philosophers hold that nothing is coloured, others that colour are powers to affect perceivers, and others that colours are physical properties
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (1997). Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Clark, Austen (1998). Color perception (in 3000 words). In George Graham & William Bechtel (eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science. Blackwell.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A neighbor who strikes it rich evokes both admiration and envy, and a similar mix of emotions must be aroused in many neighborhoods of cognitive science when the residents look at the results of research in color perception. It provides what is probably the most widely acknowledged success story of any domain of scientific psychology: the success, against all expectation, of the opponent process theory of color perception. Initially proposed by a Ewald Hering, a nineteenth century physiologist, it drew its inspiration from the existence of opposing muscle groups. Hering thought that analogous opposing processes could explain some aspects of color perception, but the resulting theory was more complicated and less intuitive than that proposed by the great Hermann von Helmholtz. Helmholtz carried his day, but in the long run Hering turned out to be right
Cohen, Jonathan (online). A guided tour of color. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most salient facts about our experience of the world is that objects appear to have colors. This feature of our experience is both striking and pervasive. Indeed, representations of colors of objects are among the most notable deliverances of the visual modality, which is perhaps our most important source of information about the world. For this reason, among others, questions about the nature of color have crucial significance for a variety of philosophical subjects including perception, ontology, epistemology, semantics, and philosophy of mind. But the nature of color is a fascinating philosophical topic in its own right, and there has been a significant increase in the philosophical attention paid to this matter in recent years. In this essay I'll survey some of the main views about the nature of color in the contemporary literature and attempt to lay out some of the arguments that have been used to support or reject various of these accounts
Cohen, Jonathan (2007). A relationalist's guide to error about color perception. Noûs 41 (2):335–353.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations to perceiving subjects. Among its explanatory virtues, relation- alism provides a satisfying treatment of cases of perceptual variation. But it can seem that relationalists lack resources for saying that a representa- tion of x’s color is erroneous. Surely, though, a theory of color that makes errors of color perception impossible cannot be correct. In this paper I’ll argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, relationalism contains the resources to account for errors of color perception. I’ll conclude that worries about making room for error are worries the relationalist can meet
Cohen, Jonathan (web). Color. In John Symons & P. Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Questions about the ontology of color matter because colors matter. Colors are (or, at least, appear to be) extremely pervasive and salient features of the world. Moreover, people care about the distribution of these features: they expend money and effort to paint their houses, cars, and other possessions, and their clear preference for polychromatic over monochromatic televisions and computer monitors have consigned monochromatic models to the status of rare antiques. The apparent ubiquity of colors and their importance to our lives makes them a ripe target for ontological questions such as the following:
• What is the nature of colors?
• Are they, as they seem to be, properties of objects?
Cohen, Jonathan (2003). Color: A functionalist proposal. Philosophical Studies 113 (1):1-42.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   In this paper I propose and defend an account of color that I call color functionalism. I argue that functionalism is a non-traditional species of primary quality theory, and that it accommodates our intuitions about color and the facts of color science better than more widely discussed alternatives
Cohen, Jonathan (2008). Colour constancy as counterfactual. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy. [Swift 1711: 258] In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, and defend it from objections. Finally, I show why, on this improved understanding, colour constancy does not have the philosophical consequences that have been claimed for it in the literature
Cohen, Jonathan & Matthen, Mohan (eds.) (2010). Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press.   (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (2004). Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalist manifesto. Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Are colors relational or non-relational properties of their bearers? Is red a property that is instantiated by all and only the objects with a certain intrinsic (/non-relational) nature? Or does an object with a particular intrinsic (/non-relational) nature count as red only in virtue of standing in certain relations - for example, only when it looks a certain way to a certain perceiver, or only in certain circumstances of observation? In this paper I shall argue for the view that color properties are relational (henceforth, relationalism), and against the view that colors are not relational (henceforth, anti- or non-relationalism)
