Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

3.7g. Color Terms (Color Terms on PhilPapers)

Averill, Edward W. (1980). Why are colour terms primarily used as adjectives? Philosophical Quarterly 30 (January):19-33.   (Google | More links)
Brown, D. H. (2006). On the dual referent approach to colour theory. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):96-113.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Casati, Roberto (1993). Colour predicates and vagueness. Acta Analytica 10 (10):129-134.   (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (2007). A relationalist's guide to error about color perception. Noûs 41 (2):335–353.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations to perceiving subjects. Among its explanatory virtues, relation- alism provides a satisfying treatment of cases of perceptual variation. But it can seem that relationalists lack resources for saying that a representa- tion of x’s color is erroneous. Surely, though, a theory of color that makes errors of color perception impossible cannot be correct. In this paper I’ll argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, relationalism contains the resources to account for errors of color perception. I’ll conclude that worries about making room for error are worries the relationalist can meet
Gold, Ian (1999). On Lewis on naming the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):365-370.   (Google | More links)
Hazen, A. P. (1999). On naming the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):224-231.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1997). Naming the colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):325-42.   (Cited by 54 | Google | More links)
Mizrahi, Vivian (2006). Color objectivism and color pluralism. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Most objectivist and dispositionalist theories of color have tried to resolve the challenge raised by color variations by drawing a distinction between real and apparent colors. This paper considers such a strategy to be fundamentally erroneous. The high degree of variability of colors constitutes a crucial feature of colors and color perception; it cannot be avoided without leaving aside the real nature of color. The objectivist theory of color defended in this paper holds that objects have locally many different objective colors. Most color variations are then real and result from the extreme richness of color properties.
Mizrahi, Vivian (2009). Is colour composition phenomenal? In D. Skusevich & P. Matikas (eds.), Color Perception: Physiology, Processes and Analysis. Nova Science Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: Most philosophical or scientific theories suppose that colour composition judgments refer to the way colours appear to us. The dominant view is therefore phenomenalist in the sense that colour composition is phenomenally given to perceivers. This paper argues that there is no evidence for a phenomenalist view of colour composition and that a conventionalist approach should be favoured.
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1997). The character of color predicates: A phenomenalist view. In M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. CSLI Press.   (Google)
Pilat, Robert (online). Colour names and the concepts of colours.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is growing body of knowledge about how humans and animals perceive col- ours; we may safely say that both physiology and physics of colour perception are becoming less and less mysterious. Still it doesn't help to solve a philosophical puzzle: What do exactly mean expressions like “perceived red” or “perceived green”? What do perceived colours refer to in the world? There are three problem fields I am touching on in this paper: (i) semantics of colour names, (ii) ontological status of colours, (iii) cognitive relevance of colours. I am trying to formulate onto- logical and epistemological assumptions for semantics of colour names. I am espe- cially focused on classical problem of objectivity of colours. While pursuing my task I am making some critical remarks about Wittgenstein's views on colours as formulated in “Tractatus” and modified in “Remarks on Colours”. I am using
Spohn, Wolfgang (1997). The character of color predicates: A materialist view. In M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. CSLI Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: where _x_ stands for a visible object and _y_ for a perceiving subject (the reference to a time may be neglected).1 I take here ”character” in the sense of Kaplan (1977) as substantiated by Haas-Spohn (1995 and Chapter 14 in this book)). The point of using Kaplan’s framework is simple, but of utmost importance: It provides a scheme for clearly separating epistemological and metaphysical issues, for specifying how the two domains are related, and for connecting them to questions concerning meaning where confusions are often only duplicated. All this is achieved by it better than by any alternative I know of.2
Srzednicki, D. J. (1962). Incompatibility statements. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (August):178-186.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Sutton, John (ms). Review of Don Dedrick, naming the Rainbow: Colour language, colour science, and culture.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By spotlighting the irreducible role of cognitive processes between biology and culture, this synthesis and critique of the universalist tradition in colour science offers a genuine starting-point for all future 'serious inquiry into the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of colour classification'