Cohen, Jonathan, Color relationalism and color phenomenology.   (Google)
Abstract: Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between subjects and objects. The most historically important form of color relationalism is the classic dispositionalist view according to which, for example red is the disposition to look red to standard observers in standard conditions (mutatis mutandis for other colors).1 However, it has become increasingly apparent in recent years that a commitment to the relationality of colors bears interest that goes beyond dispositionalism (Cohen, 2004; Matthen, 1999, 2001, 2005; Thompson, 1995). Accordingly, it is an important project for those interested in the metaphysics of color to sort through and assess different forms of color relationalism. There is, however, a powerful and general cluster of objections that has been thought by many to amount to a decisive refutation of any and all forms of color relationalism. Although this idea has been developed in a number of ways, the basic thought is that relationalism — qua theory of color — is at odds with the manifest evidence of color phenomenology, and that this clash between theory and data should be resolved by giving up the theory
Cohen, Jonathan (online). It's not easy being green: Hardin and color relationalism.   (Google)
Abstract: But Hardin hasn’t contented himself with reframing traditional philosoph- ical issues about color in a way that is sensitive to relevant empirical con- straints. In addition, he has been a staunch defender of color eliminativism — the view that there are no colors, qua properties of tables, chairs, and other mind-external objects, and a vociferous critic of several varieties of re- alism about color that have been defended by others (e.g., [Hardin, 2003], [Hardin, 2005]). These other views include the so-called color physical- ism of [Hilbert, 1987], [Byrne and Hilbert, 1997a], [Byrne and Hilbert, 2003], and [Tye, 2000],1 and, inconveniently, even the relationalist view defended in [Cohen, 2003a], [Cohen, 2004a], [Cohen, 2003b], [McLaughlin, 2003], and [Jakab and McLaughlin, 2003]
Cohen, Jonathan (2003). On the structural properties of the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):78-95.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Primary quality theories of color claim that colors are intrinsic, objective, mind-independent properties of external objects — that colors, like size and shape, are examples of the sort of properties moderns such as Boyle and Locke called primary qualities of body.1 Primary quality theories have long been seen as one of the main philosophical options for understanding the nature of color
Cohen, Jonathan; Hardin, C. L. & McLaughlin, Brian P. (2006). True colours. Analysis 66 (292):335-340.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (Tye 2006) presents us with the following scenario: John and Jane are both stan- dard human visual perceivers (according to the Ishihara test or the Farnsworth test, for example) viewing the same surface of Munsell chip 527 in standard conditions of visual observation. The surface of the chip looks “true blue” to John (i.e., it looks blue not tinged with any other colour to John), and blue tinged with green to Jane.1 Tye then in effect poses a multiple choice question
Cohen, Jonathan (2001). Two recent anthologies on color. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):118-122.   (Google)
Abstract: Although philosophers have puzzled about color for millennia, the recent explosion in philosophical interest in the topic can largely be traced to C. L. Hardin’s widely-read and deservedly-praised Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow [Hardin, 1988]. While Hardin has had no more than the usual, limited success in convincing other philosophers to adopt the substance of his views, he has been quite influential about a point of philosophical methodology: he has convinced many that responsible philosophical work on color simply must make contact with the vast body of empirical color science, and thereby has effected an enormous (and to my mind, extremely salutary) change in the terms of recent philosophical discussion of color.1 Indeed, writers have been so eager to take Hardin’s lesson on board that one is hard-pressed to find a recent philosophical book on color that does not acknowledge it, crediting Hardin by name
Hardin, C. L. (1988). Color for Philosophers. Hackett.   (Cited by 383 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hazlett, Allan & Averill, Edward Wilson (forthcoming). A problem for relational theories of color. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: We argue that relationalism entails an unacceptable claim about the content of visual experience: that ordinary ‘red’ objects look like they look like the look like they’re red, etc
Hilbert, David R. (1987). Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism. CSLI Press.   (Cited by 94 | Google)
Hilbert, David R. & Kalderon, Mark Eli (2000). Color and the inverted spectrum. In Steven Davis (ed.), Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Abstract: If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance)
Hilbert, David R. (online). Theories of colour.   (Google)
Abstract: The world as perceived by human beings is full of colour. The world as described by physical scientists is composed of colourless particles and fields. Philosophical theories of colour since the scientific revolution have been primarily driven by a desire to harmonize these two apparently conflicting pictures of the world. Any adequate theory of colour has to be consistent with the characteristics of colour as perceived without contradicting the deliverances of the physical sciences. Given this conception of the aim of a theory of colour, there are three possibilities for resolving the apparent conflict between the scientific and perceptual facts. The first possibility is to deny that physical objects have colours. Theories of this kind admit that objects appear coloured but maintain that these appearances are misleading. The conflict is resolved by removing colour from the external world. Second, it might be that colour is a relational property. For an object to possess a particular colour it must be related in the right way to a perceiver. One common version of this view analyzes colour as a disposition to cause particular kinds of perceptual experiences in a human being. Since the physical sciences deal only with the intrinsic properties of physical objects and their relations to other physical objects and not their relations to perceiving subjects, the possibility of conflict is removed. A third possible response to the conflict is to maintain that colour really is a property of external objects and that the conflict is merely apparent. Some theories of this form maintain that colour is identical to a physical property of objects. Others maintain that colour is a property that physical objects possess over and above all their physical
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properties. Philosophical discussions of colour typically take the form of either elaborating on one of these three possibilities or attempting to show more generally that one of these three types of responses is to be preferred to the others..
Kulvicki, John (2003). Hue magnitudes and revelation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.   (Google)
Abstract: Revelation, the thesis that the full intrinsic nature of colors is revealed to us by color experiences, is false in Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) view, but in an interesting and nonobvious way. I show what would make Revelation true, given B&H's account of colors, and then show why that situation fails to obtain, and why that is interesting
Matthen, Mohan P. (1999). The disunity of color. Philosophical Review 108 (1):47-84.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is color? What is color vision? Most philosophers answer by reference to humans: to human color qualia, or to the environmental properties or "quality spaces" perceived by humans. It is argued, with reference to empirical findings concerning comparative color vision and the evolution of color vision, that all such attempts are mistaken. An adequate definition of color vision must eschew reference to its outputs in the human cognition and refer only to inputs: color vision consists in the use of wavelength discrimination in the construction of visual representations. A color quality is one that is generated from such processing
Maund, Barry (online). Color. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Mizrahi, Vivian (2006). Color objectivism and color pluralism. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Most objectivist and dispositionalist theories of color have tried to resolve the challenge raised by color variations by drawing a distinction between real and apparent colors. This paper considers such a strategy to be fundamentally erroneous. The high degree of variability of colors constitutes a crucial feature of colors and color perception; it cannot be avoided without leaving aside the real nature of color. The objectivist theory of color defended in this paper holds that objects have locally many different objective colors. Most color variations are then real and result from the extreme richness of color properties.
Palmer, Stephen . (1999). Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relations among consciousness, brain, behavior, and scientific explanation are explored in the domain of color perception. Current scientific knowledge about color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories is used to assess Locke
Pautz, Adam (web). Colors. In Bayne, T., Cleeremans, A., Wilkins & P. (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: An overview of the main positions on color forthcoming in the Oxford Companion to Consciousness
Thompson, Evan (1995). Colour Vision. Routledge.   (Cited by 155 | Google | More links)
Thompson, Evan; Palacios, A. & Varela, F. J. (1992). Ways of coloring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.   (Cited by 142 | Google)
Westphal, Jonathan (1991). Colour: A Philosophical Introduction. Blackwell.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Zemplén, Gábor A. (2004). Newton's colour circle and Palmer's “normal” colour space. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):166-168.   (Google)
Abstract: Taking the real Newtonian colour circle – and not the one Palmer depicts as Newton's – we don't have to wait 300 years for Palmer to say no to the Lockean aperçu about the inverted spectrum. One of the aims of this historical detour is to show that one's commitment about the “topology” of the colour space greatly affects Palmer's argument